

## Dharmakīrti against the *pudgala*\*

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The rise to prominence of the Vātsīputrīyas and especially the Sāṃmitīyas,<sup>(1)</sup> two Buddhist sects noted for their defence of a “person” (*pudgala*) that cannot be said (*avakātavya*, *avācya*) to be either the same or different from the constituents (*skandha*), is very likely to have aroused a heated controversy as regards the ontological status of the *pudgala*, the Buddha’s didactic intentions while referring to it as well as its soteriological relevance. Taking into consideration the fact that the Sāṃmitīyas had become, by the middle of the 7<sup>th</sup> century, the numerically most important among the Buddhist Śrāvakayānist denominations, this controversy raises very interesting sociohistorical and methodological questions as regards the use of such categories as “orthodoxy” and “heterodoxy” in the Indian Buddhist context. And indeed, the anti-Personalist doctors showed no unanimity as to whether their Pudgalavādin opponents were co-religionists (*svayūthya*<sup>(2)</sup>) or not, i.e. genuine Buddhists (*bauddha*<sup>(3)</sup>) capable of obtaining the highest fruit of religious life, or rather pseudo-, purely nominal Buddhists (*saugatammanya*<sup>(4)</sup>) espousing the outsiders’ doctrines (*antaścāratīrthika*, “outsiders from within”<sup>(5)</sup>).<sup>(6)</sup> Extant Sanskrit and/or (translational) Tibetan literature records three

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(1) See Eltschinger 2010:292-293.

(2) MSAVBh *Tsi* D163a1-4/P191b2-6, MAV 244,8, 286,12.

(3) AKVy 699,4-5.

(4) TS 336, BCAP 329,1.

(5) BCAP 328,28.

(6) See Eltschinger 2010:293, fn. 8.

main testimonies concerning the *pudgala* controversy, all of which reflect the anti-Personalist side:<sup>(7)</sup> Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh), Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* (MAV 244,1-288,9) and Kamalaśīla's commentary (*Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*, TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 159,16-166,18/TSP<sub>K</sub>125,16-131,9) on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* (TS 336-349). Whereas the latter two have received comparatively little attention,<sup>(8)</sup> the so-called ninth chapter of the AKBh has been made the object of several editions, translations, summaries and studies.<sup>(9)</sup> However, probably due to both the institutional importance of the Sāmmitīyas and the doctrinal as well as soteriological relevance of the topic, the controversy over Personalism did attract the attention of several other outstanding Buddhist scholars, and it left traces in parts of their works. This is the case of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (MSA 18.92-103) and its *Bhāṣya* (MSABh 154,27-160,6), of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* (PVSV 147,2-148,5 and PV 2.202-204) and of Bhāviveka/Bhavya's *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (MHK 3.90-93).<sup>(10)</sup> Now, these allegedly minor testimonies have remained either entirely neglected (MSA[Bh]) or largely unnoticed (PVSV/PV 2, MHK 3.90-93). This disdain is unjustified in at least two cases: the MSA(Bh) presents many interesting arguments, and although a number of them do not recur in Vasubandhu's polemical tract, it is a likely source of AKBh 9; as for the PVSV, it presents us with an entirely new line of argument (that, however, left hardly any trace in subsequent epistemological literature). One of the two authors of this study has dealt with MSA(Bh) 18.92-103 elsewhere.<sup>(11)</sup> The present essay focuses on Dharmakīrti's anti-Personalist arguments in PVSV 147,2-148,5 and PV 2.202-204.

### ***The immediate context and doctrinal background of PVSV 147,2-148,5***

To the best of our knowledge, Dharmakīrti alludes nowhere explicitly to the *pudgala*. How to make sure, then, that PVSV 147,2-148,5 is directed against the (or at least one version

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<sup>(7)</sup> The ideas of the Pudgalavādins are known to us mainly through their opponents' literature. On the literature of the Pudgalavādins themselves, see Venkata Ramanan 1953, Bareau 1955:115 and 122, Chau 1984:7-8, Chau 1987:34-35, Cousins 1995:84-90, Buswell 1999, Priestley 1999 and Lusthaus 2009. On the terms *pudgalavāda*/Pudgalavādin, used here for convenience's sake but which refer neither to an institutional sect nor to a doctrinal school and were probably employed by the opponents of Personalism rather than by its proponents, see e.g. Lusthaus 2009:275, fn. 1 and Eltschinger 2010:292-293, fn. 7.

<sup>(8)</sup> See Schayer 1931, Tauscher 1981:36-39, Duerlinger 1984 and 2008, Huntington 1992:171-177.

<sup>(9)</sup> See e.g. Stcherbatsky 1970, *Kośa* V.230-302, Duerlinger 1982, 1989a, 1989b, 2003a and 2009, Anacker 1999 and Goodman 2009. Editions include Pr and LE.

<sup>(10)</sup> On the latter, see Iida 1980:173-175.

<sup>(11)</sup> See Eltschinger 2010.

of the) *pudgalavāda*? Let us distinguish here between external and internal criteria. External criteria exhaust themselves in the fact that Dharmakīrti's commentators Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin are unanimous in holding this passage as a piece of polemics against the *pudgala*. Besides their introductory objection,<sup>(12)</sup> both of them consistently explain Dharmakīrti's anaphoras (*tad*, etc.) as referring either to the *pudgala* or the *skandhas* (quite often: *rūpādi*). Among the internal criteria, let us mention first that significant parts of Dharmakīrti's terminology are reminiscent of traditional discussions about the *pudgala*. Thus the word *avācya* (PVSV 147,6, 7, 15, 148,4), highly characteristic – especially in the context of the treatment of identity (*tattva*) and otherness (*anyat[t]va*) –, clearly echoes the Pudgalavādins' *avaktavya/avācya*,<sup>(13)</sup> so does the allusion to *upādāna* (PVSV 147,23), which is to be interpreted in a sense closer to the notion of *upādāyaprajñāpti* (“designation-on-the-basis-of”) than to that of *upādāna* as “material cause” found in the Abhidharmic theory of causality.<sup>(14)</sup> Moreover, the opponent's recourse to causality (PVSV 147,5-12) as a means of demonstrating that a certain entity (the effect) cannot be said to be either identical with or different from another one (the cause) is certainly reminiscent of the MSA(Bh)'s and the AKBh's lengthy digressions on the relationship between fuel (*indhana*, etc.) and

(12) See below, fn. 41.

(13) On the Pudgalavādins' thesis that the *pudgala* cannot be said (*avaktavya*, *avācya*) to be either the same as or other than the constituents (or that it is inexpressible insofar as it cannot be described either in terms of identity or in terms of otherness with respect to the *skandhas*), see e.g. Chau 1984:11, Chau 1987:42, chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Lusthaus 2009:279-280. Cf. MSA 18.93ab (stating that the *pudgala* is *ekatvānyatvato 'vācyaḥ*: see below, fn. 26; see also MSA 18.94-95) and MSAVBh *Tsi* D163a1-4/P191b2-6 (quoted in Eltschinger 2010:307, fn.53). See also AKBh, e.g. 464,4/LE58,3: *atha rūpapudgalavat tadupalabdhyor apy anyānanyatvam avaktavyam...* “But if [the Pudgalavādin replies that] just as a visible shape and the *pudgala* [cannot be said to be other than or identical to each other], their [respective] perceptions as well cannot be said (*avaktavya*) to be other than or identical to [each other]...” (On the meaning of *rūpa* in this context, see below, fn. 62.) The idea is found again in TS 337: *skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo nānyas tīrthadṛṣṭiprasaṅgataḥ / nānanyo 'nekatādyāpteḥ sādhvī tasmād avācyatā //*. “The *pudgala* is neither other than the constituents—for [otherwise] the outsiders' [false] view [of a permanent self] would ensue—nor the same [as them], for [otherwise its] multiplicity would follow; as a consequence, [its] being inexpressible (*avācyatā*) [in terms of identity or otherness with regard to the constituents] is well [established].” See also below, fn. 26.

(14) On the probable meaning of *upādāna/upādāya* (both as “basis”/“on the basis of” and as “appropriation”/“after appropriating”) in *pudgalavāda*(s), see e.g. Chau 1987:36, Cousins 1995:89 and Priestley 1999:71-72. AKBh 461,19-20/LE40,3-4 ascribes to the Pudgalavādin the assertion that the *pudgala* is designated on the basis of (*upādāya*) the constituents: *ādhyātmikān upātān vartamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñāpyate / tad idam andhavacanam anunmilitārthaṃ na budhyāmahe / kim idam upādāyeti /*. “[Objection:] The *pudgala* is designated on the basis of the constituents that are internal, appropriated [as belonging to oneself and] existing [when the *pudgala* is designated]. [Answer: as for us,] we do not understand this obscure statement the meaning of which [you have] not made clear: what does this [mean], ‘on the basis of’?” (Cf. PVSV 147,23: *ko 'yam upādānārthaḥ /*. “[But] what is the meaning of ‘basis’?”) The greater part of the *pudgala* critique in the AKBh is then devoted to the refutation of this thesis (see e.g. the quotations of the AKBh below, fn. 29, where both *upādāya* and *upādāna* appear).

fire (*agni*, etc.).<sup>(15)</sup> We take it for granted, then, that PVSV 147,2-148,5 is to be interpreted as a critique of the (or a version of the) *pudgalavāda*.

Yet the passage shows significant differences with respect to previous attempts to refute Personalism.<sup>(16)</sup> Making an exhaustive list of these differences and systematically examining them is far beyond the scope of this article, but a brief summary of the passage's context and structure may be of help in understanding how Dharmakīrti's strategy in the *pudgala* controversy departs from that of his predecessors.

The discussion over the *pudgala* occurs in the context of the inference of the fact that things perish at every single moment (*vināśītvānumāna*).<sup>(17)</sup> While explaining the reason of this inference, i.e. the fact that things' destruction is spontaneous or causeless (*ahetuka*), Dharmakīrti specifies that stating this reason does not amount to seeing destruction as a property which would come to belong to the perishing entity. When saying that a thing's destruction is causeless (a formula seemingly implying that the thing and its destruction are ontologically distinct), the proponent of causeless destruction only makes use of an artificial distinction so as to make clear that there is no cause for destruction,<sup>(18)</sup> for the use of an

(15) At least some Pudgalavādins seem to have compared the relation between the constituents and the *pudgala* with the causal relation between fuel and fire, arguing that fuel and fire cannot be said to be either identical or mutually other; see Venkata Ramanan 1953:182, Chau 1987:35, Cousins 1995:88, Buswell 1999:360 and chapter 11 in Priestley 1999. This fuel-fire analogy (which, according to Cousins 1995:88, does not occur in the earliest accounts of the *pudgalavāda* and might have been borrowed by "later Pudgalavādins" from chapter 10 of Nāgārjuna's MMK) is mentioned (before being criticized: see below, fn. 28) in MSABh 156,13-14 (*yathāgnir indhanān nānyo nānanyo vaktavya iti*, "As fire can be said to be neither distinct from nor the same as the fuel...") and AKBh 462,1-2/LE42,2-3 (*na cānya indhanād agniḥ śakyate pratijñātum\* / nāpy anyayaḥ /*. \*AKBh<sub>LE</sub> *pratiñātum*: AKBh<sub>PT</sub> *prajñāpayitum*. "And fire cannot be asserted [to be] either other than fuel or identical."). See Duerlinger 1982 and Eltschinger 2010:315, fn.76.

(16) For instance the MSABh devotes much of the discussion over the *pudgala* to the examination of the exegetical problems that a personalistic doctrine entails (on the *yukti/āgama* structure of the MSABh argument, see Eltschinger 2010:298) and so does AKBh (from 464,25/LE64,1 onwards it mainly deals with scriptural matters), whereas this aspect of the problem is conspicuously absent in PVSV 147,2-148,5.

(17) On this inference see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §12b and (for bibliographical references) fn. 23.

