Meditations on the Retrieval of Lost Texts with Special Reference to the Sāṅkhya Section of *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Chapter 2

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Due to the eminent position Dignāga holds in the history of Buddhist and Indian philosophy, it is clear that scholars concerned with these fields are interested in knowing exactly what this famous thinker had to say. I consider it therefore of primary importance to regain as much as possible of Dignāga’s works in their original language. With this in mind, I have been an active participant in the efforts to regain Dignāga’s original texts, efforts that, in the modern academic context, have been continuing for over a hundred years. My special focus in this endeavour has been the second chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; the particular task I have been working on is a reconstruction of this chapter’s Sanskrit text. When I started working on this text, I did so in a rather non-reflective way. The circumstances were too inviting. Not only did a photocopy of a Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrauddhi’s commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* become available, I was given the chance to work on this sensational material in close cooperation with two specialists in the field, Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Krasser. The huge quantity and high quality of the newly available material and the special working conditions I met with will make you easily understand that I jumped head over heels into my work without much pondering and theoretical reflection of what it means to reconstruct a text in general nor in this specific case. One thing, however, was clear to me from the outset: It would be of major importance to meticulously document the data upon which my

1 This article is the slightly modified version of a lecture held at Ryukoku University, Kyoto, on 24 September 2010. It is based on research I undertook during a three-month stay at that university. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Numata Foundation for granting me a fellowship for this period, as well as to Professor Shoryu Katsura for his valuable guidance and encouragement. I would also like to express my heartfelt thanks to Professor Esho Mikogami, who took care of me in many ways. I am also very grateful to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek, who kindly improved the English text.

2 Cf. Steinkellner 2005: Introduction IV.
respective decisions were based. For the rest, I just started doing my work in a more or less intuitive way.

In the course of time, however, this attitude of innocence changed. In this connection, I feel it necessary to take a stance regarding two topics. The first concerns a certain assumption about the starting point of the respective manuscript traditions we are dealing with. In particular, I have the manuscript traditions of the Indian Buddhist pramāṇa school in mind, but I do not want to exclude the traditions of other śāstraic works belonging to roughly the same period of time. The second topic concerns a certain view of what it means to reconstruct a text.

With regard to the first point, I take the following to be the ordinary understanding of scholars working in this field: A certain author composes a certain text that – perhaps after some reworking – finally takes on a definitive wording. This text is then written down in the author’s own hand or by means of dictation. Indeed, already at this stage mistakes like misspellings or omissions might occur. In any case, the resulting manuscript becomes the sole starting point of the subsequent manuscript transmission. During the process of transmission, changes might occur in the wording, either intentionally or by mistake. Although I am not aware of any explicit statements in this regard, to me this seems to be the underlying supposition upon which the scholarly work being done in our field is based.

At the 14th World Sanskrit Conference held in Kyoto, Helmut Krasser proposed a different idea about the starting point of manuscript traditions. Since his lecture is not available in printed form, the following remarks are based on what I remember from his lecture and from several personal discussions with him. I have also not refrained from elaborating on his ideas where I have considered it appropriate.

According to this model, the production of a written text takes place in an instructional environment, in a teaching situation. The author delivers a lecture – while not necessarily so, this is presumable in most cases – based on a core text that was prepared earlier. The wording of this core text may be somewhat fixed, as for instance in the case of verses, or it may be of a less definite character. During the lecture he produces – so to speak – a new text by re-wording, adding and omitting in an ad hoc manner. Interaction from the students may influence this process. The students take down notes on what the teacher says. One or several of these records, which according to the students’ various interests, abilities and so on, may already diverge from what the teacher actually said, become the source of the resultant manuscript transmission or transmissions. Of course, from this point onwards, we have to reckon with the same possibilities for changes occurring in the manuscript

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3 If the author is commenting on a text – perhaps in a rather stereotyped way – it is possible that he does so even without relying on a wording that has been thought out in advance.
transmission as already mentioned above.

The important points of this model are:

1) The source text – or parts of it – may have been composed in an ad hoc manner.

