

## English Translation of the \**Upāyahṛdaya* (pt. 1)

By Brendan Gillon and Shoryu Katsura

Brendan Gillon (BG) and Shoryu Katsura (SK) have engaged in translating 方便心論 (\**Upāyahṛdaya/Prayogasāra*) into English for more than ten years by now and come up with the following still ‘tentative’ translation. The translator 吉迦夜 (472?), according to Toru Funayama, was the only active translator in North China during the fifth century that was the first dark age of translation activity in China, which may explain the existence of some notable inconsistencies in the Chinese translation. The text is attributed to Nāgārjuna (150-250?) but Hakuju Ui denied his authorship, which was later severely criticized by Yuichi Kajiyama, and Michiko Ishitobi believes that the author of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* actually wrote the text. In this connection Masaaki Hattori has somewhat different idea; he once suggested in a personal communication that 吉迦夜 might have composed the text by putting together whatever information on the Indian method of argumentation was available for him during that dark period.

In the following we first present the Chinese text of \**Upāyahṛdaya* (UH) adopted from the SAT Daizōkyō Text Database (<http://21dzk.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/SAT/satdb2015.php>) with sporadic editorial suggestions in footnotes. It is followed by English translation with footnotes that contain references to relevant texts such as *Carakasamhitā* (CS), *Nyāyasūtra* (NSū), *Nyāyabhāṣya* (NBh), *Yogasūtra* (YS) and *Hetvidyā* (HV) section of *Śrutamayībhūmi*. Whenever the two translators have a different understanding of the Chinese text, we put an alternative translation headed by initials in the footnote. We also put in footnotes Dr. Kang’s German translation of the text wherever it is available. We discuss some Chinese expressions in footnotes but give very little doctrinal and logical analysis of the text. We are planning to publish a fully annotated translation of UH after putting up the second installment of this kind of translation in the next issue of this journal.

We would like to thank Mark Siderits (MS) for his meticulous response to the first draft of this translation. We incorporated most of his suggestions and noted some of his remarks in footnotes. We would also like to thank Ernst Prets (EP) for providing relevant passages of CS, NSū and NBh with some comments. We noted most of them in footnotes. Yasutaka Muroya kindly provided some information on the Chinese text from his research into the old Japanese manuscripts of 方便心論.

We emphasize that the following is just a ‘tentative’ translation and we are still aiming for a better rendering of this particularly complicated, if not confused, text. Therefore, any comment and suggestion from the readers will be most welcome.

### Abbreviations:

- Kang [2007]: Yong KANG, *Pañcāvayava: Die fünfgliedrige Argumentationsform in den frühen Debattentraditionen Indiens mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Carakasamhitā* Vi. 8.30-36, Cuvillier Verlag, Göttingen.
- Muroya [2016]: Yasutaka Muroya, “On the Kongōji and Kōshōji manuscripts of the /Fangbian xin lun/,” *Journal of the Research Institute for Old Japanese Manuscripts of Buddhist Scriptures* 1: 13-34. (室屋安孝「漢訳『方便心論』の金剛寺本と興聖寺本をめぐって」『日本古写経研究所研究紀要』第1号、2016年、13-34頁。)「追記」<http://id.nii.ac.jp/1153/00000349/>.
- Tucci [1929]: Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Gaekwad’s oriental series, no. 49.

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#### (23b4) 方便心論一卷 後魏西域三藏吉迦夜譯<sup>(1)</sup>

Treatise on the Essence of Expedient Means (方便心論 \**Upāyahṛdaya*), in one book, translated by the Later Wei Dynasty (後魏) Tripiṭaka Master from Western Regions (西域三藏), Ji Jiaye (吉迦夜).

#### (23b6) 明造論品第一

Chapter 1: Explaining how to engage in debate<sup>(2)</sup>

#### [1.1 Topic and Purpose of the Treatise]

<sup>(1)</sup> According to Muroya [2015], Kongō-ji Ms. reads 後魏延興年吉迦夜共曇曜等於洛陽譯.

<sup>(2)</sup> BG: ‘Understanding debate’ for 明造論.

[Initial Verse]

(23b7) 若能解此論 則達諸論法  
如是深遠義 今當廣宣說

If one is able to understand this treatise (此論)<sup>(3)</sup>, then one will grasp all the teachings on debate (論法)<sup>(4)</sup>. Thus, I should now expound at length this deep and far reaching subject matter (義).

(23b9) 問曰。不應造論。所以者何。凡造論者、多起恚恨、憍逸貢高。自擾亂心、少柔和意。顯現他惡、自歎己善。如斯衆過、智者所呵。是故一切諸賢聖人、無量方便斷諍論者。常樂遠離、如捨毒器。

又造論者、內實調柔、外觀多過。是以若欲自利利人、應當捨此諍論之法。

Question (問曰): One should not engage in debate (造論)<sup>(5)</sup>. What is the reason? All those who engage in debate, by and large, promote hatred, arrogance and pride. Since their thoughts are disturbed, their minds are rarely gentle or serene. They point out what is bad in others and proclaim what is good in themselves. The wise (智者) denounce all such faults. Therefore, all spiritually noble people (賢聖人) use unlimited means (方便 \**upāya*) to cut debaters (諍論者) off. The wise are usually happy to keep them at a distance, just as they are happy to avoid vessels of poison (毒器).

Furthermore, those who engage in debate (造論者), even if they are, in fact, harmonious and gentle on the inside, evince many faults on the outside. Therefore if one wishes to benefit oneself and others, one should avoid [practicing]<sup>(6)</sup> the teachings on debate (諍論之法).

(23b14) 答曰。不然。今造此論、不爲勝負利養名聞。但欲顯示善惡諸相、故造此論。世若無論、迷惑者衆、則爲世間邪智巧辯、所共誑惑起不善業、輪迴惡趣、失真實利。若達論者、則

(3) 論 seems to be used in this text in two distinct senses, viz. ‘treatise’ (\**sāstra*) and ‘debate’ (\**vāda*).

(4) 論法 literally means ‘method of debate’ or ‘principle of debate’ but in this text this term is used ambiguously to refer to topics which are debated, the doctrines of various schools, and to principles which govern debate. For this reason, we render the term as “teachings on debate”.

(5) 造 means, among other things, ‘to make’. We have rendered it as ‘to compose’, when followed by the word 論 in the sense of treatise and as ‘to engage in’, when followed by the word 論 in the sense of debate.

(6) ‘practicing’ is added upon the suggestion of MS.

自分別善惡空相<sup>(7)</sup>、衆魔外道邪見之人、無能惱壞作障礙也。故我爲欲利益衆生、造此正論。又欲令正法流布於世。如爲修治菴婆羅果、而外廣植荊棘之林、爲防果故。今我造論亦復如是。欲護正法、不求名聞故。汝前說長諍論者、是事不然。爲護法故、故應造論。

Answer (答曰): This is not so. Now I have not composed this treatise (造此論) for the sake of victory or to increase profit or fame. I only wish to reveal all features (相) [of debate], good and bad. Therefore I compose this treatise (造此論).

If the world had no treatise [such as this one] / no debate (無論), the confused would be many. Then,<sup>(8)</sup> due to people's perverse views and sophisticated argumentation (邪智巧辯), the confusion shared by them would give rise to bad deeds, evil incarnations (輪迴惡趣) and loss of real/true benefits (真實利). If, then, one who understands debate (達論者) himself distinguishes [its] good, bad and useless features (空相), then<sup>(9)</sup> the many devilish non-Buddhists (衆魔外道) and adherents of perverse views (邪見之人)<sup>(10)</sup> will not be able to vex and harm him, thereby putting up obstacles [to his *nirvāṇa*]. Therefore, to benefit sentient beings, I compose this corrective treatise (造此正論).

Furthermore, I wish to spread the true teaching (正法\**saddharma*) [of the Buddha] all over the world. Just as, in order to cultivate the fruits of mango trees (菴婆羅果), one plants widely round them thickets of brambles (荊棘之林) so as to protect their fruits,<sup>(11)</sup> now in composing [this] treatise (造論), I too act in the same way as well, for I wish to protect the true teaching [of the Buddha] and I do not seek fame. Those whom you mentioned earlier as good at debate (長諍論者) are not like this. In order to protect the teaching (法 \**dharma*) [of the Buddha], I should compose [this] treatise (造論).

### [1.2 The teachings on debate 論法]

(23b24) 問曰。汝先言「解此論者、達諸論法」。當說其相。

答曰。此論分別有八種義。若有能通達解其義趣、則能廣爲其餘諸論。如種稻麥以水溉灌、則嘉苗滋茂。不去稊稗、善穀不生。若人雖聞此八不解其義、則於諸論皆生疑惑。設有明解斯八義者、決定能達一切論法。

Question: You said earlier [i.e., in the initial verse] that those who are able to understand

(7) According to Muroya [2015] 福州開元禪寺版 reads 善惡諸相 in stead of 善惡空相.

(8) SK: 'If (若) the world had no treatise [such as this one]/debate (論) and the confused were many, then (則), ...'

(9) SK: 'If they understand debate (若... 者), then (則) they distinguish [its] good, bad and useless features and ...'

(10) BG: 'many devilish people (衆魔.... 之人) [holding] the perverse views (邪見) of non-Buddhist schools (外道)'

(11) Cf. NSū 4.2.50: *tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārtham jalpavitāṇḍe bījaparorohasaṃrakṣaṇārtham kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat.*

this treatise (此論) will grasp all the teachings on debate (論法). You should state what their [defining] features (相) are.

Answer: In this treatise, I distinguish eight rubrics/topics/items (八種義)<sup>(12)</sup>. If someone can grasp and understand their significance (義趣\**arthagati*), then he can [grasp and understand the significance of] all other treatises (餘諸論). Just as when one plants rice and barley and waters them, good sprouts become luxuriant.<sup>(13)</sup> [But] if one does not remove the weeds [lit. darnels], then good grain will not grow. If someone does not understand the significance of the eight [rubrics] (八義), though he has heard them, then doubts will arise regarding [the significance of] all treatises (諸論). Suppose someone clearly understands the significance of these eight [rubrics] (八義). He will definitely be able to understand all the other teachings on debate (一切論法).

(23c1) 問曰。汝言「解此論者、決了論法」。今諸外道有論法不耶。答曰有。如衛世師有六諦。所謂陀羅驪、求那、總諦、別諦、作諦、不作諦<sup>(14)</sup>。如斯等比<sup>(15)</sup>皆名論法。雖善通達、猶不了別諸餘經論。

Question: You said that those who understand this treatise (此論) will definitely comprehend the teachings on debate (論法). Now, do all the non-Buddhist schools (外道) have teachings on debate (論法)?

Answer: They do. For example, the Vaiśeṣikas (衛世師) have six categories/truths/realities (諦<sup>(16)</sup> \**padārtha/satya/tattva*): [1] substance (陀羅驪\**dravya*), [2] quality (求那 \**guṇa*), [3] universality (總諦 \**sāmānya*), [4] particularity (別諦 \**viśeṣa*), [5] action (作諦

<sup>(12)</sup> The expression alternates with 八種論法 (23c5; 26b1). 義, in the context of 八種義, seems to be a synonym/equivalent of 論法.

EP: CS 3.8.27 lists 44 *vādamārgapadas*: *imāni tu khalu padāni bhīṣagvādamārgajñānārtham adhi-gamyāni bhavanti; tadyathā vādaḥ, dravyam, guṇāḥ, karma, sāmānyam, viśeṣaḥ, samavāyaḥ, pratijñā, sthāpanā, pratiṣṭhāpanā, hetuḥ, dṛṣṭāntaḥ, upanayaḥ, nigamanam, uttaram, siddhantaḥ, śabdaḥ, pratyakṣam, anumānam, aitihyam, aupamyam, saṃśayaḥ, prayojanam, savyabhicāram, jñānāsā, vyavasāyaḥ, arthaprāptiḥ, saṃbhavaḥ, anuyogyam, ananuyoyam, anuyogaḥ, pratyanyogaḥ, vākyadoṣaḥ, vākyaprasaṃsā, chalam, ahetuḥ, atītakālam, upāmbhaḥ, pariahraḥ, pratijñāhāniḥ, abhyuanujñā, hetvantaram, arthāntaram, nigrahasthānam iti.*

NSū 1.1.1 lists 16 *padārthas* (the notation occurs not in NSū but in NBh): *pramāṇaprameya-saṃśayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarakanirṇayavādajalpavitāṇḍāhetvābhāsacchala-jātini-grahasthānānām tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.*

<sup>(13)</sup> EP: CS 1.11.23-25 gives as examples for *yukti* as a means of investigation (*parīkṣā*) three examples of which the first one runs thus: *jalakarṣaṇabījartusamyogāt sasyasaṃbhavaḥ yuktiḥ ... buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhavān bahukāraṇayogajān yuktiḥ trikālā sā jñeyā ...*

<sup>(14)</sup> Read 不障諦 instead of 不作諦.

<sup>(15)</sup> Read 如是等此 instead of 如是等比.

<sup>(16)</sup> 諦 is usually a translation for *satya*; usual translation for *padārtha* is 句義

\**karman*) and [6] inherence (不障諦<sup>(17)</sup> \**samavāya*). These and similar things are all said to be teachings on debate (論法)<sup>(18)</sup>. Even if one grasps [them] well, still one will not comprehend all the other scriptures and treatises (餘經論).

