The rise to prominence of the Vātsiputriyas and especially the Sāṃmitīyas, two Buddhist sects noted for their defence of a “person” (pudgala) that cannot be said (avakatavya, avācyā) to be either the same or different from the constituents (skandha), is very likely to have aroused a heated controversy as regards the ontological status of the pudgala, the Buddha’s didactic intentions while referring to it as well as its soteriological relevance. Taking into consideration the fact that the Sāṃmitīyas had become, by the middle of the 7th century, the numerically most important among the Buddhist Śrāvakāyānist denominations, this controversy raises very interesting sociohistorical and methodological questions as regards the use of such categories as “orthodoxy” and “heterodoxy” in the Indian Buddhist context. And indeed, the anti-Personalist doctors showed no unanimity as to whether their Pudgalavādin opponents were co-religionists (svayāthya) or not, i.e. genuine Buddhists (bauddha) capable of obtaining the highest fruit of religious life, or rather pseudo-, purely nominal Buddhists (saugetatmanya) espousing the outsiders’ doctrines (antaścaratīrthika, “outsiders from within”). Extant Sanskrit and/or (translational) Tibetan literature records three

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(1) See Eltschinger 2010:292-293.
(2) MSAVbH 7si D163a1-4/P191b2-6, MAV 244,8, 286,12.
(3) AKV 699,4-5.
(4) TS 336, BCAP 329,1.
(5) BCAP 328,28.
(6) See Eltschinger 2010:293, fn. 8.
main testimonies concerning the pudgala controversy, all of which reflect the anti-Personalist side: (7) Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh), Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakavatāra (MAV 244.1-288,9) and Kamalaśīla’s commentary (Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, TSP 159,16-166,18/TSPK 125,16-131,9) on Śantarakṣita’s Tattvasaṅgraha (TS 336-349). Whereas the latter two have received comparatively little attention, (8) the so-called ninth chapter of the AKBh has been made the object of several editions, translations, summaries and studies. (9) However, probably due to both the institutional importance of the Śammitiyas and the doctrinal as well as soteriological relevance of the topic, the controversy over Personalism did attract the attention of several other outstanding Buddhist scholars, and it left traces in parts of their works. This is the case of the Mahāyānasūtraśāstra (MSA 18.92-103) and its Bhāṣya (MSABh 154.27-160.6), of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika (PVSV 147.2-148.5 and PV 2.202-204) and of Bhāviveka/Bhavya’s Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (MHK 3.90-93). (10) Now, these allegedly minor testimonies have remained either entirely neglected (MSA[Bh]) or largely unnoticed (PVSV/PV 2, MHK 3.90-93). This disdain is unjustified in at least two cases: the MSA(Bh) presents many interesting arguments, and although a number of them do not recur in Vasubandhu’s polemical tract, it is a likely source of AKBh 9; as for the PVSV, it presents us with an entirely new line of argument (that, however, left hardly any trace in subsequent epistemological literature). One of the two authors of this study has dealt with MSA(Bh) 18.92-103 elsewhere. (11) The present essay focuses on Dharmakīrti’s anti-Personalist arguments in PVSV 147.2-148.5.

The immediate context and doctrinal background of PVSV 147.2-148.5

To the best of our knowledge, Dharmakīrti alludes nowhere explicitly to the pudgala. How to make sure, then, that PVSV 147.2-148.5 is directed against the (or at least one version

(7) The ideas of the Pudgalavādins are known to us mainly through their opponents’ literature. On the literature of the Pudgalavādins themselves, see Venkata Ramanan 1953, Baren 1955:115 and 122, Chau 1984:7-8, Chau 1987:34-35, Cousins 1995:84-90, Buswell 1999, Priestley 1999 and Lusthaus 2009. On the terms pudgalavāda/Pudgalavādin, used here for convenience’s sake but which refer neither to an institutional sect nor to a doctrinal school and were probably employed by the opponents of Personalism rather than by its proponents, see e.g. Lusthaus 2009:275, fn. 1 and Eltschinger 2010:292-293, fn. 7.


(10) On the latter, see Iida 1980:173-175.

(11) See Eltschinger 2010.
Dharmakirti against the pudgala

of the pudgalavāda? Let us distinguish here between external and internal criteria. External criteria exhaust themselves in the fact that Dharmakirti’s commentators Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagonin are unanimous in holding this passage as a piece of polemics against the pudgala. Besides their introductory objection, both of them consistently explain Dharmakirti’s anaphoras (tad, etc.) as referring either to the pudgula or the skandhas (quite often: rūpādī). Among the internal criteria, let us mention first that significant parts of Dharmakirti’s terminology are reminiscent of traditional discussions about the pudgala. Thus the word avācya (PVSV 147.6, 7, 15, 148.4), highly characteristic – especially in the context of the treatment of identity (tattva) and otherness (anyat[t]va) –, clearly echoes the Pudgalavādins’ avaktavya/avācya; so does the allusion to upādāna (PVSV 147.23), which is to be interpreted in a sense closer to the notion of upādāyaprājnapti (“designation-on-the-basis-of”) than to that of upādāna as “material cause” found in the Abhidharmic theory of causality. Moreover, the opponent’s recourse to causality (PVSV 147.5-12) as a means of demonstrating that a certain entity (the effect) cannot be said to be either identical with or different from another one (the cause) is certainly reminiscent of the MSA(Bh)’s and the AKBh’s lengthy digressions on the relationship between fuel (indhana, etc.) and

(12) See below, fn. 41.

(13) On the Pudgalavādins’ thesis that the pudgala cannot be said (avaktavya, avācya) to be either the same as or other than the constituents (or that it is inexpressible insofar as it cannot be described either in terms of identity or in terms of otherness with respect to the skandhas), see e.g. Chau 1984:11, Chau 1987:42, chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Lusthaus 2009:279-280. Cf. MSA 18.93:ab (stating that the pudgala is ekavānvyatvato ‘vācyat: see below, fn. 26; see also MSA 18.94-95) and MSAVBh Tś Tś D163a1-4/P191b2-6 (quoted in Eltschinger 2010:307, fn.53). See also AKBh, e.g. 464.4/LE58,3: atha rūpapudgalavat tadupalabdhyor apy anyānupātvan anavaktvyam... “But if [the Pudgalavādin replies that] just as a visible shape and the pudgala [cannot be said to be other than or identical to each other], their [respective] perceptions as well cannot be said (avaktavya) to be other than or identical to [each other]...” (On the meaning of rūpā in this context, see below, fn. 62.) The idea is found again in TS 337: skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo vāyasyā tātpradāyaptā / nānanyo ‘nayatlādyaḥ sādhas tasmād avācyaḥ // “The pudgala is neither other than the constituents —for [otherwise] the outsiders’ [false] view [of a permanent self] would ensue— nor the same [as them], for [otherwise its] multiplicity would follow; as a consequence, [its] being inexpressible (avācyaḥ) in terms of identity or otherness with regard to the constituents is well [established].” See also below, fn. 26.

(14) On the probable meaning of upādāna/upādāya (both as “basis”/“on the basis of” and as “appropriation”/“after appropriating”) in pudgalavāda(s), see e.g. Chau 1987:36, Cousins 1995:89 and Priestley 1999:71-72. AKBh 461.19-20/LE40,3-4 ascribes to the Pudgalavādin the assertion that the pudgula is designated on the basis of (upādāya) the constituents: abhiṣṭānān upātānān vartamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñāpyate / tad idam avādhataram hāva vatsarājatāḥ / nānanyo ‘nayatlāpah śādhas tad uṣṭātā / “[Object:] The pudgula is designated on the basis of the constituents that are internal, appropriated [as belonging to oneself and] existing [when the pudgula is designated]. [Answer: as for us,] we do not understand this obscure statement the meaning of which [you have] not made clear: what does this [mean], ‘on the basis of’? ” (Cf. PVSV 147.23: ko ‘yam upādānārthah / “[But] what is the meaning of ‘basis’?” The greater part of the pudgula critique in the AKBh is then devoted to the refutation of this thesis (see e.g. the quotations of the AKBh below, fn. 29, where both upādāya and upādāna appear).
fire (agnī, etc.).(15) We take it for granted, then, that PVSV 147.2-148.5 is to be interpreted as a critique of the (or a version of the) pudgalavāda.

Yet the passage shows significant differences with respect to previous attempts to refute Personalism.(16) Making an exhaustive list of these differences and systematically examining them is far beyond the scope of this article, but a brief summary of the passage's context and structure may be of help in understanding how Dharmakīrti's strategy in the pudgala controversy departs from that of his predecessors.

The discussion over the pudgala occurs in the context of the inference of the fact that things perish at every single moment (vināśātvānumāna).(17) While explaining the reason of this inference, i.e. the fact that things' destruction is spontaneous or causeless (ahetuka), Dharmakīrti specifies that stating this reason does not amount to seeing destruction as a property which would come to belong to the perishing entity. When saying that a thing's destruction is causeless (a formula seemingly implying that the thing and its destruction are ontologically distinct), the proponent of causeless destruction only makes use of an artificial distinction so as to make clear that there is no cause for destruction,(18) for the use of an

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(15) At least some Pudgalavādins seem to have compared the relation between the constituents and the pudgala with the causal relation between fuel and fire, arguing that fuel and fire cannot be said to be either identical or mutually other; see Venkata Ramanan 1953:182, Chau 1987:35, Cousins 1995:88, Buswell 1999:360 and chapter 11 in Priestley 1999. This fuel-fire analogy (which, according to Cousins 1995:88, does not occur in the earliest accounts of the pudgalavāda and might have been borrowed by “later Pudgalavādins” from chapter 10 of Nāgārjuna’s MMK) is mentioned (before being criticized: see below, fn. 28) in MSAbh 156.1-14 (yathāśām naśaśām naṁ naṁnanyo nāṁnāṁya vaktānya iti, “As fire can be said to be neither distinct from nor the same as the fuel...”) and AKBh 462.1-2/LE42.2-3 (na cânaya indhanād agnih śākyate pratijnātum* / nāpy anumahā). See Duerlinger 1982 and Eltschinger 2010:315, fn.76.