2) We are dealing with a recording situation that has not been primarily created for the purpose of producing a written text in a definitive form. A manuscript produced under such circumstances is certainly more prone to deviations from its source then one would expect from a manuscript that was either written from dictation or by the author himself.

3) There is the possibility of multiple written sources at the very beginning of a manuscript transmission.

By referring to these three points, this model can well explain phenomena such as a lack of consistency in the argumentation, unexpected redundancy, dubious naivety, simple blunders, and diverging testimonies of what is considered a single text.

In Krasser’s opinion, the many diverging points observed in the two Tibetan translations of the Pramāṇasamuccaya make this text an apt candidate for being explained by this model. Whether I consider this model to be applicable to the Pramāṇasamuccaya and useful in the context of its reconstruction is closely connected to the second question I mentioned above. I will therefore suspend my answer for the moment and go on to the next point.

In the introduction to his reconstruction of the first chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Ernst Steinkellner talks about “[t]hree major efforts” that “have been undertaken in the past to reconstruct, restore, or retranslate the text.” With reference to the expressions “reconstruct,” “restore,” and “retranslate” he makes a note worth quoting:

The terms used in this connection by scholars should be clearly distinguished. “Reconstruction” (or “restoration, reconstitution”) is only possible if a large amount of original linguistic materials is available from citations or commentaries. When offering a “reconstruction”, the original linguistic material should be clearly distinguished from those parts of the text for which no original wording has been found so far. These parts may either be filled in with a “retranslation” of the Tibetan translation into Sanskrit which is, if possible, typographically differentiated, or by adding the Tibetan text as such, or even by adding a modern, e.g., English translation of the Tibetan text. In the latter case we can only hope to be able to grasp the meaning. In all three cases we can never be certain of the original wording.4

It is interesting to read this together with another statement made by Steinkellner at an earlier date:

Re-translations into Sanskrit, often mistakenly and misleadingly published under the style

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4 Steinkellner 2005: IV-VI, n. 4
of “reconstruction” are no substitute for the original or fragments of the original.\(^5\) The great accuracy and consistency of most Tibetan translations of works from this school and our generally increasing knowledge of the Tibetan translation-techniques usually allow a good idea of what the original Sanskrit might have looked like, but there is no critical certainty in this and with regard to the details of phraseology and syntactical arrangement we can never reach such a standard of probability that a re-translation can be considered as a real substitute of the original text.

These re-translations have the same distance to the original as e.g. English or German translations from the Tibetan, although this distance is deceptively minimized by the seeming identity of the language used with the language of the original. They have to be considered, therefore, as modern translations into Sanskrit, and not as restorations or reconstructions of the Sanskrit original. The merit of re-translations consists only in that they render intelligible the Tibetan translations to the traditional Indian scholar or Indologist who does not read Tibetan, and thus present him with an impression of a lost literary treasure of the Indian tradition. Since it is tempting to consider such translations into Sanskrit as the original and at the same time evident that such a conception can lead further on towards misinterpretation, one cannot caution too strongly against this kind of error. To be sure, from such re-translations we have to distinguish authentic reconstructions which are possible, however, only to that extent to which fragments of the original and Sanskrit-commentaries extant have transmitted the language-material of the text, which then can be checked and arranged by means of comparing them with the Tibetan translations.\(^6\)

At this point I would also like to refer to a short statement made by Erich Frauwallner in a review article in 1957:

As regards the restoration of lost texts from the Tibetan versions, reconstructing (I am not speaking of retranslating) is little more than a scholarly game, and such reconstructions can never replace the traditional text or serve as a basis for serious research.\(^7\)

From the passages by Steinkellner quoted above and from his description of the “[t]hree major efforts” in the introduction to his reconstruction of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* I, I understand that he is mainly distinguishing between reconstructions and retranslations.

A reconstruction, if I venture to elaborate a little on Steinkellner’s statements, consists in a collection of pieces of “original linguistic material” ordered in the sequence of the position they are

\(^{5}\) Here and in the following, the emphasis is mine.