(18) PVSV 145,11-20 (together with PV 1.276): *kathaṃ tarhīdānīm ahetuko vināśo bhavatiṭy ucyate / naśyan bhāvo 'parāpekṣa iti tajjñāpanāya sā / avasthā 'hetur uktāsyā bhedaṃ āropya cetasā // na bhāvo jāto 'parasmān nāśaṃ pratilabhate / tathābhūtasyaiva svayaṃ jāter ity aparāpekṣadharmāntarapratīṣedhārthaṃ tatsvabhāvajñāpanenārthāntaram iva dharmīṇo dharmāṃ cetasā vibhajya tanmātraññāsāyāṃ svabhāva eva tathocyate / tad etan mandabuddhayaḥ kvacit tathādarśanād ghoṣamātravipralabdā nāśaṃ guṇaṃ tasya ca bhāvam āropya sahetukam ahetukaṃ vāpratiṣṭhitatattvayā bhāvacintayātmānam ākulayanti /*. "[Objection:] Now[, if there is nothing called 'destruction'], then in what sense do [you] say that destruction is causeless? [Answer:] *An entity does not depend on [anything] else [i.e. a cause of destruction] while perishing. Therefore in order to indicate this [i.e. the fact that it does not depend on a cause of destruction, we] say [that] this state [of destruction] is without a cause. [And this we do] after having [erroneously] construed through [conceptual] thought a [purely artificial] distinction between this [state of destruction and the destroyed en-*

expression such as “the x of y” does not necessarily imply that x and y are distinct real entities.<sup>(19)</sup> The opponent objects that Dharmakīrti, who has repeatedly stated that an

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*tity itself*] (PV 1.276). An entity, once produced, does not receive [its] destruction from [anything] else [i.e. from any cause of destruction], for it is produced itself as being exactly such [i.e. as possessing a transient nature]. Thus when one wishes to know just this [i.e. when one wonders whether the destruction of an entity comes from something else or not],<sup>a</sup> by indicating the [transient] nature of this [entity] in order to negate a distinct property [i.e. destruction] that [would] depend on [something] else, it is [in fact nothing but this] nature that [we] describe in those terms (*tathā*), [but this we do] after distinguishing through [conceptual] thought a property [i.e. destruction] from a property-bearer as if [this property were] something [really] distinct [from it]. [And] this is precisely what (*tad etat*)<sup>b</sup> dull-witted [people erroneously] construe (*āropya*) as a [distinct] property [consisting in] destruction, [subsequently construing] its existence as well [and its being] either with or without a cause, [as these people are] led astray by the mere words[: ‘The entity’s destruction occurs’] because they have seen, in a certain [other] case [i.e. in such words as ‘the king’s servant’<sup>c</sup> that it is] so, [i.e. that such a statement refers to two distinct entities. In so doing] they perplex themselves with [idle] ontological considerations (*bhāvacintā*) of unfounded truth.” <sup>a</sup> According to PVṬ *Je* D323a5/P395a6-7 ≈ PVSṬ 521,28-29: *bhāvasyānyasmāt kiṃ vināśo bhavati na veti\*...\*veti* em. PVṬ (... ‘gyur ram ’on te...): *ceti* Ed. <sup>b</sup>Note PVṬ *Je* D323a6/P395a8-b1 ≈ PVSṬ 521,31-522,10: *tad etad ... bhāvād\* avyatiriktaṃ nāśītvam tattvato vyavasthāpitam ... \*bhāvād* em. PVṬ (*dños po las*): *abhāvād* Ed. “Precisely that destruction that has been determined as not being really distinct from the [perishing] entity [itself].” <sup>c</sup>PVṬ *Je* D323a7/P395b2 = PVSṬ 522,12-13: *rājñāḥ puruṣa ityādau vyatirekavibhakti\*prayoge tathādarśanāt sambandhinor vibhāgadarśanāt / .* \*Note PVṬ *tha dad pa’i rten can rnam par dbye ba*, “case-endings that possess a distinct basis.” “Because they have seen, in a use of the case-endings [conveying] a distinction, such as: ‘the king’s servant’, [that it is] so [i.e. that there is] a distinction between the two correlates.” On the use of the genitive *vyatirekavibhakti* when there is no real difference, see fn. 19.

(19) PVS 32,18-33,5 (together with PV 1.60): *nanu ca vācyaviśeṣābhāvāt saṅketabhedo ’py ayukto dvayor ekābhīdhānāt / tathā ca vyatirekiṇyā vibhakter ayogas tasyā bhedaśrayatvāt / dvayor ekābhīdhāne ’pi vibhaktir vyatirekiṇī / bhinnam artham iwānveti vācye leśaviśeṣataḥ // na vai śabdānām kācid viśayasvabhāvāyattā vṛttir icchāto vṛtṭyabhāvaprasaṅgāt / te yathā vyatirikte ’vyatirikte vā prayoktum iśyante tathā niyuktās tam artham apratibandhena prakāśayanti / tena gaur gotvam ityekārthābhīdhāne ’pi kasyacid viśeṣasya pratyāyanārthaṃ kṛte saṅketabhede vyatiriktārthā vibhaktir arthāntaram iwādarśayanti pratibhāty anarthāntare ’pi tathāprayogadarśanābhīyāsāt / na tāvatā sarvatra bhedaḥ / anyatrāpi puruṣecchāvaśāt pravṛttasya pratibandhābhāvāt / yathaikaṃ kvacid ekavacanena khyāpyate tadaviśeṣe ’pi gauravādikhyāpanārthaṃ bahuvacanena / .* “Objection (*nanu ca*): since the [thing] signified [by the two words ‘property’ and ‘property-bearer’] is the same (*viśeṣābhāva*), even a distinct convention is improper, for these two [words] refer to one [and the same thing]. And thus[, since the property and the property-bearer are not distinct things according to you], a [genitive] case-ending conveying a distinction<sup>a</sup> is improper, because [the use of] this [case-ending] presupposes (*āśraya*) a [real] distinction. [Answer:] *Even though the [two words expressing the property and the property-bearer] refer to one [and the same thing], the [genitive] case-ending, which [usually] conveys a distinction, shows (anveti, gl. darśayati) the object as [if it were] distinct because of the slight difference [brought] into the signified [by a distinct convention], and not because of any real difference*. (PV 1.60) The reference of words is certainly never (*na ... śabdānām kācid ... vṛtṭiḥ*) based on the [intrinsic] nature of the [external] objects, for it would follow that reference would not be [made] arbitrarily. These [words are] employed in the way one wishes to use [them, be it] with regard to [something] distinct[, as when one says: ‘the king’s servant’], or with regard to [something that is] not distinct[, as when one says: ‘It is the self that is the seer of the self’, and they] manifest this object without any restriction (*apratibandhena*). Therefore, even though the [two words] ‘cow’ [for the property-bearer and] ‘cowness’ [for the property] refer to one [and the same] thing, when a specific convention is made in order to make known a certain difference,<sup>b</sup> the [genitive] case-ending whose object is [usually] distinct appears and

entity x is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to an entity y,<sup>(20)</sup> must admit that destruction is either distinct from the entity that perishes (but then destruction should be perceived as a distinct entity, which is not the case) or identical with it (but then nothing can happen to this entity that is destruction itself): whatever the case, how can the entity ever perish?<sup>(21)</sup> Dharmakīrti answers that in fact

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[*ipso facto*] presents [the property] as [if it were] something different [from the property-bearer] although it is not something different; [and this occurs] because of [our] habit of observing [the genitive case-ending] being used in this way[, i.e. when there is a real distinction]. [But] for all this[, i.e. due to the mere use of this case-ending], there is not a [real] distinction in every case, because there is nothing to prevent a [word conveying a distinction from being] used according to human arbitrariness in another case as well[, i.e. when there is no real difference]. For example, one [thing] is expressed in a certain [context] with the singular [*tvam*, and in another context] with the plural [*yūyam*] in order to express respect, etc., even though [this thing] does not differ with regard to its [oneness].”<sup>a</sup> Note PVSVT 146,11: *vyatirekiṅyā iti vyatirekābhīdhāyinyā gor gotvam iti śaṣṭhyā /*, and PVSVT 146,15: *vibhaktir vyatirekiṅ vyatirekasya vācīkā śaṣṭhī /*.<sup>b</sup> PVSVT 146,25-26: *agovyāvṛttinimittasya gotvasya prakāśanārtham / agovyāvṛttimātram gotvaśabdena pratipādyam ity evaṃkr̥te (sanketabhede)*... “When a specific convention is made as follows: with a view to manifesting that cowness is the criterion of the exclusion of [one thing] from non-cows, the mere exclusion [of this thing] from non-cows must be indicated by the word ‘cowness’.” On the issues of the genitive case-ending and distinction/non-distinction in the context of the refutation of the *puḍgala*, see also MAV 6.143 (Huntington 1992:174-175).

(20) PVSV 75,21-22: *svabhāvo hi svabhāvān na tattvam anyatvaṃ vā laṅghayati / rūpasyātadbhūtasānyatvāvyatikramāt /*. “[And] indeed, a [real] nature [x] does not avoid being either identical to or other than a [real] nature [y], for a [real] nature [x] that is not y does not elude being other [than y].” PVSV 117,18-20: *...vastu... nīyamena... bhedābhedau nātivartate / rūpaṃ hi vastu / tasyātattvam evānyattvam ity uktam /*. “Necessarily, a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] distinction and non-distinction, for a [real] entity is a nature. [Now, we have already] said [above in PVSV 75,21-22] that otherness is nothing but x’s not being y.” PVSV 118,23-24: *na ca bhedābhedau muktvā vastuno ’nyā gatiḥ / tasya rūpalakṣaṇatvāt / rūpasya caitadvikalpānavṛttheḥ /*. “And for a [real] entity [x], there is no other possibility than being distinct or not [from an entity y], because this [real entity] is defined as a nature, and because a nature does not escape this alternative [between distinction and non-distinction].” PVSV 144,11: *tasmāt sato rūpasya tattvānyattvāvyatikramāt /*. “Therefore [it is so] because a [really] existing nature [x] does not escape [the alternative between] being identical with or other than [y].” See also PVSV 64,3-7.

(21) PVSV 145,21-25 (together with PV 1.277ab): *svato ’pi bhāve ’bhāvasya vikalpās ced ayaṃ samaḥ / nanv aparabhāvitve ’pi vināśasya svato eva bhāvasya bhavato ’yaṃ tattvānyattvavikalpas tulyaḥ / tadā kim arthāntarabhāve bhāvo na dṛśyate / anarthāntaratve ’pi tad eva tad bhavati / tan na kiṃcid asya jātam iti kathaṃ vinaśto nāma /*. “[Objection:] Even if [one admits with you that] non-existence [i.e. destruction] exists by itself [i.e. is causeless, you have to face] the same alternative [between identity and otherness] (PV 1.277ab). But even if [destruction] is not due to [anything] else, [you have to face] the same alternative as to whether an entity’s destruction existing only by itself is the same [as the entity itself] or other [than it]. Then if [this causeless destruction] exists as something distinct, why don’t [we] perceive this [distinct] entity?<sup>a</sup> [But] again, in case [this causeless destruction] is not something distinct, it is the [entity itself, say a pot,] that is what [is called ‘destruction’]. Therefore since nothing happens to the [entity], how [can it be called] ‘destroyed’ [at all]?”<sup>a</sup> PVT Je D323b5/P396a2: *...ci’i phyir mi snañ ste / snañ ba ñid du ’gyur ro /*. “Why don’t [we] perceive this entity? [We] should perceive [it].” Here does *bhāvaḥ* refer to destruction (which should be perceived if it is a distinct entity) or to the entity such as the pot (which remains unaffected by destruction if destruction is something distinct from it, so that it should be perceived)? The interpretation of *tan na kiṃcid asya jātam iti* depends on the answer given to this question. In the first hypothesis, this

the alternative between identity and otherness only applies to the arising of something real possessed of a distinct nature. As a consequence it cannot concern destruction itself, for the proponent of causeless destruction does not assert the existence of a distinct property called “destruction” but only the fact that the entity itself does not exist.<sup>(22)</sup> Destruction only appears to be endowed with a nature of its own when we say that it *is* causeless, but the activity (*vyāpāra*) expressed by any verbal root<sup>(23)</sup> (i.e. here, the activity consisting in existing) can only belong to an entity endowed with functionalities, so that destruction cannot be considered the real agent of the verb “to be”. Thus when we say that a hare’s horn *is* a non-existence, far from asserting the hare’s horn existence, we actually intend to deny the existence of the hare’s horn; accordingly, the statement “destruction *is* causeless” is not the affirmation that destruction exists as a real entity but the negation of its having a cause. Dharmakīrti concludes that only a real entity *x* (i.e. only an entity possessing a nature of its own, which is not the case of destruction) is subjected to the alternative

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conclusion concerns *anarthāntaratve 'pi tad eva tad bhavati*. In the second hypothesis, it concerns both members of the alternative.