(16) For instance the MSAbh devotes much of the discussion over the pudgala to the examination of the exegetical problems that a personalistic doctrine entails (on the yukti/āgama structure of the MSAbh argument, see Eltschinger 2010:298) and so does AKBh (from 464.25/LE64.1 onwards it mainly deals with scriptural matters), whereas this aspect of the problem is conspicuously absent in PVSV 147.2-148.5.

(17) On this inference see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §12b and (for bibliographical references) fn. 23.

(18) PVSV 145.11-20 (together with PV 1.276): kathāṃ tarhiśānim ahetuka vnāśā bhavatity ucyate / naśayān bhāvo 'parāpeksa iti taṇijaṇāpya sa / avasthā 'hetur utkāśā bhedam āropya cetasa / na bhāvā jāto 'parasmān nāsaṃ pratilabhate / tathābhāvāntaścito svarṣa jāte ity aparāpeksa dharmāntaraṇaḥ pratisedhātthān tatvabhāvaṁ śiṣtenāpravṛttādāntram vivaśāya dharmāṁ cetasaṁ svbhajya tāntarajaṇijaśāya svabhāva eva tathocacyate / tad etān mandabuddhāyaḥ kavacī tathādārśanaḥ ghoṣanātrupavilalabhā nāsaṁ jñāṇam tasya ca bhāvanā āropya sahetukam ahetucan vāpaśīhitattattvāpya bhāvacintayātmānam akulaṃtañ. / "[Objection:] Now, if there is nothing called ‘destruction’; then in what sense do [you] say that destruction is causeless? [Answer:] An entity does not depend on [anything] else i.e. a cause of destruction while perishing. Therefore in order to indicate this [i.e. the fact that it does not depend on a cause of destruction, we] say [that] this state [of destruction] is without a cause. [And this we do] after having [erroneously] construed through [conceptual] thought a [purely artificial] distinction between this [state of destruction and the destroyed en-
expression such as “the x of y” does not necessarily imply that x and y are distinct real entities. The opponent objects that Dharmakirti, who has repeatedly stated that an
entity x is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to an entity y, must admit that destruction is either distinct from the entity that perishes (but then destruction should be perceived as a distinct entity, which is not the case) or identical with it (but then nothing can happen to this entity that is destruction itself): whatever the case, how can the entity ever perish? Dharmakirti answers that in fact

[ipso facto] presents [the property] as [if it were] something different [from the property-bearer] although it is not something different; [and this occurs] because of [our] habit of observing [the genitive case-ending] being used in this way[, i.e. when there is a real distinction]. [But] for all this[, i.e. due to the mere use of this case-ending], there is not a [real] distinction in every case, because there is nothing to prevent a [word conveying a distinction from being] used according to human arbitrariness in another case as well[, i.e. when there is no real difference]. For example, [thing] is expressed in a certain [context] with the singular [tvam, and in another context] with the plural [ṣṛṣṇam] in order to express respect, etc., even though [this thing] does not differ with regard to its [oneness].” 

Note PVSVT 146,11: vyatirekṣhinaḥ iti vyatirekhābhāvyangiṣṭaḥ gotaṃ tvam ity uktah /, and PVSVT 146,15: vibhaktir vyatirekṣhinaḥ vyatirekṣasya vācāḥ vācyāḥ /.


“Necessarily, a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] distinction and non-distinction, for a [real] entity is a nature. [Now, we have already] said [above in PVSV 75,21-22] that otherness is nothing but x’s not being y.” PVSVT 118,23-24: na ca bhedabhedaḥ avyayah /.

“[And indeed, a [real] nature [y] that is not y do not elude being other [than y].” PVSV 117,18-20: —vastu... nyamena... bhedabhedaḥ nātvatvate /.

“[But] again, in case [this causeless destruction] is not something distinct, it is the [entity itself, say a pot] that is what [is called ‘destruction’]. Therefore since nothing happens to the [entity], how [can it be called ‘destroyed’ at all]?” PVŚ 75.21-22: svabhāvo hi svabhāvinā na tat tvam anyattvam /.

Note PVSVT 146,11: tām tattvānāt tattvāntarabhāvam ity uktah /.

For example, [thing] is expressed in a certain [context] with the singular [tvam, and in another context] with the plural [ṣṛṣṇam] in order to express respect, etc., even though [this thing] does not differ with regard to its [oneness].” 

Note PVSVT 146,11: vyatirekṣhinaḥ iti vyatirekhābhāvyangiṣṭaḥ gotaṃ tvam ity uktah /.

PVSVT 146,15: vibhaktir vyatirekṣhinaḥ vyatirekṣasya vācāḥ vācyāḥ /

PVSVT 146,25-26: agogyāyāśāryaśāya gotaṃ tvam ity uktah /.

“[And indeed, a [real] nature [y] that is not y do not elude being other [than y].” PVSV 117,18-20: —vastu... nyamena... bhedabhedaḥ nātvatvate /.

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Note PVSVT 146,11: vyatirekṣhinaḥ iti vyatirekhābhāvyangiṣṭaḥ gotaṃ tvam ity uktah /.

PVSVT 146,15: vibhaktir vyatirekṣhinaḥ vyatirekṣasya vācāḥ vācyāḥ /

Note PVSVT 146,11: vyatirekṣhinaḥ iti vyatirekhābhāvyangiṣṭaḥ gotaṃ tvam ity uktah /.

PVSVT 146,15: vibhaktir vyatirekṣhinaḥ vyatirekṣasya vācāḥ vācyāḥ /

Note PVSVT 146,11: vyatirekṣhinaḥ iti vyatirekhābhāvyangiṣṭaḥ gotaṃ tvam ity uktah /.

PVSVT 146,15: vibhaktir vyatirekṣhinaḥ vyatirekṣasya vācāḥ vācyāḥ /

Note PVSVT 146,11: vyatirekṣhinaḥ iti vyatirekhābhāvyangiṣṭaḥ gotaṃ tvam ity uktah /.
the alternative between identity and otherness only applies to the arising of something real possessed of a distinct nature. As a consequence it cannot concern destruction itself, for the proponent of causeless destruction does not assert the existence of a distinct property called “destruction” but only the fact that the entity itself does not exist. \( ^{22} \) Destruction only appears to be endowed with a nature of its own when we say that it is causeless, but the activity (vyāpāra) expressed by any verbal root \( ^{23} \) (i.e. here, the activity consisting in existing) can only belong to an entity endowed with functionalities, so that destruction cannot be considered the real agent of the verb “to be”. Thus when we say that a hare’s horn is a non-existence, far from asserting the hare’s horn existence, we actually intend to deny the existence of the hare’s horn; accordingly, the statement “destruction is causeless” is not the affirmation that destruction exists as a real entity but the negation of its having a cause. Dharmakirti concludes that only a real entity x (i.e. only an entity possessing a nature of its own, which is not the case of destruction) is subjected to the alternative

Conclusion concerns anarthāntarete ‘pa tad eva tad bhavati. In the second hypothesis, it concerns both members of the alternative.

\( ^{22} \) PVSV 145,25-146,1 (together with PV 1.277cd): nanv atra / na taspa kiṣṇaṇid bhavati na bhavaty eva kevalam / stya uktam / na hy ayaṃ vināśo ‘nayo vā kaścit bhāvasya bhavatity āka / kim tarka / sa eva bhāvo na bhavatī / yadi hi kaścicid bhāvāṃ bhavatī / na bhāvo ‘nena navartitaḥ syāt / tatā ca bhāvavīrtitāṃ prastutāyāṃ aprastutām esoktam syāt / na hi kaścicid bhāvena bhāvo na bhāto nāma / tadā na bhāto yadi vṛayaṃ na bhavet / . \[Answer:] But haven’t [we] said in this [regard]: this [entity] possesses no [particular property called ‘destruction’], be it distinct or not from itself; it simply does not exist (PV 1.277cd). For the [proponent of causeless destruction] does not say that destruction or any other [property like continued existence and transformation] belongs to the entity, but rather that it is the entity itself that does not exist. For if he stated[, with the word ‘destruction’], the existence [i.e. the rise] of a certain [property], the existence of this property\( ^{c} \) would not make the entity cease to exist (navarteta). And thus, since the cessation of the entity is the subject under discussion, [he] would only be stating [something] irrelevant [by positing another distinct thing],\( ^{d} \) for an entity [can]not be said not to exist [merely] because of the existence of something [else]. Then [an entity can only be said] not to exist if it itself does not exist.” “According to PVṬ Je D323b7-324a1/P396a6-7 = PVSVT 523,6-7: anyo vā sūtyanyathātāvādiko dharmanoh... \( ^{3} \) According to PVṬ Je D324a1-2/P396a8 = PVSVT 523,10: ...bhāvam upādām... ‘Against PVṬ Je D324a2/P396a8 = PVSVT 523,10: anena vādāmā. \( ^{4} \) According to PVṬ Je D324a2/P396b1 = PVSVT 523,12: arthāntaravāyaṃ puro ṣaḥṅāṃ aprastutāṃ... ‘Note PVṬ brjod pa‘i phyir for vādāṃ. The text of the PVSV is not well established here: (1) PVSVₜib D346b3/P509a7-8 reads: ‘jig pa ōt ye ba (*na bhāto nāma*?), which echoes the reading of the MSA (svayam na bhāto nāma bhavet /). (2) PVSVₜib D346b3/P509a8 and PVṬ Je D324a3/P396b2 read: gani gi tse (*padā). (3) PVSVₜib D346b3/P509a8 reads: yod pa med pa (*bhavati?), clearly more satisfactory than bhavet.

