On the Ideal Debater: \textit{Yog\textasciicircum{c}r\textasciicircum{a}rabh\=umi, Abhidharmasamuccaya} and \textit{Abhidharmasamuccayabh\=asya}\textsuperscript{1}

Alberto Todeschini

I

It is well-known among specialists that India was, from very early, characterized by the presence of public debates. The origin of such practice remains obscure, but from the \textit{R\=g Veda} we can infer that in the second millennium BCE there were verbal contests, which, according to Kuiper, may “be regarded as a special instance of a more general type of contest, which included unpoetical verbal contests as well as chariot races, combats, etc.”\textsuperscript{2} Whatever the connection between earlier and later verbal practices might be, the accounts of debates found in the surviving literature offer a lively picture in which humans as well as the occasional supernatural being compete vigorously, making use of a variety of tactics, argumentative maneuvers and tricks. While many of these accounts are historically rather dubious, the impact of debating and argumentation practices on the development of philosophy, religion and numerous other fields of inquiry was substantial and is beyond dispute. Furthermore, many of India’s most important religious and philosophical protagonists are depicted as taking part and being skilled in debate.

As far as Buddhism is concerned, an interest in argumentation seems to have been present from the

\textsuperscript{1} I wish to express my sincerest gratitude to Prof. Katsura Sh\=ory\=u for hospitality, help and encouragement during my stay at Ry\=ikoku University in 2010-2011. Prof. Silvio Vita and the staff at Italian School of East Asian Studies in Kyoto greatly facilitated my work. The final touches were put while guest of Kyoto University’s Institute for Research in the Humanities (人文科学研究所), for which I thank Prof. Funayama T\=oru. I am also much obliged to Prof. Tom Tillemans and Giuliana Martini.

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\textsuperscript{2} Kuiper, “The Ancient Aryan Verbal Contest,” 217.
very beginning and is particularly evident at least since the *Kathāvatthu (circa 3rd century BCE), which however does not yet contain the meta-discussion seen in texts that were in circulation a few centuries later and that were either entirely dedicated to or at least extensively dealt with the art of debating. These works have sometimes been referred to in the secondary literature as “debate manuals” or some such. At any rate, just how—if at all—one ought to engage in debate was itself a debated topic and in this connection it is telling that a manual like the *Upāyahrdaya (*Prayogasāra? 方便心論) begins with an opponent listing a number of reasons why one shouldn’t debate and the author offering his defense.

This paper is dedicated to three texts that deal with a number of issues relevant to argumentation and debate practices. These are the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (henceforth, Samuccaya) and the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (henceforth, Bhāṣya). In particular, the focus will be on a section of the Yogācārabhūmi’s Śrutamāyibhūmi concerned with hetuvidyā (henceforth, “Hetuvidyā section”), on the Samuccaya’s section titled “Vādavinīścaya” and on the Bhāṣya’s corresponding portion.

While our three texts do not put forward what I would call a ‘systematic theory of argumentation’ (henceforth, STOA), they are the text’s author and so did Ishitobi (henceforth, I.) 4

My point is that although the Kathāvatthu contains plenty of arguments for or against a number of claims, these are not about the activity of argumentation itself. Differently put, these are not arguments about the theory of argumentation. I am influenced here by Finocchiaro, *Arguments about Arguments*, passim. The phrase “meta-discussion” is borrowed from Eemeren and Grootendorst, *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation*, 143. The authors use it in the context of the rules for a critical discussion.


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5 T. 1632. The text was translated in *circa* 472 by Ijiyae 吉迦夜. *Upāyahrdaya is the title given by Giuseppe Tucci, Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*. Erich Frauwallner, “Vasubandhu’s Vādavidhiḥ,” 107, suggests the alternative "Prayogasāra." Kajiyama, “On the Authorship of the Upāyahrdaya,” argues that Nāgārjuna is the text’s author and so did Ishitobi 石飛. 龍樹造「方便心論」の研究, 9-14. While this isn’t the right occasion to evaluate their arguments, I believe that more work needs to be done before the matter is settled satisfactorily.

6 T. 1632, 23b09: 問曰。不造詬論。所以者何。凡造詬論者。多起忿恨懈 遲真空。自擾亂心少柔和意。顯現他惡自 歡己善。如斯業過智者所呵。是故一切諸賢聖人。無量方便斷詬論者。常樂遠離如捨毒器。又造詬論者。內調柔 外觀多道。是以若欲自利利人。應當捨此詬論之法。For an English translation of this passage as well as of the one in the next footnote see Gillon, “An Early Buddhist Text on Logic: *Fang Bian Xin Lun*,” 22-23. For a Japanese translation with notes see Ishitobi 石飛. 龍樹造「方便心論」の研究, 41-44. Henceforth Chinese passages from the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō are pasted from CBETA <http://cbeta.org/index.htm> but I have also consulted SAT: <http://21dzk.1u-tokyo.ac.jp/SAT/ddb-sat2.php>.

7 T. 1632, 23b15: 答曰不然。今造詬論非為勝利義名聞。但欲顯示善惡義相故造詬論。世若無論迷惑者衆。則為世 間邪智巧辯。其所迷惑起不善業。輪廻恩怨失真義利。若造詬論者自分別善惡空相。衆魔外邏邪見之人。無能破壞 作障礙也。故我為欲利益衆生。造此正論。又欲令正法流布於世。如為修治藥藥棄果。而外魔薦薦棄林。為防其 故。今造詬論亦依是。欲護正法不求名聞故。汝前論無論論者。決非不然。為護法故故造詬論。
tion," they do cover a substantial amount of topics and in spite of the idiosyncrasies some of the issues they deal with will be familiar to anyone who has opened a contemporary textbook on argumentation theory or informal logic. To give just one example, argumentation theorists Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans mention the following as some of the rules that participants in oral argumentation should observe:

1. Each point raised in the discussion must be relevant to the matter at hand at that moment. There is no use in advancing solutions before the problem has been clarified, nor is there any use in presenting essential information after a decision has already been made. Participants must speak only if they really have something to say and, at the same time, must not refrain from raising a relevant point.

2. It is best to avoid making too many points at once. The discussion can quickly become chaotic. Instead of presenting six points, it is better to start with one or two. Participants should restrict themselves to a couple of important points and not bring up side issues and minor details.

3. The function of each contribution must be clear. Why is the speaker responding as she is? Is she trying to set something straight? Is she offering supplementary evidence or an explanation? Is she presenting an alternative solution?

4. Participants should not draw out the discussion by unnecessary repetition or by bringing up points that have already been dealt with.

5. The discussion must be brought to a clear conclusion. It must be perfectly clear whether the difference of opinion has been resolved, and if so, what the resolution is. The consequences of the resolution must also be made clear. Should the agreement be reported to a certain organization? Do further steps need to be taken?8

Some similar concerns are found, e.g., in the Nyāyasūtra’s, *Tarkaśāstra’s and *Upāyārddaya’s discussion of the points of defeat (nigrahastra)9 as well as in our three texts’ treatment of defeat in debate (vādanigraha).10 To be sure, there are also considerable differences between the theoretical

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8 Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans, Argumentation, 174-175.
9 On the nigrahastra in the Nyāyasūtra see Todeschini, “Twenty-Two Ways to Lose a Debate.” I hesitatingly give the Sanskrit title *Tarkaśāstra for 如實論 (T. 1633) as many scholars have done before me, but this is problematic. On the title see Vassiliev, “Ju-shih Lam: A Logical Treatise Ascribed to Vasubandhu,” 1014ff, and Katsura 慈, “インド論理学における過صلاح念の生成と発展,” 49. The text was translated by Paramārtha and as both Vassiliev and Katsura report, according to Chinese tradition it is a work of Vasubandhu. The relevant section begins at T. 1633, 34b25. For the *Upāyārddaya see especially T. 1632, 26b01ff, but relevant material is found elsewhere in the text.
10 See Hayashima 早島, Abhidharmasamuccaya and Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya: インド大乗仏教論僧行諸識学派における聖典継承と教義解釈の研究, 928-929; Wayman, A Millennium of Buddhist Logic, 31-37; Yaita 夢穂, 仏教知識論
engagement with argumentation in the so-called “West” and in South Asia, such as the fact that the influential tripartite Aristotelian distinction of logic, dialectic and rhetoric has no explicit parallel in classical Indian treatments of argumentation.\footnote{See Emmeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans, \textit{Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory}, 29-50; Tindale, \textit{Acts of Arguing}, especially 21-93; and Bermejo-Luque, “La Distinción Aristotélica entre Lógica, Dialéctica y Retórica y su lugar en la Teoría de la Argumentación.”}