\(^{6}\) Steinkellner 1980: 97-98

\(^{7}\) Frauwallner 1957: 59a
assumed to have had in the original text. The remaining gaps are bridged by some sort of filler. Acceptable fillers are “a ‘retranslation’ of the Tibetan translation into Sanskrit,” “the Tibetan text as such,” or “a modern, e.g., English translation of the Tibetan text.”

A retranslation, on the other hand, is a translation of the Tibetan translation into Sanskrit. It may, however, contain “original linguistic material.”

A possible danger I see is that Steinkellner’s suggestive manner of strongly contrasting reconstructions with retranslations might invite another misunderstanding. Warning that a retranslation is “no substitute for the original,” since it lacks “critical certainty” concerning “what the original Sanskrit might have looked like” and that “with regard to the details of phraseology and syntactical arrangement we can never reach such a standard of probability that a re-translation can be considered as a real substitute of the original text,” can easily mislead the reader to mistake an “authentic reconstruction” as being the original text. The reader might easily overlook the problems entailed in identifying “original linguistic material.” He might not be aware of how uncertain assessing and demarcating potentially original linguistic material sometimes is. He might also forget that texts can undergo changes in the course of their transmission, and that linguistic material attested at one point in the text’s history might not be as original as he may suppose. At this point one might ask whether we have access to any “original text” of the Pramāṇa school, if we take the expression literally. I would like to mention here that Frauwallner, in the passage quoted above, seems to be more cautious in this respect, by contrasting a reconstruction with “the traditional text” rather than with an “original” text.

Steinkellner’s evaluation of retranslations, and the fact that he considers retranslations one of only three possible ways to close the gaps between pieces of “original linguistic material” in a reconstruction, seems to allow no other choice than accepting that a reconstruction like that of the Pramāṇasamuccaya breaks down into highly trustworthy “original linguistic material” on the one hand, and some fillers of only very limited value on the other.

The experience I have gained during my work on the Pramāṇasamuccaya has slowly led me to develop another idea of what a reconstruction can be. In the two Tibetan translations, I repeatedly met passages that, judging from their position in their respective environments, should be translations of the same Sanskrit passage and could therefore be expected to express the same idea, but that

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8 For the sake of clarity, I will restrict myself to the case of works composed in Sanskrit and available only in Tibetan translation, without attempting a more general description.

9 As for instance “the Sanskrit text in Iyengar’s pioneering attempt” which “consists almost entirely of retranslations from the Tibetan translations” (Steinkellner 2005: Introduction) – but also of original linguistic materials – and which is, as a whole, identified as a retranslation (Steinkellner 1980: 97 and note 5).

10 Frauwallner’s use of the expressions “reconstruction” and “retranslation” evidently differs from that of Steinkellner. Frauwallner’s “reconstruction” might here be taken as subsumable under, or at least overlapping, Steinkellner’s “retranslation.”
did not fulfil this expectation. What was I supposed to do in such cases? If the Sanskrit text of
the passage could be gained from Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary or another source, I saw no major
problem. I accepted the passage as regained original text and made a note that one or the other, or
even both Tibetan translations differ from it. But what should I do if there was no Sanskrit testimony
available? If, according to my assessment, the meaning of one Tibetan translation fitted the context
well and the other did not or was even unintelligible to me, I chose the one I judged as good, and
rendered it into Sanskrit. One could say, I retranslated it. But there were also cases in which the two
Tibetan translations differed in their meaning, but both fitted equally well into the context, or equally
did not fit. In such cases, I produced two retranslations and postponed further decisions.

Of course, I deliberated the different possibilities of how the meanings of the Tibetan translations
might have diverged from one another or from attested Sanskrit material. I considered the following
possibilities:
- Errors in the transmissions of the two Tibetan translations;
- Different interpretations of the Sanskrit text by the two translation teams;
- Scribal errors in a Sanskrit manuscript or reading errors on the translators’ side, either having the
  same effect;
- Real variant readings in different Sanskrit manuscripts.