(22) PVSV 145,25-146,1 (together with PV 1.277cd): *nanv atra / na tasya kiṃcid bhavati na bhavaty eva kevalam // ity uktam / na hy ayaṃ vināśo 'nyo vā kaścid bhāvasya bhavatīty āha / kiṃ tarhi / sa eva bhāvo na bhavatīti / yadi hi kasyacid bhāvaṃ brūyāt / na bhāvo 'nena nivartitaḥ syāt / tathā ca bhāvanivṛttau prastutāyām aprastutam evoktaṃ syāt / na hi kasyacid bhāvena bhāvo na bhūto nāma / tadā na bhūto yadi svayaṃ na bhavet /*. “[Answer:] But haven’t [we] said in this [regard]: *this [entity] possesses no [particular property called ‘destruction’, be it distinct or not from itself]: it simply does not exist* (PV 1.277cd). For the [proponent of causeless destruction] does not say that destruction or any other [property like continued existence and transformation]<sup>a</sup> belongs to the entity, but rather that it is the entity itself that does not exist. For if he stated[, with the word ‘destruction’,] the existence [i.e. the rise]<sup>b</sup> of a certain [property], the [existence of this property]<sup>c</sup> would not make the entity cease to exist (*nivarteta*). And thus, since the cessation of the entity is the subject under discussion, [he] would only be stating [something] irrelevant [by positing another distinct thing],<sup>d</sup> for an entity [can]not be said not to exist [merely] because of the existence of something [else]. Then [an entity can only be said] not to exist if it itself does not exist.”<sup>e</sup> <sup>a</sup>According to PVT *Je* D323b7-324a1/P396a6-7 = PVSVT 523,6-7: *anyo vā sthityanyathātvādiko dharmāḥ...* <sup>b</sup>According to PVT *Je* D324a1-2/P396a8 = PVSVT 523,10: *...bhāvam utpādam...* <sup>c</sup>Against PVT *Je* D324a2/P396a8 = PVSVT 523,10: *anena vādinā.* <sup>d</sup>According to PVT *Je* D324a2/P396b1 ≈ PVSVT 523,12: *arthāntarasānyasya vidhānād\* aprastutam...* \*Note PVT *brjod pa'i phyir* for *vidhānāt*. <sup>e</sup>The text of the PVSV is not well established here: (1) PVSV<sub>tib</sub> D346b3/P509a7-8 reads: *'jig pa zes bya ba (\*na bhūto nāma?)*, which echoes the reading of the MSA (*svayaṃ na bhūto nāma bhavet /*). (2) PVSV<sub>tib</sub> D346b3/P509a8 and PVT *Je* D324a3/P396b2 read: *gaṇ gi tshē (\*yadā)*. (3) PVSV<sub>tib</sub> D346b3/P509a8 reads: *yod pa med pa (\*bhavati?)*, clearly more satisfactory than *bhavet*.

(23) See e.g. Cardona 1974.

between identity and otherness with respect to *y*.<sup>(24)</sup>

The Pudgalavādin enters the stage at this point,<sup>(25)</sup> objecting that the *pudgala* is not sub-

(24) PVSV 146,11-147,2 (together with PV 1.278ab): *tasmād yasya nāśo bhavatīty ucyate sa svayam eva na bhavatīty uktam syāt / na vai ghoṣasāmyād viṣayāntaradr̥ṣṭo vidhiḥ sarvatra yojanām arhati / na hi gadarbha iti nāmakaraṇād bāleyadharmā manuṣye 'pi saṃyojyāḥ / tathā na caitrasya putro bhavatīty atra dr̥ṣṭo vidhir nāśe 'pi virodhāt / evaṃ cābhīdhāne 'pi prayojanam āveditam eva / ataḥ / bhāve hy eṣa vikalpaḥ syād vidher vastvanurodhataḥ / bhāvo 'vaśyaṃ bhavantam apekṣate / sa ca svabhāva eva / niḥsvabhāvāsya kvacid vyāpāre samāveśābhāvāt / vyāpāra iti hi tathābhūtasvabhāvotpattiḥ / sā niḥsvabhāvāsya katham syāt / katham idānīm bhavaty abhāvāḥ śaśaviṣāṇam ityādivyavahārah / na vai śaśaviṣāṇam kiṃcid bhavatīty ucyate / api tv evam asya na bhavatīti bhāvapratiśedha eva kriyate / api ca / vyavahartāra eva etad evaṃ vyāpāravād iva samāropyādarśayanti prakaraṇena kenacit / na tu tat tathā / sarvārthavivecanaṃ hi tatra tattvam na kasyacit samāveśaḥ / na khalv evaṃ vināśo vastuni tadbhāvāt / asāv api yadi vaktṛbhīr evaṃ khyāpyate na tu svayaṃ tathā tadā na kiṃcid bhavatītiṣṭam eva / tasmāt svayaṃ bhavan svabhāvo vikalpadvayaṃ nātivartate tattvam anyattvam iti /* “Therefore one must say that it is the [entity] the destruction of which is said to ‘exist’ that does not exist itself. It is certainly not the case that, on the grounds of a [mere] similarity in wording, the affirmation (*vidhi*, *bya ba*) observed in another case [such as: ‘Caitra’s son’] can be applied to every case [i.e., to ‘the thing’s destruction’ too]. Indeed, the properties of an ass (*bāleya*) cannot be applied to a human being as well [merely] on the grounds that [a certain person] is named ‘Gardabha (= ass)’; in the same way, the affirmation (*vidhi*, *bya ba*)<sup>a</sup> that is observed in the [statement]: ‘Caitra’s son *exists*’ (*caitrasya putro bhavatīti*) [does] not [apply] to [the case of] destruction as well,<sup>b</sup> because it is contradictory. And although the [verbal] expression is [grammatically] the same (*evam*), [its real] purpose (*prayojana*, *dgoñs pa*) has been presented [above].<sup>c</sup> Therefore: *this alternative [between identity and otherness] can [only] concern the [coming into] existence [of something real], because activity (vidhi) necessarily belongs (anurodhā) to something real* (PV 1.278ab). [Coming into] existence necessarily requires [something] that comes into existence, and this [can] only [be] a nature, for that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity (*vyāpāra*). For [what we call] an ‘activity’ is [nothing but] the arising of such a nature; [but] how could this [arising] pertain to [something] that lacks a nature[, i.e. destruction]? [Objection:] Now, [if that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity,] how [do you explain] a usage such as ‘a hare’s horn *is* a non-existence’? [Answer:] One certainly does not say that a hare’s horn *is* something; rather, [when] thus [stating that a hare’s horn *is* a non-existence,] one simply negates the existence of this [hare’s horn by saying] that [it] does not exist. Moreover, it is the speakers who, according to the context [of discussion such as: ‘*Is* the hare’s horn non-existence or is it not?’, erroneously] construe and present this [hare’s horn] thus [i.e. as the agent of existence in the sentence: ‘The hare’s horn is a non-existence’] as if it had an activity; but it is not so.<sup>d</sup> Being devoid of [the nature of] any object is the true nature of this (*tatra*) [hare’s horn, and] nothing [unreal] engages in [an activity such as coming into existence].<sup>e</sup> [But our opponent] certainly does not [admit] destruction [to be] such[, i.e. characterized as void of the nature of any object, like a hare’s horn or the son of a barren woman], because [according to him] this [property] exists [i.e. arises] in the entity. Even though (*yadi... tu*) the [ordinary] speakers present this very [destruction that our opponent considers thus] in the same way [as having an activity when they say that it ‘exists’, they] do acknowledge that it itself is not so [i.e. that it does not have arising as a property],<sup>f</sup> [and] therefore that it is nothing. Therefore if it exists by itself [i.e. in a non-superimposed way],<sup>g</sup> the nature [of an entity] cannot escape these two [mutually] exclusive options (*vikalpadvaya*), i.e. [either] identity [or] otherness.” <sup>a</sup>PVSVT 525,23: *vidhir arthāntarasya putrasya vidhānam /* “Affirmation, i.e. the position of a son who is something distinct.” In spite of the Tibetan rendering of *vidhi* as *bya ba* (a usual equivalent of Skt. *vyāpāra*), here the meaning of *vidhi* seems more likely to be “affirmation,” although from the next verse onwards it obviously means *vyāpāra* (in the sense of the grammatical agent’s activity). <sup>b</sup>PVSVT 525,24: *na bhāvāsya nāśo bhavatīty atrāpi bhāvād vyatireko nāśo vidheyāḥ /* “In the [statement:] ‘There is a destruction of the entity’ as well, destruction is not to be posited as distinct from the entity [itself].” Note that PVT *Je* D325a6/P397b7 explicitly refers here to the genitive (\**ṣaṣṭhī*) case-endings (*de ltar na nag pa'i bu zes bya ba'i riag 'di la tha dad pa'i rten can gyi drug pa [\*vyatirekavibhaktiṣaṣṭhī] sbyar ba dag ni...*). <sup>c</sup>I.e. in PVSV 145,16-17

jected to this alternative since it is neither the same as nor other than the constituents.<sup>(26)</sup> it is not identical to them because its nature is distinct from theirs, but it is not other than them because it is causally related to them and because otherness is a mere lack of relation (*apratibandha*). Dharmakīrti criticizes his opponent's notion of causality (which entails that a cause and its effect are neither identical nor mutually other) while relying on his own analysis of relation (according to which a relation can be either of identity or of causality, the latter obtaining between entities that have distinct natures).<sup>(27)</sup> He then puts forward his own definition of otherness as the fact that two natures remain unmixed. As a consequence, if, as the Pudgalavādin contends, the *pudgala* and the constituents do not have the same nature, there can be no relation between them (except a causality relation that the Pudgalavādin cannot accept since it concerns entities that are mutually other) and they have distinct properties, so that they must be mutually other. The opponent attempts to rescue the thesis of a relation between the constituents and the *pudgala* by explaining that this relation does not lie in a causal connection between them but in some sort of invariable connection between their respective cognitions. Dharmakīrti replies by showing that there is no such connection and by arguing that the *pudgala*, which is not known through a distinct cognition but, according to the Pudgalavādin himself, “on the basis” of the constituents,

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according to PVT *Je* D325a5/P398a2-3 = PVSVT 525,28-29. <sup>d</sup>I.e., pseudo-things like a hare's horn or the son of a barren woman (*vandhyāsuta* in PVT *Je* D325b3/P398b2-3 = PVSVT 526,23) do not have a *vyāpāra* (*\*vyāpāravat* PVT *Je* D325b6/P398b6, *vyāpārayukta* PVSVT 526,30) simply because of linguistic usage (*vyavahāramātreṇa*, PVT *Je* D325b6/P398b6 = PVSVT 526,29). <sup>e</sup>Note PVT *Je* D325b6/P398b7-8: *...gyi dños por gyur pa'i bya ba 'ga' zig dan ldan pa ni ma yin no //*. “But it does not have any real activity.” <sup>f</sup>As a justification for this, PVT *Je* D326a2/P399a3 = PVSVT 527,13 add: *nīrūpatvād asya /*. <sup>g</sup>According to PVT *Je* D326a3/P399a4 = PVSVT 527,15: *svayam anadhyaṅropitenākāreṇa...*

(25) See below, fn. 41.