[1.2.1 Summary of the eight teachings on debate]

(23c5) 如此八種深妙論法、我當略說。爲開諸論門、爲斷戲論故。一曰譬喻。二隨所執<sup>(19)</sup>。三曰語善。四曰言失。五曰知因。六應時語。七似因非因。八隨語難。

Thus, I should state briefly our eight kinds of profound and subtle teachings on debate (八種深妙論法) so as to open the door to all treatises (諸論門) and to eliminate idle discourse (戲論 \**prapañca*):

[1] the first is said to be example (譬喻 \**dr̥ṣṭānta*), [2] the second, tenet/established doctrine (隨所執 \**siddhānta*; lit. that which accords with what one holds)<sup>(20)</sup>, [3] the third, excellence/virtue of statement (語善 \**vākya-praśamsā*), [4] the fourth, deficiency of statement (言失 \**vākya-doṣa*), [5] the fifth, reason for knowledge/causes of [veridical] cognition (知因 \**jñāna-hetu/upalabdhī-hetu/ pramāṇa*),<sup>(21)</sup> [6] the sixth, timely statement (應時語 \**prāpta-kāla-vākya*)<sup>(22)</sup>, [7] seventh, non-reason [called] specious/pseudo-reason

<sup>(17)</sup> Usual translation for *samavāya* is 和合.

<sup>(18)</sup> MS wonders why the six *padārthas* of the *Vaiśeṣika* school is called 論法.

<sup>(19)</sup> BG: Here is an inventory of the usages of 執:

隨所執 隨 seems meaningless here (23c7,9).

隨其所執 according to what one holds (23c26)

執 to grasp; to maintain > to hold > tenet

執義 to hold a thesis (in a debate) (26b26, 28b28–28c2)

to hold a fact > tenet (24c3)

所執 what is held or maintained > a tenet

執法 teachings which are held > tenets (23c26, 24a13)

執相 tenet feature (23c25, 23c26, 24b26)

The passage in which all the key topics of each school is listed is just a list of the topics about which each school has tenets. Their tenets are not necessarily beliefs which get debated. It seems to me that this closely corresponds to *siddhānta* as found in CS 3.8.37 and in NSū 1.1.27-31.

<sup>(20)</sup> 隨所執 is not the usual translation for *siddhānta* (悉檀).

<sup>(21)</sup> According to EP, CS regards *pramāṇa* as *upalabdhīhetu* and in *Arthaśāstra* and *Manuśmṛti* *hetu* is *jñānahetu*.

<sup>(22)</sup> BG: 應時 (adapted to the times, meeting the current requirements) seems to be the Chinese translation of *prāpta-kāla* (one whose time has come, timely, opportune). The example given below is one where one's speech is suited to one's audience, and hence to the occasion.

(似因非因\**hetvābhāsa-ahetu*), and [8] the eighth, objection based on wording (隨語難).<sup>(23)</sup>

(23c08) 喻有二種。一具足喻。二少分喻。

隨所執者、名究竟義。

語善者、謂語順於義。

言失者、謂言乖於理。

知因者、能知二因。一生因。二了因。

語應時者、若先說界入後說五陰、名不應時。

若善通達言語次第、是則名曰應時語也。

似因者、如焰似水而實非水。若有論者嚴飾言辭以爲水者、是名似因。

隨言難者、如言「新衣」。即便難曰「衣非是時、云何名新」。如是等名隨言難也。

[1] There are two kinds of examples (喻):<sup>(24)</sup> a complete example (具足喻) and an incomplete example (少分喻).

[2] A tenet (隨所執) refers to a definitively settled fact (究竟義; lit. the fact at which one arrives at the end of an exhaustive examination).

[3] Excellence of statement (語善) is said to be the accord of statement with fact (語順於義).

[4] Deficiency of statement (言失) is said to be the opposition of statement to reason (言乖於理).

[5] With respect to reason for knowledge/causes of [veridical] cognition (知因), there are two reasons/causes (因) whereby one can know (能知): one is the reason for/cause of arising [of a result] (生因\**kāraṅka-hetu*) and the other is the reason for/cause of understanding (了因 \**jñāpaka-hetu*).<sup>(25)</sup>

[6] As for timely statement (語應時)<sup>(26)</sup>, if, after someone first speaks of the elements (界

<sup>(23)</sup> The order of enumeration here is not the same as the order of exposition below. The sixth item in enumeration, ‘timely statement’, is taken up between the third and the fourth items. The detailed exposition omits the eighth item in enumeration as a separate heading, including it instead under the heading of ‘specious reasons’.

<sup>(24)</sup> Cf. 譬喻 in the above list.

<sup>(25)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 59], “Wissensursache sind die zwei Ursachen, die [uns etwas] wissen lassen: Erstens Entstehungsursache, zweitens Erkenntnisursache.”

Prof. Funayama kindly provided the following list of occurrences of two kinds of ‘reason/cause’ in Chinese translations prior to UH. 後秦·鳩摩羅什 (約 350-409 頃) 譯『中論青目釋』作因 (=生因)·言說因 (=了因), 『百論』(漢譯年: 404) 作因·了因; 北涼·曇無讖 (385-433) 譯『大乘涅槃經』(漢譯年: 421) 生因·了因; 『優婆塞戒經』(漢譯年: 426) 生因·了因; 南朝·宋·僧亮 (約 400-468 頃) 『涅槃經注釋』作因·了因; 梁·寶亮 『涅槃經注釋』作因·了因; 南朝·齊·僧宗 (438-496) 『涅槃經注釋』了因; 北魏·吉迦夜譯『方便心論』明造論品第一 (漢譯年: 472) 生因·了因. Ms. Hiroko Matsuoka provided the following occurrences of *karaka* and *jñāpaka*: PV III.392, NV on NS 5.1.8.

<sup>(26)</sup> Cf. 應時語 in the above list.

\**dhātu*) and the sense fields (入\**āyatana*), he speaks of the five groups (陰\**skandha*), then it is said to be [a case of] untimely [statement] (不應時 \**aprāpta-kāla*<sup>(27)</sup>). If someone understands well proper order in speaking, then it is said to be [a case of] a timely statement (應時語).

[7] A specious reason (似因)<sup>(28)</sup> is where, for example, a mirage (焰) [lit. brilliance (of the sun) \**marīci*] appears like water but in fact is not water. If a debater (論者 \**vādin*) embellishes his statement to make [one believe] it water, then it is said to be [a case of] specious reason.

[8] Objection based on wording (隨言難)<sup>(29)</sup> is where, for example, someone speaks of new clothes (新衣\**nava-kambala*), [whereupon] one right then objects to this, saying: “Clothes are not time; why do you call them new?”<sup>(30)</sup> Such a case is said to be [a case of] objection

(27) BG: CS 3.8.58 identifies two senses of ‘*kālātīta*’, one broader than the other. (1) A statement which is unsuited to the occasion, or untimely, and (2) a statement which is out of proper order, or mistimed.

Asaṅga uses the term ‘*akālena vacanam*’ (HV 5.3), but from the description, it is not clear which sense he has in mind. Finally, NS 5.2.11 uses the term ‘*aprāptakāla*’ and only in the latter sense. This is the sense pertinent to the expression below of 過時.

EP: A comparable understanding (*kālātītavacana* in the CS list of *nigrahasthāna* – CS 3.8.65; *atītakāla* in the definition) related to debate in general is found in CS: *atītakālaṃ nāma yat pūrvam vācyaṃ tat paścād ucyate, tat kālātītāvād agrāhya.bhavatīti. pūrvam vā nigrahaprāptam anigṛhya pariṅhya pakṣāntaritaṃ paścān nigṛhite tat tasyātītakālatvān nigrahavacanam asamarthaṃ bhavati.* (CS 3.8.58)

NSū 5.2.11 seems to have a more specific – proof-related – understanding of the item. Cf. NSū 5.2.11: *avayavaviparyāsavacanam aprāptakālam.* Accordingly Pakṣilasvāmin comments: *pratiññādīnām avayavānām yathālakṣaṇam arthavaśāt kramaḥ, tatrāvayavaviparyāseṇa vacanam aprāptakālam asamaddhārthaṃ nigrahasthānam iti.* (NBh ad NSū 5.2.11)

Cf. also the *Yogācāra* tradition (*akāla*, also *akālena vacanam* in *Śrutamayībhūmi*) one of the *kathādoṣas*: *yat pūrvam vaktavyaṃ paścād abhīhitaṃ paścād vaktavyaṃ pūrvam abhīhitam.*

(28) Cf. 似因非因 in the above list

(29) Cf. 隨語難 in the above list.

(30) EP: CS 3.8.56 uses also the adjective “*nava*” in the sense of “new”, “newly”, “in a new way”, “nine” as an example for this kind of *chala*: *tatra vākchalaṃ nāma yathā kaścid brūyāt - navatanthro ‘yaṃ bhīṣag iti, atha bhīṣag brūyāt - nāhaṃ navatantra ekatanthro ‘ham iti; paro brūyāt - nāhaṃ bravīmi nava tantrāṇi taveti, api tu navābhyastaṃ te tantram iti; bhīṣag brūyāt - na mayā navābhyastaṃ tantram, anekadhābhyastaṃ mayā tantram iti; etad vākchalam.*

NSū 1.2.12 defines the term: *aviśeṣābhīhite ‘rthe vaktur abhiprāyād arthāntarakalpanā vākchalam.* Pakṣilasvāmin gives not only *navakambala* as the example for *vākchala* but also analyzes elaborately: *navakambalo ‘yaṃ māṇavaka iti prayogaḥ. atra navaḥ kambalo ‘syeti vaktur abhiprāyāḥ. vīgraha tu viśeṣaḥ, na samāse. tatrāyaṃ chalavādī vaktur abhiprāyād avivakṣitam anyam arthaṃ nava kambalā asyeti tāvad abhīhitaṃ bhavateḥ kalpayati, kalpayitvā cāsambhavena pratiśedhati eko ‘sya kambalaḥ kuto nava kambalā iti. tad idaṃ sāmānyāśabde vāci chalaṃ vākchalam iti. asya pratyavasthānaṃ sāmānyāśabdasyā - nekārthatve ‘nyatarābhīdhānakalpanāyāṃ viśeṣavacanam. navakambala ity anekārthābhīdhānam, navaḥ kambalo ‘syeti nava kambalā asyeti, etasmīn prayukte yeyaṃ kalpanā nava kambalā asyety etad bhavatābhīhitaṃ ta ca na sambhavatīti.*

based on wording.

[1.2.2 Details of the eight teachings on debate]

(23c16) 我已略說此八種義。今當次第廣明其相。

Now that I have stated briefly these eight kinds of rubrics (八種義), let me explain more fully their [defining] features (相) in due order.

[1.2.2.1 Example]

(23c17) 問曰。汝前言喻、今立喻者作何方便。答曰。若說喻者、凡聖同解然後可說。如言「是心動發、猶如迅風」。一切凡夫知風動故、便得決了心爲輕躁。若不知者、不得爲喻。問曰。何故不但說正義而說喻耶。答曰。凡說喻者爲明正義。問曰。汝先言「凡聖同解方得爲喻」。何者名「同」、云何爲「異」。答曰。如前風喻、名之爲「同」。聖得涅槃而凡不得、是名爲「異」。

Question: You previously mentioned the example (喻). Now, what use (方便\**prayoga*) does putting forth an example have?<sup>(31)</sup>

Answer: If someone states an example, he can state it [only] after [he knows that] ordinary people (凡) and the spiritually noble (聖) understand it in the same way.<sup>(32)</sup> For example (如), if someone says that thoughts rise up like gusts of wind, because all ordinary people

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*etasyām anyatarābhīdhān- akalpanāyām viśeṣo vaktavyaḥ. yasmād viśeṣo 'rthaviśeṣu vijñāyate 'yam artho 'nenābhīhita iti. sa ca viśeṣo nāsti. tasmān mithyābhīyogamātram etad iti. prasiddhaś ca loke śabdārthasambandho 'bhīdhānābhīdheyaniyama- nīyogaḥ. asyābhīdhānasyāyam artho 'bhīdheya iti samānaḥ sāmānyaśabdasya, viśeṣo viśiṣṭaśabdasya. prayuktapūrvāś ceme śabdā arthe prayujyante nāprayuktapūrvāḥ. prayogaś cārthasampratyaḥarthāḥ. arthapratyaḥ ca vyavahāra iti. tatraivam arthagatyarthe śabdaprayoge sāmāthyāt sāmānyaśabdasya prayoganiyamaḥ. ajām grāmaṃ naya sarpirāhara brāhmaṇaṃ bhojayeti sāmānyaśabdāḥ santo 'rthāvayaveṣu prayujyante. sāmāthyād yatrārthakriyādeśanā sambhavati tatra pravartante. nārthasāmānye kriyādeśanā sambhavet. evam ayaṃ sāmānyaśabdo navakambala iti yo 'rthaḥ sambhavati navaḥ kambalo 'syeti tatra pravartate. Yas tu na sambhavati nava kambalā asyeti tatra na pravartate. so 'yam anupāpadyamānārthakalpanayā paravākyopālabhas ten a kalpata iti. (NBh ad NSū 1.2.12)*

<sup>(31)</sup> SK & EP: 'Now, when you put forth an example, what kind of formulation (方便 \**prayoga*) do you give?'