\( ^{23} \) See e.g. Cardona 1974.
between identity and otherness with respect to y. (24)

The Pudgalavādin enters the stage at this point, (25) objecting that the pudgala is not sub-

(24) PVSV 146.11-147.2 (together with PV 1.278ab): tasmād yasya nāśa bhavatītya ucyyate sa svayam eva na bhavatītya uktam syāt / na vai gosasāmyd vīsaṃtāntaraṃ dvītīvdh sarvatva jannam arhati / na hi gadarbha iti nāmākaravād bālayadharmā manuyaye 'pi samyojāh / tathā na ca trastra putro bhavatītya atma drṣṭo evah nāše 'pi vrodhāt / evam cābhīdhāñe 'pi prajñotanam āvedatam eva / atah / bhāve hy esa vikalpaḥ syāt dvīter vastvanurodhatabhā / bhāvo 'vaśāṃ bhavantam apecyate / sa ca svabhāva eva / na svabhāvabhāvaṃ kucvid vāyāpār samāvēśåhōvāt / vāyāpār iti hi tathābhātavabhāvopattih / sa niśvabhāvabhāvaṃ kathāṃ syāt / kathām idāśīn bhavatī abhāvah śaśāvīṣyām ityāvyāvahārāḥ / na vai śāśāvīṇaṃ kilācīd bhavatītya ucyyate / api te evam asya na bhavatīti bhāvopratisedhā eva kriyate / api ca / vāyavahārārā eva etad evam vāyāpārvatvam sa maśāpyādāśā仪表 prakaraṇayena kacitāt / na tathā sarvābhāvecaḥ ca tadā nāśo bhavatāc ātmanyam anaptum ści / . "Therefore one must say that it is the [entity] the destruction of which is said to ‘exist’ that does not exist itself. It is certainly not the case that, on the grounds of a [mere] similarity in wording, the affirmation (vidhi, bya ba) observed in another case [such as: ‘Caitra’s son’] can be applied to every case [i.e., to ‘the thing’s destruction’ too]. Indeed, the properties of an ass (bāleya) cannot be applied to a human being as well [merely] on the grounds that [a certain person] is named ‘Gardabha (= ass)’; in the same way, the affirmation (vidhi, bya ba) in [25] that is observed in the [statement]: ‘Caitra’s son exists’ (caitrastra putro bhavatīti) [does not] apply to [the case of] destruction as well, (26) because it is contradictory. And although the [verbal] expression is [grammatically] the same (evam), [its real] purpose (prajñatman, dgo is pa) has been presented [above]. (27) Therefore: this alternative [between identity and otherness] can [only] concern the [coming into] existence of [something real], because activity (vidhi) necessarily belongs [as anu родд] to something real (PV 1.278ab). [Coming into] existence necessarily requires [something] that comes into existence, and this [can] only [be] a nature, for that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity (vāyāpā). For [what we call] an ‘activity’ is [nothing but] the arisal of such a nature; [but] how could this [arisal] pertain to [something] that lacks a nature [i.e., destruction]? [Objection:] Now, [if that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity] how [do you explain] a usage such as ‘a hare’s horn is a non-existence’? [Answer:] One certainly does not say that a hare’s horn is something; rather, [when] thus [stating that a hare’s horn is a non-existence,] one simply negates the existence of this [hare’s horn by saying] that [it] does not exist. Moreover, it is the speakers who, according to the context [of discussion such as: ‘Is the hare’s horn non-existence or is it not?’, erroneously] construe and present this [hare’s horn] thus [i.e. as the agent of existence in the sentence: ‘The hare’s horn is a non-existence’ as if it had an activity; but it is not so. (28) Being devoid of [the nature of] any object is the true nature of this (tatra) [hare’s horn, and] nothing [unreal] engages in [an activity such as coming into existence].” [But our opponent] certainly does not [admit] destruction [to be] such, i.e. characterized as void of the nature of any object, like a hare’s horn or the son of a barren woman; because [according to him] this [property] exists [i.e. arises] in the entity. Even though [yadi... tu] the (ordinary) speakers present this very [destruction that our opponent considers thus] in the same way [as having an activity when they say that it ‘exists’, they] do acknowledge that it itself is not so [i.e. that it does not have arisal as a property], [and] therefore that it is nothing. Therefore if it exists by itself [i.e. in a non-superimposed way], (29) the nature [of an entity] cannot escape these two [mutually] exclusive options (vikalpadvaya), i.e. [either] identity [or] otherness. (30) PVSTV 525.23: vidhi arthaśāntarasya putrasya viśñānam /. “Affirmation, i.e. the position of a son who is something distinct.” In spite of the Tibetan rendering of vidhi as bya ba (a usual equivalent of Skt. vāyāpā), here the meaning of vidhi seems more likely to be “affirmation”, although from the next verse onwards it obviously means vāyāpā (in the sense of the grammatical agent’s activity). (31) PVSTV 525.24: na bhavatī putro bhavatītya atāpi bhāvād vāyāreko nāśo viśñāyak / “In the [statement]: ‘There is a destruction of the entity’ as well, destruction is not to be posited as distinct from the entity [itself].” Note that PVT Je D325a6/P397b7 explicitly refers here to the genitive (*ṣaṭṭhi) case-endings (de itar na nag pa’i bu ḅeṣ bya ba’i nag ‘di la tha dus pa’i rten can ggs drug pa’[*vyātirekavohaktiṣaṭṭhi*] sbyar ba dag ni...). “I.e. in PVSV 145,16-17
jected to this alternative since it is neither the same as nor other than the constituents.\(^{(26)}\)

it is not identical to them because its nature is distinct from theirs, but it is not other than them because it is causally related to them and because otherness is a mere lack of relation (\textit{apratibandha}). Dharmakirti criticizes his opponent’s notion of causality (which entails that a cause and its effect are neither identical nor mutually other) while relying on his own analysis of relation (according to which a relation can be either of identity or of causality, the latter obtaining between entities that have distinct natures).\(^{(27)}\) He then puts forward his own definition of otherness as the fact that two natures remain unmixed. As a consequence, if, as the Pudgalavadin contends, the \textit{pudgala} and the constituents do not have the same nature, there can be no relation between them (except a causality relation that the Pudgalavadin cannot accept since it concerns entities that are mutually other) and they have distinct properties, so that they must be mutually other. The opponent attempts to rescue the thesis of a relation between the constituents and the \textit{pudgala} by explaining that this relation does not lie in a causal connection between them but in some sort of invariable connection between their respective cognitions. Dharmakirti replies by showing that there is no such connection and by arguing that the \textit{pudgala}, which is not known through a distinct cognition but, according to the Pudgalavadin himself, “on the basis” of the constituents,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{vyāpāra} (*vyāpāravat* PVT. \textit{Je D325b6/P398b6, vyāpārayukta} PVS\textit{V}T 526,30) simply because of linguistic usage (\textit{vyavahāranātēraṇa}, PVT. \textit{Je D325b6/P398b6 = PVS\textit{V}T 526,29}). \(\text{Note PVT. \textit{Je D325b6/P398b7-8:} ...gyi dhis por gyur pa'i bya ba 'ga' zig dan ldan pa nu ma yin no //}.

  \item \text{As a justification for this, PVT. \textit{Je D326a2/P399a3 = PVS\textit{V}T 527,13 add: nirūpatvād asya /}.

  \item \text{According to PVT. \textit{Je D326a3/P399a4 = PVS\textit{V}T 527,15: svayam anadhyāropitenaśākēraṇa...} (25) See below, fn. 41.

\end{itemize}

\(^{(25)}\) See below, fn. 41.

\(^{(26)}\) On the Pudgalavadin’s contention that the \textit{pudgala} is neither the same as nor other than the constituents, see e.g. Bareau 1955:115 (Vātsāputriyā), Chau 1987-40, chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Eltschinger 2010:294. This thesis is presented in the following way in MSA 18.93: \textit{ekatvānyatvato 'ācyas tasmāt dovāsamāyāt asau / skandhātmatvaprasāṅgāca taddārvatvoprasāṅgatā} //. “This [\textit{pudgala}] cannot be said (\textit{avācya}) to be either one [and the same with] or distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e. from the five constituents], because of the two faults [that would ensue]: for [if the constituents and the \textit{pudgala} were one and the same,] the constituents would be the self, and [if the constituents and the \textit{pudgala} were distinct,] the [\textit{pudgala}] would be a [real] substance.” (See Eltschinger 2010, Text-Critical Remarks:330). See also AKBh 462,3-4/LE42,5-6: \textit{na caṁyaḥ skandhebhyaḥ śākyate pratijnātāṁ śāvāvatpraśāṅgāt / nāpy ananya uccēdaprāsaṅgāt //}. “And this [\textit{pudgala}] cannot be asserted [to be] other than the constituents, because [if it were other than them its] eternity would ensue; nor [can it be asserted to be] the same, because [then its] annihilation would ensue.” Cf. TS 337 (see above, fn.13).

\(^{(27)}\) On the two types of relation acknowledged by Dharmakirti, i.e. identity (\textit{tadātmya}), which concerns two conceptually extracted properties of one and the same entity, and causality (\textit{tadutpatti}), which regards to distinct entities, see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10c (and fn. 14 for bibliographical references) and below, fn. 30.
has no nature of its own: if it did it would necessarily appear in a distinct way as an object of cognition.

Dharmakirti thus follows the gist of the MSAbh or AKBh arguments insofar as he too attacks the Pudgalavadin’s contention that the *pudgala* is designated on the basis of the constituents by showing that the causal relation assumed between the constituents and the *pudgala* does not stand critical examination (28) and that the *pudgala* is not perceived on the basis of the constituents. (29) However he does so with arguments that appear profoundly

(28) Both the MSAbh and the AKBh criticize the view that causally related elements can be said neither to be identical nor to be mutually other: they endeavour to show that in fact an effect and its cause are mutually other, most notably because they have different characteristics. See MSAbh 156,17-18 (tesaṁ ca bhinnam laksanaṁ sya anya evāṁśir indhanāt / “Now since their characteristics are distinct, fire is simply other than fuel.” See Eltschinger 2010:315, fn. 77) and AKBh 462,14/LE44,13 (tayor api siddham anyatvam laksanaḥ breathingl, / “Even [so] these two, [fire and fuel,] are established to be [mutually] other, because they have different characteristics.”). This idea seems to find an echo in PVSV 147,12 (see below, fn. 60 and 61) but Dharmakirti’s main argument is much more encompassing: instead of merely pointing out the distinct characteristics of fire and fuel (or those of the *pudgala* and the *skandha*), he shows that the Pudgalavadins’ thesis, which equates the causality relation with inexpressibility in terms of identity or otherness, ends up diluting the very notion of causality to the point that everything can be considered a causal condition while nothing can be said to be other than anything else.