(26) On the Pudgalavādins' contention that the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor other than the constituents, see e.g. Bareau 1955:115 (Vātsīputriya), Chau 1987:40, chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Eltschinger 2010:294. The thesis is presented in the following way in MSA 18.93: *ekatvānyatvato 'vācyaḥ tasmād doṣadvayād asau / skandhātmatvaprasaṅgāc ca taddravyatvaprasaṅgataḥ //*. “This [*pudgala*] cannot be said (*avācya*) to be either one [and the same with] or distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e. from the five constituents], because of the two faults [that would ensue]: for [if the constituents and the *pudgala* were one and the same,] the constituents would be the self, and [if the constituents and the *pudgala* were distinct,] the [*pudgala*] would be a [real] substance.” (See Eltschinger 2010, Text-critical Remarks:330). See also AKBh 462,3-4/LE42,5-6: *na cānyaḥ skandhebhyaḥ śakyate pratijñātum śāsvataprasaṅgāt / nāpy ananya ucchedaprasaṅgāt /*. “And this [*pudgala*] cannot be asserted [to be] other than the constituents, because [if it were other than them its] eternity would ensue; nor [can it be asserted to be] the same, because [then its] annihilation would ensue.” Cf. TS 337 (see above, fn.13).

(27) On the two types of relation acknowledged by Dharmakīrti, i.e. identity (*tādātmya*), which concerns two conceptually extracted properties of one and the same entity, and causality (*tadutpatti*), which regards to distinct entities, see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10c (and fn. 14 for bibliographical references) and below, fn. 30.

has no nature of its own: if it did it would necessarily appear in a distinct way as an object of cognition.

Dharmakīrti thus follows the gist of the MSABh or AKBh arguments insofar as he too attacks the Pudgalavādin's contention that the *pudgala* is designated on the basis of the constituents by showing that the causal relation assumed between the constituents and the *pudgala* does not stand critical examination<sup>(28)</sup> and that the *pudgala* is not perceived on the basis of the constituents.<sup>(29)</sup> However he does so with arguments that appear profoundly

(28) Both the MSABh and the AKBh criticize the view that causally related elements can be said neither to be identical nor to be mutually other: they endeavour to show that in fact an effect and its cause are mutually other, most notably because they have different characteristics. See MSABh 156,17-18 (*teṣāṃ ca bhinnam lakṣaṇam ity anya evāgnir indhanāt* / "Now since their characteristics are distinct, fire is simply other than fuel." See Eltschinger 2010:315, fn. 77) and AKBh 462,14/LE44,13 (*tayor api siddham anyatvaṃ lakṣanabhedāt* / "Even [so,] these two, [fire and fuel,] are established to be [mutually] other, because they have different characteristics."). This idea seems to find an echo in PVSV 147,12 (see below, fn. 60 and 61) but Dharmakīrti's main argument is much more encompassing: instead of merely pointing out the distinct characteristics of fire and fuel (or those of the *pudgala* and the *skandhas*), he shows that the Pudgalavādins' thesis, which equates the causality relation with inexpressibility in terms of identity or otherness, ends up diluting the very notion of causality to the point that everything can be considered a causal condition while nothing can be said to be other than anything else.

(29) The MSA(Bh) rejects the *pudgala*'s existence as a substantially existing (*dravyasat*) nature on the grounds of its not being perceived (see MSA 18.92: *prajñāptiyastitayā vācyaḥ pudgalo dravyato na tu / nopalambhād viparyāsāt samkleśāt kliṣṭahetutaḥ* //). "The *pudgala* must be said to exist as a [mere] designation, but not as a [real] substance, because one does not perceive [it] (*nopalambha*), because [our pseudo-perception of the *pudgala*] is [nothing but] a wrong notion, because it is a pollution, because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled." Translation Eltschinger 2010:305; on the form *nopalambha*, see Conze 1973 *s.v.*). The AKBh, examining the relation between the awareness of the constituents and that of the *pudgala*, points out that the designation (*prajñāpti*) "*pudgala*" rests either on the perception of the constituents (but then the unperceived *pudgala* is nothing but a designation for the perceived constituents) or on the perception of the *pudgala* itself (but then the *pudgala* differs from the constituents since it can be perceived by itself). See AKBh 463,3-6/LE50,1-5: *yadā ca pudgalaḥ prajñāpyate kiṃ tāvat skandhān upalabhya prajñāpyate / āhosvit pudgalam / yadi tāvat skandhāṃs teṣv eva pudgalaprajñāptiḥ prāpnoti / pudgalasyānupalambhāt / atha pudgalaṃ katham asya skandhān upādāya prajñāptir bhavati / pudgala eva hi tasyā upādānam prāpnoti* / "And when the *pudgala* is designated, is it designated when perceiving the constituents or the *pudgala* [himself]? On the one hand, if [it is designated when perceiving] the constituents, then the designation '*pudgala*' concerns only these [constituents], since the *pudgala* is not perceived (*anupalambha*); on the other hand, [if it is designated when perceiving] the *pudgala*, how could the [*pudgala*] be designated on the basis of (*upādāya*) the constituents [as the Pudgalavādin claims]? For then the basis (*upādāna*) of this [designation] concerns the sole *pudgala*." See also AKBh 463,25-464,2/LE56,8-13: *atha rūpāṇy upalabhamānaḥ pudgalam upalabhate / kiṃ tayāvopalabdhypopalabhate / āhosvid anyayā / yadi tayaiiva / rūpād abhinnaśabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ prāpnoti / rūpa eva vā tatprajñāptiḥ / idaṃ ca rūpam ayaṃ pudgala iti\* katham idaṃ paricchidyate\*\* / athaivaṃ na paricchidyate / katham idaṃ pratijñāyate rūpam apy asti pudgalo 'py astīti / upalabdhivaśena hi tasyāstitvaṃ pratijñāyeta\*\*\** / \*AKBh<sub>LE</sub> *iti*: AKBh<sub>P<sub>r</sub></sub> om. *iti*. \*\*AKBh<sub>LE</sub> *paricchidyate*: AKBh<sub>P<sub>r</sub></sub> *gamyate*. \*\*\*AKBh<sub>LE</sub> *pratijñāyeta*: AKBh<sub>P<sub>r</sub></sub> *pratijñāyate*. "If [the opponent explains that] one perceives the *pudgala* when perceiving visible shapes (*rūpa*), does one perceive [the *pudgala*] through the same perception [as that of the visible shapes] or through another one? If [it is] through the same [perception], the *pudgala* must have the same nature [as the visible shapes], or

renewed insofar as they rest on important innovations of his own system: while his criticism of the relation between the *pudgala* and the constituents rests on his definition of the so-called natural relation (*svabhāvāpratibandha*),<sup>(30)</sup> his analysis of the *pudgala*'s alleged perception, which shows that the *pudgala* is no real entity, rests on his elaboration of the notion of *anupalabdhi*<sup>(31)</sup> and more importantly, on the equation between existence and functionality (*arthakriyā*)<sup>(32)</sup> and on the idea that any existing entity must have the minimal efficacy consisting in producing a cognitive appearance of itself:<sup>(33)</sup> the *pudgala* is not a real entity precisely because it is devoid of such a power.

Here the *pudgalavāda*'s critique is instrumental in establishing Dharmakīrti's own version of the identity principle (according to which a real entity x must be either the same as or other than a real entity y), or rather, it is instrumental in establishing that this principle only applies to real entities (so that the opponent of the causeless destruction thesis cannot claim that destruction must be subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with

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[rather,] the designation [*pudgala*] only regards the visible shape, and [thus] how could [we] make this distinction: 'This is the visible shape, this is the *pudgala*'? Now if [we] cannot make such a distinction, how could [we] admit that both the visible shape and the *pudgala* exist? For it is due to perception (*upalabdhi*) that the existence of this [*pudgala*] could be admitted."

<sup>(30)</sup> Thus Dharmakīrti's opponent considers that related entities cannot have natures that are completely alien to each other; accordingly, in PVSV 147, 3-4 he defines the otherness of two given entities as a lack of relation between their natures (*svabhāvāpratibandha*). However according to Dharmakīrti, relation cannot be understood as the merging or mixture (*miśrībhavana*) of the relata's natures: real entities remain unmixed with one another (see e.g. SP 5: *tau ca bhāvau tadanyaś ca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ / ity amiśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā //*. "And the two [so-called related] entities as well as [their relation, which is supposedly] distinct from [these two entities,] all rest in themselves; as a consequence, entities remain unmixed (*amiśra*) in themselves: it is conceptual thought that mixes them."). According to Dharmakīrti, otherness is precisely this fact that entities' natures do not merge or their mutual exclusiveness (*parasparam ananugamanam*, PVSV 147,8-9; cf. PVSVṬ 528,15-16, which explains it as *amiśrībhavanam*: see below, fn. 53). Indeed, Dharmakīrti acknowledges one relation besides that of pure and simple identity, namely, the causality relation, but he shows that the natures involved in it remain heterogeneous (see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10c). The *Pudgalavādin*, by claiming that the *pudgala* is related with the constituents, is thus confronted with the very alternative between identity and otherness that his *pudgala* supposedly escapes: either the *pudgala*'s relation with the constituents is one of pure and simple identity, or it is one of causality (and therefore of otherness). In order to get away from this alternative he has to acknowledge the lack of relation (*apratibandha*) between the *pudgala* and the constituents, but by doing so he is doomed to accept their otherness since he himself defines otherness as *apratibandha* (PVSV 147,12; see below, fn. 59).

<sup>(31)</sup> See Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10e (and fn. 17 for bibliographical references) and below, fn. 66.

<sup>(32)</sup> See Eltschinger forthcoming a, §5b. Cf. TS 347ab, quoted below, fn. 91.

<sup>(33)</sup> PVSV 149,27-150,2: *jñānamātrārthakriyāyām apy asāmarthyē vastv eva na syāt / tathā hi tallakṣaṇaṃ vastv iti vakṣyāmaḥ /*. "If [something] lacks the ability to perform the functionality (*arthakriyā*) that is a mere cognition, it is no real entity at all; for we will say that a real entity has as its characteristic this [functional efficacy]." See e.g. Yoshimizu 1999:145 and 149.

respect to the perishing entity). However it is worth noting that the TSP adopts the reverse strategy: there the *pudgala*'s ontological status is no longer used to establish the scope of the identity principle; rather, it is the scope of the identity principle that determines the *pudgala*'s ontological status. Thus Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla endeavour to show that because the identity principle only applies to real entities, the *pudgala*, which escapes the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to the constituents, cannot be a real entity.<sup>(34)</sup> Saying that only a real entity cannot escape the alternative between identity and otherness is tantamount to claiming that something which cannot be stated in terms of identity or otherness can only be unreal or is a pseudo-entity (*avastu*), and such is (one among) the Buddhist epistemologists' criteria for the old Abhidharmic distinction between "substantially real" (*dravyasat*) and "real as a designation" (*prajñaptisat*) so constantly at stake in all the traditional accounts of the *pudgala* controversy.<sup>(35)</sup> How to establish the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the two properties *tattvānyatvāvācyatva* and *avastutva*? This is what Śāntarakṣita is up to in TS 338-342. The argument is formulated as follows in TS 338a<sub>2</sub>-d: "A real *pudgala* does not exist, because it cannot be said to be either identical with or other than [another entity], like a water-lily in the sky."<sup>(36)</sup> Kamalaśīla reformulates

(34) Candrakīrti had already adopted a somewhat similar strategy (on this strategy, see Duerlinger 1984:264 and 270). Candrakīrti spells out the anti-Personalist's classical argument as follows (MAV 6.147): *gañ phyir gzugs las sems brjod med mi rtogs // dños yod brjod med rtogs pa ma yin ñid // gal te bdag 'ga' dños por grub gyur na // sems ltar grub dños brjod du med mi 'gyur //*. "[The difference or identity of] mind with respect to form is not conceived of as inexpressible, and in fact, no existing (*vastusat*) is considered inexpressible. It follows that if the self is an established entity, then, like 'mind', which is [also] an established entity, [its difference or identity with respect to psychophysical aggregates] would not be inexpressible." (Translation Huntington 1992:175.) The full version of the argument in contraposed form appears in MAV 6.148: *gañ phyir khyod bum dños por ma grub pa'i // ño bo gzugs gañ phuñ po las brjod med 'gyur te // rañ gis yod par grub par rtogs mi bya //*. "According to our opponent, a jug is not by nature an established entity precisely because [its difference or identity] with respect to form, for example, is inexpressible. Likewise, the relationship of the self to the psychophysical aggregates is also inexpressible, and therefore one ought not conceive of the self as intrinsically existent." (Translation Huntington 1992:175.)