<sup>(32)</sup> EP: CS's definition of example: *dr̥ṣṭānto nāma yatra mūrkhaviduṣāṃ buddhisāmyam, yo varṇyaṃ varṇayati. yathāgnir uṣṇaḥ, dravam udakam, sthīrā pṛthivī, ādityaḥ prakāśaka iti; yathā vādityaḥ prakāśakas tathā sām̐khyajñānaṃ prakāśakam iti. (CS 3.8.34)*

NSū1.1.25: *laukikaparīkṣakānāṃ yasmīn arthe buddhisāmyaṃ sa dr̥ṣṭāntḥ*. It has to be that in comparison to NSū that CS does not differentiate between the general example and the example in proof (*dr̥ṣṭānta - udāharaṇa*)

Cf. NBh ad NSū 1.1.25: *lokasāmyam anatītā laukikā naisargikaṃ vainayikaṃ buddhyatisāyam aprāptāḥ. tadviparītāḥ parīkṣakāḥ. tarkeṇa pramāṇair arthaṃ parīkṣitum arhantīti. yathā yam arthaṃ laukikā budhyante tathā parīkṣakā api, so 'rtho dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ. dr̥ṣṭāntavirodhena hi pratipakṣāḥ pratiṣeddhavyā bhavantīti, dr̥ṣṭāntasamādhinā ca svapakṣāḥ sthāpanīyā bhavatīti, avayaveṣu codaharaṇāya kalpata iti.*

Cf. *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* ss. 27 & 29.

(凡夫) are aware of the fact that gusts of wind rise up, they certainly should at once comprehend that thoughts are frivolous and restless. If they do not know [this about the wind], then one should/can not give it as an example (不得爲喩).

Question: Why is it that one not only states one's correct thesis (正義 \**siddhānta*?) but [also] states an example [of it]?

Answer: Every statement of an example has the purpose of making clear one's correct thesis (正義).

Question: You said earlier that, if ordinary people and the spiritually noble have the same understanding, then one should give an example. What is said to be the same and what is said to be different?

Answer: The above example of the wind is said to be [a case of] the same [understanding]. The spiritually noble attain [the correct understanding of] *nirvāṇa*, but ordinary people do not. This is said to be [a case of] a different [understanding].

[1.2.2.2 Tenet/established doctrine]

(23c25) 問曰。已說喩相。執相云何。答曰。隨其所執、廣引因緣、立義堅固、名爲執相。

Question: You have stated an example's [defining] features. What is the [defining] feature of a tenet (執 lit. what one holds)<sup>(33)</sup> <sup>(34)</sup> ? Answer: What is put forth as solid (立義堅固) by adducing many reasons (因緣) in accordance with what one holds (隨其所執) is said to be what a tenet (執) is.<sup>(35)</sup>

[1.2.2.2.1 Fourfold classification of tenets]

(23c26) 問曰。執法有幾。答曰有四。一一切同。二一切異。三初同後異。四初異後同。問曰。汝今應當說此四相。

<sup>(33)</sup> Cf. 隨所執 in the above list.

<sup>(34)</sup> Or 'You have stated what an example is. What is a tenet?'

<sup>(35)</sup> SK: 'Putting forth a thesis (立義) which is established firmly by adducing many reasons in accordance with what one holds is said to be the [defining] feature of *siddhānta*'.

Cf. Kang [2007:14], "Was nent man Festsatz (*siddhānta*)? Antwort: Man folgt dem Festgehaltenen nach und greift auf breiter Basis die Gründe. [Dann] stellt man seine Meinung sehr fest. Das nent man den Festsatz."

EP: CS (3.8.37) very similar: *siddhānta nāma sa yaḥ parīkṣakair bahuvīdhaṃ parīkṣya hetubhīś ca sādhayitvā sthāpyate nirṇayaḥ. sa caturvidhaḥ - sarvatantarāsiddhāntaḥ, pratitantrasiddhāntaḥ, adhikaraṇāsiddhāntaḥ, abhyupagamasiddhāntaś ceti.*

NSū does not speak about *nirṇaya* but of *saṃsthiti* as the defining word for *siddhānta*: *tantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasamsthitiḥ siddhāntaḥ. sa caturvidhaḥ, sarvatantrapratitantrādhikaraṇābhyupagamasamsthityarthāntarabhāvāt.* (NSū 1.1.26f.)

Although UH does not mention the four different kinds of *siddhānta* as in CS and NSū, it – nevertheless – has also a fourfold differentiation of *siddhānta*.

Question: How many kinds of tenets (執法 lit. teachings which are held) are there?

Answer: There are four<sup>(36)</sup>: [1] first, [the proponent and the opponent] completely agree (一切同); [2] second, they completely disagree (一切異); [3] third, at first they agree but in the end they disagree (初同後異); [4] fourth, at first they disagree but in the end they agree (初異後同).

Question: You should now explain/state the [defining] features of the four.

(23c29) 答曰。凡欲立義、當依四種知見。何等爲四。一者現見。二者比知。三以喩知。四隨經書。

Answer: Everyone who wishes to put forth a thesis (立義) should rely on the four kinds of knowledge (知見).

[Question:] What are these four?

[Answer:] [1] The first is perception (現見 \**pratyakṣa*); [2] the second is inference (比知 \**anumāna*); [3] the third is knowledge based on analogy (以喩知 \**upamāna*); and [4] the fourth is [knowledge] in accordance with scripture (隨經書\**āgama*).<sup>(37)</sup>

(24a2) 一切同者、如說者言「無我我所」、問者亦說「無我我所」、名一切同。一切異者、說者言「異」、問則說「一」、是名俱異。初同後異者、如說者曰「現法皆有。神非現見亦復是有」。問者或言「現見之法可名爲有。神若非現、何得有耶」。若言「比知而有神」者、要先現見後乃可比。神非現法、云何得比。若復以喩明神有者、有<sup>(38)</sup>相似法然後得喩。神類何等而爲喩乎。若隨經書證有神者、是事不可。經書意亦難解。或時言「有」或時言「無」。云何取信。是名初同後異。初異後同者。如說者言「無我無所」。而問者曰「有我有人」。此二論者俱信涅槃。是名初異後同。

[1] The case of completely agreeing (一切同) is where, for example, the proponent (說者) says that there is no self (無我 \**anātman*) nor anything related to the self (我所\**ātmiya*) and the opponent (問者) also says that there is no self nor anything related to the self. This is said to be [a case of] completely agreeing (一切同).

[2] The case of completely disagreeing (一切異) is where, while the proponent says [that things are] distinct [from one another], the opponent says [that they are] the same. This

<sup>(36)</sup> Differently defined fourfold classifications are found in CS 3.8.37 and in NSū 1.1.27-31.

<sup>(37)</sup> This portion seems to be out of place but is presupposed by 1.2.2.2.1[3].

Cf. Kang [2007: 62], “Man wendet ein: “Sie müssen jetzt diese vier Beschaffenheiten erklären.” Darauf wird erwidert: “Im allgemeinen [gilt]: wer eine Behauptung (\**artha*?) etablieren will, muß sich auf vier Arten von Wissen basieren. Was sind die vier? Erstens die Wahrnehmung, zweitens die Schlußfolgerung, drittens Vergleich (Wissen durch die Analogie), viertens Überlieferung.”

<sup>(38)</sup> SK: Read 見 instead of 有?

is said to be [a case of] both [parties'] disagreeing (俱異).<sup>(39)</sup>

[3] A case where at first they agree but in the end they disagree (初同後異) is where there is, for example, the following:

The proponent says that all perceptible things (現法\**pratyakṣa-dharma*) exist and, though souls (神\**puruṣa=ātman*) are not perceptible (非現見), still they too exist.

The opponent might (或) say:

(1) Perceptible things (現見之法 \**pratyakṣa-dharma*) may be said to exist. [However,] if souls are not perceptible (非現), how can [you say that] they exist?

(2) If you say that you know from inference (比知) that they exist, you need to perceive [a soul] first; only then, can you infer (可比) that they exist. If souls are not perceptible things (非現法), how do you manage to infer them?

(3) If, still you [try to] show that souls exist through an analogy (喩), the analogy succeeds (得喩) [only] after some similarity (相似法) has been perceived<sup>(40)</sup>. What kind of thing is a soul similar to (神類何等), so that you can draw an analogy (爲喩)? (4) It is not possible to prove that souls exist [through knowledge] in accordance with scripture (隨經書). The intention of scripture too is difficult to understand. Sometimes it says [souls] exist; sometimes it says [souls] do not exist. How can one make [some one] believe [in scriptures]?<sup>(41)</sup>

This is said to be [a case of] at first agreeing but in the end disagreeing (初同後異).<sup>(42)</sup>

[4] The case where at first they disagree but in the end they agree (初異後同) is where, for example, the proponent says that there is no self (我) nor what is related to it and the opponent says that there is a self and there is a person (人 \**pudgala*). [Yet] these two debaters (論者) both believe in *nirvāṇa*.

This is said to be [a case of] at first disagreeing but in the end agreeing (初異後同).

#### [1.2.2.2.2 Tenets by school]

#### (24a13) 復次執法、隨義有無量相。

Next come the tenets (執法 lit. the teachings held). As they [vary] with the topic (隨義), they are limitless (有無量相, lit. there are limitless features).<sup>(43)</sup>

#### [1.2.2.2.1 Buddhists]

<sup>(39)</sup> BG: 'This is said to be [a case of] entirely disagreeing.'

<sup>(40)</sup> SK: 'the analogy succeeds [only] after some similar thing (相似法) has been perceived.'

<sup>(41)</sup> BG & EP: 'How can one believe [that souls exist]?'

<sup>(42)</sup> Cf. 中論 (青目注) chapter 18.

<sup>(43)</sup> SK: 'In accordance with the topics (隨義) there are limitless features [of tenets].'

(24a14) 如十二因緣、苦習滅道、三十七品、四沙門果。如是等法名佛正義。

For example, [there are] the twelve causal conditions (十二因緣\**dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda*); [the four noble truths of] suffering, its origin, its extinction, and the path (苦習滅道\**duḥkha-samudaya-nirodha-mārga*)<sup>(44)</sup>; the thirty-seven conditions (三十七品) [leading to enlightenment \*(*bodhi-*)*pakṣa*]; the four fruits of asceticism (四沙門果 \**śrāmaṇya-phala*). Teachings (法 \**dharma*) such as these are said to be the Buddha's true teachings (佛正義).

[1.2.2.2.2.2 Fire-worshippers]

(24a15) 如說晨朝禮敬、殺生祭祠<sup>(45)</sup>、然衆香木、獻諸油燈。如是四種名事火外道。

For example, some speak of morning worship (晨朝禮敬), sacrificing animals (殺生祭祠), burning much aromatic wood (然衆香木), and offering with oil lamps (獻諸油燈). These four kinds are said [to be topics pertaining to] the non-Buddhist school which worships fire (事火外道).

[1.2.2.2.2.3 Grammarians]

(24a17) 六十三字、四句之義。是音聲外道。

The topics (義) of the sixty-three syllables (六十三字<sup>(46)</sup> \**varṇa*) and of the four [kinds of] words (四句<sup>(47)</sup> \**pada*) pertain to the non-Buddhist school [that studies] linguistic sound (音聲外道).

[1.2.2.2.2.4 Physicians]

(24a18) 明藥有六。一藥名、二藥德、三藥味、四藥勢力、五和合、六成熟。是名醫法。

There are six things to explain about medicines (藥): [1] first, the names of medicines (藥

<sup>(44)</sup> For 習 (not 集) as the second truth, see 中阿含、雜阿含、阿毘曇心論、成實論。

<sup>(45)</sup> Read 祭祀 (ritual) instead of 祭祠。

<sup>(46)</sup> BG: 字 refers to a single Chinese ideograph. However, here it is clearly being used to render the Sanskrit word 'varṇa', or letter. The sixty three letters (六十三字) clearly corresponds to the Sanskrit *triṣaṣṭivarnāḥ*. Just as the simplest orthographic unit for a sound in Chinese is the Chinese ideograph, so the simplest orthographic unit for a sound in Sanskrit is the *varṇa*.

<sup>(47)</sup> BG: 句 refers to a Chinese sentence. However, as suggested to us by Prof. Hideyo Ogawa, the four kinds of words (四句) correspond to the Sanskrit *catvāri padajātāni*, which are nouns (*nāman*), verbs (*ākhyāta*), preposition (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*). Just as a Sanskrit word is the smallest linguistic unit made up of *varṇas*, so the sentence is the simplest linguistic unit made up of ideographs.

Cf. Abhidharma categories: 名身 *nāma-kāya* (word), 句身 *pada-kāya* (phrase/sentence), and 文身 *vyañjana-kāya* (syllable).

Dr. Muroya kindly informed us of the similar passage in the *Arthaśāstra* Chap. 10: *akārādayo varṇās triṣaṣṭiḥ. varṇasaṅghātaḥ padam. tac caturvidhaṃ nāmākhyātopasarganipātās ceti.*

名 \**nāman*); [2] second, the properties of medicines (藥德 \**guṇa*); [3] third, the flavors of medicines (藥味 \**rasa*); [4] fourth, the powers of medicines (藥勢力 \**vīrya*); [5] fifth, the mixing (和合 \**kaṣāya*) [of medicines]; [6] sixth, the digestion (成熟 \**vipāka*) [of medicines]. These are said [to be the topics pertaining to] the teachings of medicine (醫法).