(29) The MSA(Bh) rejects the *pudgala*s existence as a substantively existing (dravyasat) nature on the grounds of its not being perceived (see MSA 18,92: prajñaṇaptoastitaya vaśayā pudgalo dravyata na tu / nopolambhaṅ vempasyaṁ satvaksitaṁ kṣīṣṭeṣiṣitaḥ / “The *pudgala* must be said to exist as a [mere] designation, but not as a [real] substance, because one does not perceive [it] (nopolambha), because [its pseudo-perception of the *pudgala*] is [nothing but] a wrong notion, because it is a pollution, because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled.” Translation Eltschinger 2010:305; on the form *nopolambha*, see Conze 1973 s.v.). The AKBh, examining the relation between the awareness of the constituents and that of the *pudgala*, points out that the designation (prajñaṇit) “pudgala” rests either on the perception of the constituents (but then the unpereceived *pudgala* is nothing but a designation for the perceived constituents) or on the perception of the *pudgala* itself (but then the *pudgala* differs from the constituents since it can be perceived by itself). See AKBh 463,3-6/LE50,1-5: yado ca pudgalaḥ prajñaṇiyate kṣī tāvat skandhān upalabhya prajñaṇiyate / āhordv pudgalam / yadi tāvat skandhāṁ tayā eva pudgalaprājñaptiḥ prāṇāt / pudgalasyapupalambhāt / atha pudgalaṁ kathā asya skandhān upādāya prajñaṇitih bhavati / pudgala eva hi tāyā upādānam prāṇāt / “And when the *pudgala* is designated, is it designated when perceiving the constituents or the *pudgala* [himself]? On the one hand, if [it is designated when perceiving] the constituents, then the designation ‘pudgala’ concerns only these [constituents], since the *pudgala* is not perceived (anupalambha); on the other hand, [if it is designated when perceiving] the *pudgala*, how could the *pudgala* be designated on the basis of (upādāya) the constituents [as the Pudgalavadins claim]? For then the basis (upādāna) of this [designation] concerns the sole *pudgala.*” See also AKBh 463,25-464,2/LE56,8-13: atha rūpasy upalabhānāṁ pudgalam upalabhante / kṣī tayāṃvapalabdhyopalabhante / āhordv anyagā / yadi tayāvā / rūpād abhinivasabhāvāḥ pudgalaḥ prāṇāt / rūpā eva vā tatprājñaptih / idam ca rūpaṁ āyaṁ pudgala iti* katham idam pariṣcchidyaṁ** / athavaṁ na pariṣcchidyaṁ / katham idam pratyaṇyāgyaṁ rūpo naḥ asti pudgalo ‘py astī / upalabdhisvāna hi tayāstitaṁ pratyayāgyaṁ*** / *AKBhLE iti: AKBhPṛ om. iti. **AKBhLE pariṣcchidyaṁ: AKBhPṛ, ganyayate. ***AKBhLE pratyayāgyaṁ: AKBhPṛ, pratyayāgyaṁ. “If [the opponent explains that] one perceives the *pudgala* when perceiving visible shapes (rūpa), does one perceive [the *pudgala*] through the same perception [as that of the visible shapes] or through another one? If [it is] through the same [perception], the *pudgala* must have the same nature [as the visible shapes], or
renewed insofar as they rest on important innovations of his own system: while his criticism of the relation between the pudgala and the constituents rests on his definition of the so-called natural relation (svabhāva-pratibandha), his analysis of the pudgala’s alleged perception, which shows that the pudgala is no real entity, rests on his elaboration of the notion of anupalabdhi and more importantly, on the equation between existence and functionality (arthakriya) and on the idea that any existing entity must have the minimal efficacy consisting in producing a cognitive appearance of itself: the pudgala is not a real entity precisely because it is devoid of such a power.

Here the pudgalavāda’s critique is instrumental in establishing Dharmakīrti’s own version of the identity principle (according to which a real entity x must be either the same as or other than a real entity y), or rather, it is instrumental in establishing that this principle only applies to real entities (so that the opponent of the causeless destruction thesis cannot claim that destruction must be subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with

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[rather,] the designation [‘pudgala’] only regards the visible shape, and [thus] how could [we] make this distinction: ‘This is the visible shape, this is the pudgala?’ Now if [we] cannot make such a distinction, how could [we] admit that both the visible shape and the pudgala exist? For it is due to perception (upalabdhi) that the existence of this [pudgala] could be admitted.”

Thus Dharmakīrti’s opponent considers that related entities cannot have natures that are completely alien to each other; accordingly, in PVSV 147, 3-4 he defines the otherness of two given entities as a lack of relation between their natures (svabhāvā-pratibandha). However according to Dharmakīrti, relation cannot be understood as the merging or mixture (miśrībhavana) of the relata’s natures: real entities remain unmixed with one another (see e.g. SP 5: tāvam ātma satyam ca sarve te svātmāni sthitah / ity anmiśrāh svayaṃ bhāvāṁ tāṁ miśravyāt kalpaṇā //). “And the two [so-called related] entities as well as [their relation, which is supposedly] distinct from [these two entities,] all rest in themselves; as a consequence, entities remain unmixed (anmiśra) in themselves: it is conceptual thought that mixes them.”). According to Dharmakīrti, otherness is precisely this fact that entities’ natures do not merge or their mutual exclusiveness (parasparam ananugamanam, PVSV 147,8-9; cf. PVSVT 528,15-16, which explains it as anmiśrābhavanam, see below, fn. 53). Indeed, Dharmakīrti acknowledges one relation besides that of pure and simple identity, namely, the causality relation, but he shows that the natures involved in it remain heterogeneous (see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10e). The Pudgalavādin, by claiming that the pudgala is related with the constituents, is thus confronted with the very alternative between identity and otherness that his pudgala supposedly escapes: either the pudgala’s relation with the constituents is one of pure and simple identity, or it is one of causality (and therefore of otherness). In order to get away from this alternative he has to acknowledge the lack of relation (apratisbandha) between the pudgala and the constituents, but by doing so he is doomed to accept their otherness since he himself defines otherness as apratisbandha (PVSV 147,12; see below, fn. 59).

(31) See Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10e (and fn. 17 for bibliographical references) and below, fn. 66.

(32) See Eltschinger forthcoming a, §5b. Cf. TS 347ab, quoted below, fn. 91.

(33) PVSV 149,27-150,2: jñānāmātrārthakravyāyām api asamarthyye vastv eva na syāt / tathā hi tallākṣaṇoṁ vastv iti sīryaṇāṁ / "If [something] lacks the ability to perform the functionality (arthakriya) that is a mere cognition, it is no real entity at all; for we will say that a real entity has as its characteristic this [functional efficacy].” See e.g. Yoshimizu 1999:145 and 149.
respect to the perishing entity). However it is worth noting that the TSP adopts the reverse strategy: there the \textit{pudgala}'s ontological status is no longer used to establish the scope of the identity principle; rather, it is the scope of the identity principle that determines the \textit{pudgala}'s ontological status. Thus Šantaraksīta and Kamalaśīla endeavour to show that because the identity principle only applies to real entities, the \textit{pudgala}, which escapes the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to the constituents, cannot be a real entity.\footnote{Candrakīrti had already adopted a somewhat similar strategy (on this strategy, see Duerlinger 1984:264 and 270). Candrakīrti spells out the anti-Personalist's classical argument as follows (MAV 6.147): \textit{gani phir gzung las sems byod med mi rtags pa ma yin gnyid // gsal te bskyi 'ga' dchos por byod gyur na // svar grub dchos byod du med mi 'gyur //}. "[The difference or identity of] mind with respect to form is not conceived of as inexpressible, and in fact, no existing (\textit{vastusat}) is considered inexpressible. It follows that if the self is an established entity, then, like 'mind', which is [also] an established entity, [its difference or identity with respect to psychophysical aggregates] would not be inexpressible." (Translation Huntington 1992:175.) The full version of the argument in contraposed form appears in MAV 6.148: \textit{gani phir khyod bum dchos por ma grub pa'i // rdo bo gzung gani phu po las byod med 'gyur te // ran gis yod par grub par rtags mi bya //}. "According to our opponent, a jug is not by nature an established entity precisely because [its difference or identity] with respect to form, for example, is inexpressible. Likewise, the relationship of the self to the psychophysical aggregates is also inexpressible, and therefore one ought not conceive of the self as intrinsically existent." (Translation Huntington 1992:175.)} Saying that only a real entity cannot escape the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to the constituents, cannot be a real entity.\footnote{Note TSP\textsc{S} 115,15/TSP\textsc{K} 127,17: \textit{evam távad avácyatvábhypsyagame prajñaptisattvam pudgalasya príptam ti prítapádatam //}. "Thus, it has been shown first that if one accepts that the \textit{pudgala} cannot be said [to be either identical with or different from the constituents], it follows that it [only] exists as a designation." On Vasubandhu's distinction between \textit{dhyasat} and \textit{prajñaptisat}, see Katsura 1976. Note that surviving evidence regarding theories of the \textit{pudgala} seems to indicate that the Pudgalavādins themselves considered the \textit{pudgala} as a \textit{prajñapti} (see e.g. Chau 1987:42-43, Buswell 1996:354, Lusthaus 2009 or Eltschinger 2010:294-295). Some scholars consider that the Pudgalavādins' opponents have betrayed their thought by accusing them of "promoting the idea of a 'real' self" whereas "the handful of surviving Vātsiputrya texts strenuously deny this" (Lusthaus 2009:276); others attempt to reconstruct the \textit{pudgalavāda}s by conciliating both claims that the \textit{pudgala} is a \textit{prajñapti} and that somehow it ultimately exists (see Priestley 1999 and Duerlinger 2003b).} Kamalaśīla reformulates \footnote{TS 338a2-d: \textit{pudgalo naive vidyate pūramārthikāḥ / tattvāntavād/yavācyatvān nabhākṣokanādādīvat //}.}
his master's argument in the following “formal” application (prayoga): “[Vyāpti:] Whatever cannot be said to be either the same as or other than a [given] entity is not a [real] entity, like a water-lily in the sky. [Pakṣadharmaṭā:] now, the pudgala cannot be said [to be either the same as or other than another entity. The logical reason involved in the present argument] is the non-perception of the pervader.”(37) According to TSP$_S$ 114.22/TSP$_K$ 126.17, TS 340-342 are aimed at demonstrating this pervasion: “Since the alternative between difference and identity has a [real] entity as its basis, the [pseudo-things] that are without a nature [of their own] are not [to be] designated as identical with or other than [other things], etc., but [this is] not [the case of] a [real] entity. For the negation [to which one resorts when saying:] ‘[x] is not y [i.e., does not have y for its nature]’ entails (vat) [the affirmation of] another entity. [Therefore] one obviously states [its] otherness with regard to y.(38) And to negate that [x] does not have y for its nature amounts to saying that [x] is identical [with y]. Therefore a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] identity and difference with regard to a [real] entity [y].”(39) As a consequence, the pudgala is not a real entity. Equivalently, the pudgala is nothing but an entity of designation, which perfectly coincides with the MSA(Bh)’s and Vasubandhu’s conclusions.