Hereafter, I shall not cover all that the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}, the \textit{Samuccaya} and the \textit{Bhāṣya} have to say on debate and argumentation, as this is well beyond the scope of a single paper and I will focus on the characteristics of an ideal debater instead. Our texts don’t offer a characterization of the ideal debater as such, rather, they put forward a number of qualities that are clearly desirable. The fact that I am using the word “ideal” should alert readers that I am not under the illusion that debaters always behaved impeccably, and indeed there is plenty of evidence to the contrary. In any event, the person who possesses such characteristics will, on the one hand, be a formidable discussant; on the other hand, he will behave in a way that reflects many of the qualities that Buddhists had long believed speakers in general should possess.\footnote{For historical and grammatical reasons, masculine pronouns will be used throughout the paper, even though female debaters are not unheard of (e.g. Gārgī, Maitreyī, Bhaddā Kuṇḍalakesā, Nanduttarā).}

Some qualifications before proceeding: below I frequently make use of “argument” and cognate words. Now, the English “argument” can have the sense of \textit{dispute} or even \textit{quarrel}, as in the sentence “she had a nasty argument with the neighbor.” This has been called the \textit{disputational} sense of “argument” and “to argue”\footnote{Hitchcock, “Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument,” 103. The author proceeds to make the definition more precise, but for the present purpose what I quoted should suffice.} and such sense is absent in the case of the Latin \textit{argumentum}, the German \textit{Argument}, the French \textit{argument} and the Italian \textit{argomento} for example.\footnote{This issue has already been discussed a number of times. See \textit{ibidem}, 101-103; Emmeren, \textit{Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse}, 25-27; and Plantin, “Argumentation Studies in France,” 173-174.} I have no doubt that disputes and quarrels were present at least on occasion. For instance, Scharfe reports that a “classical Tamil Jaina text warns of evil scholars who if defeated [in a discussion] turn to abuse and challenge their opponent to a fistfight.”\footnote{Scharfe, \textit{Education in Ancient India}, 287. The brackets are mine.} However, I use “argument” in the sense of “a type of discourse in which the author expresses a point of view and offers one or more reasons in support of that point of view.”\footnote{Emmeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans, \textit{Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory}, 29-50; Tindale, \textit{Acts of Arguing}, especially 21-93; and Bermejo-Luque, “La Distinción Aristotélica entre Lógica, Dialéctica y Retórica y su lugar en la Teoría de la Argumentación.”} Naturally, the two senses can apply to one and the same situation as the case when two or more parties exchange arguments (in the latter sense) in a dispute. As for “debate,” my
use of this word is neutral with regard to the presence or absence of hostility and animosity in the exchange.

II

Buddhists were, like many who preceded or followed them in South Asia, very interested in speech, and the Buddha is on several occasions depicted as describing proper and improper ways to participate in verbal exchanges. Further, there is ample textual evidence suggesting that the Buddha and his disciples engaged in debates extensively, both among themselves as well as with people not associated with Buddhism and even openly antagonistic to the Buddha or his teachings. Also, according to at least one text the Buddha actively encouraged both lay and ordained followers to publicly discuss and refute the views of people belonging to other religious groups. At the same time, in canonical sources there are also numerous injunctions against debating inappropriately.

To speak, the Buddha realized, is to perform an action, and as such speaking can lead to various painful or happy consequences. One of the cornerstones in this regard is that of right speech (Sanskrit: samyagvāc; Pāli: sammāvācā), defined as follows:

And what, monks, is right speech? It is called “right speech,” monks, which is abstaining from speaking falsely, abstaining from malicious speech, abstaining from harsh speech, abstaining from frivolous chatter.

To be sure, elsewhere the Buddha says that he is willing to debate on condition that the interlocutor—Upāli—discusses based on truth (saćce patitthāya). At any rate, while in the Hetuvidyā and

17 My discussion on debate and argumentation practices in early Buddhism is exclusively based on Pāli sources. Such exclusivity could be a fault if one were trying to settle certain doctrinal or historical matters for which it is essential to study non-Theravāda material as well. But reliance on only Pāli sources is perfectly acceptable for a general introduction to equally general attitudes.

18 See AN 10.49 at AN V 191-2, in which the Buddha praises the householder Vajjīya for refuting foolish people (mogha-purisā) and then encourages monks to refute wanderers of other sects (aṁhatitthīye paribbaṆake) as Vajjīya had done: sādhu sādhu gahapatī. evaṁ kho te gahapatī mogha-purisā kālena kālam sahaddhammena suniggahitaṁ niggaheṭabba [...] yo pi so bhikkhave bhikkhā dīgharattam appurakkaṁ kho imasmiṁ dhammavinaye, so pi evaneva aṁhatitthīye paribbaṆake sahaddhammena suniggahitaṁ niggaheyya yathā tam vajjīyaṁhitena gahapatinā niggaheṭī. Tā pāsage is interesting terminologically because of the use of words cognate with the Sanskrit nigraha, term which is widely employed in so-called “debate manuals” with the specific meaning of “defeat.”

19 Naturally, many of the points the Buddha made about speaking equally apply to writing or other forms of communication that didn’t exist or weren’t in common use in South Asia at the time of the Buddha.

20 SN 45.8 at SN V 9: katamā ca bhikkhave, sammāvācā: yā kho bhikkhave, musvādāveramaṇī pisunāya vāccāya veramaṇī phurasūya vāccāya veramaṇī samphappalāpā veramaṇī ayaṁ vuccati bhikkhave sammāvācā. For other relevant passages see, e.g., the Brahma-jālasutta (DN 1 at DN I 4) and the Sevitabbāsevitabbhasutta (MN 114 at MN III 47).

21 Upālisutta, MN 56 at MN I 376.
Vādaviniścaya sections there is no explicit reference to the notion of right speech, similar attitudes are certainly present.  

In the Anguttara Nikāya there is a relevant discussion of what to consider in order to know whether a person exhibits the right behavior and has the right qualities so that he is fit for conversation (kaccho/akaccho). Among these, there are issues pertaining to whether the interlocutor attacks (abhiharati), crushes (abhimaddati) or derides (anupajagghati) the person he is conversing with, grasps at his faux pas (khalitaṃ gaṅghāti), etc.

More background is provided by the Mahāsaccakasutta, where we witness a dialogue between the Buddha and Saccaka Niganṭhaputta, referred to in the sutta as “Aggivessana” and described by Ānanda as “fond of disputation, skilled in debate and regarded by many people as a sage.” In it Saccaka describes the demeanor of Pūraṇa Kassapa—a number of teachers who were contemporaries of the Buddha—when debating, which is contrasted with the effect that hostile encounters have on the Buddha himself:

I recall, Master Gotama, engaging Pūraṇa Kassapa in debate, and then he prevaricated, led the talk aside, and showed anger, hate, and bitterness. But when Master Gotama is spoken to offensively again and again, assaulted by discourteous courses of speech, the colour of his skin brightens and the colour of his face clears, as is to be expected of one who is accomplished and fully enlightened.