[1.2.2.2.2.5 Vaiśeṣika]

(24a19) 如六諦等衛世師有。

The Vaiśeṣikas (衛世師), for example,<sup>(48)</sup> have six categories/realities/truths (諦).<sup>(49)</sup>

[1.2.2.2.2.6 Sāṃkhya]

(24a20) 冥初一義多異解。是僧伽。

The deviant teachings/views (異解) that primordial matter (冥初 \**pradhāna/prakṛti*) is one and that souls (我 \**ātman=puruṣa*) are many are [the teachings of] the Sāṃkhya (僧伽).

[1.2.2.2.2.7 Yoga]

(24a20) 有八微。所謂四大、空、意、明、無明。八自在。一能小、二爲大、三輕舉、四遠到、五隨所欲、六分身、七尊勝、八隱沒。是名踰伽外道。

[I] There are the eight subtleties (微),<sup>(50)</sup> such as (所謂) (1-4) the four great elements (四大 \**mahābhūta*), (5) space (空 \**ākāśa*), (6) the mind (意 \**manas*), (7) knowledge (明 \**vidyā*) and (8) ignorance (無明 \**avidyā*), and [II] the eight supernatural powers (自在 \**aiśvarya/vaśitva*)<sup>(51)</sup> : (1) first, being able to become small (能小), (2) second, being able to become big (爲大), (3) third, being able to become light (輕舉), (4) fourth, being able to reach far away (遠到), (5) fifth, being able to obtain whatever one desires (隨所欲), (6) sixth, making multiple manifestations of one's body (分身), (7) seventh, being able to be victorious (尊勝), (8) eighth, being able to become invisible (隱沒).

These are said [to be the topics pertaining to] the non-Buddhist school of Yoga (踰伽外

<sup>(48)</sup> 如 does not make much sense in this context.

<sup>(49)</sup> See 1.1 above for the list.

<sup>(50)</sup> BG: The four great elements (*mahābhūta*) are mentioned in YBh 3.44 and enumerated by Vyāsa as earth, water, fire and air. Space is mentioned in YS 3.41 and 3.42, mind in YS 3.48 and ignorance in YS 2.3-5.

<sup>(51)</sup> BG: Vyāsa, in his commentary to YS 3.45, lists eight perfections, the first five of which are the same as the first five listed here. Cf. 大智度論 (Taisho 1509, Vol. 25, p.105a): 作八種變化。一者能作小乃至微塵。二者能作大乃至滿虛空。三者能作輕乃至如鴻毛。四者能作自在能以大爲小以長爲短如是種種。五者能有主力。有大力人無所下故言有主力六者能遠到。七者能動地。八者隨意所欲盡能得。 Cf. CS 4.1.140-141.

道).

[1.2.2.2.8 Jains]

(24a23) 有命、無命、罪、福、漏、無漏差、戒具足、縛解。五智。聞智、思智、自覺智、慧智、義智。六障。不見障、苦受障、愚癡障、命盡障、性障、名障。四濁。瞋慢貪諂。是皆名爲尼乾陀法。

[I] There are [1] souls (命 \**jīva*) and [2] non-souls (無命\**ajīva*), [3] vice/demerit (罪 \**pāpa*) and [4] virtue/merit (福 \**punya*), [5] influx (漏 \**āsrava*), [6] non-aging/annihilation (無差+老<sup>(52)</sup> \**nirjarā*<sup>(53)</sup>), and [7] taking the full precepts / prevention (戒具足\**saṃvara*<sup>(54)</sup>), [8] bondage (縛 \**bandha*) and [9] liberation (解\**mokṣa*);

[II] the five forms of knowledge (五智), [namely,] [1] knowledge through hearing (聞智 \**śruta*), [2] knowledge through reflection (思智\**mati*), [3] knowledge through self-awareness (自覺智), [4] knowledge through wisdom (慧智) and [5] knowledge of facts (義智);

[III] the six obstructions (六障), [namely,] [1] blindness (不見), [2] suffering (苦受), [3] stupidity (愚癡), [4] exhaustion of life-span (命盡), [5] class (性 \**gotra*) and [6] names (名\**nāman*); and

[IV] the four corruptions (四濁 \**kaṣāya*), [namely,] [1] hatred (瞋 \**krodha*), [2] pride (慢 \**māna*), [3] greed (貪\**lobha*) and [4] flattery (諂 \**māyā*).

These are all said [to be the topics pertaining to] the teachings (法) of the Jains (尼乾陀: \**Nirgrantha*).

[1.2.2.2.9 Radical Monists]

(24a27) 又有說言「一切諸法盡是有故、當知是一」。又「一切法盡有求那、亦名爲一」。又「一切法從冥初生根本一故、當知是一」。又「頭足等成身與身爲一」。又「依者是空、當知是一」。如是等名計一外道。

Furthermore, there are some who say that, [1] because absolutely all things (一切諸法), in their entirety, exist, one should recognize that they are one [and the same]; or again that, [2] because all things, in their entirety, have [three] qualities (求那\**guṇa*), they too are said to be one [and the same]; or again that, [3] because all things arise from primordial matter (冥初 \**pradhāna/prakṛti*) and so have the same origin (根本), one should recognize that they are one [and the same]; or again that, [4] [because] the head, the feet and other [parts of the body] make up the body, [one should recognize that they are] the same as

<sup>(52)</sup> Read 無差+老? instead of 無漏差; see Muroya [2015].

<sup>(53)</sup> *nirjarā*: lit. annihilation of *karma*.

<sup>(54)</sup> *saṃvara*: lit. observance of precepts.

the body; or again that, [5] [because] substrata (依) are empty<sup>(55)</sup>, one should recognize that they are one [and the same]. Such [views] are said [to be those of] the non-Buddhist school which reckons all things to be one [and the same] (計一外道).<sup>(56)</sup>

[1.2.2.2.10 Radical Pluralists]

(24b2) 又言「一切法異。所以者何。如頭足等與身為異」。又「衆相差別、如牛非馬等、故知法異」。如是等名計異外道。

Furthermore, [some] say that all things are different [from one another]. What is the reason? They are just like the head, the feet and other [parts of the body] that are different from the body. Furthermore, because [their] many features (衆相) are different from one another just as cows are different from horses [lit. cows are not horses] and other such things, one recognizes that things are different [from each other]. Such [views] are said [to be those of] the non-Buddhist school which reckons all things to be different (計異外道).<sup>(57)</sup>

[1.2.2.2.3 Other tenets]

[1.2.2.2.3.1 Tenet of identity/Radical Monists is rejected.]

(24b4) 若言「一切法有故一」者、有法二種。一有覺、二無覺。云何爲一、因不同故。如是等法皆已總破。

Suppose one says that all things are one [and the same] because they exist (有). [But] existing things (有法) are of two kinds: those which are sentient (有覺) and those which are not (無覺). How can one say that they are identical, since (因...故) they are not the same? Teachings (法) such as these have all already been, in general, refuted.<sup>(58)</sup>

[1.2.2.2.3.2 Tenet of identity or difference is rejected.]

(24b6) 論者言。若有人說「苦習滅道、十二因緣、有無等法爲一異」者。皆非正因。所以者何。若言「一」者、則墮苦邊。若言「異」者、則墮樂邊。是故、有說若一若異、必墮二邊。非佛法義。The author (論者) says: if there are some who say that the teachings [of the Buddha] (法) such as [the four noble truths of] suffering, its origin, its extinction, and the path (苦習滅道), the twelve causal conditions (十二因緣), existence and non-existence (有無), and

<sup>(55)</sup> SK: 'because the super-strata (依者) are empty, ...'

<sup>(56)</sup> Cf. 百論 chapter 3, NSū 4.1.41-42. Some of the ideas mentioned here are the Sāṃkhya doctrines.

<sup>(57)</sup> Cf. 百論 chapter 4, NSū 4.1.34-36 & NBh.

According to Tucci [1929: 16], in our text two kinds of *pṛthagvāda* are alluded to: one refers to the differences in the *avayavas* [parts] and the *avayavin* [the whole] and the other to the difference of things on account of the difference of their *lakṣaṇas* [defining features].

<sup>(58)</sup> Cf. 百論 chapters 3-4.

other teachings are either the same or different, [then what they say] is all without genuine grounds (非正因). What is the reason? If one says that they are the same, then one falls to the extreme [view] of suffering [i.e., the extreme view that everything is suffering] (苦邊). If one says that they are different, then one falls to the extreme [view] of happiness [i.e., the extreme view that everything is happiness] (樂邊). Therefore, if there are some who say that they are either the same or different, they must fall to one of the two extremes (二邊).<sup>(59)</sup> This is not the meaning of the Buddha's teaching (佛法義).

[1.2.2.2.3.3 Tenet that *nirvāṇa* is neither suffering nor happiness]

(24b10) 復次、如有說言「涅槃之性無苦無樂。何以知之。凡一切法以有覺故、故有苦樂。涅槃無覺、云何言「樂」。」

Moreover, for example, there are some who say that *nirvāṇa*'s nature (性) is neither suffering nor happiness. How do they know this? Absolutely all things, because they are sentient (有覺), either suffer or are happy. If *nirvāṇa* is insentient (無覺), how can it be said to be happiness [or suffering]?

[1.2.2.2.3.4 Tenet that *nirvāṇa* is happiness]

(24b12) 復有說者而言「有樂。所以者何。樂有三種。一樂受樂、二無惱害、三無希求。涅槃之中無所求故、是故得名涅槃為樂」。

Moreover, there are some who say that there is happiness [in *nirvāṇa*]. What is the reason? Happiness is of three kinds. [1] The first is to experience happiness (樂受樂). [2] The second is not to experience harmful upset (無惱害). [3] The third is not to seek [after anything] (無希求). Because in *nirvāṇa* there is nothing to be sought after, *nirvāṇa* should be said to be happiness.

[1.2.2.2.3.5 Tenet that *nirvāṇa* is identical with the conditioned *dharmas* is rejected.]

(24b15) 又有問言「我先已知涅槃是常。今與諸行為異不耶」。答曰。汝若先知涅槃常者、云何謂為同諸行耶。諸行之性流轉敗壞。涅槃之體是常是樂。誰有智者言「同於行」。

Again, there are some who ask, saying (問言): I learned earlier that *nirvāṇa* is eternal. Now, is it the same or not as all the conditioned [*dharmas*] (行 \**saṃskāra*)?

Answer: if you already know that *nirvāṇa* is eternal, why do you ask whether or not it is the same as all the conditioned [*dharmas*]? The nature of all the conditioned [*dharmas*] is transmigration (流轉) and decline into ruin (敗壞). The essence of *nirvāṇa* is eternity and happiness. Who among intelligent people would say that it is the same as conditioned

<sup>(59)</sup> BG: "Therefore, there are some who say that, whether it is the same or different, one must fall to one of the two extremes."

[*dharmas*]?

[1.2.2.2.3.6 Tenet that the self has shape is rejected.]

(24b18) 復有問言「神我之性雖有形色、而未分別常與無常」。答曰、若一切法有對礙者、皆悉無常。如瓶有礙、則可破壞。我若如是、必亦無常。然我有形、非經所載、無有道理。如取沙磔名爲珍寶。汝亦如是言多虛妄。問曰。汝何故言「我無形」耶。答曰。我先已說「瓶有形礙、故可毀壞。我若如是、亦應磨滅」。云何復問「何故而說我無形」耶。

Furthermore, there are some who object (問) [lit. ask], saying that, even if it is the nature of the soul (神我) [lit., spiritual self, \**puruṣa=ātman*] to have shape and color, still one could not discern (分別) whether it is eternal or not.

Answer: if [one holds that] all things (一切法) have resistance (有對礙\**sapratigha*), then they are utterly non-eternal. For example, while a pot has resistance (有礙), it can be destroyed.<sup>(60)</sup> If the self (我 *ātman*) were like that, it too must be non-eternal. But, that the self has shape is not something recorded in scripture (經) and has no basis in reason (道理). You too speak as falsely (虛妄) as one who says of a pebble that it is a jewel.

Question: Why do you say that the self has no shape?

Answer: I said earlier that because a pot has shape and resistance (有形礙), it can be destroyed and that if the self were like that, it too should be obliterated. Why do you again ask why the self has no shape?

[1.2.2.2.4 Unsettled tenets]

(24b26) 復次、復有不定執相。

Next, there are, moreover, kinds of unsettled tenets (不定執相).

[1.2.2.2.4.1 Eternal or non-eternal?]

(24b26) 如或問言「以物爲聲<sup>(61)</sup>常無常乎」。

答曰。爲分成者、皆悉無常。聲亦分成、豈獨常也。

問曰。何名聲物。

答曰。若未分別、云何爲問。

For example, someone might ask (問言) whether sound (聲 \**śabda*), taken as a real entity (物), is eternal or not.

Answer: All things which are divisible (分成)<sup>(62)</sup> are utterly non-eternal. Sound too is

<sup>(60)</sup> Lit. “For example, if a pot has resistance, then it can be destroyed.” However, here, “p 則 q” does not mean ‘if p then q’ because of the statement below.

<sup>(61)</sup> Read 以聲爲物 instead of 以物爲聲.

<sup>(62)</sup> SK: 分成 may mean ‘consist of parts’.

divisible. Could it alone possibly be eternal?

Question: Why does one call sound a real entity?

Answer: If you are not yet sure (分別) [that sound is a real entity], how can there be a question [of whether or not it is eternal in the first place]?

[1.2.2.2.4.2 Who experiences suffering and happiness?]