(37) TSP$_S$ 114,19-20/TSP$_K$ 126,14-15: yad vastu naḥ saktā sat tattvanyatvābhāyan vacyam na bhavati na tad vastu / yathā gaganam manam / na bhavati ca vacyaḥ pudgala iti vyāpakaṇupalabhiḥ /.

(38) According to TSP$_S$ 115,5/TSP$_K$ 127,7-8: svabhāvanta vidhināntarīyakatvād vastuno vastvantara-bhāvanīśedhasya /.

(39) TS 340-342: bhedābhāvāravikalpasya vastuvadhisṛṣṭābhāvataḥ / tattvāntavātādvyāmardeśo niḥsvabhāvēṣu yugyate // na vastum yad etad dhi tan neti pratisṛṣṭān / tad vastvantarvat tasmād vyāktaṃ anyatvam ucyate // atadbhāvāravikalpasya ca tattvam evābhāvabhāyate / nātikṛṣṇat tad vastu tattvam bhedaṃ ca vastu naḥ //.

Kamalasila concludes (TSP$_S$ 115,13-14/TSP$_K$ 127,16): iti svadhiḥ vyāptir maualasya hetuḥ //.” Thus, the principal reason’s pervasion is established.”
**PVSV 147,2-148,5** (40): Annotated Translation

(40) A [certain real] nature [x]'s being other [than y] is nothing but its not being y, (42) for visible shape's (rupa) and taste's being reciprocally other, too, is nothing else [than each one's not being the other one]. (43) Objection: [although x does not have the nature of y, still it cannot be said to be other than y, for] otherness [actually] consists in [their] natures' lacking a [mutual] relation (pratibandha). (44) [Answer:] What does this so-called relation [between x and y] consist of, so that [x] would be neither this [i.e. of the nature of y] nor of a nature other [than y]? Objection: [this relation consists in x's] being born (janman) [of y]. (45) [Answer: if it were because x is the effect of y that it could not be said to be either y or other than y, then] no cause <and no effect> (46) could [ever] be said.
Dharmakirti against the *pudgala*

[to be either identical with or other than] one another; and so (47) everything [would be] somehow (48) [causally] useful (*upayogin*) to everything; therefore (49) nothing would be other than anything. And thus even [someone using the word] “inexpressibility” (*avacyatā*) (50) [defined in the afore-mentioned way] would merely express a causality relation with another word without [conveying] a different meaning. (51) (52) [As for ourselves] however, we define (53) otherness as the exclusiveness (*ananugamana*) of [two real] natures [i.e. as the fact that they do not mix with each other (53)]. Now, since [all entities] possessing a [real] nature are mutually [exclusive, (54)] they have to be [mutually] other. (55) And [between entities that are not identical, (56)] nothing except the natural relation consisting in causality [can be] called a “relation,” for it is not contradictory that [something which is causally] independent (57) [from something else] may deviate [from the latter]. (58) [Both] because of this [lack of relation (59)] and because [x and y have] distinct properties [i.e. inexpressibility-...

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(47) Explanation, PVT. Je D326b2/P399b6 = PVSVT 528,11: *tathā ceto kāryavād avacyatve... “And so, i.e. if [it is] because [the *pudgala*] is an effect [of the constituents that it] cannot be said [to be either identical to or other than them]...”*

(48) Explanation, PVT. Je D326b2-3/P399b6-7 = PVSVT 528,12: *kathāṃcid iti sākṣāt pāramparyena ca... “Somehow’, i.e. in a direct or indirect manner...”*

(49) Explanation, PVT. Je D326b3/P399b7 = PVSVT 528,12-13: *itis sarvatra kāryakāraṇābhināvāt... “Therefore [i.e.] because a causality relation [would thus obtain] with respect to everything...”*

(50) See above, fn. 13 and 26.

(51) On this refutation of the opponent’s view of causal relation, see above, fn. 28.

(52) Introduction, PVT. Je D326b4/P400a1 = PVSVT 528,15: *anyattvam tu na nisiddham / yasmāt... “But [according to us, their] otherness is not discarded [for all that], because...”*

(53) PVT. Je D326b4-5/P400a1-2 = PVSVT 528,15-16 explain *parasparam ananugamanam as amīti-bhavanam.*

(54) According to PVT. Je D326b5/P400a2 = PVSVT 528,16, *sa* does not refer to the neutral noun *ananugamam* but to the masculine *ananugamah.*

(55) Introduction, PVT. Je D326b5-6/P400a3-4: *gal te skye ba’i mtshan rīd can gyi rgya lugs pas phun po dag las sani zang rgyan rīd du yod pa ni ma yin mod kyi ’on kyai rgya lugs pa gzan rīd du yod do ze na /. “Objection: [true,] it is not thanks to a relation defined as causality (*yamnalokṣyanaprati-bandha*) that the *pudgala* is other than the constituents; there are, however, other [kinds of] relations.”*

(56) The causality relation (*tadutpatti*) is the only one possible in the case of discrete entities, and the only one left open for the Pudgalavādīn, for whom an identity-type (*tādātya*) relation is ruled out by his insistence on the fact that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be the same as the constituents. See Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10c, and above, fn. 30.

(57) Explanation, PVT. Je D326b7/P400a5 = PVSVT 528,19: *anāyātatasya taduttattāya tatrāpratibandhasya... “Independent, [i.e.] not related to y through causality.”*

(58) On this reasoning see above, fn. 30.

(59) According to PVT. Je D327a1/P400a7 = PVSVT 528,20, *tataḥ* provides the first of two reasons: *tato pratibandhāt* *pudgalasya skandhebhyo ‘nyatvam /. “Because of...*
as and expressibility-as respectively, \(x\) and \(y\) are [simply] other.\(^{(60)}\)

Objection: the relation [between \(x\) and \(y\)] is a matter of cognition[, not of causality]. Suppose the following be urged (\(syād\ etat\)): because \(x\), the cognition of which is invariably connected to the cognition of \(y\), necessarily appears [in cognition] when \(y\) is cognized[, their relation is a matter of cognition, and due to this ontological relation, \(x\) cannot be said [to be other than \(y\)] although it does not have the nature of \(y\).\(^{(62)}\) To this, let us answer as follows:] no, [the cognition of \(x\) is not invariably connected to the cognition of \(y\)] because \(x\) is devoid

\(^{(60)}\) See PVSVT 528.20-21: \(talāḥ bhā svaćāyataṃ pudgalaṃya dharmāḥ skandānāṃ tu parasparāṃ vācyaṃ sti dharmahṛdayaḥ.\) “To explain: the pudgala has the property of being inexpressible (avācyata) [in terms of identity or otherness] whereas the constituents [have the property of] being expressible (vācyata) [in these terms] with respect to one another, so [the pudgala] on the one hand and the constituents on the other hand] have distinct properties.” Cf. TSP\(_2\) 115.25/TSP\(_1\) 127.27 (following the statement that two real entities determined as having mutually contradictory properties are distinct from each other): vācyata-vācyatādāparasparavṛddhiḥ kāraṇāyāstau ca skandhapudgalaḥ. “Now, the constituents and the pudgala are determined as having mutually contradictory properties such as expressibility and inexpressibility.”

\(^{(61)}\) Explanation, PVT Je D327a2-3/P400a8-b2: \(‘di la yaśaṃ shāya bha gāya su ‘gurav te / gaṇi ‘yig gaṇi la rag las pa med pa de ni de las gāṇaṃ pa yin te / rta las ba lai (D: lai daśi P) tta bu’o // phuṇ po do la gāṇi saq kyāri rag las pa med pa ‘zes bya ba ni ran bīn gī gī gī tshigs so // gāṇi ‘yig gāṇi las chos tha dad pa de ni de las gāṇaṃ yin te / dper na rta las ba lai tta bu’o // phuṇ po do las gāṇi saq kyāri chos tha dad pa yin no ‘zes bya ba ni ran bīn gī gī tshigs ni di do / // . “And there are two [formal applications in this [connection: (1)] an \(x\) that is not related to \(y\) is other than \(y\), as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the pudgala is not related to the constituents. [The logical reason involved here] is a svabhāvahetu. (2) An \(x\) whose properties differ from \(y\)’s is other than \(y\), as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the pudgala has properties different from \(y\)’s. [The logical reason involved here] is a svabhāvahetu.”