Again, what is seen in this passage is congruous with a debater’s desirable and undesirable traits as

22 More information on right speech and related matters can be found in Bodhi, The Noble Eightfold Path, 48-56; Harvey, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics, 74-77.
23 AN I 197: yadi vā kaccho yadi vā akaccho’ti.
24 AN I 198: kathāsampayogena bhikkhave puggalo veditabbo yadi vā kaccho, yadi vā akaccho. sacāyaṃ bhikkhave puggalo pathaṃ patho samāno abhiharati, abhimaddati, anupajagghati, khalitaṃ gaṅghāti. evaṃ santāyaṃ bhikkhave puggalo sakaccho hoti. sacē paṇiyaṃ bhikkhave puggalo pathaṃ patho samāno na abhiharati, na abhimaddati, na anupajagghati, na khalitaṃ gaṅghāti. evaṃ santāyaṃ bhikkhave puggalo sakaccho hoti.
25 MN I 237: bhassappavādiko paññitavādo sādhandaṃ mahaṃ paharaṃ. Bhassappavādiko is also used in the Milindapañha, an unusual but most interesting Pāli text, to describe king Milinda, who allegedly was, as Finot, Les Questions de Milinda, 13, put it, a “‘Sophiste et beau parleur.” See Milindapatha 4.
26 MN I 250: abhijānānaṃhaṃ bhogotama pūraṇaṃ kassapaṃ vaddaṃ vaddaṃ samārabhātī. sopī mayā vaddaṃ vaddaṃ samārauddhaḥ aṭṭhena nīnaṃ paṭicci, bahiddhā kathah aparāmesi, kopaṭiṣṭha dosaṭi appacayati pūrvākāsi. bhoto kho pana gotamassa evaṃ āsavā ṣāsavā vuccamānassa upānaṭiḥ upānaṭiḥ vacanapathacumuddaraciyamānassa chāvivāṇo ceva pariyoṣṭhāti, mukhaṃ vam ca vippasitati, yathā tathā arahato sammāsamuddhassā. Translation quoted from Nāṇamoli and Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha, 343. The same is repeated about Makkhāli Gosāla, Ajīta Kesakambalīni, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Sāṇaya Belaṭṭhiputta and Nigaṇṭha Nātakutta. On the so-called “six heretics” see ibidem, 50-51; Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, passim; and MacQueen, “The Doctrines of the Six Heretics According to the Śrāmaṇayaphala Sūtra.” For a Mālasarvāstivāda perspective see Vogel, The Teachings of the Six Heretics According to the Praavrτyāvastava of the Tibetan Mālasarvāstivāda Vinaya.
found in the Hetuvidyā and Vādaviniścaya sections.

There is one last issue that I’d like to address before proceeding. In brief, some texts may give the impression that, contrary to my previous claims, the Buddha in fact did not encourage or engage in debate and doctrinal discussions or that he even actively discouraged such activities. For instance, mention can be made of the Madhupiṇḍikasutta (MN 18), the Cūḷamāṇḍkaśyasutta (MN 63), the Pāśādikasutta (DN 29), the Ovādasutta (SN 16.6), the Pupphasutta (SN 22.94), the Khemāsutta (SN 44.1) and the Ānandasutta (SN 44.10). In these discourses the Buddha or a disciple is seen as avoiding to provide answers, avoiding commitment on some specific question, remaining silent, giving negative depictions of debates, and so forth. The apparent tension has been aptly commented upon by David Seyfort Ruegg and Richard Gombrich:

[I]f it is true that the Buddha does not hold back, so to say in a closed teacher’s fist (acariyamaṁṭhi = acaryamaṇḍi), any relevant teaching required by his disciples, neither does he indulge in any utterance that is unwarranted and unjustified in a given philosophical and teaching situation. And what he is shown as eschewing was disputatiousness and contentiousness masquerading as philosophy rather than discussion, reason and analysis.

While the evidence is thus somewhat inconsistent, on balance one may conclude that the Buddha was against discussing theory in the abstract, that he did not pick arguments, and that when

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27 In addition to the texts already mentioned, noteworthy material relevant to debating and argumentation practices and the early Buddhist attitude thereto can also be found in: Potthipādasutta (DN 9 at DN I 178), Abhayasutta (MN 58 at MN I 392), Cūḷahatthipadopamasutta (MN 27 at MN I 176), Pasārasutta (Suttapāta IV.8 at 161).

28 The Pupphasutta contains the well-known statement in which the Buddha expresses the view that it isn’t him who disputes with the world but the world that disputes with him: nāham bhikkhave lokena vivādati loko ca bhikkhave mayā vivādati (SN III 138). Cf. also Trisumavarindasaparivarta Sūtra (大方廣三戒經, T. 311, 689b19); 佛說文殊師利現實藏經 (T. 461, 463a20); Abhidharma Mahāvibhūṣaṇa Sūtra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, T. 1545, 255c07); Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* (成實論, T. 1646, 327a27). A similar passage is found in Candrakīrti’s *Prasannapadā* (xviii.8, 370): loko mayā sārdham vivādati nāham lokena sārdham vivādati. Note that vivāda (“dispute, quarrel”) is one of the six types of vīda that our Yogācāra texts discuss in part 1 of the Hetuvidyā and Vādaviniścaya sections. The seven parts in which these sections are divided will be introduced below, in III.

29 Several authors have already discussed issues surrounding the unanswered questions, the Buddha’s silence and related matters, e.g., Robinson, “Some Methodological Approaches to the Unexplained Points;” Gómez, “Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli Canon;” Collins, Selfless Persons, 131-138; Nagao, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, 35ff; Oetke, “Die ‘Unbeantworteten Fragen’ und das Schweigen des Buddha;” Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy, 152-156; Saigusa 三枝, 初期仏教の思想, 2-41-72; Karunadasa, “The Unanswered Questions: Why Were They Unanswered? A Re-examination of the Textual Data.” Some relevant thoughts by Vasubandhu can be found in Duerlinger, Indian Buddhist Theories of Persons, 89-93 and 222-232. On silence in Buddhism generally see also Seyfort Ruegg, Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective, 209-212.

30 Seyfort Ruegg, “Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism,” 152-153. Parentheses in the original. The first remark is on the Pupphasutta in particular but I think that it applies beyond that specific text.
discussion arose he avoided head-on confrontation by adopting 'skill in means'.

The preceding overview is far from comprehensive, but should be sufficient for the present purpose. What is seen in canonical Pāli texts is a lively picture of frequent verbal exchanges, challenges and debates. Textual evidence suggests that such activities continued to happen long after the events narrated in the suttas we have seen above and mentions or depictions of debates are very common in the surviving literature. To give just one example, according to Tārānātha, Dharmakīrti on one occasion defeated 500 philosophers and converted them to Buddhism over three months of debating. On another, he refuted—with a total of 50000 arguments!—500 theses put forward by Kumārārīḷa. Allegedly, Dharmakīrti also defeated Śaṅkara three times, thereby causing the latter’s conversion to Buddhism and this happened in spite of the fact that Śaṅkara had been trained by the god Mahādeva. Depictions such as this can’t always be regarded as providing reliable historical evidence, but the fact remains that many of the best-known figures of South Asia’s religious and philosophical traditions are portrayed as taking part and being skilled in debating.

III

The three texts on which I shall henceforth focus my attention are the Yogācārabhūmi, the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya. It is well-known that there are several problematic issues surrounding the authorship of the Yogācārabhūmi, and this has long been a contested issue. I remain uncommitted on the matter. The Samuccaya is commonly attributed to Asaṅga but in this regard too there are outstanding questions. As for the Bhāṣya, a number of possible authors have been put forward and there is no agreement. At any rate, these three texts cover a large amount of subjects, most of which aren’t directly related to debate practices and argumentation. The Yogācārabhūmi discusses debate in what I call “Hetuvidyā section,” which survives

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31 Gombrich, How Buddhism Began, 17.
32 For more information on debates and argumentation in early Buddhism see Watanabe, Philosophy and its Development in the Nikāyas and Abhidhamma, 71ff; Matilal, The Character of Logic in India, 33-37; Ganeri, “Indian Logic,” 309ff; Manné, “Categories of Sutta in the Pāli Nikāyas and Their Implications for Our Appreciation of the Buddhist Teaching and Literature,” 44-61; Manné, “The Dīgha Nikāya Debates: Debating Practice at the Time of the Buddha.”
33 Chattopadhyaya, Chattopadhyaya, and Lama Chimpa, Tārānātha’s History of Buddhism in India, 231ff. For more information on accounts of debates see Cabezón, “Buddhist Narratives of the Great Debates” and for later periods than treated in the present paper see Bronkhorst, “Modes of Debate and Refutation of Adversaries in Classical and Medieval India.”
35 See Schmithausen, Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viiniñcavyasamgrahani der Yogācārabhāmīḥ, 101, note y; Schmithausen, Alavariyāṇa, 411, note 755; Shinoda 原田, “Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya の成立年代,” 882; Taïa, Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣyam, xxii; Tsukamoto 塚本, Matsunaga 松長, and Isoda 原田, 梵語仏典の研究, 349; Bayer, The Theory of Karman in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 42-44.
in Sanskrit and was translated in Tibetan (henceforth, *Yogācārabhūmiṣṭhāna*) and Chinese (henceforth, *Yogācārabhūmiṣṭhāna*).