(35) Note TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 115,15/TSP<sub>K</sub> 127,17: *evam tāvad avācyatvābhyupagame prajñaptisattvam pudgalasya prāptam iti pratipādītam /*. "Thus, it has been shown first that if one accepts that the *pudgala* cannot be said [to be either identical with or different from the constituents], it follows that it [only] exists as a designation." On Vasubandhu's distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat*, see Katsura 1976. Note that surviving evidence regarding theories of the *pudgala* seems to indicate that the Pudgalavādins themselves considered the *pudgala* as a *prajñapti* (see e.g. Chau 1987:42-43, Buswell 1996:354, Lusthaus 2009 or Eltschinger 2010:294-295). Some scholars consider that the Pudgalavādins' opponents have betrayed their thought by accusing them of "promoting the idea of a 'real' self" whereas "the handful of surviving Vātsīputrīya texts strenuously deny this" (Lusthaus 2009:276); others attempt to reconstruct the *pudgalavāda*(s) by conciliating both claims that the *pudgala* is a *prajñapti* and that somehow it ultimately exists (see Priestley 1999 and Duerlinger 2003b).

(36) TS 338a<sub>2</sub>-d: *pudgalo naiva vidyate pāramārthikah / tattvānyatvād[y]avācyatvān nabhaḥkokanadādivat //*.

his master’s argument in the following “formal” application (*prayoga*): “[*Vyāpti*:] Whatever cannot be said to be either the same as or other than a [given] entity is not a [real] entity, like a water-lily in the sky. [*Pakṣadharmatā*:] now, the *pudgala* cannot be said [to be either the same as or other than another entity. The logical reason involved in the present argument] is the non-perception of the pervader.”<sup>(37)</sup> According to TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 114,22/TSP<sub>K</sub> 126,17, TS 340-342 are aimed at demonstrating this pervasion: “Since the alternative between difference and identity has a [real] entity as its basis, the [pseudo-things] that are without a nature [of their own] are not [to be] designated as identical with or other than [other things], etc., but [this is] not [the case of] a [real] entity. For the negation [to which one resorts when saying:] ‘[x] is not y [i.e., does not have y for its nature]’ entails (°*vat*) [the affirmation of] another entity. [Therefore] one obviously states [its] otherness with regard to y.”<sup>(38)</sup> And to negate that [x] does not have y for its nature amounts to saying that [x] is identical [with y]. Therefore a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] identity and difference with regard to a [real] entity [y].”<sup>(39)</sup> As a consequence, the *pudgala* is not a real entity. Equivalently, the *pudgala* is nothing but an entity of designation, which perfectly coincides with the MSA(Bh)’s and Vasubandhu’s conclusions.

(37) TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 114,19-20/TSP<sub>K</sub> 126,14-15: *yad vastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatvābhyāṃ vācyam na bhavati na tad vastu / yathā gagananīlanam / na bhavati ca vācyāḥ pudgala iti vyāpakānupalabh[i]ḥ /*.

(38) According to TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 115,5/TSP<sub>K</sub> 127,7-8: *svabhāvāntaravidhīnāntarīyakatvād vastuno vastvantara-bhāvaniṣedhasya /*. According to TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 115,3/TSP<sub>K</sub> 127,5, this answers the question: *katham punar gatyantarābhāvaḥ /*.

(39) TS 340-342: *bhedābhedavikalpasya vastvadhīṣṭhānabhāvataḥ / tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣu yu-  
jyate // na vastuni yad etad dhi tan neti pratiṣedhanam / tad vastvantaravat tasmād vyaktam anyatvam ucya-  
te // atadbhāvaniṣedhaś ca tattvam evābhīdhīyate / nātikrāmati tad vastu tattvaṃ bhedaṃ ca vastunaḥ //*. Kamalaśīla concludes (TSP<sub>Ś</sub> 115,13-14/TSP<sub>K</sub> 127,16): *iti siddhā vyāptir maulasya hetoḥ //*. “Thus, the principal reason’s pervasion is established.”

**PVSV 147,2-148,5<sup>(40)</sup>: Annotated Translation**

(41) A [certain real] nature [x]’s being other [than y] is nothing but its not being y, <sup>(42)</sup>for visible shape’s (*rūpa*) and taste’s being reciprocally other, too, is nothing else [than each one’s not being the other one].<sup>(43)</sup> Objection: [although x does not have the nature of y, still it cannot be said to be other than y, for] otherness [actually] consists in [their] natures’ lacking a [mutual] relation (*pratibandha*).<sup>(44)</sup> [Answer:] What does this so-called relation [between x and y] consist of, so that [x] would be neither this [i.e. of the nature of y] nor of a nature other [than y]? Objection: [this relation consists in x’s] being born (*janman*) [of y].<sup>(45)</sup> [Answer: if it were because x is the effect of y that it could not be said to be either y or other than y, then] no cause <and no effect><sup>(46)</sup> could [ever] be said

(40) Śākyabuddhi’s and Kaṇṇakagomin’s commentaries appear in PVṬ *Je* D326a4-Ñe 1b3/P399a6-Ñe 1b5 and PVSṬ 527,18-530,22.

(41) Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D326a4-5/P399a6-8 ≈ PVSṬ 527,18-20: *rūpādīskandhasvabhāvaḥ pudgalo na bhavaty atha ca\* rūpādībhyo nānyaḥ / tasmāt\*\* tattvānyattvam ativartata eva svabhāva iti cet / tan na / yasmāt...* \*PVṬ *de lta na yañ (\*tathāpi?)*; \*\**tasmāt* em. (PVṬ *de bas na*): *tasma* Ed. “Objection: the *pudgala* does not have as its nature the constituents such as corporeality, and yet it is not other than corporeality, etc. Therefore it is the case that a [real] nature escapes [the alternative between] identity and otherness. [Answer:] This is not [the case], because...” On the Pudgalavādin’s thesis that the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor other than the constituents, see above, fn. 13 and 26.

(42) Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D326a5/P399a8 = PVSṬ 527,21: *yadi pudgalo ’pi na skandhasvabhāvas tadā skandhebhyo ’nya eva / yataḥ...* “If the *pudgala* itself does not have the constituents as its nature, then [it can] only [be] other than the constituents, because...”

(43) Conclusion, PVSṬ 527,22-23: *atatsvabhāvatvam evānyattvam / tac ca pudgale ’py astīti so ’pi skandhebhyo ’nya eveṣṭavyaḥ /*. “[X’s] being other [than y] is nothing but [its] not having y as its nature. Now, since this is the case of the *pudgala* too, [you] have to admit that it is [simply] other than the constituents.”

(44) Conclusion, PVṬ *Je* D326a6-7/P399b1-2 = PVSṬ 527,24-26: *sa ca pratibandhaḥ pudgalasya skandheṣu asti / tato [’]tatsvabhāvatve ’pi nānyattvaṃ skandhebhyo pudgalasyeti /*. “Now, there is a [mutual] relation between the *pudgala* and the constituents. Therefore even though the *pudgala* does not have the constituents as its nature, it is not other than them.”

(45) Conclusion, PVṬ *Je* D326b1-2/P399b4 ≈ PVSṬ 528,10: *evaṃ sati kāryatvāt skandhebhyāḥ pudgalasya tattvānyattvenāvācyatvam iṣṭam...* “This being the case, since [the *pudgala*] is an effect [of the constituents, we] admit that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be either the same as or other than the constituents.” (Note that the PVṬ treats this as the conclusion of the objection whereas the PVSṬ seems to understand it as the beginning of Dharmakīrti’s rebuttal.) On the Pudgalavādins’ contention that the constituents and the *pudgala* stand in a causal relation comparable to that of fuel and fire, see above, fn. 15.

(46) Note that PVSṬ 527,7, PVSṬ<sub>tib</sub> D346b6/P510b1 and PVṬ *Je* D326b2/P399b5 read *sarvakāryakāraṇānām* (*rgyu dan ’bras bu thams cad*), against PVSṬ 528,11 (*sarvakāraṇānām*) and according to Gnoli (*a silentio*), MSS A and B. We have read: *sarvakāryakāraṇānām*.

[to be either identical with or other than] one another; and so<sup>(47)</sup> everything [would be] somehow<sup>(48)</sup> [causally] useful (*upayogin*) to everything; therefore<sup>(49)</sup> nothing would be other than anything. And thus even [someone using the word] “inexpressibility” (*avācyatā*)<sup>(50)</sup> [defined in the afore-mentioned way] would merely express a causality relation with another word without [conveying] a different meaning.<sup>(51)</sup> <sup>(52)</sup>[As for ourselves] however, we define (*brūmah*) otherness as the exclusiveness (*ananugamana*) of [two real] natures [i.e. as the fact that they do not mix with each other<sup>(53)</sup>]. Now, since [all entities] possessing a [real] nature are mutually [exclusive,<sup>(54)</sup> they] have to be [mutually] other. <sup>(55)</sup>And [between entities that are not identical,<sup>(56)</sup> no[thing] except the natural relation consisting in causality [can be] called a “relation,” for it is not contradictory that [something which is causally] independent<sup>(57)</sup> [from something else] may deviate [from the latter].<sup>(58)</sup> [Both] because of this [lack of relation<sup>(59)</sup>] and because [x and y have] distinct properties [i.e. inexpressibility-

(47) Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b2/P399b6 = PVSVT 528,11: *tathā ceti kāryatvād avācyatve...* “And so, i.e. if [it is] because [the *puḍgala*] is an effect [of the constituents that it] cannot be said [to be either identical to or other than them]...”

(48) Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b2-3/P399b6-7 ≈ PVSVT 528,12: *kathaṃcid iti sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa ca\*...* \*PVT reads \**vā*. “Somehow’, i.e. in a direct or indirect manner...”

(49) Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b3/P399b7 = PVSVT 528,12-13: *iti sarvatra kāryakāraṇabhāvāt...* “Therefore [i.e.] because a causality relation [would thus obtain] with respect to everything...”

(50) See above, fn. 13 and 26.

(51) On this refutation of the opponent’s view of causal relation, see above, fn. 28.

(52) Introduction, PVT *Je* D326b4/P400a1 = PVSVT 528,15: *anyattvaṃ tu na niṣiddham / yasmāt...* “But [according to us, their] otherness is not discarded [for all that], because...”

(53) PVT *Je* D326b4-5/P400a1-2 = PVSVT 528,15-16 explain *parasparam ananugamanam* as *amiśrābhavanam*.

(54) According to PVT *Je* D326b5/P400a2 = PVSVT 528,16, *sa* does not refer to the neutral noun *ananugamanam* but to the masculine *ananugamaḥ*.

(55) Introduction, PVT *Je* D326b5-6/P400a3-4: *gal te skye ba’i mtshan ñid can gyi rag lus pas phuñ po dag las gañ zag gzan ñid du yod pa ni ma yin mod kyi ’on kyañ rag lus pa gzan ñid du yod do že na /*. “Objection: [true,] it is not thanks to a relation defined as causality (\**janmalakṣaṇapratibandha*) that the *puḍgala* is other than the constituents; there are, however, other [kinds of] relations.”