Most interesting is the last possibility: real variant readings in the Sanskrit manuscripts of the
Pramāṇasamuccaya used by the two translation teams and also by Jinendrabuddhi. I therefore ex-
amined the second chapter for indications of such variant readings, and happily found, in addition to
some less convincing evidence, one passage I consider an unmistakable proof in the matter.\footnote{11} The
two translations of verse 2.10c diverge from one another and – this is the exciting point – both have
a corresponding Sanskrit passage. Vasudhararaksita’s translation matches the version attested in the
Nyāyavārttikatātparyajitā (NVTT 148,4), and Kanakavarman’s translation matches the one found in
Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary (PST 69a2). Prof. Katsura has discovered a similar case. According
to his report, presented at a seminar on “Sanskrit manuscripts in China,” the two translations of verse
27d in the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya differ from one another and are both supported
by external testimonies. Vasudhararaksita’s version is supported by Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary,
and Kanakavarman’s by the Chinese translation of the Nyāyamukha.\footnote{12}

My attempts to deal with the problem of the diverging Tibetan translations as well as my resulting
search for indications of variant readings in lost manuscripts taught me something in connection
with the gaps between the attested Sanskrit passages in a reconstruction. Rather than regarding
the Tibetan translations as a source for retranslations, in any language, to be used as filler without

11 I gave a talk on this topic at the 14th World Sanskrit Conference.
considerable merit, I started to look at them as valuable sources for forming hypotheses about the manuscripts that served as their sources.

In some cases, one could possibly go even further and, in an attempt to come closer to an original text – use the hypothesized manuscript readings as base for further hypotheses about their common predecessor.

It might now be the right time to give you an example, so that you can better understand what I am talking about. Let us compare the following Tibetan translations. For the sake of clarity, I present the parallel texts in two rows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>P 37b8-38b1</th>
<th>P 119a7-8</th>
<th>śrotrādvīrtīḥ (-iś ca) pratyakṣam cf. PST 72a5; NCV 107,24; YD 5,11 ayathārthatvād iti PST 87a1-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ci ste yan 'dod do že na ma yin te</td>
<td>rna ba la sogs pa'i 'jug pa thams cad ni mnon sum ma yin te</td>
<td>ci lta ba bzin gyi don can ma yin pa'i phyir ro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de'i phyir de ŋid bye brag tu brjod par bya ste</td>
<td>gzan du tha sñad du mi bya ba 'khrul pa med pa ŋes bya ba la sogs pa ji skad brjod pa bzin no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ji lta gzan du bstan par bya ma yin 'zhin 'khrul pa med pa ŋes bya ba la sogs pa ltar khyad par de ŋid brjod par bya'o</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the left column you see the translation of Vasudhararaks.ita and Seṅge rgyal mtshan, in the middle that of Kanakavarman and Dad pa 'ṣes rab, and in the right column material from Jinnendrabuddhi’s commentary and other sources together with text critical notes.

Please note in the first row the striking syntactical difference. The passage on the left starts with a protasis: ci ste yan 'dod do že na ma yin te (“And if [you] say that you accept,” or short: “And if [you] accept.”). After that follows a short apodosis: ma yin te (“It is not.”), which is immediately followed by its elaborated version: rna ba la sogs pa'i 'jug pa thams cad ni mnon sum ma yin te (“It is not [the case that] each activity of the auditory sense, etc. is perception.”) Next follows the statement of the reason: don ji lta ba ma yin pa'i phyir ro (“Since [it] is not conforming to the object/reality.”).

Let us now look at Kanakarvarman’s translation. Here, the entire passage forms the protasis: ci ste... ŋes 'dod na (“If [you] accept that...”). The remaining part of the passage – subordinated as description of what is being accepted – consists of a main clause: des na rna ba la sogs pa 'jug pa thams cad ni mnon sum ma yin te (“Therefore, not each activity of the auditory sense, etc. is perception.”), and by a statement of a reason: ci lta ba bzin gyi don can ma yin pa'i phyir ro (“Since
[it] is not conforming to the object/reality.