The term *hetuvidyā* literally means “science of reason(s)”\(^{36}\) and became relatively widely used in East Asia in its translation as 染明. The term has also been given in English as “logical science”\(^{37}\) and this reflects the logico-philosophical context in which *hetu* is used. However, the *Yogācārabhūmiṣṭhāna*’s *Hetuvidyā* section covers several topics that have little or no relation to logic or philosophy. Interestingly, while the *Samuccaya*’s treatment of debate is profoundly influenced by the *Hetuvidyā* section –indeed, it is most likely based on it– the corresponding section is titled “Vādavinīscaya,” i.e., “Discussion of Debate.”\(^{39,40}\) And as far as I have been able to ascertain, nowhere does the text contain the compound *hetuvidyā*. In any event, about 40% of the *Samuccaya* has so far been recovered in Sanskrit but the Vādavinīscaya section isn’t included among these fragments. Fortunately, the text survives in a Chinese translation by Xuanzang (henceforth, *Samuccaya*)\(^{41}\) and in a Tibetan one by

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\(^{37}\) Almost needless to say, here “science” isn’t used with the meaning of “natural science” as is common in contemporary English, rather, in a more etymological sense akin to the Italian *scienza* or the French *science*, which in turn overlap with the German *Wissenschaft* and the Japanese *gaku*.


\(^{39}\) According to Franklin Edgerton, *vinīscaya* is a “philosophical, doctrinal exegesis or disquisition, discussion.” See Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*, Volume II Dictionary, 490, s.v, emphasis in the original.

\(^{40}\) A French translation of the *Samuccaya*, was published by Walpola Rahula in 1971 as *Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine (Philosophie) (Abhidharmasamuccaya) d’Asanga*. While it is very useful in general, unfortunately, the Vādavinīscaya section is frequently problematic. There are other parts of Rahula’s rendering of the *Samuccaya* that are much more successful. The Vādavinīscaya section begins on page 181. There exists an English translation of Rahula’s work by Sara Boin-Webb with the title of *Abhidharmasamuccaya = The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy)*. Just as for the *Hetuvidyā* section, Oberhammer et al. (1991, 1996, 2006) also provide translations of the Vādavinīscaya section.

\(^{41}\) *Da cheng a pi da mo ji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨集論, T. 1605. The Vādavinīscaya section begins at 693b13.
Jinamitra, Śilendrabodhi and Ye shes sde (henceforth, _Samuccaya_).

Finally, the _Bhāṣya_ survives in Sanskrit and in Tibetan (henceforth, _Bhāṣya_). In addition to providing valuable commentary and to being interesting in its own right, the _Bhāṣya_ is important as it quotes—and thus preserves in Sanskrit—several passages from the _Samuccaya_.

The Hetuvidyā and Vādavinīcāya sections share the same seven-fold structure. The seven parts are of uneven length with some being much longer than others and altogether they cover a fairly large and heterogeneous number of issues:

1. Different types of talk exchanges (_vāda_);
2. The location of talk exchanges/debates (_vādādhikaraṇa_);
3. Matters relating to arguments, evidence and perception, including a discussion of _pramāṇas_ (_vādādhīṣṭhāna_).

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42 Chos mngon pa kun las btus pa, DT 4049. The Vādavinīcāya section begins at 118a6.

43 Chos mngon pa kun las btus pa'i bshad pa, DT 4053. Translated, like the _Samuccaya_, by Jinamitra, Śilendrabodhi and Ye shes sde. The Vādavinīcāya section begins at 287a4.

44 There are two other relevant texts. The first, attributed to Asaṅga, is the _Xian yang sheng jiao lun_ (顯示聖教論, T. 1602, translated by Xuanzang; henceforth, _Xianyang_). The Sanskrit version has hitherto not been recovered. The original title is uncertain. Some possibilities have been briefly discussed by Schmithausen, _Ālayavijñāna_ 261; note 99, where the following alternative renderings are mentioned together with references to secondary sources on each: (Āryadeśanā)-Vikhyāpana, Prakaraṇāryasūrasamāśāstra; Sāsanodhūvāna and Saddharmavyākhyāna. Schmithausen (ibidem) says “I refrain from committing myself in the matter” and I shall do likewise. On the text’s relationship with the _Yogācārabhūmi_ see Suguro 聖吾, 初期唯識思想の研究, 125-138. For an introduction to this text, which also touches upon matters of authorship, see Hayashima 早島, “『顯示聖教論』研究序” The _Xianyang_ contains a portion (beginning at 531a15) that, as Tucci, “Buddhist Logic Before Diṅnāga (Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, _Tarkasūtras_),” 453, recognized already in 1929, is very close to the Hetuvidyā section of the _Yogācārabhūmi_. The second text is the _Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā_ which doesn’t survive in Sanskrit. The comparison between it and the _Bhāṣya_ shows that the texts are sometimes identical _verbatim_; give or take the odd _shad_; on other occasions, they are nearly identical, expect for a word or two, but such words are very close in meaning; finally, there are places were the two texts differ considerably. More information, though not specifically on the Vādavinīcāya section, can be found in Kritzer, “The ‘Additional Leaf’ of the _Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya_ Manuscript: The Results of the Ten Bad Courses of Action.”

45 Additional historical and philological information about the _Yogācārabhūmi_, the _Samuccaya_ and the _Bhāṣya_ can be found in Deleanu, _The Chapter on the Mundane Path_ and Bayer, _The Theory of Karman in the Abhidharmasamuccaya_, which contain a wealth of material on these three texts, on secondary sources devoted to them and generally on Yogācāra.

46 The Vādavinīcāya section also has a short appendix that mentions twelve reasons why a bodhisattva shouldn’t debate inimically.

47 Note that elsewhere I translate _vāda_ with “debate” but here our texts discuss under _vāda_ a number of types of exchanges that can’t properly be described as “debates”and so I borrow “talk exchange” from Grice, _Studies in the Way of Words_, 26ff. On _vāda_ in the context of Indian argumentation see Kang, _Die Debatte im Alten Indien_, 18-42.

48 It is probably fair to say that Part 3 is the most philosophically interesting as well as the most important as far as the
4. The debate’s ornament, i.e., the characteristics of the ideal debater (vādālankāra);

5. Conditions under which one is defeated in debate (vādanigraha);

6. Considerations to entertain when deciding whether to withdraw from the debate (vādaniḥsaraṇa);

7. Qualities useful in debate (vāde bahukārṇa dharmāḥ).

While the overall structure of the Vādavinīscaya section is clearly derived from the Yogācārabhāmi’s Hetuvidyā section, and while the content of the two is frequently close or even identical, there are also many occasions in which the Samuccaya departs from the Yogācārabhāmi in important ways, such as in the two texts’ exposition of “the basis of the debate” (vādādhīsthāna). Some differences are also present in part four and seven of these sections, which will be the main focus of my attention hereafter.

IV

As we have just seen in the list that I gave above in III, part 4 of the Hetuvidyā and Vādavinīscaya sections is titled “the debate’s ornament” (vādālankāra). While the Samuccaya doesn’t explain what “ornament” means in the present context, the Yogācārabhāmi and the Bhāṣya do. In the Yogācārabhāmi, the debater is compared to someone who is enjoying pleasures (kāmopabhogin) and “resplends, shines [and] brightens” exceedingly with tied-on adornments such as necklace, bracelet, arm-bracelet, studded with gems, pearls, beryl, and so forth. The debater with the five-

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49 Bhāṣate tapati virocayate (see footnote 52 below for reference). A similar imagery and terminological choice is found in, e.g., the SN’s Devaputtasamyutta (SN I 64-65), in the Khuddaka Nikāya’s Itivuttaka in the Mettāceto vimutissutta (It 19-21).