\(^{(62)}\) Explanation, PVT Je D327a6-7/P400b6-8: \(gzuṅ la sogs pa gzuṅ ba niśid kyāri gāṇi gāṇi gāṇaṃ gzuṅ ba yin te / de ni mig la sogs pa ‘i ram par ‘ses pas ‘ses par bya ba niśid yin pa ‘i phrul ro // de bas na gzuṅ la sogs pa rtogs pa med na ma ‘byun ba gāṇi (P: D om. ‘yani) gāṇi saq rtogs pa yan pa de ltar na gāṇi saq phuṇ po ‘i ran bīn ma yan du zin kyāri phuṇ po do las gāṇaṃ niśid du brjod par bya ba ma yan ‘ze na / . ‘It is [indeed] due to [our] grasping of [objects] such as visible shapes that the pudgala too is grasped,” for this [pudgala] can be cognized (“gyaéra”) through a visual cognition, etc. Therefore, the cognition of the pudgala is invariably connected with the cognition of [objects] such as visible shapes. [And] thus, although the pudgala does not have the nature of the constituents, it cannot be said to be other than the constituents.\(^{(6)}\) “To be compared with PVSVT 528.26-27: \(talāḥ hi rūpāśabdādīgāraṇaṃ navā pudgalagraṇaṃ syate / . \(^{b}\) To be compared with PVSVT 528: caksurād-viṣajñānāvajñeyatāḥ pudgalasyāt / . \(^{c}\) To be compared with PVSVT 528.29: askandhasvabhāvan api / . \(^{d}\) To be compared with PVSVT 528.28: skandhebho ‘nyatvenāvācyam... How to interpret gzuṅ = rūpa in this explanation? The commentators’ allusion to caksur-ṣajñāna as well as Karnākaṅgaśīn’s reference to śabda suggest that the objects (viṣaya) of the different sensory cognitions are meant (cf. the shift of meaning of the term rūpa in the ABKḥ when the discussion moves to the pudgala as an object of knowledge, viṣaya, from ABKḥ 463.1/LE48.6 onwards). Remember, however, that these viṣayas are instances of the rūpāskāndha (as dhātus/āyatanas no. 1-5). Thus, the pudgala would be cognized when one cognizes (through indrāṇapratyākṣa) visible shapes, sounds, etc., i.e. objects belonging to the realm of corporeality, and/or when one cognizes (through svanāṇa-pratyākṣa) affective sensations (vedanāskāndha), perceptive identifications (samjñāskāndha), cognitions (viṣajñāskāndha), etc.
of [any] nature of its own (svayam) [i.e. independently of the nature of y] for its nature is nothing but that which appears [in cognition in the form of y, and this for two reasons: 

(63) first] because if x were endowed with a nature [of its own, i.e. if it were not simply of the nature of y], then it would appear (pratibhāsapaśaṇa) [separately in cognition], as [does] y:

(64) [and second,] because [something] perceptible (65) does not exist if it does not appear [in cognition].

(66) [And since even if [x] were [held to be] imperceptible, the cognition [still] would not have this form [i.e. the aspect of x],

what is it the cognition of, and related to what?

(67) Moreover (ca), if the [perceptual] cognition of a [real entity] x depends on [something else, say] y, it is certainly not the case that the nature of x ceases to appear (pratibhāṣa eva na sātya) as [does] y:

(68) (69) Moreover (ca), if the perceptual cognition of a [real entity] x depends on something else, say y, it is certainly not the case that the nature of x ceases to appear (pratibhāṣa eva na sātya) as [does] y:

(70) Conclusion, PVT. Je D327b2/P401a4 *PVT. reads *prthak pratibhāṣate. “Now, it does not appear [separately PVT.]. Therefore the pudgala simply does not exist.”

(71) Conclusion, PVT. Je D327b3/P401a4: na ca pratibhāṣate* / tato nāṣṭy eva pudgala/. *PVT. reads *prthak pratibhāṣate. “Now, it does not appear [separately PVT.]. Therefore the pudgala simply does not exist.”

(72) Explanation, PVT. Je D327b3/P401a5: ‘dis ni gani zag med par bsgrub pa’i phyir ra’ zin ma dngos pa bsad pa yin no... “With this, [Dharmakīrti] resorts (bsad pa, *ukt) to the non-perception of a thing/nature (*svabhāvānapalabdhi) in order to demonstrate that the pudgala does not exist.” On svabhāvānapalabdhi, see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10e.

(73) Explanation, PVT. Je D327b3/P401a6: ‘de’i no bo’ es pa ste / gani zag ri’ ran bzin ma dngos pa bsad pa yin no... “The cognition would not have this form, i.e., the cognition would not grasp the nature of the pudgala (*pudgalasvabhāvagṛhaka?).” (2) PVSVT. 529:13: na tadrgam jñānam na pudgalakāram jñānam. “The cognition would not have this form, i.e. the cognition would not have the pudgala as its aspect.”

(74) Conclusion, PVT. Je D327b4/P401a7 = PVSVT 529,14-15: na rūpādjęnaṇāntarāryakaṃ pudgala- jñānam ity arthaḥ / tathā ca na jñānakṛtṛ prabhandaḥ tī bhāvāḥ / “The cognition of the pudgala is not invariably connected to the cognition of [constituents] such as corporeality: this is the meaning. And thus, the relation is not a matter of cognition: this is [Dharmakīrti’s] intention.” Here Dharmakīrti’s reply rests on the principle that if the pudgala were a real entity endowed with a nature of its own it would necessarily produce a distinct cognitive appearance of itself (see above, fn. 33).

(75) Introduction, PVT. Je D327b4-5/P401a7-8 = PVSVT 529,16: ‘rūpādjęnaṇāntarāryakaṃ eva prthak pudgalo na pratibhāṣata tī cet / “Objection: it is because [its] cognition depends on [constituents] such as corporeality that the pudgala does not appear separately [in cognition].”

(76) Explanation, PVSVT 529,19-20: ‘yatā nilādīnām alokaṇaṇasvādāpyaṇaṃ aloka pratibhāsasamāne ‘yi svapratibhāsa na nāṣyati / alokayatvatreṇa teśan prabhādari / tadvat pudgalasvāpya syāt / “For example, the own [cognitive] appearance of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which is related to light, does not cease when light appears [in the cognition], because these [colours] appear distinctly from light [in

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(63) Introduction, PVT. Je D327b1/P401a3 ≈ PVSVT 529,10: athārūpādśvabhāvah pudgalah / tadā... “If the pudgala does not have the constituents as its nature, then...”

(64) Conclusion, PVT. Je D327b2/P401a4 ≈ PVSVT 529,11: na ca pratibhāṣate* / tato nāṣṭy eva pudgala/. *PVT. reads *prthak pratibhāṣate. “Now, it does not appear [separately PVT.]. Therefore the pudgala simply does not exist.”

(65) Explanation, PVT. Je D327b2-3/P401a4-5: snan du ruṇ ba ste dmigs pa’i mtshan ˜ nid kyir gyur pa ni... “Perceptible, i.e. for which the [causal] characteristics for a perception have been attained (*upalabdhilaksānapapraptas).” On upalabdhilaksānapapraptas, see Eltschinger forthcoming a, x10e.

(66) Explanation, PVT. Je D327b3/P401a5: dis ni gan zag med par bsgrub pa’i phyir ra’ zin ma dngos pa bsad pa yin no... “With this, [Dharmakīrti] resorts (bsad pa, *ukt) to the non-perception of a thing/nature (*svabhāvānapalabdhi) in order to demonstrate that the pudgala does not exist.” On svabhāvānapalabdhi, see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10e (and ibid., fn. 17 for bibliographical references).

(67) Explanations. (1) PVT. Je D327b3/P401a6: de’i no bo’ es pa ste / gani zag ri’ ran bzin ma dngos pa ma yin pa... “The cognition would not have this form, i.e., the cognition would not grasp the nature of the pudgala (*pudgalasvabhāvagṛhaka?)?.” (2) PVSVT. 529:13: na tadṛgam jñānam na pudgalakāram jñānam. “The cognition would not have this form, i.e. the cognition would not have the pudgala as its aspect.”

(68) Conclusion, PVT. Je D327b4/P401a7 = PVSVT 529,14-15: na rūpādjęnaṇāntarāryakaṃ pudgala- jñānam ity arthaḥ / tathā ca na jñānakṛtṛ prabhandaḥ tī bhāvāḥ / “The cognition of the pudgala is not invariably connected to the cognition of [constituents] such as corporeality: this is the meaning. And thus, the relation is not a matter of cognition: this is [Dharmakīrti’s] intention.” Here Dharmakīrti’s reply rests on the principle that if the pudgala were a real entity endowed with a nature of its own it would necessarily produce a distinct cognitive appearance of itself (see above, fn. 33).

(69) Introduction, PVT. Je D327b4-5/P401a7-8 = PVSVT 529,16: ‘rūpādnęṇāntarāryakaṃ eva prthak pudgalo na pratibhāṣata tī cet / “Objection: it is because [its] cognition depends on [constituents] such as corporeality that the pudgala does not appear separately [in cognition].”

(70) Explanation, PVSVT 529,19-20: ‘yatā nilādīnām alokaṅaṇasvādāpyaṇaṃ aloka pratibhāsasamāne ‘yi svapratibhāsa na nāṣyati / alokayatvatreṇa teśan prabhādari / tadvat pudgalasvāpya syāt / “For example, the own [cognitive] appearance of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which is related to light, does not cease when light appears [in the cognition], because these [colours] appear distinctly from light [in
Or what does x’s close connection (pratyāsatti) <to y> consist of, so that x itself is [also] manifest (pratyupatīṣṭhate) when one cognizes y [although this y] lacks x’s own nature? For [if it were] so there would an absurdity. Objection: [this close connection consists in] the fact that [the x] which is being cognized has y for its basis (upādana). [Answer: but] what is the meaning of “basis”? [First,] a causality relation [between x and y can] not [be intended] since it is not accepted. Or, if one accepts [a causality relation between x and y, still one does not necessarily perceive x when one perceives y, for] the effect and the cause do not manifest (pratyupasthāpana) a cognition of each other [in a reciprocal way]. Objection: it is the cognition [of x, not x itself,] that is invariably related to y[, and their] close connection [consists in this invariable relation]. [Answer:] has it not been [already] said [above] that this very [invariable relation of a cognition] is impossible in the absence of a relation [between x and y themselves]? Now, [we have already] said [many times] that [there is] no relation between [things] that are not effect and cause [of one another]. [What has been said, i.e. that] “[an x] the cognition of which is invariably related to the cognition of y, etc.,” [this] also would be [true] provided there were a cognition of x [distinct from y. Now, there is no such cognition,] because there is no cognition of that x which does not appear in cognition in its own form, independently (asamsurēṇa) of [anything] heterogeneous (asvarūpa). And for want of such a [cognition], defining the nature of an object [such as x] as inexpressible [as being identical to or other than y] is illegitimate (na sidhyati). A really existing [thing]

the cognition]. Now, the pudgala too should likewise have [a distinct appearance when light appears]."

(71) As testified to by PVSVT D347a4/P511a1 (de la ni [P: D om. ni] don de nē ba gān yin /) and the commentaries [PVT Je D327b6/P401b3: phun po de la ga ngag ces bya ba's don de nē ba ste 'brel pa gān yin /]. PVSVT 529,21: kā vā tasya pudgalasya pratyāsattīḥ sambandhas tatra skandhe /, tatra (PVSV 147,21) belongs to this sentence. We have read: kā vā tasya pratyāsattīḥ tatra /, yat...