(24b29) 問曰。我身與命、於未來世、獨受苦樂、共身受耶。

答曰。此身滅已、我餘身受。

問曰。何者是我、於未來世、受苦樂乎。

答曰。汝前言「我」。云何復問「有我不耶」。此非道理。

Question: As for the self (我 \**ātman*), body (身 \**śarīra*) and life (命 \**jīva*),<sup>(63)</sup> in the future life (未來世), will [the self] alone experience suffering and happiness or will it together with the body experience [suffering and happiness]?

Answer: Once this body has been destroyed, the self with another body experiences [suffering and happiness].

Question: What is this self such that it will experience suffering and happiness in the future life?

Answer: You previously explained [what] the self [is]. Why do you ask again whether or not there is a self?<sup>(64)</sup> This is not correct reasoning (道理).

[1.2.2.3 Excellence of statement]

(24c3) 問曰。已說執義。云何名爲語善相耶。

答曰。不違於理、不增不減、善解章句、應相說法、所演譬喻而無違背、無能輕訶。以是因緣名爲語善。

Question: You have explained [what] tenets (執義) [are]. What is said to be the [defining] feature of excellence/virtue of statement (語善 \**vākya-praśamsā*)?<sup>(65)</sup>

<sup>(63)</sup> 我身與命 may mean ‘The self and the body are together with life (i.e., they are together in the present life).’

<sup>(64)</sup> No such question appeared before.

<sup>(65)</sup> EP: CS 3.8.55: *vākya-praśamsā nāma yathā khalv asinn arthe tv anyūnam, anadhikam, arthavat, anapārthakam, aviruddham, adhigatapadārtham ceti yat tad vākyaṃ ananuyojyam iti praśasyate. In CS 3.8.54 vākya-praśamsā is the negative counterpart of the vākya-doṣas except for adhigatapadārtham which has no negative equivalent: vākya-doṣo nāma yathā khalv asmīn arthe nyūnam, adhikam, anarthakam, apārthakam, viruddham ceti. etāni hy antareṇa na prakṛto ‘rthah prāśāsyet.*

In NSū all *vākya-doṣas* are subsumable concepts of *nigrahasthāna* without mentioning them under a further header.

BG: in CS 3.8.55, *vākya-praśamsā* are ‘not deficient’ (*a-nyūna*), ‘not prolix’ (*an-adhika*), ‘not meaningless’ (*an-apārthaka*), ‘uncontradicted’ (*a-viruddha*) and ‘understandable’ (*adhigata-*

Answer: [1] Not to contradict reason (不違於理\**hetv-aviruddha*),<sup>(66)</sup> [2] not to be excessive (不增 \**anadhika*) and not to be deficient (不減 \**anyūna*), [3] to understand well the texts (善解章句), [4] to explain the teachings [of the Buddha] according to their features (應相說法), [5] to set out examples which do not contradict [reason] (所演譬喻而無違背), and [6] to have nothing to reproach (無能輕訶 \**ananujoyya*). A statement is said to be excellent (語善) for these reasons (因緣).

[1.2.2.3.1 Not contradicting reason]

(24c07) 問曰。不違於理。其事云何。

答曰。有人計「識是我。以諸行空無我故。非一切行皆是於識」。此非道理。行是識因。因無我故、識云何我。

問曰。一切諸法皆悉無常。聲非一切、是故爲常。

答曰。汝言「一切」聲、有何義非一切耶。此說非因。又一切法有造作者、皆悉無常。如火傳<sup>(67)</sup>等。聲亦如是。是故無常。是則名爲不相違相。

Question: What, in fact, is it not to contradict reason (不違於理)?

Answer: There are some who reckon consciousness (識 \**vijñāna*) to be the self (我 \**ātman*) because all *saṃskāras* (行 conditioned *dharma*s) are empty and selfless (無我 \**anātman*). [Yet, they also say that] not all *saṃskāras* (行 dispositions) are in one's consciousness. This is not correct reasoning (非道理). *Saṃskāras* (行 dispositions) are the causes of consciousness. If the causes (i.e., *saṃskāras*, dispositions/conditioned *dharma*s) are non-self (無我 \**anātman*), how can consciousness be the self?<sup>(68)</sup>

Opponent (問曰): All things (一切諸法) are, in their entirety, utterly non-eternal (無常 \**anitya*). Sound (聲 \**śabda*) is not all [things](一切). Therefore, [sound is] eternal (常 \**nitya*).<sup>(69)</sup>

Answer (答曰): You said 'all' (一切). What meaning does sound have so that it is not all (非一切)? This [statement of yours] uses (說) a non-reason (非因 : \**ahetu*).

Furthermore, if all things (一切法) are produced (有造作 \**kṛtaka*), then they all are, in their entirety, utterly non-eternal, as fire and others are [produced,] transmitted [and

*padārtha*). Asaṅga's HV (5.3) mentions *nyūna*, *adhika*, *punar-ukta*, *an-artha*.

<sup>(66)</sup> This text refers to two kinds of contradiction, viz. (1) contrary to logic and (2) contrary to example. CS 3.8.54 defines 'viruddha' as a *vākyadoṣa*: *viruddham nāma yad dṛṣṭāntasiddhāntasamayaiḥ viruddham*. Later the author takes up "viruddha" as a specious reason. See 1.2.2.8.8 below.

<sup>(67)</sup> The compound 火傳 occurs in 莊子.

<sup>(68)</sup> In this paragraph 行 (*saṃskāra*) and 無我 (*anātman*) seem to be used in double meaning, viz. 'conditioned *dharma*' and 'disposition', and 'selfless' and 'non-self'.

<sup>(69)</sup> Cf. 如實論 35a1-7, 聲為是一切所攝。為非一切所攝; 因明正理門論 1a25-28: 以於此中立聲爲常、一切皆是無常故者、是喻方便惡立異法、由合喻顯非一切故。此因非有、以聲攝在一切中故; PSV ad PS 3.6.

non-eternal]; sound is that way; therefore it is non-eternal.

This then is said to be the [defining] feature of ‘not contradicting [reason]’ (不相違相).

[1.2.2.3.2 Neither excessive nor deficient]

(24c14) 問曰。云何名爲言「不增減」。

答曰。我當先說增減之相。減有三種。一因減、二言減、三喩減。

若言「六識無常、猶如瓶等」。不說因緣。是名因減。

若言「是身無我、衆緣成故。聲亦無我、從緣而有」。是名喩減。

若言「四大無常、如瓶造作」。是名言減。

與上相違名爲具足。

Question: What is said to be neither excessive nor deficient (不增減)?

Answer: I should first explain what excess is and what deficiency is (增減之相; lit., the [defining] feature of excessiveness and deficiency).<sup>(70)</sup>

There are three kinds of deficiency. [1] The first is deficiency of reason (因減); [2] the second is deficiency of statement (言減); [3] the third is deficiency of example (喩減).

[1] If you say that the six [kinds of] consciousness (識 \**viññāna*) are non-eternal like such things as pots, and if you do not state the reason (因緣), then this is said to be [a case of] deficiency of reason (因減).

[2] If you say that this body has no self (無我 \**anātman*) because it results from many causes (衆緣成), and that sound too has no self, coming into existence from causes, [then] this is said to be [a case of] deficiency of example (喩減).

[3] If you say that the four great elements (四大 \**catvāri mahābhūtāni*) are non-eternal, like a pot, which is produced (造作), [then] this is said to be [a case of] deficiency of statement (言減).<sup>(71)</sup>

What is opposite to the above is said to be complete (具足).

(24c19) 又具足者、若人言「我」、應當問言「汝所說我爲常無常。若無常者、則同諸行、便是斷滅。若令常者、即是涅槃、更何須求。是則名爲具足之相。」

<sup>(70)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 166], “Man fragt: Was nennt man kein Zu- oder Abnahme? Man antwortet: Ich muß erst die Bestimmung der Zu- und Abnahme erklären.”

<sup>(71)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 166], “Es gibt drei Arten der Abnahme. Erstens, Abnahme des Grundes. Zweitens, Abnahme der Rede. Drittens, Abnahme des Beispiels. Wenn jemand sagt: “Die sechs Bewußtsein (*viññāna*) sind vergänglich wie der Krug usw.”, dann nennt er nicht den Grund. Dies nennt man Abnahme hinsichtlich des Grundes. Wenn jemand sagt: “Dieser Körper hat kein Eigenwesen, weil er aus vielen Umständen entstanden ist. Der Ton hat auch kein Eigenwesen [und] existiert nur nach Umständen.” Dies nennt man Anbahnung hinsichtlich des Beispiels. Wenn jemand sagt: “Die vier Elemente haben kein Eigenwesen wie ein mit Absicht geschaffener Krug.” Dies nennt man Abnahme hinsichtlich der Rede.“

There is still the case of being complete (具足): If someone says that the self (我) [exists], then one should ask him whether the self he says exists is eternal or not. If [he says] it is not eternal, then if it is the same as the conditioned [*dharmas*] (諸行), it comes to an end (斷滅). If one supposes (令) it to be eternal, then it is nothing but *nirvāṇa*. What further is to be sought?<sup>(72)</sup>

This then is said to be the [defining] feature of complete (具足) [statement].<sup>(73)</sup>

(24c22) 問曰。何名言增。

答曰。增亦三種。一因增、二喩增、三言增。

若言「聲法無常、和合成故。如瓶造作、則爲無常」。又言「聲是空之求那。空非對礙、聲是色法。云何相依。」是名因增。

若言「五根無常、如呼聲響造作法故。聲亦如是。何以知之。爲唇口等之所出故」。是名喩增。

如言「微塵細小、虛空遍大。如此二法則名爲常。聲不如是、故曰無常」。是名喩增。

又說「聲是無常、衆緣成故。若言「常」者、是事不然。所以者何。有二種因。一從形出、二爲根了。云何言常。又同異法皆無常故」。是名言增。

Question: What is said to be excess of statement (言增)?

Answer: Excess too is of three kinds. [1] The first is excess of reason (因增); [2] the second is excess of example (喩增); [3] the third is excess of statement (言增).<sup>(74)</sup>

[1] If one says that sound is non-eternal, because it arises from contact (和合成 \**saṃyogaja*),<sup>(75)</sup> like a pot, which while produced (造作), it is non-eternal. Furthermore, suppose someone says: [Because] sound is a quality (求那 \**guṇa*) of space (空 \**ākāśa*).<sup>(76)</sup> Space does not impede/resist [anything] (非對礙 \**apratigha*), [yet] sound is material [色法 \**rūpa-dharma*]. How do they [i.e., sound and space] depend on each other [相依 i.e., are related to each other] ?

This is said to be [a case of] excess of reason (因增).

<sup>(72)</sup> BG: What we have here is an instance of “*tarka*”, as defined at NSū 1.1.40, and discussed in NSūBh.

<sup>(73)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 166], “Diese [drei] nennt man die Annahme. Das Gegenteil dieser [drei Abnahmen] nennt man Vollständigkeit. Und die Vollständigkeit ist [wie folgt]: Wenn jemand die Seele (\**ātman*) nennt, sollte man fragen; “Ist die von dir erwähnte Seele ewig [Dinge] oder vergänglich? Wenn vergänglich, dann wird sie wie alle verursachen [Dinge] vergehen. Wenn tatsächlich ewig, dann ist sie die Erlösung das, was man anstreben sollte.” Dies is eben, was man die Bestimmung der Vollständigkeit nennt.”

<sup>(74)</sup> It is a bit strange to have the sub-category 言增 within the category of 言增.

<sup>(75)</sup> Cf. VS 2.2.31/36: *saṃyogād vibhāgāc chabdāc ca śabda-niṣpattiḥ/-niṣpattēḥ, Padārthadharmasamgrha* p. 323 (Bronkhorst & Ramseier’s ed., paragraph 323): *śabdāc ca saṃyogavibhāganīṣpannāt*; NBh to NSū 2.2.13 presents extensive discussion of the theories of the nature of sound.

<sup>(76)</sup> Cf. NBh ad NSū 2.2.13, 2.2.38, 3.1.73.

[2] Suppose someone says: the five sense organs (根) are non-eternal, because, like the echo of a cry (呼聲響), they are produced (造作法). Sound too is this way. How is this known? Because it goes forth from the lips and mouth, etc. This is said to be [a case of] excess of example (是名喻增).<sup>(77)</sup> [Furthermore,] for example, someone says: Atoms (微塵) are subtle (細) and space (虛空) is pervasive and large (遍大). These two things (二法) are then said to be eternal. Because sound is not like them, it is said to be non-eternal.

This is said to be [a case of] excess of example (喻增).

[3] Moreover, [suppose] someone says: Sound is non-eternal because it arises from many causes (衆緣成). If someone [else] says that [sound is] eternal, then that is wrong. What is the reason? [Because] there are two kinds of reasons (因): one is ‘arising from form’ (從形出), the other is ‘being known by the senses’ (根了).<sup>(78)</sup> Why does one say that [sound] is eternal? Furthermore, because [all] things, be they the same or different (同異法), are non-eternal.

This is said to be [a case of] excess of statement (言增).

[1.2.2.4 Timely statement] <sup>(79)</sup>

(25a4) 問曰。何語能令世人信受。

答曰。若爲愚者分別深義、所謂「諸法皆悉空寂、無我、無人、如幻、如化、無有真實。」如斯深義智者乃解。凡夫若聞、迷沒墮落。是則不名應時語也。

若言「諸法有業、有報、及縛解等、作者受者」、淺智若聞、即便信受。如鑽燧和合、則火得生。若所演說應前衆生、則皆信樂。如是名爲隨時而語。

Question: What statement can lead worldly people (世人) to believe and to accept (信受) [the doctrine]?