50 Vaidūrya is frequently translated as “lapis lazuli” but see Winder, “Vaidūrya,” 86: “What, then, does vaidūrya mean? Etymologically it is related to Pāli velūrya and Prākrit velūra, velūrya and vēlula. Prākrit velūla became Greek βερυλλον [sic] whence came English ‘beryl’.” Beryl crystals, of which emerald, aquamarine and morganite are varieties, can be of several colors. The author concludes (94) that vaidūrya indeed refers to beryl, as against e.g. lapis lazuli, such as is given by Wayman (1999, 31) in his translation of this passage. Winder also explains why the term has been understood as referring to lapis lazuli. Oberhammer et al. (2006, 129) give “Katzenaugen” and Yaita (2005, 36) has “Katzenaugen” ~“Cat’s Eye” in English— is a type of chrysoberyl, and in spite of the name
fold ornament of the debate provided with twenty-seven benefits does the same and this is the reason for the label “the debate’s ornament.” The Bhāṣya is less baroque, less detailed and uses a different Sanskrit verb to express it, but the general idea is repeated. As stated in the passage from the Hetuvidyā section above and as reiterated elsewhere, the ornament should be understood to be fivefold, as follows:

4. The debate’s ornament (vādālaṅkāra):

4.1. Knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine (svaparasamayajñatā)
4.2. Consummation of speaking (vākkaraṇasampannatā / vākkaraṇasampad)
4.3. Confidence (vaiśāradya)
4.4. Calm (sthairya)
4.5. Consideration (dākṣīṇya)

The list given in the SamuccayaC is somewhat different, in that the text adds eloquence (pratibhāna) as fourth characteristic and so calm (sthairya) is fifth, hence the SamuccayaC includes a total of six items among the debate’s ornament. In addition to the Yogācārabhūmi’s Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan versions, the SamuccayaR, the Bhāṣya and the Xianyang all have five items.

The individual items will be analyzed in part V below. We have just seen that the debate’s ornament is composed of five items. Our texts tell us that the qualities useful in debate are three, as follows:

51 The twenty-seven benefits will be discussed below in V.
52 Oberhammer et al. (2006, 130):
53 Hayashima (2003, 925):
54 Reference below.
55 For “consideration” I have in mind the following among several meanings this word has: “Regard for the circumstances, feelings, comfort, etc. of another; thoughtfulness for another; thoughtful kindness.” Quoted from Oxford English Dictionary, on-line edition <http://www.oed.com>, s.v. “consideration.” Accessed 5/15/2011.
56 The SamuccayaC does explicitly state that there are six items in the debate’s ornament (693c11).
57 Rahula, Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine, 182, who follows Pradhan’s retranslation from Chinese, includes pratibhāna in this section rendering it as “la vivacité d’esprit.”
7. Qualities useful in debate (vāde bahukā dharmāḥ)

7.1. Knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine (svaparasamayajñatā)
7.2. Confidence (vaiṣāradya)
7.3. Eloquence (pratibhāna)

The rubric “qualities useful in debate” is self-explanatory. Evidently the first and second of these qualities correspond, respectively, to the first and third member of the debate’s ornament. The question arises as to the reason for such redundancy and the answer is that the seventh and final part of the Hetuvidyā and Vādaviniścaya sections likely is a later inclusion.60 As we saw above in III, the first six topics are the following:

1. Different types of talk exchanges (vāda);
2. The location of talk exchanges/debates (vādādhikaraṇa);
3. Matters relating to arguments, evidence and perception, including a discussion of pramāṇas (vādādhiśṭhāna);
4. The debate’s ornament, i.e, the characteristics of the ideal debater (vādālāṅkāra);
5. Conditions under which one is defeated in debate (vādanigraha);
6. Considerations to entertain when deciding whether to withdraw from the debate (vādaniḥsaraṇa).

In this list we can see a natural progression from introductory matters, including a definition of the word vāda itself in No. 1, to how debates end. The list makes perfect sense as it is, with six items.61 But then there is part 7, “qualities useful in debate,” which not only feels out of place but also largely repeats issues already dealt with in part 4. As far as I can see, the most likely explanation is that part 7 is a later addition. In any event, since the topic is essentially the same, i.e, qualities that are desirable for a debater, I will treat part 4 and 7 concurrently.

V

I will start with the Samuccaya, because the discussion is the shortest among our three texts and it is convenient as overview. For the debate’s ornament, Asaṅga merely lists the five items that we have already encountered above:

4. The debate’s ornament is knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine, consum-

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60 If the Vādaviniścaya section is indeed based on the Hetuvidyā section, then likely the inclusion is later only as far as the Yogācārabhūmi is concerned and might have been in the Samuccaya from the beginning.

61 One may quibble about whether the progression would be even more natural reversing 5 and 6, but the general substance of my argument remains.
mation of speaking, confidence, calm and consideration.62

As for the qualities useful in debate, Asaṅga only gives a short clarification for each: with knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine, one can debate on every matter; with confidence, one can debate in the presence of every audience; with eloquence one can answer in every instance.63

“Knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine” (svaparasamayajñatā) is the first item in both part 4 and 7. It shouldn’t surprise that in a debate proficiency with the teachings of one’s own and of the opponent’s tradition is desirable.64 The Yogācārabhūmi is somewhat verbose but essentially such proficiency is acquired from what one may call “study.”65 Additional information is provided in the discussion of svaparasamayajñatā found among the qualities useful in debate:

[Yogācārabhūmi:] With knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine the debater converses on all matters.66

The same idea is expressed in the Bhāṣya and is self-explanatory.67 The more knowledge one has of his own and the opponent’s teachings, the easier it is to play to one’s strengths and to the opponent’s

62 Hayashima (2003, 924): smra ba’i rgyan ni bdag dang gzhan gyi gzhung legs shes pa dang / tshig zur phyin pa phan sum tshogs pa dang / mi ‘jigs pa dang / brian pa dang / mthun par byed pa’o. Note: here as well as below my translations rely on the known Sanskrit equivalents for terminology.


64 Wayman (1999, 26 and 40) renders samaya with “context” and so has “knowledge of one’s and the other’s context.” I find this rendering difficult to accept. Rahula, Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine, 182 has “doctrine,” Kang, Die Debatte im Alten Indien, 148, has “System,” Yaita (2005, 34) has “Lehre,” and Oberhammer et al. (2006, 268) have “Lehre.” These are preferable to Wayman’s choice. Compare Samuccaya: gzhung legs (see previous footnote); Samuccaya: फँ (693c11).

65 Oberhammer et al, (2006, 268): tatra sāître samaye sidhihānte pāḥato dhṛtiḥāḥ śravaṇatāḥ cintanatāḥ pariṇākatāḥ pratipattitaḥ ca kṛtakāśalo bhavati kṛtābhāvyatā kṛtvāvyād. Wayman (1999, 27) has prṛtiḥāḥ instead of dhṛtiḥāḥ (or vṛttiḥāḥ as Wayman previously read the manuscript, see note 35 on same page) on strength of the fact that the Yogācārabhūmi has dgra’ ba (195a). However, the reading dhṛtiḥāḥ, which, in addition to Oberhammer et al. is also accepted by Yaita (2005, 114), is supported by the Yogācārabhūmi, which has रित (359a25) and the Xianyang, which also has रित (534a10). Moreover, it makes more sense in context. Hence, Wayman’s (1999, 27) “through ... satisfaction in” cannot be accepted. Better Yaita (2005, 34) with “...保持 ...によって...” or Oberhammer et al. (2006, 268) with “vom Behalten...”. Formations from धर्तिः are commonly found in sequences with similarities to the one above. For instance, Lamotte, Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, IV:1854, writes the following –from Pāli rather than Sanskrit, but my point still holds– based on the Kīṭāgirīsutta (MN 70 at MN I 480) and the Cankīsutta (MN 95 at MN II 173): “1. Il prête l’oreille et entend l’enseignement (ohitasoto dhammam. sun. āteti). 2. Ayant entendu l’enseignement, il le garde en mémoire (suvā dhhammak dhāreti). 3. Il examine le sens des enseignements qu’il garde en mémoire (dhārītānaṃ dhhammānaṃ atthaṃ upaparikkhati). 4. Tandis qu’il en examine le sens, les enseignements s’impriment en lui (atthaṃ upaparikkhato dhammā nijjhānaṃ khamanti).” Parentheses in the original. For more cases see ibidem, 1854-1868.