(56) The causality relation (*tadutpatti*) is the only one possible in the case of discrete entities, and the only one left open for the *Puḍgalavādin*, for whom an identity-type (*tādātmya*) relation is ruled out by his insistence on the fact that the *puḍgala* cannot be said to be the same as the constituents. See Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10c, and above, fn. 30.

(57) Explanation, PVT *Je* D326b7/P400a5 ≈ PVSVT 528,19: *anāyattasya tadutpattiyā tatrāpratibaddhasya...* “Independent, [i.e.] not related to y through causality.”

(58) On this reasoning see above, fn. 30.

(59) According to PVT *Je* D327a1/P400a7 ≈ PVSVT 528,20, *tataḥ* provides the first of two reasons: *tato ’pratibandhāt\* puḍgalasya skandhebhyo ’nyattvam /*. \*PVT reads \**yathoktād apratibandhāt*. “Because of

as and expressibility-as respectively,<sup>(60)</sup> x and y] are [simply] other.<sup>(61)</sup>

Objection: the relation [between x and y] is a matter (*kr̥ta*) of cognition[, not of causality]. Suppose the following be urged (*syād etat*): because x, the cognition of which is invariably connected to the cognition of y, necessarily appears [in cognition] when y is cognized[, their relation is a matter of cognition, and due to this cognitional relation], x cannot be said [to be other than y] although it does not have the nature of y.<sup>(62)</sup> [To this, let us answer as follows:] no, [the cognition of x is not invariably connected to the cognition of y,] because x is devoid

the [afore-mentioned] lack of relation, the *puḍgala* is other than the constituents.” See above, fn. 30.

(60) See PVSVT 528,20-21: *tathā hy avācyatvaṃ puḍgalasya dharmāḥ skandhānām tu parasparaṃ vācyatvam iti dharmabhedah* /. “To explain: the *puḍgala* has the property of being inexpressible (*avācyatva*) [in terms of identity or otherness] whereas the constituents [have the property of] being expressible (*vācyatva*) [in these terms] with respect to one another, so [the *puḍgala* on the one hand and the constituents on the other hand] have distinct properties.” Cf. TSP<sub>S</sub> 115,25/TSP<sub>K</sub> 127,27 (following the statement that two real entities determined as having mutually contradictory properties are distinct from each other): *vācyatvāvācyatvādīparasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitau ca skandhapuḍgalau*. “Now, the constituents and the *puḍgala* are determined as having mutually contradictory properties such as expressibility and inexpressibility.”

(61) Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D327a2-3/P400a8-b2: *’di la yañ sbyor ba gñis su ’gyur te / gañ žig gañ la rag lus pa med pa de ni de las gžan pa yin te / rta las ba lañ (D: lañ dañ P) lta bu’o // phuñ po dag la gañ zag kyañ rag lus pa med pa žes bya ba ni rañ bžim gyi gtan tshigs so // gañ žig gañ las chos tha dad pa de ni de las gžan yin te / dper na rta las ba lañ lta bu’o // phuñ po dag las gañ zag kyañ chos tha dad pa yin no žes bya ba ni rañ bžim gyi gtan tshigs ñid do //*. “And there are two [formal] applications in this [connection: (1)] an x that is not related to a y is other than y, as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the *puḍgala* is not related to the constituents. [The logical reason involved here] is a *svabhāvahetu*. [(2)] An x whose properties differ from y’s is other than y, as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the *puḍgala* has properties different from y’s. [The logical reason involved here] is a *svabhāvahetu*.”

(62) Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D327a6-7/P400b6-8: *gzugs la sogs pa gzun ba ñid kyis kyañ gañ zag kyañ gzun ba yin te / de ni mig la sogs pa’i rnam par šes pas šes par bya ba ñid yin pa’i phyir ro // de bas na gzugs la sogs pa rtogs pa med na mi ’byuñ ba yañ (P: D om. yañ) gañ zag rtogs pa yin pa de ltar na gañ zag phuñ po’i rañ bžim ma yin du zin kyañ phuñ po dag las gžan ñid du brjod par bya ba ma yin že na /*. “It is [indeed] due to [our] grasping of [objects] such as visible shapes that the *puḍgala* too is grasped,<sup>a</sup> for this [*puḍgala*] can be cognized (*\*jñeya?*) through a visual cognition, etc.<sup>b</sup> Therefore, the cognition of the *puḍgala* is invariably connected with the cognition of [objects] such as visible shapes. [And] thus, although the *puḍgala* does not have the nature of the constituents,<sup>c</sup> it cannot be said to be other than the constituents.<sup>d</sup>” <sup>a</sup>To be compared with PVSVT 528,26-27: *tathā hi rūpaśabdādīgrahaṇenaiva puḍgalagrahaṇam iṣyate /*. <sup>b</sup>To be compared with PVSVT 528,27: *caḥsurādivijñānavijñeyatvāt puḍgalasyeti /*. <sup>c</sup>To be compared with PVSVT 528,29: *askandhasvabhāvam api /*. <sup>d</sup>To be compared with PVSVT 528,28: *skandhebhyo ’nyatvenāvācyam...* How to interpret *gzugs = rūpa* in this explanation? The commentators’ allusion to *caḥsurvijñāna* as well as Karṇakagomin’s reference to *śabda* suggest that the objects (*viśaya*) of the different sensory cognitions are meant (cf. the shift of meaning of the term *rūpa* in the AKBh when the discussion moves to the *puḍgala* as an object of knowledge, *jñeya*, from AKBh 463,1/LE48,6 onwards). Remember, however, that these *viśayas* are instances of the *rūpaskandha* (as *dhātus/āyatana*s no. 1-5). Thus, the *puḍgala* would be cognized when one cognizes (through *indriyapratyakṣa*) visible shapes, sounds, etc., i.e. objects belonging to the realm of corporeality, and/or when one cognizes (through *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*) affective sensations (*vedanāskandha*), perceptive identifications (*saṃjñāskandha*), cognitions (*vijñānaskandha*), etc.

of [any] nature of its own (*svayam*) [i.e. independently of the nature of y,] for its nature is nothing but that which appears [in cognition in the form of y, and this for two reasons: (63)first] because if x were endowed with a nature [of its own, i.e. if it were not simply of the nature of y], then it would appear (*pratibhāsaprasaṅga*) [separately in cognition], as [does] y;<sup>(64)</sup> [and second,] because [something] perceptible<sup>(65)</sup> does not exist if it does not appear [in cognition].<sup>(66)</sup> [And] since even if [x] were [held to be] imperceptible, the cognition [still] would not have this form [i.e. the aspect of x],<sup>(67)</sup> what is it the cognition of[, and] related to what?<sup>(68)</sup>

(69)Moreover (*ca*), if the [perceptual] cognition of a [real entity] x depends on [something else, say] y, it is certainly not the case that the nature of x ceases to appear (*pratibhāsa eva naśyati*) [in cognition when y appears], as [the nature] of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which depends on light[, does not cease to appear when light appears in cognition].<sup>(70)</sup>

(63) Introduction, PVT *Je* D327b1/P401a3 ≈ PVSVT 529,10: *athārūpādīsvabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ / tadā...* “If the *pudgala* does not have the constituents as its nature, then...”

(64) Conclusion, PVT *Je* D327b2/P401a4 ≈ PVSVT 529,11: *na ca pratibhāstate\* / tato nāsty eva pudgalaḥ /*. \*PVT reads \**prthak pratibhāstate*. “Now, it does not appear [separatelyPVT]. Therefore the *pudgala* simply does not exist.”

(65) Explanation, PVT *Je* D327b2-3/P401a4-5: *śnañ du ruñ ba ste dmigs pa'i mtshan ñid kyir gyur pa ni...* “Perceptible, i.e. for which the [causal] characteristics for a perception have been attained (\**upalabdihlakṣaṇaprāpta*).” On *upalabdihlakṣaṇaprāpta*, see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10e.

(66) Explanation, PVT *Je* D327b3/P401a5: *'dis ni gañ zag med par bsgrub pa'i phyir rañ bñin mi dmigs pa bśad pa yin no...* “With this, [Dharmakīrti] resorts (*bśad pa*, \**ukta*) to the non-perception of a thing/nature (\**svabhāvanupalabdhī*) in order to demonstrate that the *pudgala* does not exist.” On *svabhāvanupalabdhī*, see Eltschinger forthcoming a, §10e (and *ibid.*, fn. 17 for bibliographical references).

(67) Explanations. (1) PVT *Je* D327b3/P401a6: *de'i ño bo śes pa ste / gañ zag gi rañ bñin 'dzin pa'i śes pa ma yin pa...* “The cognition would not have this form, i.e., the cognition would not grasp the nature of the *pudgala* (\**pudgalasvabhāvagrāhaka?*).” (2) PVSVT 529,13: *na tadrūpaṃ jñānaṃ na pudgalākāraṃ jñānam*. “The cognition would not have this form, i.e. the cognition would not have the *pudgala* as its aspect.”

(68) Conclusion, PVT *Je* D327b4/P401a7 = PVSVT 529,14-15: *na rūpādījñānanāntarīyakaṃ pudgala-jñānam ity arthaḥ / tathā ca na jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti bhāvaḥ /*. “The cognition of the *pudgala* is not invariably connected to the cognition of [constituents] such as corporeality: this is the meaning. And thus, the relation is not a matter of cognition: this is [Dharmakīrti's] intention.” Here Dharmakīrti's reply rests on the principle that if the *pudgala* were a real entity endowed with a nature of its own it would necessarily produce a distinct cognitive appearance of itself (see above, fn. 33).

(69) Introduction, PVT *Je* D327b4-5/P401a7-8 = PVSVT 529,16: *rūpādyāyattapratītitvād eva prthak pudgalo na pratibhāsata iti cet /*. “Objection: it is because [its] cognition depends on [constituents] such as corporeality that the *pudgala* does not appear separately [in cognition].”

(70) Explanation, PVSVT 529,19-20: *yathā nīlādīnām ālokapratibaddhajñānām āloke pratibhāsamāne 'pi svapratibhāso na naśyati / ālokavyatirekeṇa teṣāṃ pratibhāsanāt / tadvat pudgalasyāpi syāt /*. “For example, the own [cognitive] appearance of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which is related to light, does not cease when light appears [in the cognition], because these [colours] appear distinctly from light [in

Or what does x's close connection (*pratyāsatti*) <to y><sup>(71)</sup> consist of, so that x itself is [also] manifest (*pratyupatiṣṭhate*) when one cognizes y [although this y] lacks x's own nature? For [if it were] so there would an absurdity.<sup>(72)</sup> Objection: [this close connection consists in] the fact that [the x] which is being cognized has y for its basis (*upādāna*).<sup>(73)</sup> [Answer: but] what is the meaning of "basis"? [First,] a causality relation [between x and y can]not [be intended] since it is not accepted. Or, if one accepts [a causality relation between x and y, still one does not necessarily perceive x when one perceives y, for] the effect and the cause do not manifest (*pratyupasthāpana*) a cognition of each other [in a reciprocal way].<sup>(74)</sup> Objection: it is the cognition [of x, not x itself,] that is invariably related to y[, and their] close connection [consists in this invariable relation]. [Answer:] has it not been [already] said [above] that this very [invariable relation of a cognition] is impossible in the absence of a relation [between x and y themselves]? <sup>(75)</sup>Now, [we have already] said [many times] that [there is] no relation between [things] that are not effect and cause [of one another]. [What has been said,<sup>(76)</sup> i.e. that] "[an x] the cognition of which is invariably related to the cognition of y, etc.," [this] also would be [true] provided there were a cognition of x [distinct from y. Now, there is no such cognition,] because there is no cognition of that x which does not appear in cognition in its own form, independently (*asamsargeṇa*) of [anything] heterogeneous (*asvarūpa*). And for want of such a [cognition], defining the nature of an object [such as x] as inexpressible [as being identical to or other than y] is illegitimate (*na sidhyati*). A really existing [thing]

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the cognition]. Now, the *pudgala* too should likewise have [a distinct appearance when light appears]."