In both translations we can see the use of the same concepts and the same argumentative connectors, but the different arrangements produce quite different meanings. Whereas in Vasudhararaksita’s translation the given passage expresses both the opinion of an opponent and Dignaga’s response, the passage in Kanakavarman’s translation presents the whole passage as the opponent’s opinion.

The two translations do not diverge as much in the passages found in the second row. Here, both passages state that as a consequence of the opponent’s opinion, he should modify his definition of perception.

At this point I would like to tell you a little more about the context. At the beginning of the Sankhya-section, Dignaga criticizes the definition of inference as proposed by the followers of the Sankhya school. According to Frauwallner’s identification, Dignaga refers here to the Sastitantra. In this definition, there is a reference to perception. From another statement of the Sastitantra, however, one can derive that the cognition of a logical mark involves the cognition of specific and general features. Since perception cannot have those features for its object, there is a contradiction. This becomes evident from the Sastitantra’s own definition of perception as the activity of the auditory sense, etc. (śrotrādivṛttiḥ). At this point the proponent of the Sankhya says that he actually accepts that specific and general features can become the object of the activity of the auditory sense, etc., and that therefore, Dignaga is not justified in construing a contradiction between the statements in the Sastitantra under consideration. Dignaga’s response to this is that this understanding renders the Sastitantra’s definition of perception incorrect, and that therefore the definition should be modified. Jinendrabuddhi indicates how this modified definition might look: yathārthā śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratvākṣam (PST 87,2).

Let us now return to our passage. According to my understanding, Vasudhararaksita’s translation states the following:

And if [you] accept [that specific and general features can become the objects of the activity of the auditory sense, etc.], then it is not – it is not [the case that] each activity of the auditory sense, etc. is perception, – since [not every activity of the auditory sense, etc.] conforms to the object/reality. Therefore, this very [activity of the auditory sense, etc.] must be stated in a specifying way [in the definition of perception], as [it has been stated] in another [text]...

Kanakavarman’s translation, on the other hand, seems to say:

And if [you] accept that therefore [i.e., because specific and general features can become the objects of the activity of the auditory sense, etc.], not every activity of the auditory sense, etc. is perception, since [not every activity of the auditory sense, etc.] conforms to the object/reality, then exactly this specification must be stated [in the definition of perception], as [it has been done] in another [text]...

If I were to try to “render intelligible the Tibetan translations to the traditional Indian scholar or
Indologist who does not read Tibetan,” inserting, however, attested linguistic material if available rather then also retranslating those passages – I might come up with something like:

“atheṣyate, na, na sarvāśrotādīvṛttīḥ pratyakṣam, ayathārthatvat. tasmāt saiva viśesya vaktavyā, yathānātyatoktam – avyapadeṣyam avyabhicārītyādi” as a translation of Vasudhararaksīta’s translation, or

“atha – tena na sarvā śrotādīvṛttīḥ pratyakṣam, ayathārthatvād itiṣyate, saiva viśesya vaktavyā, yathānātra – avyapadeṣyam avyabhicārītyādi” as a translation of Kanakavarman’s translation.

Next, I would have to choose one of the two retranslations to insert into the text. Or perhaps I should insert both retranslations. Then the reader would have the possibility to draw his own conclusions: that, for instance, one Tibetan translation is good and represents the “original text” well, and the other is a mistranslation; or that the two translations are based on two different versions of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, and could possibly date back to different records taken down by students, and so on.

At this point, however, a question arises. If I recognize the possibility that the material allows conclusions like those mentioned above – or other, similar ones – then why should I not draw them myself? The conclusions I am now most interested in concern the possible state of the manuscripts upon which the two translations were based, and about their possible relation to one another. In my mind, the two translations of the passage under discussion allow for conclusions of this sort.