weaknesses as well as to defend oneself and to respond to the opponent successfully, thus increasing the likelihood of victory. A related notion is mentioned elsewhere in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, according to which there are twenty-seven benefits (*anuśāmsa*) to the debate’s ornament, including the fact that one is knowledgeable about the faults in the opponent’s doctrine and the characteristics of one’s own.68

“Consummation of speaking” (*vākkaraṇasampattā / vākkaraṇasampad*) appears only as part of the debate’s ornament. If we follow the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the debater speaks with proper language. The emphasis here is on the difference between śabda and apaśābda, which has been captured with varying degrees of success by modern translators of this definition.69 George Cardona, discussing Patañjali’s use of the terms, gives “correct” and “incorrect linguistic units” for śabda and apaśābda respectively.70 The latter has also been rendered as “forme vicieuse, barbarisme” and “corrupt form of a correct word.”71 In any event, in the Hetuvidyā section śabda is said to have five qualities: not being vulgar, being easy to understand, clear, coherent and having a good meaning.72 The *Yogācārabhūmi* then adds another nine characteristics and these are in opposition to the nine factors constituting “fault in the discussion” (*kathādosa*), viz, the third component, after “giving up the discussion” (*kathātyāga*) and “diverting the discussion” (*kathāśāda*), of the “defeat in debate” (*vādanigrāha*) portion of the Hetuvidyā and Vādaviniścaya sections, which is found immediately after the debate’s ornament. These characteristics are: not confused or angry, convincing, measured, significant, timely, resolute, clear and continuous.73 The *Bhāṣya* repeats that consumma-

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68 Oberhammer et al. (2006, 130): *parasamayadoṣajña bhavati, svasamayavīśajña bhavati*. I return to the twenty-seven benefits below.


70 Cardona, “Approaching the *Vākyapadīya*, “101. In addition to Patañjali, Cardona discusses other relevant grammarians and their use of śabda / apaśābda and related words.


73 Oberhammer et al. (2006, 110): *tac caivaṃ śabdavādīno navabhīr ākāraṇāh sampannaṃ vākkaraṇām veditavyam. anākulaṃ asamrabdhāmaṃ gamakaṃ mitam arthavyaktaṃ kālena dīptāṃ prabuddhāṃ ca. tud hat sarvaṃ abhi-paramāyaṃ [read: abhisamāyaṃ] vākkaraṇasampad ity ucye. Wayman’s edition (1999, 28, my underlining) is problematic in that it has tac caivaṃ śabdavādīnaḥ [sic] navabhīr ākāraṇāh sampannaṃ vā karaṇām veditavyam. In addition to Oberhammer et al, the reading vākkaraṇāṃ is also accepted by Yaita (2005, 115). Wayman (1999, 28) translates: “And the composition (karaṇa) by the speaker of the words should be understood as perfect by nine aspects as follows”
tion of speaking is in opposition with the characteristics described under “fault in the discussion.”

While the content is somewhat heterogeneous, consummation of speaking is the characteristic of the ideal debater that will allow him the most to avoid pragmatic mistakes.

“Confidence” (vaiśāradhya) is given in both part 4 and 7. As we saw above in the definition given by Asaṅga, by possessing confidence one can debate in the presence of every audience, and the Yogācārabhūmi makes a similar claim. Further, according to the Hetuvidyā section the idea seems to be that irrespective of what group of people the debater is in front of, as he speaks he doesn’t lose his presence of mind (ālīnacittā), he doesn’t have a depressed mind (adīnacittā), his mind isn’t frightened (abhītacittā), his body doesn’t perspire (asamsvinnagātra), his face isn’t pale (apāṇḍumukha), his voice doesn’t stammer (agadgadasvara) and, finally, his speech hasn’t left him (ahīnavākyā).

In short, confidence here refers to the quality of remaining unperturbed mentally...

Parentheses in the original. Note that Oberhammer et al. (2006, 110) admit that the manuscript has abhisamasya but emend to abhisamyayasa, and so translate the last sentence as “Das alles wird vākkaraṇasampad genannt, die dem klaren Verständnis dient.” Yaita (2005, 115) and Wayman (1999, 28) have abhisamasya, which I accept. Accordingly, they translate: “これらすべてを集めて「言葉という道具の円満」という”(Yaita 2005, 35) and “taking all the foregoing together, there is ‘accomplishment of speech arts’.” (Wayman 1999, 29). The Yogācārabhūmi has जीवनमुक्ति: has de dag thams cad geig tu bsuds pa ni tshig stbyor ba phun sum tshogs pa ste (195b), both of which weigh against abhisamasya, as does the Xianyang: 以此定前聴名語具圓滿(534a24).

74 Hayashima (2003, 925): vākkaraṇasampad śādavādīino vaksyaṃnānakathādaśaviparyayenānukalādīvādītā. As listed in the Bhāṣya, these are akāla, saṃrabhida, agamaka, amita, anarthayukta, akālayuktavacana, asthira, apradāptavacana, aprabaddha. These are all types of vaca (Hayashima 2003, 929).

75 Here “pragmatic” is used in a technical sense but as I said, what is covered under “consummation of speaking” is heterogeneous. For the record, I am not suggesting that the authors of our three texts were pragmatists.

Regarding pragmatic mistakes, see Caffi, “Metapragmatics,” 83: “it is a fact that pragmatic mistakes are much more compromising than grammatical ones: there is nothing worse for an interactant than the pragmatica sanctio whereby his/her syntactically and semantically well-structured utterance is inappropriate, ineffective, unhappy, inadequate to his/her wishes and aims.”

76 Oberhammer et al. (2006, 163): vaiśāradhyena suravyāṃ parsadī kathāṃ karoti. Wayman (1999, 40) translates: “By confidence one is able to deliver a discourse to all groups.” (Italics mine). Yaita (2005, 41) has “恐れないからあらゆる聴衆の前で陳述をなし.” Oberhammer et al. (2006, 163): have “Zufolge von vaiśāradhyā debattiert er vor jederlei Versammlung.” I believe that Yaita’s and Oberhammer et al.’s renderings are preferable to Wayman’s. The main point here is that the confident debater is able to debate among or in front of –i.e, in the presence of– every kind of audience, including knowledgeable and hostile ones. Further, the term parsad (cf. also: pariṣad) doesn’t refer to just any group of people, rather, it is used with the specific meaning of “audience,” which sometimes also functioned as jury. On these terms see Oberhammer et al. (1996, 159-161 and 164). While Oberhammer et al. in the quote above have “Versammlung,” in the entry just referred to (159) they give “Jury” and “Sachverständigenkollegium.” For the above passage, compare Yogācārabhūmi: मि जिग्स पै नि ‘क्हो भांस सद क्यि नटं दु ग्दम ब्रह्म नस सो (199a-b); Yogācārabhūmi: 男猛無我故。處一切聚能起談論(360c18); Xianyang: 由無我故。於一切聚能起談論(535b21).

77 Oberhammer et al. (2006, 163): vaiśāradhyāṃ kutumat. yathādhipaikatyā bhunakāśyāyāṃ api parsadī vicitranakāśyāyāṃ api udāraṇaikāśyāyāṃ api abhinivāṣtanakāśyāyāṃ api satyanaikāśyāyāṃ api kūsaḷa-nakāśyāyāṃ api, ālīnacittāḥ, adīnacittāḥ, abhītacittāḥ, asamsvinnagātraḥ, apāṇḍumukhaḥ, agadgadasvaraḥ, adīnadvākṣa vācām udāharati. Wayman (1999, 29) reads suhānaikāśyāyāṃ instead
and physically in the presence of the audience.\textsuperscript{78} There are parallels here with the four confidences of a bodhisattva mentioned in the \textit{Da zhi da lun} (大智度論), which deal expressly with the situation in which the bodhisattva is in the presence of an audience.\textsuperscript{79}

“Calm” (sthairyya) only appears in the debate’s ornament and seems to be very specific. According to the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} the debater, having waited for the time to speak, utters his words not being in a hurry.\textsuperscript{80} If we follow the Bhāṣya, what the debater waits for is specifically the conclusion (avasāṇa) of the opponent’s speaking.\textsuperscript{81} The Hetuvidyā and Vādavinścaya sections don’t provide any additional information.