Answer: If one explains (分別)<sup>(80)</sup> the profound facts (深義) for the dull-witted – such as the fact that all things, in their entirety, are utterly empty and quiescent (空寂), that there are neither selves (我 \**ātman*) nor persons (人 \**pudgala*), and that, like an illusion (幻 *māyā*) or like magical creation (化 \**nirmāṇa*), they have no reality (真實 \**tattva*).<sup>(81)</sup> Such profound facts are understood only by the wise (智者). If ordinary people (凡夫) hears this, they are deluded and fall into error (迷沒墮落). This then is not said to be [a case of] a timely statement (應時語 \**prāpta-kāla-vākya*).

<sup>(77)</sup> SK: perhaps 是名喻增 is redundant.

<sup>(78)</sup> Hakuju Ui takes that 從形出 and 根了 correspond to *kāraka-hetu* and *jñāpaka-hetu* respectively. The meaning of 從形出 is unclear.

<sup>(79)</sup> This section should come after 知因 (1.2.2.7).

<sup>(80)</sup> Elsewhere we translated 分別 as ‘points out’.

<sup>(81)</sup> Cf. 大品般若 p.416c、大智度論 p.732b

If one says that all beings (諸法) have karma (業) and a retribution (報), that there is bondage (縛 \**bandhana*) and release (解\**mokṣa*), etc. and that there are those who act (作者 *kartṛ*) and those who experience (受者 \**bhoktr*), and if those with little wisdom hear this, then they will believe and accept it (信受), just as fire arises when there is [wood's] contact with either a drill or flint (鑽燧)<sup>(82)</sup>. If what is said is suited to one's audience [lit., people before one], then they will all believe in and aspire to it (信樂). Such is said to be [a case of] a timely statement (隨時而語 \**prāpta-kāla-vākya*).

[1.2.2.5 Convincing statement]<sup>(83)</sup>

(25a10) 問曰。何名言證。答曰。雖多所說善能憶念、若宣諸義深得其相、所立堅固令人愛樂。如言「諸法皆空無主。現見萬物衆緣成故」。是名言證。

Question: What is said to be a convincing statement (言證)?

Answer: If one is well able to recollect what has been said, though it is much, and if one states its complete meaning (諸義) and deeply grasp its features, then what is to be established (所立) will become firm and it will lead people to aspire to it (愛樂). For example, if someone says that all things are empty and without a possessor (無主) because one perceives that all real entities (萬物) arise from many causes (衆緣成).

This is said to be [a case of] a convincing statement (言證).

[1.2.2.6 Deficiency of statement]

(25a14) 問曰。何名言失。

答曰。與上相違名爲言失。

又二種語亦名爲失。何等爲二。一義無異而重分別。二辭無異而重分別。

云何一義而重分別。如言「橋尸迦」、亦言「天帝釋」、亦言「富蘭陀那」。是名義一名異而重分別。名義同者、如言「因陀羅」、又言「因陀羅」。是名義無異而重分別。

復次凡所言說、但飾文辭無有義趣、皆名爲失。

又雖有義理而無次第、亦名言失。如偈說。

如人讚歎 天帝釋女 名曰金色 足手殊勝  
而便說於 釋提桓因 壞阿修羅 三種之城

(82) 鑽燧 occurs in 論語 and means '[starting a fire with] wood-wood friction' Cf. '*araṇi*' *Madhyamakāvataṛābhāṣya* on *Madhyamakāvataṛa* 6.161cd (the piece of wood used for kindling fire by attrition)

(83) This section seems to be out of place. This topic is not listed in 1.2.1 or in 1.2.2, yet it appears as part of a series in which those technical terms are explained.

如是名爲無次第語。

Question: What is said to be deficiency of statement (言失 \**vākya-doṣa*)?

Answer: That which is the opposite of what was said above is said to be deficiency of statement.

Furthermore, there are two kinds of statements which are said to be deficient. What are the two kinds? [1] First, though what is meant is not different, one speaks redundantly (義無異而重分別)<sup>(84)</sup> ; [2] second, though the words are not different, one speaks redundantly (辭無異而重分別)<sup>(85)</sup> (86).

[1] What is a case of meaning one thing and speaking redundantly (一義而重分別)? For example, someone says 'Kauśika', he says also 'Devendra-śakra' and he says also 'Puraṃdara'.<sup>(87)</sup> This is said to be a case of having different names for a single meaning [i.e., referent] and of speaking redundantly (義一名異而重分別).

[2] A case of both names and [their] meanings being the same (名義同) is where someone says 'Indra' and he says 'Indra' again. This is said to be a case of the names and [their] meanings being not different and of speaking redundantly (名義無異而重分別)<sup>(88)</sup> .

[3] Next anything which is said consisting only of florid and meaningless (無有義趣 \**anarthagati*) language is said to be deficient (失).<sup>(89)</sup>

[4] Furthermore, though what is said is reasonable (義理), it is disorderly, it too is said to be [a case of] deficiency of statement.<sup>(90)</sup> As the verse says:

As people praise Indra's consort (天帝釋女) called 'Golden Colour' (金色)<sup>(91)</sup> who has excellent limbs, yet they<sup>(92)</sup> speak of Śakra (釋), the lord of gods (提桓因 \**devānām indrah*), who destroyed three castles of the demons (壞阿修羅三種之

<sup>(84)</sup> Though 分別 typically means to distinguish or to divide and in Buddhist Chinese usually translates *vikalpa*, it is clear from the context that the Sanskrit term is '*ukti*'. In particular, the Sanskrit term for 重分別 (redundantly distinguish) is *punar-ukti*. Only a translation of the Sanskrit original is sensible in this context.

<sup>(85)</sup> Cf. '*śabdapunarukta*' and '*arthapunarukta*'. These two forms of redundancy, redundancy of words and redundancy of meanings/referents, are mentioned in NSū 5.2.14. *arthāpattipunarukta* of NSū 5.2.15 is missing in UH. Redundancy is also mentioned in CS 3.8.54 and in Asaṅga's HV 5.3.4.

<sup>(86)</sup> This second case is not explained below; instead, other three cases of deficiency of statement will be given.

<sup>(87)</sup> Those different names refer to the same deity, Indra.

<sup>(88)</sup> Note that 義無異 (no difference in meaning) and 一義 (single meaning) are taken to be synonymous.

<sup>(89)</sup> Cf. '*nīrthaka*' in NSū 5.2.7 and *anarthaka* in CS 3.8.54 & HV 5.3.

<sup>(90)</sup> Cf. '*apārthaka*' in NSū 5.2.10 and CS 3.8.54 also mentions '*vyarthaka*'.

<sup>(91)</sup> 'Golden Color' is the name of Lakṣmī, the wife of Viṣṇu.

<sup>(92)</sup> BG: 'others speak of Śakra, etc.'

城\**tripurāntaka*)<sup>(93)</sup> <sup>(94)</sup>.

Such is said to be [a case of] disorderly statement (無次第語).

[1.2.2.7 Reasons for knowledge/Cause of veridical cognition]

(25a26) 問曰。何名知因。

答曰。知因有四。一現見、二比知、三喩知、四隨經書。

Question: What are the reasons for knowledge/causes of veridical cognition (知因 \**jñāna-hetu*)?

Answer: There are four reasons for knowledge/causes of veridical cognition. [1] The first is perception (現見\**pratyakṣa*); [2] the second is inference (比知 \**anumāna*); [3] the third is analogy (喩知 \**upamāna*); and [4] the fourth is scriptural authority (隨經書 \**agama*; lit. [knowledge] in accordance with scripture).

[1.2.2.7.1 perception]

(25a27) 此四知中現見爲上。

問曰。何因緣故現見上耶。

答曰。後三種知由現見故、名之爲上。如見火有烟、後時見烟、便知有火。是故現見爲勝。又如見焰、便得喩水。故知先現見故、然後得喩。後現見時、始知眞實。

問曰。已知三事由現故知。今此現見何者最實。

答曰。五根所知有時虛僞。唯有智慧正觀諸法。名爲最上。

又如見熱時焰、旋火輪、乾闥婆城。此雖名現、而非眞實。

又相不明了故見錯謬、如夜見杙疑謂是人。以指按目、則覩二月。若得空智、名爲實見。

Among these four [kinds of] knowledge, perception (現見) is the most basic [上 lit., highest].

Question: Why is perception the most basic?

Answer: Because the last three kinds of knowledge depend on (由) perception, it is said to be the most basic.

[1] For example, when one sees fire together with smoke (火有烟), afterwards, when one sees smoke, one at once knows (i.e., infers) that there is fire. Therefore, perception is superior.

[2] Again, for example, when some one sees a mirage (焰), he might at once liken it to

<sup>(93)</sup> This is an epithet of Śiva, not Indra.

<sup>(94)</sup> SK: If we translate the verse style Chinese text *pada* by *pada*, then it runs: ‘As people praise (如人讚歎) / Indra’s consort (天帝釋女) / called ‘Golden Colour’ (名曰金色) / excellent limbs (足手殊勝) / yet they speak of (而便說於) / Śakra, the lord of gods (釋提桓因) / destroyer of the demons’ (壞阿修羅) / three castles (三種之城): The translation makes some sense and does not look disorderly; probably the original Sanskrit text in verse style may look disorderly due to the metre.

water (得喻水, lit. make analogy with water).<sup>(95)</sup> Therefore, we know that since he first perceived [water], later he might liken [the mirage] with [water] (得喻).<sup>(96)</sup>

[3] [In the case of the verbal cognition based on the scriptures],<sup>(97)</sup> later, when he perceives [what one heard of before], he only then recognizes it for what it is [真實, lit. the reality]. Question: We have learned that in these [last] three cases knowledge depends on perception (現). Now which of the following perceptions is the truest?

Answer: What is perceived through the five senses is sometimes specious (虛偽). There is only wisdom (智慧) that correctly sees all things (諸法). It is said to be the most basic.

Still, one sees, for example, a mirage in hot weather, a revolving wheel of fire (旋火輪 \**alāta-cakra*)<sup>(98)</sup>, and Gandharva city (乾闥婆城 \**gandharva-nagara*). Although these are said to be perceived (現), they are not real (非真實).

Furthermore, because one does not clearly discern (明了) the [defining] features of something, one sees it erroneously (錯謬). For example, at night one sees [what is actually] trunk (杙)<sup>(99)</sup>, has doubt [as to whether it is trunk or a person] and says that it is a person (人). [Or,] when one presses a finger against the eye, one sees two moons.

If one obtains wisdom of emptiness (空智), it is said to be true perception (實見).

[1.2.2.7.2 Inference]

(25b8) 問曰。已知現相。比相云何。

答曰。前已分別、今當更說。比知有三。一曰前比、二曰後比、三曰同比。

前比者、如見小兒有六指頭上有瘡、後見長大聞提婆達、即便憶念本六指者、是今所見。是名前比。

後比者、如飲海水得其鹹味、知後水者皆悉同鹹。是名後比。

同比者、如即此人行至於彼、天上日月東出西沒、雖不見其動、而知必行。是名同比。

<sup>(95)</sup> BG: 'he might at once take it to be water'.

Cf. *Vigrahavyāvarttanā* vv. 13, 65 and ṛtti; NBh ad NSū 1.1.4, *grīṣme marīcayāḥ*, etc.

The definition of *upamāna* occurs at NSū 1.1.6.

BG: Here is the idea, as I understand it. Someone sees a mirage and takes it to be water. Then, later, he finds out that there are such things as mirages, which give the appearance of water. The next time he actually sees a mirage, he takes it, not for water, but for what it is, a mirage.

<sup>(96)</sup> BG: 'after he first (先) realizes the reason for his previous perception (現見), he grasps (得) the likeness (喻). Later, when he perceives (現見) it [again], he for the first time (始) recognizes (知) it for what it is [lit. knows the reality]'.

<sup>(97)</sup> Tucci suggests that some sentence seems to be missing here.

<sup>(98)</sup> Randle (*Indian Logic in the Early Schools*, 1930, p. 57, n.2) reports that the example 旋火輪 (*alāta-cakra*) is found to illustrate illusion in the *Laikāvtaāra-Sūtra* (1.41; 10.176; 10.443). He also reports that it is found, to illustrate a different point, in NSū 3.2.61. Faddegon (*The Vaiśeṣika-System*, 1918, p.65) also reports the example to be in *Gauḍapādīyakārikā*.

<sup>(99)</sup> Usual example for a doubt is 'post'(杙), not 'trunk/stump of a tree'(杙).

Question: We have learned what the [defining] features of perception (現相 \**pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa*) are, what are the [defining] features of inference (比相 \**anumāna-lakṣaṇa*)?

Answer: We analyzed (分別) it above. Now we should further explain it. Inference is of three kinds: [1] the first is inference with respect to [what has come] before (前比 \**pūrvavat*), [2] the second is inference with respect to [what will come] after (後比 \**śeṣavat*) and [3] the third is inference based on similarity (同比 \**sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*).<sup>(100)</sup>

[1] Inference with respect to [what has come] before (前比) is, for example, a case where one sees a child with six fingers and a boil on his head and later one sees an adult [with six fingers and a boil on his hear] and hears that he is Devadatta. Right then one recollects that the one who previously had six fingers is indeed the one being seen now<sup>(101)</sup>. This is said to be inference with respect to [what has come] before (前比).