(71) As testified to by PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>tib</sub> D347a4/P511a1 (*de la ni* [P: D om. *ni*] *don de ñe ba gañ yin /*) and the commentaries (PVT *Je* D327b6/P401b3: *phuñ po de la gañ zag ces bya ba'i don de ñe ba ste 'brel pa gañ yin /*. PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>T</sub> 529,21: *kā vā tasya pudgalasya pratyāsattiḥ sambandhas tatra skandhe /*), *tatra* (PVS<sub>V</sub> 147,21) belongs to this sentence. We have read: *kā vā tasya pratyāsattis tatra / yat...*

(72) Explanation, PVT *Je* D327b7-328a1/P401b4-5 ≈ PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>T</sub> 529,24-26: *apratibaddhe pratibhāsamāne yadi niyamena pudgalaḥ pratibhāseta / tadā yasya kasyacit pratibhāsane 'nyo 'py atyantāsamba[d]dhaḥ pratiyeta\* ity arthaḥ /*. \**pratiyeta* em. (PVT *rtogs pa ñid du 'gyur ro*): *pratiyeta* Ed. "If the *pudgala* necessarily appeared when [something] unrelated [to it appears], then, when whatever appears [in cognition], all [things] other [than that, although] utterly unconnected [to it], would appear: this is the meaning."

(73) On this term see above, fn. 14.

(74) Explanation, PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>T</sub> 529,30-530,10: *yathā kāryāt kāraṇapratītis tathā na kāraṇāt kāryapratītir bhavatyī arthaḥ /*. "Contrary to the cognition of the cause through the effect[, which is legitimate], there is no cognition of the effect through the cause." On this point, see Eltschinger forthcoming e, §10d.

(75) Introduction, PVT *Je* D328a4-5/P402a2-3 = PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>T</sub> 530,15: *akāryakāraṇayor api pudgalarūpādyoḥ pratibandho bhaviṣyatīty ata āha...* "[Dharmakīrti] says [what follows] in order to [meet the present objection]: although they [do] not [enter a relation of] effect to cause, the *pudgala* and [constituents] such corporeality will [certainly] have a relation."

(76) According to PVT *Je* D328a5/P402a4 ≈ PVS<sub>V</sub><sub>T</sub> 530,17 (*yatpratipattināntarīyakam yajjñānam ity api yad ucyate...*), in PVS<sub>V</sub> 147,13-15.

must therefore be possessed of either identity or otherness[, for there is no other possibility for a real entity].<sup>(77)</sup>

### On PV 2.202-204

Dharmakīrti's second argument against the *pudgala* occurs at the very end of his treatment of the Truth of Destruction (*nirodhasatyā*) in PV 2 (= *Pramāṇasiddhipariccheda*). Here as in PVSV 147,2-148,5, Dharmakīrti does not allude to the *pudgala* in any explicit way, so that this interpretation relies on the immediate context (a discussion of the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and the eschatological consequences of one's adhering to a self),<sup>(78)</sup> on terminology (*avācya* in PV 2.203a and c) and on the (almost) unanimous explanation of these stanzas as a critique of the *pudgalavāda* by his successors (Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Manorathanandin).<sup>(79)</sup>

It is well-known that, at least from Vasubandhu onwards, the Yogācāra intellectuals devel-

<sup>(77)</sup> PVSV 147,2-148,5: *atattvam eva svabhāvasyānyattvam / na hi rūparasayor apy anyad eva parasparam anyattvam / svabhāvāpratibandho 'nyattvam iti cet / ko 'yaṃ pratibandho nāma yena sa ca na syāt / nānyasvabhāvaś ca / janmeti cet / sarvakāryakāraṇānām\* parasparam avācyatā syāt / tathā ca sarvaḥ sarvasya kathaṃcid upayogīti na kaścit kutaścīd anyah syāt / evaṃ cāvācyatety api kāryakāraṇabhāva eva śabdāntareṇoktaḥ syāt / nārthabhedah / svabhāvānanugamanam\*\* tv anyattvaṃ brūmaḥ / sa ca svabhāvavatām\*\*\* parasparam asty evety\*\*\*\* anyattvam eva / na ca tajjanmalakṣaṇāt svabhāvāpratibandhād anyah pratibandho nāma / anāyattasya vyabhicārāvirodhāt / tato dharmabhedāc cānyattvam / jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti cet / syād etat / yatpratipattināntarīyakaṃ yajjñānaṃ tadgatau niyameṇa tatpratibhāsanāt tad atadrūpam apy avācyam iti / na / tasya niḥsvabhāvavātvāt svayam / sa eva hi tasya svabhāvo yaḥ pratibhāti / svabhāvavattve 'sya tadvat pratibhāsaprasaṅgāt / apratibhāsamānasya ca dr̥śyasyābhāvāt / adr̥śyatve 'pi na tadrūpaṃ jñānam iti kasya kimāyattā pratipattiḥ / na ca yad yadāyattapratītikaṃ tasya svabhāvāpratibhāsa eva naśyati / prakāśāyattapratītinām iva nīlādīnām / kā vā tasya pratyāsattiḥ tatra /\*\*\*\*\* yat tasminn anātmārūpe pratīyamāne sa svayaṃ pratyupatiṣṭhate / atiprasaṅgo hy evaṃ syāt / pratīyamānasya tadupādānateti cet / ko 'yam upādānārthaḥ / na kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'nabhyupagamāt / abhyupagame vā na kāryakāraṇe 'nyonyapratītipratyupasthāpane / pratīter eva tannāntarīyakatā pratyāsattir iti cet / nanu saivāsati pratibandhe na yuktety ucyate / nākāryakāraṇayoḥ kaścit pratibandha iti coktam / yatpratipattināntarīyakaṃ yajjñānam ity api tajjñāne sati syāt / na hi yo vijñāne svarūpeṇāsvarūpāsamsargeṇa na pratibhāstate tasya kiṃcij jñānam / tadabhāvān na sidhyaty\*\*\*\*\* avācyatālakṣaṇam artharūpasya / tad bhavatā vastutas tattvānyatvabhājā bhavitavyam / \*See above, fn. 46. \*\*svabhāvānanugamanam: svabhāvānanugamaṇam PVSV. \*\*\*svabhāvavatām: svabhāvātām PVSV. \*\*\*\*evety: eva ity PVSV. \*\*\*\*\*See above, fn. 71. \*\*\*\*\*na sidhyaty: na sidhyati PVSV.*

<sup>(78)</sup> On Dharmakīrti's views regarding the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* = *avidyā*, see Eltschinger 2009:172-173 and Eltschinger forthcoming b. On PV 2.200-201 and Dharmakīrti's views on the *pratītyasamutpāda*, see Eltschinger 2009:173-175 and Eltschinger forthcoming c, §2.1.

<sup>(79)</sup> Here as elsewhere, Prajñākaragupta is an exception, as is testified to by his introduction to PV 2.203. PVA 141,8-9: *athāpi syāt – na nitya ātmā pūrvoktadoṣān nāpy anityo 'prekṣāpūrvakriyāprasāṅgāt / ato nityatvānityatvābhyām avācyaḥ / tad api na yuktaṃ /* “But if [the following] were [urged]: ‘The self (*ātman*) is neither permanent, because of the afore-mentioned fault, nor impermanent, because an irrational action would follow; therefore it cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent’– this too is incorrect.”

oped a model of causality that denied permanent entities such as God or the self any functionality and therefore any real existence, for only impermanent entities can bring about an effect.<sup>(80)</sup> To put it briefly, a permanent entity, the causal capacity of which is complete and unimpeded and therefore does not depend on the circumstantial intervention of a co-operating factor, can bring about an effect neither gradually (*kramaṇa*) nor simultaneously (*yaugapadyena*). It cannot bring it about gradually, because nothing prevents this entity from producing its effect entirely at once. But it cannot bring about its effect at one time only, since if it is permanent, no change can occur in its nature and it cannot become inactive once it has started producing. Provided that these authors' criterion for existence is functionality, only impermanent entities can be considered as existent, whereas permanent entities, which do not meet this requirement, are held to be non-existent.

Interestingly enough, the issue of the causality of permanent entities had already been touched upon in the MSA(Bh)'s critique of the *pudgala*. Suffice it to quote here MSA 18.99-100: "Because the [*pudgala*] would no [longer] be an agent, because [its exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this *pudgala*'s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen. Neither a [*pudgala*] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [*pudgala*] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this *pudgala*] would [*ipso facto*] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a *pudgala* that would be neither permanent nor impermanent]."<sup>(81)</sup>

Now, the causality of permanent entities also provides the doctrinal background of PV 2.202, a stanza most likely to be interpreted as targeting a permanent self:<sup>(82)</sup> "[There can be neither bondage nor liberation for something permanent.] Being the cause of the arising of suffering is [what we call] 'bondage': [since what is permanent is devoid of the capacity to bring about anything]<sup>(83)</sup>, how [could this belong] to [something] permanent? [And] being the cause of the non-arising of suffering is [what we call] 'liberation': how [could

<sup>(80)</sup> See Yoshimizu 1999.

<sup>(81)</sup> MSA 18.99-100: *akarṭṛtvād anīyatvāt sakṛnnīyapavṛttitāḥ / darśanādiṣu yatnasya svayambhūtvam na yujyate / tathāsthitasya naṣṭasya prāgabhāvād anīyataḥ / tṛtīyapakṣābhāvāc ca pratīyatvam na yujyate //*. On these stanzas and Vasubandhu's commentary, see Eltschinger 2010:320-322. We are not aware of any parallel argument in Vasubandhu's AKBh.

<sup>(82)</sup> As PVP D86a6/P99a6 testifies to (*g'zan yan bdag ñid kyi 'chīn ba dan thar pa ni yod pa ma yin no //*. "Moreover, a [permanent] self has neither bondage nor liberation.").

<sup>(83)</sup> According to PVP D86a7/P99a7: '*ga' zig la yan nus pa med pa'i phyir...*

this belong] to [something] permanent?”<sup>(84)</sup> But at least according to Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, Dharmakīrti’s target in the next stanza has shifted to the Pudgalavādin (which Manorathanandin takes to be a Vaibhāṣika!<sup>(85)</sup>): if only impermanent entities are able to perform functionalities, then the *pudgala*, which cannot be said to be impermanent according to the Personalist opponent, is no more able than the permanent self to act as a cause of bondage or liberation.<sup>(86)</sup> And such is indeed the intent of the objection that opens Devendrabuddhi’s commentary on PV 2.203: “Let us admit that [something] permanent [like the outsiders’ self] has neither bondage nor liberation. [As for ourselves,] however, [our position is not flawed] since we acknowledge that the *pudgala*, which cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent, [experiences] bondage and liberation.”<sup>(87)</sup> Dharmakīrti’s answer runs as follows: “For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything, [so that] even in the case of [something] that cannot be said [to be impermanent], bondage and liberation cannot be experienced in any way.”<sup>(88)</sup> While explaining Dharmakīrti’s stanza, Devendrabuddhi discards the Pudgalavādin’s objection as follows: “This is not the case, for there [can] be no [real] entity lacking one of the two aspects, since [the two properties of being] permanent and [being] impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory. [This is] because, for a [real] entity, being excluded (*\*vyavaccheda?*) from one [of these two] is invariably connected to possessing the other one,

(84) PV 2.202: *duḥkhotpādahetutvaṃ bandho nityasya tat kutaḥ / aduḥkhotpādahetutvaṃ mokṣo nityasya tat kutaḥ //*. Note PVP D86b2-3/P99b2-3: *de dag ni rañ gi sde pa bstan bcos mdzad pa gzan gyis mañ du bśad zin pa’i phyir ma spros so //*. “Since the [impossibility, for permanent entities, to bring about their effect] has [already] been dealt with extensively by other co-religionists (*\*svayūthya*) who have authored treatises (*\*sāstrakāra*) [on that topic], we won’t expatiate [upon it here].”