The last member of the debate’s ornament is “consideration” (dāksinī).\textsuperscript{82} In this connection, the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} mentions, \textit{inter alia}, that the debater is compassionate (sūratā), is not the kind of person who hurts others (paresāṁ avihetātya) and speaks words taking into consideration the minds of others (paraccittanuvartī vācāṁ bhāṣate). Further, the words of the debater should be

\textsuperscript{78} This is also supported by the Bhāṣya: \textit{vaśāradhyam} [read: \textit{vaśāradyam}] anekodāhārābhvinītavijāvajanasamāvarte ‘pi bruvato nirāsahatā gatayathathā (Hayashima 2003, 925).

\textsuperscript{79} T. 1509, 996b1: ‘得無異力。’ 閏者何等為菩薩四無所依？答曰：一者，一切聞者持故，得諸陀羅尼故。常憶念不忘故，業中說法無所依故。二者，知一切業生解脫因緣，諸根利鈍，隨其所應為說教故。菩薩在大衆中說法無所依。三者，不見於東方、南西北方、四廂，上下，如來難問。令不能如法答者——不見如是許少許相，於業中說法無所依。四者，一切業生愛受因緣，隨意如法答，巧詮說一切業生疑故，菩薩在大衆中說法無所依。 For a translation see Lamotte, \textit{Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse}, vol. I, 339. Four confidences of the bodhisattva are also found in a subsequent part of the \textit{Da zhi da lun} (T. 1509, 246a13), translated in Lamotte, \textit{Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse}, vol. III, 1613. The import of \textit{vaśārādyam} here and in our three texts is distinctly different from that of the four \textit{vaśāradyavasāra} possessed by the Buddha and found, e.g., in the \textit{Mahābhāsikādavasastra} (MN 12 at MN I 71ff). For more references see Nyataniolka, \textit{Buddhist Dictionary}, 350-351; Edgerton, \textit{Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary}: Volume II Dictionary, 512-513; Lamotte, \textit{La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asaṅga}, 59*. An extensive treatment can be found in Lamotte, \textit{Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse}, vol. III:1567-1604.

\textsuperscript{80} Oberhammer et al. (2006, 268): sthairyam katamat, yathāpūrṇakatyaḥ kālam āgamayūtvaranāṇaḥ vācāṁ bhāṣate na tvaramāṇah. idam ucyate sthairyam. Wayman (1999, 29) has kālāprapto ‘tvaramāṇaḥ instead of kālam āgamayūtvaranāṇa.

\textsuperscript{81} Hayashima (2003, 925): sthairyam prativādino vacanāvāsānaṁ āgamayyāt varamāṇabhāṣitā [read: āgamayātvaramāṇabhāṣitā].

\textsuperscript{82} I am not sure that Wayman’s “nobility” quite works here (1999, 29). Oberhammer et al. (1996, 118) have “Freundlichkeit.” Yata (2005, 35) has “丁寧であること.” Rahula, \textit{Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine}, 182, gives “courtissee.” The \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} has \textit{ego mi iz log peža} (196a) and the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} has 恵供 (359b18).
spoken in a timely manner (kālena), truthfully (bhūtena), beneficially (ārthopasamhitena), gently (ślaksṇena) and with friendliness (mitravattaya). Here we find similarities with some of the terms used in a number of Pāli sources. For example, according to the Abhayarājakamārasutta, the Buddha only speaks having taken into consideration three issues: whether a statement is true and factual (bhuta/abhūtta; taucha/taccha), whether it is beneficial (atthasamhitā/anatthasamhitā) and whether it is pleasing (piyā/appiya; manāpa/amanāpa) and this is done because the Buddha has solicitude (anukampā) for beings. The terminology employed in the Yogācārabhūmi is also very close to that found in the Subhāṣitavācāsutta. The Bhāsya defines dākṣīṇya as a natural goodness, which conforms to the mind of the judge and of the opponent.

In the Yogācārabhūmi, the Samuccaya, and the Bhāsya, the section called “debate’s ornament” is composed of the above five factors. Towards the end of this section the Yogācārabhūmi, unlike the other two texts, includes a list of twenty-seven benefits or advantages (anukampā), which by and large offer information also contained in the section on the debate’s ornament and on the one on the qualities useful in debate.

83 Oberhammer et al. (1996, 118): satthāpāthakaryatā sūrato bhavati paresām avihethanajātiyāḥ. sa yā sūrāntāṁ sūrāntāṁ tām amatīrya paraçittānurvarit vācum bhāsate. tac ca kālena bhūtenārthopasamhitena ślaksṇena mitravatayā. For arthopasamhitena, Oberhammer et al. (ibidem) have “mit Sinn verbunden,” Wayman (1999, 29) has “meaningful” and Yaita (2005, 36) has “理にかなった.” I think that the point here is different, viz, words are beneficial or advantageous.

84 Abhayarājakamārasutta, MN 58 at MN I 395. The relevant passage is discussed in Ganeri, The Concealed Art of the Soul, 47ff. Ganeri (47) mentions this tripartite classification in terms of statements’ “truth-value, utility and pleasantness to hear.”

85 Subhāṣitavācāsutta (AN 5.198 at AN III 243): pañcāhi bhikkhave, angehi samammāgatā váci subhāṣitā hoti ... kālena ca bhāṣitā hoti. saccā ca bhāṣitā hoti, saññha ca bhāṣitā hoti, atthasamhitā ca bhāṣitā hoti, metucittena ca bhāṣitā hoti.

86 Hayashima (2003, 925): dākṣiṇyaṁ prakṛtibhadratā prāṇikāprativedāntīnurvaritā [read: prāṇikāprativedāntīnurvaritā]. The prāṇīnsa, which I render as “judge,” is the arbitrator or adjudicator of the debate. The noun is also used to refer to a critic who would judge in the context of Indian theater.

87 Except for the Samuccaya, as discussed in IV above.

88 Oberhammer et al. (2006, 129). The lists contained in the Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese versions of the Yogācārabhūmi as well as in the Xianyang (534b06) have some differences. Wayman (1999, 30) partially misconstrues the list. He takes the first two items as being one, translating: “1) In the assembly (parṣata), one becomes more esteemed, receives nicer words. (2) One becomes completely fearless.” = sammatatāra bhavati, ādeyavacanatārō bhavati, parṣata viśāradatārō bhavati (Oberhammer et al, 2006, 129). Wayman (1999, 30, footnote 43) is correct that the Yogācārabhūmi has what corresponds to parṣata at the beginning of the list: nīṣaṃ tassā bhūtam yathā zinge / shin tu tsiṅg par gyur ba dang... (196a). Pace Wayman (ibidem), the Tibetan doesn’t force “the first two statements to be counted as no. 1, with no. 1 taken as the basis for the remaining 27 items.” Against Wayman’s reading see also the Yogācārabhūmīc: 一衆所敬重。二言必信受。三於大衆中無所畏... (359b24). Similarly, the Xianyang has: 一衆所敬重。二言必信受。三於大衆中無所畏... (534b07). Incidentally, Wayman’s “receives nicer words” for ādeyavacanatārō bhavati is problematic for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the idea is that the debater’s words are acceptable or trustworthy. On Sanskrit/Pali ādeya/ādeyavacana see Rhys Davids and Stede, The Pali Text Society’s Pali-English Dictionary,
As I have already mentioned, two of the items listed among the qualities useful in debate, viz, “knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine” and “confidence” also appear under the debate’s ornament and so won’t be repeated here. There remains “eloquence” (pratibhāna), which is dealt with only briefly in the Yogācārabhūmi and Samuccaya. We have already seen what the latter text says about it and the Bhāṣya is silent. The definition found in the Hetuvidyā section is:

[Yogācārabhūmi:] With eloquence [the debater can] give a reply to everything spoken.  

The Sanskrit word that I translate with “eloquence” (pratibhāna) is given by Edgerton as “presence of mind, self-confidence or brilliance, especially as manifested in speech; quickwittedness, inspiration.” Braarvig notes that allusions to pratibhāna are common in Mahāyāna works, but that it also appears “in the abhidharma of the older schools” as one of four knowledges or discriminations

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91 Also, in compounds such as asaṅgapratibhāna, anāccheyapratibhāna, etc. On the former see Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary: Volume II Dictionary, 82-83; and on the latter see Nakamura 中村, 1488, s.v. benzaikuon 聘才久達.