[2] Inference with respect to [what will come] after (後比) is, for example, a case where one drinks sea water and tastes its saltiness and one knows that all water [one will drink from sea] later will be equally salty<sup>(102)</sup>. This is said to be inference with respect to [what will come] after (後比).

[3] Inference based on similarity (同比) is, for example, a case where a person here walks to a place there. In the sky, the sun and the moon rise in the east and set in the west. Even though he does not see them move, yet he knows that they must move<sup>(103)</sup>. This is said to be inference based on similarity (同比).

#### [1.2.2.7.3 Scriptural authority]

(25b18) 問曰。聞見云何。答曰。若見真實耆舊、長宿、諸佛菩薩、從諸賢聖聽受經法、能生知見、是名聞見。譬如良醫善知方藥、慈心教授、是名善聞。又諸賢聖證一切法、有大智慧。從其聞者、是名善聞。

Question: What is knowledge through listening (聞見 \**śruti*)?<sup>(104)</sup>

<sup>(100)</sup> This threefold temporal interpretation occurs in CS 1.11.21-2. NBh gives a threefold temporal interpretation to the three kinds of inferences mentioned in NS 1.1.5.

<sup>(101)</sup> HV 3.2.7: *kaumara-dṛṣṭena nimittena saḥ eva ayam iti vṛddham anumīnoti*. ‘One infers that an old man is the very same person through a mark of his seen in his youth’.

<sup>(102)</sup> BG: As noted by Tucci [1929: xviii], this compares to the inference that all grains are cooked from determining that some are cooked. This is found in Qing Mu(青目)’s 中論. Taisho vol. 30, p.24b: 如殘。名如炊飯一粒熟知餘者皆熟。Dharmakīrti gives this example and considers it an unsound inference (PV 1. 13 and its Svavṛtti).

<sup>(103)</sup> BG: This occurs in 百論. Tucci [1929: 29]: Having seen that a man first goes and then reaches (a place), since the moon and the sun rise in the east and disappear in the west, although their movements are not seen, because they reach another (place), they are known to possess motion. This is, in fact, an argument by analogy or similarity (*sāmānyataḥ*).

<sup>(104)</sup> Previously it was called 隨經書.

Answer: One who sees reliable (眞實 lit. true) elders (耆舊), senior disciples (長宿), Buddhas or bodhisattvas and hears from all the spiritually noble (賢聖 \*ārya) the instruction of scripture (經法) can attain knowledge. This is knowledge through listening (聞見).

For example, an able doctor who knows well how to prescribe medicine and is benevolent in his teachings (教授) is said to be learned (善聞 \**suśruta*; lit., to have listened well).

Furthermore, all the spiritually noble have corroborated (證) all the teachings (一切法) and have great wisdom. Those who follow what they have listened to are said to be learned (善聞).

[1.2.2.7.4 Analogy]

(25b22) 問曰。喻相云何。答曰。若一切法皆空寂滅、如幻、如化。想如野馬。行如芭蕉。貪欲之相如瘡如毒。是名爲喻。

Question: What are the [defining] features of analogy (喻 \**upamāna*)?<sup>(105)</sup>

Answer: For example, all things (一切法) are, in their entirety, empty and quiescent (空寂滅), like an illusion (幻), like magical creation (化). Perception (想 \**saṃjñā*) is like a mirage (野馬 \**marīcika*). Volitions (行 \**saṃskāra*) are like plantains (芭蕉).<sup>(106)</sup> The feature of covetousness (貪欲) is like [that of] an ulcer (瘡), like [that of] poison. (毒) Such are said to be [cases of] analogy (喻).<sup>(107)</sup>

(25b25) 如是四事名之爲因。能通達者、名爲知因。

These four things are said to be reasons/causes (因) [for knowledge]. Those who understand them are said to know [what] the reasons/causes [for knowledge] are.<sup>(108)</sup>

[1.2.2.8 Specious reasoning]<sup>(109)</sup>

(25b25) 問曰。何名似因。

答曰。凡似因者、是論法中之大過也。應當覺知而速捨離。如此似因我當宣說。似因隨相有無量義。略則唯八。一隨其言橫爲生過、二就同異而爲生過、三疑似因、四過時語、五曰類同、六曰說同、七名言異、八曰相違。

Question: What are said to be [the cases of] specious reasoning (似因 *hetvābhāsa*)?

<sup>(105)</sup> Previously it was called 喻知.

<sup>(106)</sup> Cf. Saṃyutta-nikāya 22.95: *pheraṇiṇḍūpamaṇ rūpaṇ, vedanā bubbuḷūpamā; marīcīkūpamā saññā, saṅkhārā kadalūpamā; māyūpamaṇ ca viññāṇaṇ, desitādiccabandhunā.*

<sup>(107)</sup> BG: These examples are not examples of analogy, but of similes. Warder [Outline of Indian Philosophy, Delhi, 1971, p. 140] says that *upamāna* here refers to the similes used in the Tripiṭaka.

<sup>(108)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 60], “Etwas wie diese vier Sachverhalte nent man Ursache. Wer dieses meistert, nennt man [einen], der die Ursache weiß.”

<sup>(109)</sup> NSū 1.2.4 lists five *hetvābhāsa*: *savyabhicāra*, *viruddha*, *prakaraṇa-sama*, *sādhya-sama*, *kāla-atīta*. CS 3.8.57 lists four *ahetu*: *prakaraṇa-sama*, *samśaya-sama* and *varṇya-sama* and discusses them.

Answer: Generally speaking, the cases of specious reasoning are the great transgressions of the teachings on debate (論法中之大過). They should be understood and quickly forsaken. I should now explain what these [cases of] specious reasoning are. Based on their features, their instances (義) are limitless. In brief, then, there are only eight: [1] first, the [case of] producing errors perversely through words (隨其言橫爲生過 \**vākchala?*); [2] second, the [case of] producing errors through similarity (就同異而爲生過 \**sāmānyachala?*); [3] third, the [case of] specious reason that produces doubt (疑似因 \**saṃśayahetu/saṃśayasama?*); [4] fourth, the [case of] stating [a reason] after one's time has elapsed (過時語 \**kālātīta*); [5] fifth, the [case of] similarity (類同, lit. similar kind, \**prakaraṇasama?*); [6] sixth, the [case of] saying the same thing (說同 \**varṇyasama?*); [7] seventh, the [case of] saying different things (說異 \**savyabhicāra?*), and [8] eighth, the [case of] being contradictory (相違 \**viruddha*).

[1.2.2.8.1 Producing errors through words]<sup>(110)</sup>

(25c03) 問曰。如此八法當廣分別。

答曰。言「那婆」者、凡有四名。一名新、二名九、三名非汝所有、四名不著。如有人言「我所服者、是那婆衣」。

難曰。今汝所著唯是一衣。云何言「九」

答曰。我言「那婆」乃新衣耳。非謂「九」也。

難曰。何名爲「新」。

答曰。以那婆毛作故名「新」。

問曰。實無量毛。云何而言「那婆毛」耶

答曰。我先已說「新名」。那婆非是數也。

難曰。今知此衣是汝所有。云何乃言「非我衣」乎

答曰。我言「新衣」。不言「此物非汝所有」。

難曰。今現見汝身著此衣。云何而言「不著衣」耶

答曰。我言「新衣」不言「不著」。

Question: You should analyze (分別) these eight things (八法) at length.

Answer: In uttering [the sound] 'nava' (那婆), altogether there are four words [one might have uttered]. [1] The first is [the word] 'new'(nava). [2] The second is [the word] 'nine'(nava). [3] The third is [the expression] 'not yours'(na vah). [4] The fourth is

<sup>(110)</sup> 隨語難・隨言難 is mentioned above as the eighth independent teaching/principle, not as a kind of *hetvābhāsa*.

NBh ad NSū 1.2.12 gives an example of ambiguity in the sentence 'nava-kambalo 'yaṃ māṇavakaḥ'.

[the expression] ‘not wearing’ (*na √vas*).<sup>(111)</sup> [Suppose,] for example, there is someone who says what I am wearing is nava clothing (那婆衣 \**navaḥ kambalaḥ*, meaning ‘new clothing’).<sup>(112)</sup>

Objection: Now what you are wearing is just one [item of] clothing. Why do you say nine (九 \**nava*) [items of clothing]?

Answer: When I said ‘nava’ (那婆) [I meant] only new clothing (新衣 \**navaḥ kambalaḥ*) and nothing else; I did not mean nine (九 \**nava*) [items of clothing].

Objection: What does ‘new’ (新 \**nava*) mean? [lit., what is said to be new?]

Answer: When one uses nava (那婆, i.e., new) [animal] hair (毛) to make something, it is called ‘new’ (新 \**nava*).

Question: In fact, the hair [of your clothing] is uncountable. Why do you say [it has] nava (那婆, i.e., nine) hairs?

Answer: I said the word ‘new’ (新 \**nava*) earlier. ‘Nava’ (那婆 new) is not a numeral.

Objection: I now realize (知) that this clothing is yours (衣是汝所有 \**vaḥ kambalaḥ*). Why do you nonetheless say that it is not your clothing (非我衣, lit., ‘not my clothing’, but \**na vaḥ kambalaḥ*)?

Answer: I said it is new clothing (新衣 \**navaḥ kambalaḥ*). I did not say it is not yours (非汝所有 \**na vaḥ*)?.

Objection: I now see (現見) that your body is wearing this clothing. [Yet,] why do you say you are not wearing (不著 \**na √vas*) clothing?

Answer: I said ‘new clothing’ (新衣 \**navaḥ kambalaḥ*); I did not say I was not wearing (不著 \**na √vas*) [any clothing].

(25c16) 是名似因。亦名隨言而爲生過。

又復隨言而生過者、如說「燒山」。難曰「實焚草木。云何燒山」。是名隨言生過。乃至諸法皆亦如是。

This [kind of argument] is said to be specious reasoning (似因). It is also said to be [a case of] producing errors through words (隨言而爲生過).<sup>(113)</sup>

Still another case of producing errors through words is the following: Suppose, for example, someone says “the mountain is burning”.

<sup>(111)</sup> The Sanskrit expression *nava* is susceptible of four different meanings. It can mean new, nine, not yours and not wearing.

<sup>(112)</sup> Cf. NSū 1.2.4 and 3.8.37.

<sup>(113)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 201], “Dieses nennt man Scheingrund. Auch nennt man ein [Bloß]-dem-Ausdruck-folgend-erzeugten-Fehler-Benennen, (d.h. einen Vorwurf des Fehlers mittels der absichtlichen falschen Interpretation des mehrdeutigen Ausdrucks).”

Objection: In fact, the grass and wood [and not the mountain] are burning. Why do you say “the mountain is burning”?

This is a case of producing errors through words. This is true of all things too (乃至諸法皆亦如是).<sup>(114)</sup> <sup>(115)</sup>

[1.2.2.8.2 Ambiguity/Equivocation?]

(25c19) 復次隨言生過。凡有二種。一如前說。

二於同異而爲生過。如言「有爲諸法皆空寂滅、猶如虛空」。

難曰「若爾二者皆是空無、無性之法、便同虛空」。如是名爲同異生過。

Next comes [another] case of producing errors through words (隨言生過). Altogether, there are two kinds [of producing errors through words]. [1] One is stated above. [2] The second is to produce errors (生過)<sup>(116)</sup> through similarity (同異).<sup>(117)</sup> (1) For example, someone says that all conditioned dharmas (有爲諸法) are, in their entirety, empty and quiescent (空寂滅), like space (虛空). Objection: if so, the two of them both [conditioned dharmas and space] are empty and non-existent (空無). A dharma (法) without a nature (無性 \*niḥsvabhāva) is then like space.

This is said to be [a case of] producing errors through similarity (同異生過).<sup>(118)</sup>

(25c24) 問曰。何故名生。

答曰。有故名生。如泥有瓶性、故得生瓶。

難曰。若泥有瓶性、泥即是瓶。不應假<sup>(119)</sup>於陶師輪繩和合而有。若泥是有故生瓶者、水亦是

有應當生瓶。若水是有不生瓶者、泥云何得獨生瓶耶。是名同異尋言生過。

(2) Question: How is something said to arise (生)?

<sup>(114)</sup> MS: ‘This holds of all such cases too.’

<sup>(115)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 201], “Wiederum der [Bloß]-dem-Ausdruck-folgend-erzeugte-Fehler ist wie [folgt] – [Einer] sagt, daß der Berg brennt. [Dann] äußert [der andere] eine Erwiderung; “In Wirklichkeit brennen die Bäume und Gräser. Warum sage [Sie, daß] der Berg brennt?” – Dieses nennt man den [Bloß]-dem-Ausdruck-folgend-entstandenen-Fehler. Oder alle Beschaffenheiten wie diese [nennt man so].”

Cf. NSū 1.2.14 (*upacārachala*), 2.2.60 (*upacāra*). ‘*māñcāḥ krośanti*’

<sup>(116)</sup> 生過 ‘producing an error’ might have been a translation of *prasaṅga-jāti*.

<sup>(117)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 201], “Von dem [Bloß]-dem-Ausdruck-folgend-entstandenen-Fehler gibt es wiederum zwei Arten. Die erste ist wie die vorher erwähnte. Die zweite ist das Bezüglich-des-Gleichseins-erzeugten-Fehler-Benennen (d.h. ein Vorwurf des Fehlers mittels zu weit gehender Verallgemeinerung der Bedeutung.)”