(85) PVV 80,17-19: *syād etat / na nityasya hetutvaṃ / bandhamokṣau ca yuktāv iti / nityatvānityatvābhyām avācyaṣya pudgalasya tau bhaviṣyata iti manvānaṃ vaibhāṣikaṃ praty āha...* “Suppose the following be urged: [something] permanent is not [their] cause, and [thus] bondage and liberation are justified. Both will belong to a *pudgala* that cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent. Against a Vaibhāṣika who thinks in this way, [Dharmakīrti] says...”

(86) That the *pudgala* would not be able to experience bondage (or: *saṃsāra*) and liberation is also the focus of Bhāviveka’s MHK 3.90: *na pudgalaḥ saṃsarati mucyate naiva tattvataḥ / prajñāpyatvād yathā veśma vācyatvād vāpi gandhavat //*. “Neither does the *pudgala* really transmigrate nor is it really liberated, because it is [merely] to be designated[, but not ultimately real], like a house, and also (*vāpi*) because it can be expressed, like a smell.” (See also Iida 1980:173.) The MSA (see e.g. MSA 18.96-100 [Eltschinger 2010:306]) already set forth arguments to the effect that the *pudgala* cannot be an agent (*kartr*), hence not an agent of liberation (*moktr*).

(87) PVP D86b3/P99b3-4: *gal te rtag pa la (P: las D) ’chiñ ba dañ thar pa yod pa ma yin pa de ltar ni ’dod pa ñid yin mod kyī / rtag pa dañ mī rtag pa ñid du brjod du med pa’i gañ zag bcñis pa dañ thar par khas len pa’i phyir ro že na /*.

(88) PV 2.203: *anityatvena yo ’vācyāḥ sa hetur na hi kasyacit / bandhamokṣāv avācye ’pi na vidyete kathañ cana //*.

and possessing one [of these two] is invariably connected to being excluded from the other one. Now, this *pudgala* can be either momentary or non-momentary. To begin with, if it is non-momentary, then it is permanent, because such is the state of [that which] exceeds [one single] moment. Therefore it would be contradictory if [something] permanent could not be said to be permanent.”<sup>(89)</sup> However the most detailed treatment of this stanza (to be more precise, of PV 2.203ab) is to be found in Kamalaśīla’s commentary on TS 347, which is much indebted to Devendrabuddhi’s above-quoted explanation of PV 2.203. Kamalaśīla introduces his master’s stanza as follows: “It is not only because it cannot be said to be either identical with or other than [the constituents] that one shows that the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity; it is also because [the *pudgala*] cannot be said to be impermanent that [it] is a non-entity. In order to show this, [Śāntarakṣita] states [TS 347].”<sup>(90)</sup> As we can see, this statement provides us with an interesting transition between Dharmakīrti’s two lines of argument, i.e. between the critique of the *pudgala* as *tattvānyatvāvācyā* and the critique of the *pudgala* as *anityatvenāvācyā*; and here as in the previous argument, the notion of *arthakriyā* plays a pivotal role. Śāntarakṣita spells this out as follows: “Moreover, the capacity to [perform] functionalities is the [only] definition of existence, [and this capacity] is limited to momentary [things] only. Thus [something] that cannot be said [to be momentary] is not a [real] entity.”<sup>(91)</sup> Let us now quote Kamalaśīla’s explanation in full: “Indeed, the definition of existence, [i.e.] the nature of a [real] entity, amounts to this only: the capacity to [perform] functionalities, because not being a [real] entity is defined as [being] devoid of any [functional] efficacy. Therefore being a [real] entity is indirectly defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities. Now, this functionality is limited to momentary [things] only. [Śāntarakṣita’s] implicit idea is: it implies (*vyāpta*) momentariness. [And this is] because it is contradictory that [something] permanent [may perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time. As a consequence, the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity [if it] cannot be said to

<sup>(89)</sup> PVP D86b3-6/P99b4-7: *de ni ma yin te / gñi ga’i rnam pa* (P: par D) *ma yin pa’i dños po med pa’i phyir ro // rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa dag ni phan tshun spanis te gnas pa’i mtshan ñid can yin pa’i phyir ro // dños po la gcig rnam par gcad* (D: bcad P) *pa dañ yoñs su gcod pa dag ni de las gzan yoñs su gcod pa dañ rnam par gcad pa med na mi ’byuñ ba ñid yin pa’i phyir ro // gañ zag de yañ skad cig ma ’am skad cig ma ma yin par ’gyur grañ na / re žig gal te skad cig ma ma yin pa de’i tše skad cig ma las phyi ma’i gnas skabs ñid yin pa’i phyir rtag pa yin no // de bas na rtag pa ni rtag pa ñid du brjod par bya ba ma yin no žes bya ba ’gal lo //*. In the parallel passage of the TSP (see below, fn. 93.), *tyāga* and *parigraha* correspond to the PVP’s *rnam par gcad pa* and *yoñs su gcod pa*. Now if *\*vyavaccheda* can be interpreted in the sense of *tyāga*, the same cannot be said of *\*pariccheda* and *parigraha*. The meaning of *pariccheda(ka)* remains obscure. Of course, one cannot rule out the hypothesis that the Sanskrit manuscript(s) used by the Tibetan translators already read *pariccheda* instead of *parigraha* (due to scribal error).

<sup>(90)</sup> TSP<sub>S</sub> 116,6-7/TSP<sub>K</sub> 128,13-14: *na kevalaṃ tattvānyatvābhyām avācyatvād avastu pudgalo ’yam iti pratipādītam / ito ’py anityatvenāvācyatvād evāvastv iti pratipādayann āha...*

<sup>(91)</sup> TS 347: *arthakriyāsu śaktiś ca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam / kṣaṇikeṣv eva niyatā tathā ’vācye na vastutā //*

be momentary in this way, because in this case one negates momentariness, which is implied by [functionality], as one negates a [property] such as being a *śiṃśapā* when one negates [the property of] being a tree. As [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.203ab]: ‘For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything.’ Suppose the following be urged: if the *pudgala* were permanent, then it would be contradictory for it to [perform] a functionality either gradually or simultaneously. [But] insofar as (*yāvatā... atah*) it [cannot be said] to be permanent any more than it can be said to be impermanent, its efficacy in [performing] a functionality is not contradictory at all. [We reply:] this is incorrect, for an entity lacking both aspects cannot be a [real] individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), because [the properties of being] permanent and impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory (*anyonyavṛttiparihārasthita*), since, for a [certain real] entity, lacking (*tyāga*) one aspect is invariably connected to possessing the other one, [and] possessing (*parigraha*) [one aspect is invariably connected to] lacking [the other one]. Indeed, we do not refuse the application of the word ‘*avācya*’ to the *pudgala*, because nobody can negate [something that, like any other verbal designation, is] based on mere free will, but this [*pudgala*] is [unfortunately] presented here as having the nature of an entity. Does the nature of this entity called ‘*pudgala*’ always exist or not? If it [always] exists, then it is simply permanent, for what is called ‘permanent’ is nothing else; rather, one calls ‘permanent’ a nature that lasts forever [and] does not perish, as [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.204ab]: ‘Wise [people] call ‘permanent’ that nature which does not perish.’<sup>(92)</sup> But in the hypothesis that [its nature] does not [always] exist, then again it is simply impermanent, because [being] impermanent is defined as [having] a nature that does not last. As a consequence, since there is no other possibility than [being] momentary or non-momentary, and since it is contradictory that [something] non-momentary [may perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time, existence, which is defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities, implies momentariness. It is

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<sup>(92)</sup> PV 2.204: *nīyaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati / tyaktvemāṃ hrepanīṃ dṛṣṭim ato sa nīya ucyatām //*. “Once they have got rid of the embarrassing false view [that superimposes a *pudgala* whose nature is neither permanent nor impermanent], wise [people] call ‘permanent’ that nature which does not perish. Therefore this [*pudgala* whose nature does not perish] must be called ‘permanent’.”

therefore established that one negates existence when one negates momentariness.”<sup>(93)</sup>

As we can see from the immediate context and the purport of PV 2.202-204, Dharmakīrti’s critique of the *pudgala* has obvious soteriological implications, for giving credence to the existence of such a pseudo-entity threatens one’s progression along the Buddhist path toward salvation. First and foremost, the *pudgalavāda* is nothing but a characteristic instance of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* (in its *parikalpita*, “speculative” form, the one eliminated with the *darśanamārga*, the “path of vision”<sup>(94)</sup>), i.e. nescience (*avidyā*), the very origin of suffering according to Dharmakīrti. And by negating the impermanence of the *pudgala*, the *Pudgalavādin* also denies it any functionality, i.e. deprives it of any agency over transmigration and liberation.

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<sup>(93)</sup> TSP<sub>S</sub> 116,10-297 TSP<sub>K</sub> 128,17-129,8: *idam eva hi vidyamānatvalakṣaṇaṃ vastusvabhāvo yad utārthakriyāsu śaktiḥ / sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvād avastutvasyeti sāmartyād arthakriyā-sāmartyalakṣaṇam eva vastutvam avatiṣṭhate / sā cārthakriyā kṣaṇikeṣv eva niyatā / kṣaṇikatvenaiiva vyāpteti yāvat / nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt / atas tathā kṣaṇikatvenāvācye pudgale vastutā nāsti / tatra tadvyāpakasya kṣaṇikatvasya nivr̥tter vṛkṣatvanivr̥ttau śiṃśapātvādinivr̥ttivad iti / yathoktam – anityatvena yo ’vācyaḥ sa hetur na hi kasyacid iti\* / syād etat – yadi pudgalo nityaḥ syāt tadā tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhaḥ syāt / yāvatā yathā ’sāv anityatvenāvācycas tathā nityatvenāpīty ato ’rthakriyāsāmarthyam asyāvīruddham eveti / \*\*tad asamyak / na hy ubhayākāra-vinirmuktaṃ vastu svalakṣaṇaṃ yuktam / nityānityayor anyonyavr̥ttiparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt / vastuny ekākāratyāgaparigrahayos tadaparākāraparigrahatyāganāntariyakatvāt\*\* / na hy asmābhir avācya-śabdāniveśanaṃ pudgale pratiśidhyate / svatanrecchāmātrādhīnasya\*\*\* kenacit pratiśeddhum aśakyatvāt kimtv idam iha vasturūpaṃ nirūpyate / kim asau pudgalākhyasya vastunaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadā ’sty āhosvin nāstīti / yady asti tadā nitya evāsau / na hi nityo nāmānya eva kaścīd api tu yaḥ svabhāvaḥ sadāvasthāyī na vinasīyati sa nitya ucyate / yathoktam – nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyatīti\*\*\*\* / atha nāstīti pakṣas tadāpy anitya evāsau / anavasthāyīsvabhāvalakṣaṇatvād anityasya / ataḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikavyatirekeṇa gatyantarābhāvād akṣaṇikasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt kṣaṇikatvenārthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃ vyāptam iti pudgale kṣaṇikatvanivr̥ttau sattvanivr̥tṭiḥ siddhā /. \*PV 2.203ab. \*\*To be compared with PVP D86b3-6/P99b4-7, quoted above, fn. 89. \*\*\*°ādhīnasya TSP<sub>S</sub>: °ānītasya TSP<sub>K</sub>. \*\*\*\*PV 2.204ab.*

<sup>(94)</sup> On the distinction between *sahajā* (“innate”) and *vi-* or *pari-kalpita* *satkāyadr̥ṣṭiḥ*, see Eltschinger 2009:172-173.

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**Keywords** Buddhism, Dharmakīrti, *puḍgala* – person, *puḍgalavāda* – personalism, Sāṃmitīya, *nairātmya* – selflessness, *nairātmyavāda* – doctrine of selflessness