Let us ask some questions. On the assumption that both translations are based on manuscripts with an identical or at least very similar text, how can we explain the different syntactical interpretation of the first portion of the quoted passage? Put in another way, how is it possible for a certain passage to be understood as expressing the pūrvapakṣa by one translation team, and as belonging to the uttarapakṣa by the other team? Part of the answer is that the verb expressing the meaning ‘accepting’ was placed in a position close to the beginning of the phrase, rather than at its end. An expression like “atha X itiṣyate” can hardly be understood as meaning “And if you accept [this], then X.” But if we assume “athes. yate X,” it is easy to see how Kanakavarman could understand X as being the beginning of the description of what Dignāga’s opponent accepts (iṣyate), and Vasudhararakṣita, on the other hand, as the beginning of the passage expressing the consequence of what the opponent accepts.

The second part of the answer consists in the assumption that Vasudhararakṣita interpreted an “itti” as expressing a reason (cf. de’i phyir), whereas Kanakavarman understood it as marking the end of the reported opinion. Thus, we arrive, up to now, at “athesyate X iti Y,” understood by Vasudhararakṣita as “If you accept [this], then X. Therefore, Y,” and by Kanakavarman as “If you accept that X, then Y.”

The next question is about the passage referred to here as X. To a great extent, both translations seem to be based on the same wording. With the help of the external testimonies, we can assume it as having been “na śrotādīvṛttīḥ pratyakṣam, ayathārthatvāt.” According to Vasudhararakṣita’s
translation, however, this passage is headed by a short negative sentence (ma yin te), and according to Kanakavarman by some causal or modal expression (des na). This divergence can be explained by assuming different wordings in the respective manuscripts. For Vasudhararakṣita’s manuscript we can assume the reading “na,” and for Kanakavarman’s the reading “tena.”

I understand Vasudhararakṣita’s translation of this passage as meaning: “it is not – it is not [the case that] each activity of the auditory sense, etc. is perception.” If the base frame of this passage, namely, “na, ayathārthatvād” were part of a verse or a quotation from another text, then the whole passage would not sound unnatural. The inserted section, “na sarvā šrotādivrirṛtiḥ pratyakṣam,” would just be an elaborate explanation of “na.” But since there is no further reason to assume that it belongs to a verse or is a quotation from another text, the passage seems rather dubious. I therefore accept “tena” as the correct reading, and “na” as having been produced by omission. In any case, an unintentional omission of “te-” by a scribe seems to be more probable than its insertion.

In this way, we can offer a hypothesis about the manuscripts used by the two translation teams. It might be represented in the following way, disregarding the question of punctuation:

V’s Ms: atheṣyate na na sarvā śrotādivrirṛtiḥ pratyakṣam ayathārthatvād iti saiva viśeṣya vaktavyā yathānāyatrotkam – avyapadeśyām avyabhicārityādi

K’s Ms: atheṣyate tena na sarvā śrotādivrirṛtiḥ pratyakṣam ayathārthatvād iti sa eva viśeṣo vaktavyo yathānāyatrotkam – avyapadeśyām avyabhicārityādi

In a further step, using the type of arguments applied in the case of actually extant manuscripts, we can propose that the reading of Kanakavarman’s manuscript is probably closer to the original reading than Vasudhararakṣita’s. This would result in:

atheṣyate, tena (tena K : na V) na sarvā śrotādivrirṛtiḥ pratyakṣam ayathārthatvād iti saiva viśeṣya vaktavyā (saiva viśeṣya vaktavyā PST, V : sa eva viśeṣo vaktavyo K) yathānāyatrotkam – avyapadeśyām avyabhicārityādi.

I would understand this passage as meaning:

And if [you] accept [that specific and general features can become the objects of the activity of the auditory sense, etc.], then, as a consequence, not every activity of the auditory sense, etc. would be perception, since [not every activity of the auditory sense, etc.] would be conforming to the object/reality. Therefore, …

As you may have noticed, I draw the line between protasis and apodosis in a different way than is suggested by Kanakavarman’s translation; I stay rather close to Vasudhararakṣita’s understanding. Even if Vasudhararakṣita’s manuscript was inferior to Kanakavarman’s, his general understanding of this passage seems to fit the context better than that of Kanakavarman.

With this short demonstration, I hope I have been able to show that there is a possibility for filling in the “gaps” that is preferable to the three recommended by Steinkellner.