(72) Explanation, PVT Je D327b7-328a1/P401b4-5 ≈ PVSVT 529,24-26: apratibaddhe pratibhāsanē yadi niyamena pudgalaḥ pratibhāsē / tadā yasya kosacit pratibhāsane 'nyo 'py ahyāntasambha[d]dhaḥ pratīyeta * ury arthah /. *pratīyeta em. (PVT. rtogs pa 'nid du 'gyur ro): pratīyeta Ed. “If the pudgala necessarily appeared when [something] unrelated [to it appears], then, when whatever appears [in cognition], all [things] other [than that, although] utterly unconnected [to it], would appear: this is the meaning.”

(73) On this term see above, fn. 14.

(74) Explanation, PVSVT 529,30-530,10: yathā kāryāt kāryapratītiṣṭis tathā na kāryāt kāryapratītiv bhavatīty arthah /, “Contrary to the cognition of the cause through the effect, which is legitimate], there is no cognition of the effect through the cause.” On this point, see Eltschinger forthcoming e, §106.

(75) Introduction, PVT Je D328a4-5/P402a2-3 = PVSVT 530,15: akāryakāramayor api pudgalarūpādyogah pratibandho bhavasyatīty ata āha... “[Dharmakīrti] says [what follows] in order to [meet the present objection]: although they [do] not [enter a relation of] effect to cause, the pudgala and [constituents] such corporeality will [certainly] have a relation.”

(76) According to PVT Je D328a5/P402a4 ≈ PVSVT 530,17 (yatpratipattināntarāyakam yajñānām ity api yad ucyate...), in PVSV 147,13-15.
must therefore be possessed of either identity or otherness[77], for there is no other possibility for a real entity].

On PV 2.202-204

Dharmakīrti’s second argument against the pudgala occurs at the very end of his treatment of the Truth of Destruction (nirdeśasatya) in PV 2 (= Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda). Here as in PVSV 147.2-148.5, Dharmakīrti does not allude to the pudgala in any explicit way, so that this interpretation relies on the immediate context (a discussion of the satkāyadrṣṭī and the eschatological consequences of one’s adhering to a self),[78] on terminology (avācya in PV 2.203a and c) and on the (almost) unanimous explanation of these stanzas as a critique of the pudgalavāda by his successors (Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Śántarakṣīta, Kamalaśīla, Manorathanandin).[79]

It is well-known that, at least from Vasubandhu onwards, the Yogācāra intellectuals devel-

[77] PVSV 147.2-148.5: atātavam eva svabhāvāsvāyaṅgaṭtvam / na hī rūparasagor apy anyad eva paraśparan anyattaṃ / svabhāvaprathibandho 'nyattaṃ stī cē / ko 'yaṃ prathibandho nāma yena ca ca na syat / nānyasaṅgatasya ca / javmeti cē / sarvakāyakāryapānaṃ* paraśparan avacytā syat / tathā ca sarvāḥ sarvasya kathāṅcīd upaṇyoṣi ti kaścit kataścid anyah syat / evam cāvacyate ti api kāryakāryaḥbhāva eva sādāntaṅkotāḥ syat / nāthabhedāḥ / svabhāvānunyamanām** te anyattaṃ brāmach / sa ca svabhāvavatān∗ paraśparam astī evēty∗∗ anyattaṃ eva / na ca tajjmanyalakṣānāt svabhāvaprathibandhād anyah prathibandho nāma / anāyatasaṅgatyaṃ svabhāvavirdhotāt / tato dharmahādhi cāvacyatām / jīvāṅkṛtāḥ prathibandho stī cē / syād elat / yatpraptattānātartākocyaṃ yujjyānām tadgatau nisunena tatpratibhāsāsat tad atadṛṣṭaṃ apy avacyaṃ stī / na / tasāya nāsvabhāvātva svayam / sa eva hi tasāya svabhāvāh phalāḥ prathibandhī / svabhāvavattī 'ṣya tadvat pratibhāsaprasannāt / apratibhāsānātasaṅga ca dīryaṅgābhāvāt / adṛṣṭvate 'pi na tadṛṣṭam jīyānam stī ca kasma kiṃyātyāt pratipatthi / na ca yad yaddātappratipatikānām / tasāya svabhāvāvritthā sa nāyata / prakāsātappratīṣṭhānān eva nilādīnām / kāvā ca tasāya pratyāsātītē tatra /∗∗∗ yat tasminañātāmarūpe pratiyamāne sa sveyaṃ pratipatīṣṭhate / atiṣṭrasaṅgo ky evaṃ syat / pratityamānasya tadupādañceti cē / ko 'yaṃ upādānārūthā / na kāryakāryaḥbhāvaḥ 'nabhāvyapāganāt / abhyapagane vā na kāryakārye 'nyongapratiḥpratipasthāpane / pratiḥ eva tāṃstāntāntarjakātā pratipāstitē tī stī / nanu sarvaśātya prathibandhe na yuktē ucaye / nākāryakāryaḥkocyaṃ kāhyatāḥ pratyē api tajjyāne sati syāt / na hi yo viṣyāne svārūpēṇaśvārūpyupāsanāsyena sa pratibhāsaṃ tasāya kiṃcy jīyānam / tadbhāvaṃ na siddhyatī∗∗∗ avacyaḥbhāsānāmsya arthārūpaṃ / tad bhavātā vastuted tattvāntvabhājavahāvatāṃ / *See above, fn. 46. **svabhāvānunyamanam: svabhāvānunyamanam PVSV. ***svabhāvavatān: svabhāvavatān PVSV. ****evēty: eva stī PVSV. *****See above, fn. 71. ******na siddhyatī: na siddhyatī PVSV.


[79] Here as elsewhere, Prajñākaragupta is an exception, as is testifies to by his introduction to PV 2.203. PVA 141.8-9: atāhāya syat – na nītya uṭṭāma pūrvoktadoṣānāṃ nāpy anītya 'prekṣāpāravkāryaprasannāt / aṭo nītyataṃstāntaṅkotāḥ avacyaḥ / tad api na yuktām / "But if [the following] were [urged]: ‘The self (ātman) is neither permanent, because of the afore-mentioned fault, nor impermanent, because an irrational action would follow: therefore it cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent‘ this too is incorrect."
oped a model of causality that denied permanent entities such as God or the self any functionality and therefore any real existence, for only impermanent entities can bring about an effect.\(^{(80)}\) To put it briefly, a permanent entity, the causal capacity of which is complete and unimpeded and therefore does not depend on the circumstantial intervention of a cooperating factor, can bring about an effect neither gradually (\textit{kramen. a}) nor simultaneously (\textit{yaugapadyena}). It cannot bring it about gradually, because nothing prevents this entity from producing its effect entirely at once. But it cannot bring about its effect at one time only, since if it is permanent, no change can occur in its nature and it cannot become inactive once it has started producing. Provided that these authors’ criterion for existence is functionality, only impermanent entities can be considered as existent, whereas permanent entities, which do not meet this requirement, are held to be non-existent.

Interestingly enough, the issue of the causality of permanent entities had already been touched upon in the MSA(Bh)’s critique of the \textit{pudgala}. Suffice it to quote here MSA 18.99-100: “Because the \textit{pudgala} would no [longer] be an agent, because [its exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this \textit{pudgala}’s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen. Neither a [\textit{pudgala}] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [\textit{pudgala}] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this \textit{pudgala}] would [\textit{ipso facto}] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a \textit{pudgala} that would be neither permanent nor impermanent].”\(^{(81)}\)

Now, the causality of permanent entities also provides the doctrinal background of PV 2.202, a stanza most likely to be interpreted as targeting a permanent self:\(^{(82)}\) “[There can be neither bondage nor liberation for something permanent.] Being the cause of the arisal of suffering is [what we call] ‘bondage’: [since what is permanent is devoid of the capacity to bring about anything], how [could this belong] to [something] permanent? [And] being the cause of the non-arisal of suffering is [what we call] ‘liberation’: how [could

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\(^{(80)}\) See Yoshimizu 1999.

\(^{(81)}\) MSA 18.99-100: \textit{akarttvād anityatvād sakrṇityaspravṛttitāh / darśanādṛṣṭu yatnasya svayamabhūtvam na yuyyate / tathāsthitasya naṣṭasya prāgapbāhāvād anityatvāh / trīṇapakṣabhāvāc ca pratīṣṭhāvatvān na yuyyate //}. On these stanzas and Vasubandhu’s commentary, see Eltschinger 2010:320-322. We are not aware of any parallel argument in Vasubandhu’s AKBh.

\(^{(82)}\) As PVP D86a6/P99a6 testifies to (\textit{gzan yain bdag ntid kyi ’chi’i ba dañ thar pa ni yod pa ma yin no} ///. “Moreover, a [permanent] self has neither bondage nor liberation.”).

\(^{(83)}\) According to PVP D86a7/P99a7: \textit{’ga’ sīg la yain nus pa med pa’i phyir...}
this belong [to something] permanent?"(84) But at least according to Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, Dharmakīrti’s target in the next stanza has shifted to the Pudgalavādin (which Manorathanandin takes to be a Vaibhāṣika!(85)): if only impermanent entities are able to perform functionalities, then the pudgala, which cannot be said to be impermanent according to the Personalist opponent, is no more able than the permanent self to act as a cause of bondage or liberation.(86) And such is indeed the intent of the objection that opens Devendrabuddhi’s commentary on PV 2.203: “Let us admit that [something] permanent [like the outsiders’ self] has neither bondage nor liberation. [As for ourselves,] however, [our position is not flawed] since we acknowledge that the pudgala, which cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent, [experiences] bondage and liberation.” Dharmakīrti’s answer runs as follows: “For that which cannot be said to be permanent [can] not [be] the cause of anything, [so that] even in the case of [something] that cannot be said [to be impermanent], bondage and liberation cannot be experienced in any way.”(87) While explaining Dharmakīrti’s stanza, Devendrabuddhi discards the Pudgalavādin’s objection as follows: “This is not the case, for there [can] be no [real] entity lacking one of the two aspects, since [the two properties of being] permanent and [being] impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory. [This is] because, for a [real] entity, being excluded (*vyavaccheda?) from one of [these two] is invariably connected to possessing the other one,
and possessing one [of these two] is invariably connected to being excluded from the other one. Now, this *pudgala* can be either momentary or non-momentary. To begin with, if it is non-momentary, then it is permanent, because such is the state of [that which] exceeds [one single] moment. Therefore it would be contradictory if [something] permanent could not be said to be permanent.”