<sup>(118)</sup> BG: Perhaps the problem is that the word 空 has two meanings. In one sense, if something is empty (空), it is devoid of any objects. Space (虛空), on this sense, is empty when it contains no physical objects. In another sense, if a conditioned *dharma* (有爲法) is empty (空), then it is devoid of *svabhāva*.

<sup>(119)</sup> 假 seems to mean ‘to depend upon’ (依傍) according to the 國語辭典.

Answer: Because something exists [in its cause] (有故), it is said to arise (生). For example, [someone says that] because clay (泥) has the nature of a pot (有瓶性), clay manages to give rise to a pot (生瓶).

Objection: If clay has the nature of a pot (有瓶性), clay is nothing but (即是) a pot. There should be no need [for a pot] to depend on the assemblage (和合 \**sāmagrī*) of a potter, a wheel and a string to [come to] exist (有).<sup>(120)</sup>

If because clay has the [nature of a pot] (有故), it gives rise to a pot (生瓶), then water (水) too, having the [nature of a pot] (有), should (應當) give rise to a pot. If water, having the [nature of a pot] (有), does not give rise to a pot (不生瓶), then how does clay manage on its own to give rise to a pot (獨生瓶)?<sup>(121)</sup>

This is [a case of] producing an error by inquiring into similarity (同異尋言<sup>(122)</sup>生過).<sup>(123)</sup>

[1.2.2.8.3 Doubt producing]:

(26a1) 問曰。生疑似因其相云何答曰。如有樹机、似於人故、若夜見之、便作是念、机耶人耶。是則名爲生疑似因。

Question: What are the [defining] features of specious reasoning which produce doubt (生疑似因)?

<sup>(120)</sup> BG: ‘to depend on its convergence (和合 \**sāmagrī*) with a potter, a wheel and a string to [come to] exist.’

<sup>(121)</sup> SK: ‘If because clay exists (有故), it gives rise to a pot (生瓶), then water (水) too, being existent (有), should (應當) give rise to a pot. If water, being existent (有), does not give rise to a pot (不生瓶), then how does clay manage on its own to give rise to a pot (獨生瓶)?’

<sup>(122)</sup> BG: 尋言 The beginning of this section says 同異生過, the end of the section says 同異尋言. It is unclear why 尋言 has been added.

<sup>(123)</sup> BG: The argument is that clay manages to give rise to a pot because clay has the nature of a pot. The objection is a *reductio ad absurdum* through parity of reasoning. If a pot arises from clay because clay, being a causal factor in the arising of a pot, has the nature of a pot, then water, also a causal factor in the arising of a pot, should have the nature of a pot and thereby give rise to a pot. But this never happens. The objection seems perfectly sound.

MS: The dialectic here is puzzling. Typically the conversation goes like this: The *satkāryavādin* asserts that the pot exists in the clay. The opponent objects that in that case there should be no need for the assemblage of potter, wheel, etc. in order for the pot to become manifest. The *satkāryavādin* then replies that if pot and clay were not identical but instead distinct (as the *asatkāryavādin* opponent claims), then the clay would share this property of being distinct from pot with water, which is likewise distinct from pot. Yet pots are only produced from clay and not from water. Only identity, not distinctness, explains this difference between clay and water. So I suspect that the passage beginning with ‘If because clay has this [nature of a pot]...’ may actually be the reply of the *satkāryavādin*, and what belongs in square brackets is not ‘nature of a pot’ but ‘distinctness from pot’. Presumably the error here has to do with the claim that water and clay are sufficiently similar by virtue of their both being distinct from pot as to justify the *satkāryavādin*’s objection to *asatkāryavāda*.

Answer: For example, [suppose that] there is a tree trunk (樹机)<sup>(124)</sup> which resembles a man. Therefore, if someone [should] see it at night, then it [could] produce the thought (念): is it a trunk or is it a man?<sup>(125)</sup> This then is said to be [a case of] doubt producing specious reasoning (生疑似因).<sup>(126)</sup>

[1.2.2.8.4 Mistimed]

(26a3) 問曰。云何名爲過時似因。

答曰。如言「聲常。韋陀經典從聲出故。亦名爲常」。

難曰。汝今未立聲常因緣。云何便言「韋陀常」乎。

答曰。如虛空無形色故常。聲亦無形、是故爲常。言雖後說、義亦成就。

難曰。此語過時。如舍燒已盡、方以水救。汝亦如是。是名過時。

Question: What is mistimed (過時 \**kālātīta*)<sup>(127)</sup> specious reasoning?

(1) Answer: For example, someone states [the argument]: sound (聲)<sup>(128)</sup> is eternal; because the texts of the Vedas (韋陀經典) arise from sound, they too are said to be eternal.

Objection: now you have not established the reason (因緣) for sound being eternal. How can you then say that the Vedas are eternal?

(2) Answer: Just as space is eternal because it is without shape and color (無形色); because sound is also without shape (無形), it is eternal. Although these words (言) are said afterwards, the fact (義) [expressed by them] still is established.

Objection: The statement [that because sound too is without shape, it is eternal] came after the [proper] time. It is as if only after the house has been burned down that one brings water to help. You too are like this.<sup>(129)</sup>

(124) 机 was mentioned above.

(125) A common example for *saṃśayahetu* in Nyāya and Buddhism.

(126) BG: The expression 似因, like the Sanskrit term it translates, *hetvābhāsa*, indicates a semblance of reasoning, hence ‘specious reasoning’. Now, the previously listed *hetvābhāsa*, *vākchala*, is clearly a case of reasoning which is specious. However, the case of being in doubt about what something is is hardly a case of specious reasoning. What we have is something closer to a specious perception: it seems like a true perception, but it is not.

(127) Previously it was called 過時語.

(128) It is to be noted that the original Sanskrit word for 聲 is *śabda* that means both ‘sound’ and ‘word’.

(129) Cf. NBh on NSū 5.2.11: *avayavaviparyāsavacanam aprāptakālam*.

This is said to be [a case of being] mistimed (過時).<sup>(130)</sup>

[1.2.2.8.5 Similarity]<sup>(131)</sup>

(26a11) 問曰。類同云何。

答曰。我與身異、故我是常。如瓶異虛空、故瓶無常。是名類同。

難曰。若我異身而名常者、瓶亦異身、瓶應名爲常。若瓶異身猶無常者、我雖異身、云何常乎。是名同類。<sup>(132)</sup>

Question: What is [a bad argument on account of] similarity (類同\**prakaraṇasama*)?<sup>(133)</sup>

(1) Answer: [For example someone says:] Because the self (我\**ātman*) and body (身

<sup>(130)</sup> Cf. Kang [2007: 168,fn. 406], “Man fragt: was nennt man ein Scheingrund des verspätetseins? Antwortet man; [es ist] wie [folgendes. Ein Redner sagt]: “Der Ton is ewig. Da der Veda von dem Ton entstanden ist, ist der Veda auch ewig.” [Da] wendet [der Gegenredner] ein: “Du hast noch nicht die Ursache und Umstände für die Ewigkeit des Tones etabliert. Dann wozu noch weitere Rede über die Ewigkeit des Vedas?” [Da] erwidert [der Redner]: “Wie der leere Raum (d.h. Äther) ewig ist, weil es keine Gestalt hat, ist Der Ton auch ewig, weil er keine Gestalt hat. Obwohl es später geäußert wird, wird auch die [gezielte] Intention erreicht.” [Da] wendet [der Gegenredner nochmals] ein: “Diese Rede [begeht den Fehler des] Verpätetseins. Wie nachdem das Haus schon vollständig verbrannt ist, versucht man dann es mit Wasser zu retten. Du bist auch wie dieses [Beispiel].” Dieses nennt man Verspätetsein.”

<sup>(131)</sup> BG: I see the structure of 1.2.2.8.5 as follows. A question is asked and then an answer is given in terms of an example argument and an objection to it. In other words, it has this form:

Argument:

Pots and space are different and have different properties of non-eternality and eternity respectively.

The body and self are different and the body is non-eternal.

Therefore, the self is eternal

Objection:

The body and the self are different and have different properties of non-eternality and eternity respectively.

The body and the pot are different and the body is non-eternal. Therefore, the pot is eternal.

The second argument seems to be a *reductio ad absurdum* of the first argument through parity of reasoning.

As Tucci [1929: 16, note] observes, this example is given as a specious ground at CS 3.8.57. It has two arguments

Argument:

The soul is different from the body (which is non-eternal).

Therefore, the soul is eternal.

Objection:

The soul is different from the body.

The body is non-eternal and the soul must have the opposite property.

Therefore, the soul is eternal.

The argument seems to be an abbreviated form of the objection.

<sup>(132)</sup> Read 類同 (三本・宮本) instead of 同類 (大正).

<sup>(133)</sup> SK : The explanations of the following five items do not involve a specious reason; they are just wrong ways of argumentation.

\**śarīra*) are different, the self is eternal, just as, because a pot is different from space, the pot is non-eternal.<sup>(134)</sup>

This is said to be [a case of the specious reason that is based on] similarity (類同).<sup>(135)</sup>  
 (2) Objection: If the self is different from the body and is said to be eternal, the pot too is different from the body, and the pot should be said to be eternal. If the pot, being different from the body, is nonetheless non-eternal, then though the self is different from the body, why is it eternal?

This is said to be [a case of a bad argument on account of] similarity (類同).

[1.2.2.8.6 Saying the same thing]

(26a17) 問曰。說同云何。

答曰。如言「虚空是常、無有觸故。意識亦爾」。是名說同。

Question: What is [the case of a bad argument on account of] saying the same thing (說同 \**varṇyasama*)?

Answer: For example, someone says: space is eternal because it is not tangible (無有觸 \**asparśa*); mental awareness (意識 \**manovijñāna*) is also this way. [Therefore, it is eternal.]<sup>(136)</sup>

This is said to be [a case of a bad argument through] saying the same thing (說同).<sup>(137)</sup>

[1.2.2.8.7 Saying different things]

(26a19) 問曰。何名言異。

答曰。如言「五塵無常、爲根覺故。四大亦爾。是故無常」。難曰。龜毛鹽香是無所有、而爲意識所得、豈無常耶。是名言異。

Question: What is said to be [the case of a bad argument on account of] saying different (i.e., irrelevant) things (言異)?

Answer: For example, someone says that the five objects of the senses (五塵) are non-eternal because they are perceptible by the senses (根覺). The four great elements (四大) too are like this. Therefore, they are non-eternal.

Objection: The hair of a turtle and the smell of salt are non-existents (無所有 \**abhāva*). But they are grasped by mental awareness (意識). How could it be possible that they are

<sup>(134)</sup> Cf. CS 3.8.57: *anyaḥ śarīrād ātmā nityaḥ*.

<sup>(135)</sup> In both cases the similarity is 'difference'.

<sup>(136)</sup> Cf. CS 3.8.57: *asparśatvād buddhir anityā śabdavat*. This is a case of wrong analogy. Space and the mental awareness are the same in so far as they are both intangible; because space is eternal, the mental awareness is also eternal, which is absurd.

<sup>(137)</sup> SK & MS: 'saying that [different things] are the same'.

non-eternal?

This is said to be [a case of a bad argument on account of] saying different (i.e., irrelevant) things (言異).

[1.2.2.8.8 Contradiction]

(26a22) 問曰。相違云何。答曰。相違二種。一喻相違。二理相違。如言「我常、無形礙故、如牛」。是名喻違。理違者、如婆羅門統理王業、作屠獵等教。刹利種坐禪念定。是名理違。如此二法。愚者不解謂爲真實。是名相違。

Question: What is [the case of a bad argument on account of] contradiction (相違 \**viruddha*)?

Answer: There are two kinds. [1] One is where the example (喻) is contradicted [by fact]; [2] the other is where the reason (理)<sup>(138)</sup> is contradicted [by fact].

For example, [1] someone says that the self (我) is eternal because it has no shape and resistance (無形礙) like a bull. This is said to be [a case of] contradiction of the example (喻違).<sup>(139)</sup>

[2] The case of contradiction of the reason (理違) is where [someone says that] the brāhmaṇa (婆羅門) runs the affairs of state (統理王業) and teaches the slaughter and hunting [of animals], etc. (作屠獵等教)<sup>(140)</sup>, and [a person of] the kṣatriya caste (刹利種) sits and meditates (坐禪念定). This is said to be [a case of] contradiction of the reason (理違).

Dull-witted people do not understand these two things (二法) yet believe them to be true (真實). This is said to be [a case of a bad argument on account of] contradiction (相違).

(26a27) 問曰。何者名爲不相違耶。

答曰。異上二法名不相違。是名似因

Question: What is said to be non-contradiction (不相違)?

Answer: What is different from these two previous things (二法) is said to be [the case of]

<sup>(138)</sup> 理 is often a translation of *yukti*, but *yukti*, in the sense of reasoning, does not seem relevant here.

<sup>(139)</sup> Cf. *Vaidalyaprakāṣa* s. 46: \**nitya ātmā, amūrtatvāt, ākāśavat*.

<sup>(140)</sup> SK: ‘creates the teachings on the slaughter and hunting [of animals], etc.

non-contradiction (不相違). These are said to be specious reasons (似因).<sup>(141)</sup>

[The End of Chapter 1]

**keywords:** *Upāyahr̥daya*, Nāgārjuna, debate, proof

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<sup>(141)</sup> It is clear that, in the preceding discussion, *vākhala* is included among the *hetvābhāsa*, unlike what was indicated in the introduction. The preceding are examples of bad reasoning, that is, of statements which purport to be reasons but which in fact are not.