92 Braarvig, “Dhīrāṇa and Pratibhāna: Memory and Elocution of the Bodhisattvas,” 17-18. Incidentally, Braarvig (24-25, note 1) states that the Sāṅkhyāyānīṣayāca part of the Samuccaya, to which the Vādhāyānīṣayāca section belongs, doesn’t mention pratibhāna, but this doesn’t accord with my own findings. Pradhan, Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga [sic], 106, in his re-translation into Sanskrit, gives pratimāna instead of pratibhāna as one of the qualities useful in debate but this is problematic. The Samuccaya has spobs pa (Hayashima 2003, 932) and the Samuccaya has 聘才 (693c27). The Hetuvidyā section (Oberhammer et al. 2006, 34) does have pratibhāna and this is given in the Yogācārabhūmi (199a and b) and the Yogācārabhūmi (360c16 and 19) as spobs pa and 聘才 respectively.
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(\textit{pratisamvid}; \textit{Pāli: pātisambhidā}). However, in the definition given in the \textit{Samuccaya} and in the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} there is no mention of the \textit{pratisamvids} and so it is more prudent to take \textit{pratibhāna} in its general sense. Once again, the fact that this trait is desirable for a debater is self-evident. In any event, in the \textit{Śīksāsamuccaya} Śāntideva tells us, by means of quoting the \textit{Adhyātayasamcudanā Śūtra}, that \textit{pratibhāna} is connected with truth and with \textit{dharma} rather than the opposite, that it decreases the \textit{kleśas} rather than increasing them, and that it shows the qualities and benefits of \textit{nirvāṇa} rather than those of \textit{samsāra}.

VI

Now that we have seen the principal characteristics of parts 4 and 7 of the \textit{Hetuvidyā} and \textit{Vādavinīścaya} sections I wish to highlight two issues.

First, I want to mention again that what is found in these two sections is clearly the depiction of an \textit{ideal} debater. This treatment of debate and argumentation is normative to the extent that it seeks to regulate right and wrong behavior. However, there are portions of the \textit{Hetuvidyā} and \textit{Vādavinīścaya} sections that are better characterized as being descriptive.

In any event, what I have introduced above can be contrasted with the following account given by Xuanzang:

The different [Buddhist] schools are constantly at variance, and their contending utterances rise like the angry waves of the sea.

\ldots

93 The four are: \textit{dharma-}/\textit{dhamma}-, \textit{artha-}/\textit{attha}-, \textit{nirukti-}/\textit{nirutti}- and \textit{pratibhāna-}/\textit{patibhāna}-. Dayal, \textit{The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature}, 259ff and Deleanu, \textit{The Chapter on the Mundane Path}, 566-568, note 257, provide references to a number of primary and secondary sources on the \textit{pratisamvids} as well as a discussion.

94 The \textit{Bhāṣya} doesn’t comment on \textit{pratibhāna} as one of the qualities useful in debate, saying that it is easy to understand (\textit{sugama}). See Hayashima (2003, 933).

95 For more information on \textit{pratibhāna}, particularly in connection with the notion of \textit{buddhavacana}, see MacQueen, “Inspired Speech in Early Mahāyāna I” and MacQueen, “Inspired Speech in Early Mahāyāna II.”

96 Vaidya and Tripathi, \textit{Śīksāsamuccaya [sic] of Śāntideva}, 12: \textit{iha maitreya pratibhānaṃ satyaopasamhitāṃ bhavati, nāsatyaopasamhitāṃ dharmopasamhitāṃ bhavati, na adharmopasamhitāṃ kleśahāyaṃ bhavati, na kleśavivardhakāṃ nirvāṇaganāravandarśākaṃ bhavati, na samsāra[guṇa]ṃsvasamarcākaṃ.} Brackets in the original. As far as I know, a Sanskrit version of the \textit{Adhyātayasamcudanā Śūtra} hasn’t been recovered, but there is a Chinese translation (發願淨心經, T. 327) and a Tibetan one (\textit{ẖag pa’i bsam pa bskal ba’i mdo}, DK 69).

97 In the present context I don’t find the normative/descriptive distinction terribly useful, a distinction which is not, at any rate, unproblematic. Thus, I won’t pursue it any further. One difficulty in identifying the nature of certain passages is highlighted in the following quote, which is relevant \textit{mutatis mutandis}: ‘In English, the semantic distinction between descriptives and deontics is not reflected simply on the surface of sentences. Deontics are often expressed using subjunctives or modals – \textit{should, ought, must} – but are equally often expressed with descriptive verbs. It is impossible to tell without consultation of context, whether a sentence such as “In the UK, vehicles drive on the left” is to be interpreted descriptively or deontically – as a generalization or a legal prescription.’ Quoted from Stenning and Lambalgen, \textit{Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science}, 48. I believe that, as far as the \textit{Hetuvidyā}/\textit{Vādavinīścaya} sections are concerned, not even consultation of context is sufficient in all cases to establish a given passage’s force.
There are some [monks] who give themselves up to quiet contemplation, and devote themselves, whether walking or standing still or sitting down, to the acquirement of wisdom and insight; others, on the contrary, differ from these in raising noisy contentions about their faith.

... When a man’s renown has reached to a high distinction, then at different times he convokes an assembly for discussion. He judges of the superior or inferior talent of those who take part in it; he distinguishes their good or bad points; he praises the clever and reproves the faulty; if one of the assembly distinguishes himself by refined language, subtle investigation, deep penetration, and severe logic, then he is mounted on an elephant covered with precious ornaments, and conducted by a numerous suite to the gates of the convent.

If, on the contrary, one of the members breaks down in his argument, or uses poor and inelegant phrases, or if he violates a rule in logic and adapts his words accordingly, they proceed to disfigure his face with red and white, and cover his body with dirt and dust, and then carry him off to some deserted spot or leave him in a ditch. Thus they distinguish between the meritorious and the worthless, between the wise and the foolish.  

This depiction, including public humiliation and physical abuse, is rather more colorful than the image that emerged from the previous sections.

Second, there is nothing particularly sectarian in the definitions we have seen above. As I showed, many of the terms employed in the three texts under examination can be found with similar meanings elsewhere in Buddhist literature, however, their understanding is not as context-dependent as that of other terms. To illustrate my point, here are the six main terms – in addition to vāda– I have dealt with above: knowledge of one’s own and the opponent’s doctrine (svaparasamayajñatā); consummation of speaking (vākkaraṇasampannatā /-sampad); confidence (vaiśāradya); calm (sthairya); consideration (dāksīnyā); and eloquence (pratibhāna). Compare these with, for instance, the term pratyekabuddhayānika, which is defined elsewhere in the Samuccaya. In order to understand it properly, one has to be familiar with a substantial amount of Buddhist doctrinal background and in order to accept it, one has to also accept a constellation of Buddhist doctrines. This is not the case, or only to a low degree, regarding the six terms above. Indeed, while what we have seen in the previous sections is consistent with attitudes found elsewhere in Buddhism, much of the above applies to anyone interested in conducting a debate in an orderly, respectful and fruitful manner and is eminently intelligible even without extensive familiarity with its context. Therefore, on the one hand, the content of part 4 and 7 of the Hetuvidyā and Vādaviniścaya sections is exquisitely Buddhist; on the other hand, it is not, most of it, something to which only Buddhists could subscribe or relate to.

98 Translated in Beal, Si-yu-ki: Buddhist Records of the Western World, 80-81. The brackets are mine.
99 Hayashima (2003, 718); Rahula, Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine, 146-147.
Abbreviations

AN Aṅguttara Nikāya
DK sde dge’i bka’ 'gyur
DT sde dge’i bstan ’gyur
DN Dīgha Nikāya
It Itivuttaka
MN Majjhima Nikāya
SN Saṁyutta Nikāya
T Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō, see footnote 6

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Japanese authors frequently provide simplified transliterations of their names when they publish in languages such as English. In those cases, I have retained the transliteration given in the publication. However, for publications in Japanese I give the standard transliteration, with the result that some authors appear twice. Example: “Kajiyama, Yuichi” and “Kajiyama 仮山, Yūichi 雄一.”


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Key words: Yogācārabhūmi, Abhidharmasamuccaya, Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya, Asaṅga, vāda, debate, argumentation, Yogācāra.