However the most detailed treatment of this stanza (to be more precise, of PV 2.203ab) is to be found in Kamalaśīla’s commentary on TS 347, which is much indebted to Devendrabuddhi’s above-quoted explanation of PV 2.203. Kamalaśīla introduces his master’s stanza as follows: “It is not only because it cannot be said to be either identical with or other than [the constituents] that one shows that the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity; it is also because [the *pudgala*] cannot be said to be impermanent that [it] is a non-entity. In order to show this, [Śāntarakṣita] states [TS 347].”

As we can see, this statement provides us with an interesting transition between Dharmakīrti’s two lines of argument, i.e. between the critique of the *pudgala* as *tattvānyatvāvācya* and the critique of the *pudgala* as *anityatvenāvācya*; and here as in the previous argument, the notion of *arthakriyā* plays a pivotal role. Śāntarakṣita spells this out as follows: “Moreover, the capacity to [perform] functionalities is the [only] definition of existence, [and this capacity] is limited to momentary [things] only. Thus [something] that cannot be said [to be momentary] is not a [real] entity.”

Let us now quote Kamalaśīla’s explanation in full: “Indeed, the definition of existence, [i.e.] the nature of a [real] entity, amounts to this only: the capacity to [perform] functionalities, because not being a [real] entity is defined as [being] devoid of any [functional] efficacy. Therefore being a [real] entity is indirectly defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities. Now, this functionality is limited to momentary [things] only. [Śāntarakṣita’s] implicit idea is: it implies (*vyāpta*) momentariness. [And this is] because it is contradictory that [something] permanent [may perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time. As a consequence, the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity [if it] cannot be said to

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(89) PVP D86b3-6/P99b4-7: de ni ma yin te / gñi gu'i rnam pa (P: par D) ma yin pa'i d'nos po med pa'i phyur ro // rtag pa dæi mi rtag pa dag ni pham tshan spai te gnas pa'i misban tiid can yin pa'i phyur ro // d'nos po la gyc gnam po par gead (D: bcad P) da'i yon'i su goad pa dag ni de las gian yon'i su goad pa dæii rnam par gead pa med na ma ma 'byüi ba tiid can yin pa'i phyur ro // gan zog de yin skad cig ma 'am skad cig na ma yin par 'gyur gräi na / re 'zil gal te skad cig ma ma yin pa de'i tshe skad cig ma las phyi ma'i gnas skabs tiid yin pa'i phyur rtag pa yin no // de bas na rtag pa ni rtag pa tiid du brjod par bya ba ma yin no žes bya ba 'gal lo // /. In the parallel passage of the TSP (see below, fn. 93.), *tyāga* and *parigraha* correspond to the PVP’s *rnam par gead pa* and *yon'i su goad pa*. Now if *vyavaccheda* can be interpreted in the sense of *tyāga*, the same cannot be said of *pariccheda* and *parigraha*. The meaning of *pariccheda* remains obscure. Of course, one cannot rule out the hypothesis that the Sanskrit manuscript(s) used by the Tibetan translators already read *pariccheda* instead of *parigraha* (due to scribal error).

(90) TSP S 116,6-7/TSPk 128,13-14: na kwe la tattvānyatvābhyām avācyāvatvā avastu pudgalo 'yam iti pratipādaḥ / ito 'py anityatvenāvācyaḥ evāvastu iti pratipādayann āha...

(91) TS 347: arthakriyāsu śakti ca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam / kṣanikeśe eva nityāt talāh 'vācyena vastutā //.
be momentary in this way, because in this case one negates momentariness, which is implied by [functionality], as one negates a [property] such as being a śīṃśapā when one negates [the property of] being a tree. As [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.203ab]: ‘For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything.’ Suppose the following be urged: if the pudgala were permanent, then it would be contradictory for it to [perform] a functionality either gradually or simultaneously. [But] insofar as (yāvata... atah) it [cannot be said] to be permanent any more than it can be said to be impermanent, its efficacy in [performing] a functionality is not contradictory at all. [We reply:] this is incorrect, for an entity lacking both aspects cannot be a [real] individual (svalakṣaṇa), because [the properties of being] permanent and impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory (anyonyāvyttisparhāastrita), since, for a [certain real] entity, lacking (tyāga) one aspect is invariably connected to possessing the other one, [and] possessing (parigraha) [one aspect is invariably connected to] lacking [the other one]. Indeed, we do not refuse the application of the word ‘avācya’ to the pudgala, because nobody can negate [something that, like any other verbal designation, is] based on mere free will, but this [pudgala] is [unfortunately] presented here as having the nature of an entity. Does the nature of this entity called ‘pudgala’ always exist or not? If it [always] exists, then it is simply permanent, for what is called ‘permanent’ is nothing else; rather, one calls ‘permanent’ a nature that lasts forever [and] does not perish, as [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.204ab]: ‘Wise [people] call ‘permanent’ that nature which does not perish.’

But in the hypothesis that [its nature] does not [always] exist, then again it is simply impermanent, because [being] impermanent is defined as [having] a nature that does not last. As a consequence, since there is no other possibility than [being] momentary or non-momentary, and since it is contradictory that [something] non-momentary [may perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time, existence, which is defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities, implies momentariness. It is

(92) PV 2.204: nityam tam ātār vidvānso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati / tyaktvam durpanim drśtim ato sa nitya ucyatām // “Once they have got rid of the embarrassing false view [that superimposes a pudgala whose nature is neither permanent nor impermanent], wise [people] call ‘permanent’ that nature which does not perish. Therefore this [pudgala whose nature does not perish] must be called ‘permanent’.”
therefore established that one negates existence when one negates momentariness.” (93)

As we can see from the immediate context and the purport of PV 2.202-204, Dharmakirti’s critique of the pudgala has obvious soteriological implications, for giving credence to the existence of such a pseudo-entity threatens one’s progression along the Buddhist path toward salvation. First and foremost, the pudgalavāda is nothing but a characteristic instance of satkāyadrṣti (in its parikalpita, “speculative” form, the one eliminated with the darsānamārya, the “path of vision” (94)), i.e. nescience (avidyā), the very origin of suffering according to Dharmakirti. And by negating the impermanence of the pudgala, the Pudgalavādin also denies it any functionality, i.e. deprives it of any agency over transmigration and liberation.

(93) TSP 116,10-297 TSPK 128,17-129,8: idam eva hi vidyāmānatvalakaṃṇam vastusvabhāvo yad utārthākriguṣu saktī / sarvasāmarthyaśvabrakalakṣaṇatvād avastūrvayeti sāmarthṛśad arthaḥkriguṣ- sāmarthylaṃkāraṃ eva vastuṭvam avatārṣante / sā cārthaḥkriguṣaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ eva nityā / kṣaṇakatvenavivāpyeti yava / nityasya kramaṇaupadeśādhyāṃ arthaḥkriguṣvirodhaḥ / tatas tathā kṣaṇakatvenavācya pudgale vastutā nāsti / tatā tadvigāpasya kṣaṇakatvenava nīṃṛṭer vyakṣatvaniśvṛttavad stī / yathokaṃtā – anityatvam yo 'vacyah sa hetu na hi kasyacid itī / syād etal – yadi pudgalo nityā syāt tādā tasya kramaṇaupadeśādhyāṃ arthaḥkriguṣvirodhaḥ syāt / yāvāt tathā 'svā anityatvenāvācyas tathā nityatvenāpyītato 'rthaḥkriguṣāṃśāmṛtyam anyāvṛddham evēt / **tad asamyo / na hy ubhayākara-vinniruktāṃ vastu svalakaṃṇam yuktam / nīṃṛτyāṅyītanyo anyāvṛddhīparbhārasthitaḥkalakaṃṇatvāt / vastūnītākārasyāpārāparāhogyānādānītyā-spanītvāt / na hy asmābhīr avācya-sadbāvavēṣetām pudgale prātisiddhyate / svaṃtānṃvāntāntādhihānani** kṣaṇiṣcit praśiddhām udākṣayātā kṣaṇī eva hi vastuṣṭravam uttāpyate / kīṃ asaḥ pudgalaḥkāryaḥ vastunāḥ svabhāvo sarvādā 'ṣty ākossanā nāstītī / yady astī tadbā nityā evāsau / na hi nityā nāmāh eva kaścid api tu yāḥ svabhāvo sadāvasthiyāt na vrajaṇatī sa nitya ucye / yathoktām – nīmṛtau stī āhār vyāṇavo yāḥ svabhāvo na nāyatiiti**** / atha nāstītī pakṣo taddāpy anitya evāsau / anavasthāyaśvabhāvadkalakaṃṇatvād anityaṣya / atāḥ kṣaṇiṣkāṃkṣaṇānītyātreyekiṣva gātāntarābhāvadoh kṣaṇākṣaya eva kramaṇaupadeśādhyāṃ arthaḥkriguṣvirodhaḥ kṣaṇakatvenārthaḥkriguṣāṃśāmṛtyam evēt / sattvanā śvāṃca kṣaṇakatvenārthaḥkriguṣāṃśāmṛtyam evēt / svabhāvo / **PV 2.203ab. **To be compared with PVP D86b3-6/P99b4-7, quoted above, fn. 89. ****ādhihānani TSP 2390, ēānātiṣya TSPK. *****PV 2.204ab.

(94) On the distinction between sākhājī (“innate”) and vi- or pari-kalpīta satkāyadrṣti, see Eltschinger 2009:172-173.
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TDS  *Tridharmakāśāstra. T 25, no. 1506, 15c-30a.

tib.  Tibetan version.

Keywords

Buddhism, Dharmakīrti, pudgala – person, pudgalavāda – personalism, Sāṃmitiya, nairātmya – selflessness, nairātmyavāda – doctrine of selflessness