The kind of reconstruction I have in mind can be described as a series of assumptions concern-
ing the wording of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. The evidence and arguments used for the respective assumptions will inevitably have different strength and probative force, and thus some might be regarded as likely hypotheses, whereas, at the other end of the scale, some might be considered mere guesswork. This is a point one has to hold in mind. In this regard, we should also be aware of the fact that even those wordings that Jinendrabuddhi explicitly ascribes to the Pramāṇasamuccaya are, strictly speaking, nothing other then pieces of evidence for hypotheses concerning one or several manuscripts that Jinendrabuddhi used in composing his commentary, that is, concerning the text of the Pramāṇasamuccaya as it may have existed in a certain transmission line at a certain point of time. The same is, mutatis mutandis, true for the other Sanskrit works from which we lift “linguistic material,” and also for the two Tibetan translations. On a side note, perhaps one that is self-evident, I would like to add that actually accessible manuscripts should also be understood as attesting the wording of a text in a certain transmission line at a certain point in time, and that this situation is thus also similar to the one I have described for the Pramāṇasamuccaya.13 The reader might thus be warned against mistaking a reconstruction, or a critical edition for that matter, as something other than simply an attempt to come close to the original text.

At this point I would like to come back to the ‘classroom-model,’ as we might call it, of producing texts and manuscripts, as opposed to the ‘study room-model.’ I find the ‘classroom-model’ quite attractive, since it can be used to explain a wide range of phenomena we meet when dealing with texts, and, on top of that, it can provoke thoughts on the modes of text production at certain periods of time in ancient India, as well as our concept of authorship and related questions.

I cannot, however, see how one can make effective use of this model in regard to the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Let us take the case of divergences between the Tibetan translations and the evidence in Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary. Some of them can be explained sufficiently without referring to the ‘classroom-model,’ by assuming errors in the manuscript transmissions of the Sanskrit text or of the Tibetan translations, as the case may be. In an effort to make these assumptions plausible, we try to explain exactly how these errors may have happened. If we succeed in explaining the genesis of an error, we can sometimes also provide a hypothesis concerning the reading of the relevant Sanskrit manuscript. Another group of divergences can be explained by assuming that the translators interpreted the same Sanskrit wording in different ways. When trying to explain how these different interpretations may have been possible, it is possible for us to gain an idea of the corresponding Sanskrit wording. The remaining cases of divergences, those we have not succeeded in explaining in the ways described above, might be regarded as candidates for the ‘classroom-model.’ As in the case of assumed errors in manuscripts or in the case of different interpretations, here we should try to explain exactly how the specific data can be explained based on the ‘classroom-model.’

13 I am referring here only to texts of which – as is usual in our field – no autograph is extant and only a limited number of the manuscripts presumably once produced are available today.
If we cannot provide a detailed explanation – and at the moment I cannot think of a way this might be achieved – then the assumption is just one among many possible assumptions. We have just as much justification to assume that a divergence has been produced by a combination of scribal errors, improper emendations, and different interpretations, a combination that is far too complex to be explained in detail. We might even assume that Dignāga himself put different versions of his Pramāṇasamuccaya into circulation. As long as we cannot provide arguments that make one assumption more plausible then others, I do not see much sense in ascribing to it.

These are my thoughts on the nature of reconstructing texts in general, and more specifically with reference to the use of the two Tibetan translations of the Pramāṇasamuccaya. I have started to redo my reconstruction of the second chapter according to these ideas. I would therefore greatly appreciate any comments and suggestions.


PSṬ manuscript B of Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā, cf. Anne MacDonald’s description in Ernst Steinkellner et al. (eds), Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā. Chapter 1, Part II: Diplomatic edition with a manuscript description by Anne MacDonald. Beijing - Vienna 2005.


Steinkellner 2005 Ernst Steinkellner, Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter 1. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Sanskrit text with the help of the two Tibetan translations on the basis of the hitherto known Sanskrit fragments and the linguistic materials gained from Jinendrabuddhi’s Tīkā. www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf, April 2005.


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