

Śāntarakṣita on *Satyadvaya* ⁽¹⁾

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1. The Division and Synthesis of the Mādhyamika School

The Mādhyamika school of Indian Buddhist philosophy advocates the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), that is, the absence of intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāva*) in all dharmas. By asserting that dharmas have no intrinsic nature because they always arise dependently (*pratītyasamutpanna*), Mādhyamikas stress that no entity has an absolute reality. This theory leads to the avoidance of dogmatic extremes such as belief in production and non-production, existence and non-existence, and eternalism and nihilism.

While the doctrine of emptiness remained at the core of Mādhyamika thought, over time two branches developed, which differed in their understanding of how to establish the reality of emptiness, in other words, to prove *paramārtha-satya*. Later Tibetans called them the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika. The names of these two branches appeared apparently for the first time in Tibetan Buddhist literature of the eleventh century, and not at all in Indian texts.⁽²⁾

With regard to the understanding of *saṃvṛti-satya*, on the other hand, the divisions arose by the eighth century. They are the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika.⁽³⁾ This division can be said to have resulted from the problem of whether or not the existence of external entities was to be affirmed from the viewpoint of *saṃvṛti-satya*. Śāntarakṣita (8th c.) and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika held the view that *saṃvṛti-satya* does not admit external reality, while Bhāviveka (5-6th c.) and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika held the opposite view. Both the

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(2) See Mimaki 1982: 45.

(3) MAP: *tshul gnyis zhes bya ba ni dbu ma dang mal 'byor spyod pa zhes bya'o* // (Ichigo 1985: 303.17)

Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika belonged to the Svātantrika branch of the Mādhyamika school.

The name of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika itself, which has yet to be discovered in Indian Buddhist literature, suggests to us a process of assimilation and synthesis of the Yogācāra school with the Mādhyamika school. Śāntarakṣita says in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (= MA):

v. 93 Therefore, those who hold the reins of logic while riding
the carriage of the two systems attain the stage of a true Mahāyānist. ⁽⁴⁾

On that verse his disciple Kamalaśīla (8th c.) comments that “the two systems” refers to the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra. ⁽⁵⁾

2. A Brief Explanation of the Central Tenet of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas

Before explaining the central tenet of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas in MA verse 92, Śāntarakṣita in verse 91 alludes to and criticizes the Satyākāra- and Alīkākāra-vāda of the Yogācāra school; however, his epistemological position is akin to that of the Alīkākāravādins.

v. 91 [The Satyākāravāda:] That which is cause and effect is nothing but knowledge.
[The Alīkākāravāda:] It is established that knowledge is that which is self-validated [without any substratum]. ⁽⁶⁾

v. 92 Based on [that standpoint of] mind-only, one must know the non-existence of external entities.

Based on this standpoint [of the lack of intrinsic nature of all *dharmas*], one must know that there is no self at all even in that [mind-only]. ⁽⁷⁾

The purport of these two verses can be understood by reference to the following verses in MA:

v. 64 One should understand that *saṃvṛti* is in essence (1) that which is agreeable and

⁽⁴⁾ MA v. 93:

*tshul gnyis shing rta zhon nas su // rigs pa'i sgrab skyogs 'ju byed pa //
de dag de phyir ji bzhin don // theg pa chen po pa nyid 'thob //* (Ichigo 1985: 302)

⁽⁵⁾ Kamalaśīla calls the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika school “the two paths of the Mādhyamika” (*dbu ma'i lam rnam pa gnyis dpyod par byed pa yin no //*). See Ichigo 1985: 291.6.

⁽⁶⁾ MA v. 91:

*rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yang // shes pa 'ba' zhig kho na ste //
rang gis grub pa gang yin pa // de ni shes par gnas pa yin //* (Ichigo 1985: 292)

⁽⁷⁾ MA v. 92:

*sems tsam la ni brten nas su // phyi rol dngos med shes par bya //
tshul 'dir brten nas de la yang // shin tu bdag med shes par bya //* (Ichigo 1985: 294)

tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (**avicāryaikaramaṇīya*), (2) that which is characterized by arising and decay and (3) whatever has causal efficacy.⁽⁸⁾

v. 65 Although agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as they are not investigated critically, similar successive effects are produced, conditioned by their own successive causes.⁽⁹⁾

v. 66 Therefore, it is also correct to say that it would be impossible for *saṃvṛti* to be causeless.

But if (you claim that) its fundamental cause (**upādāna*) is real, you have to explain what it is.⁽¹⁰⁾

Although all entities have in reality no intrinsic nature, that is, they are empty, they are understood to be characterized by *saṃvṛti-satya*. The three definitions of *saṃvṛti* in verse 64, among which the first seems characteristic of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, are captured in the expression "that which is cause and effect" in verse 91. It follows that, since Śāntarakṣita explains *saṃvṛti* as that which arises dependently, it is clear that it has a cause. The cause, as suggested in verse 65, is the individual series (*saṃtāna*) of consciousness arising from the beginningless past.⁽¹¹⁾ This idea is expressed in verse 91 as "nothing but knowledge," and in verse 92 as "based on [that standpoint of] mind-only one must know the non-existence of external entities." These verses thus attribute *saṃvṛti-satya* to mind-only. Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita proposes that even mind-only is without intrinsic nature or self. One should not cling to mind-only. This idea can be found in verses 66cd and 92cd in MA mentioned above.

Adopting Buddhist philosophical terminology, the central tenet of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas

⁽⁸⁾ MA v. 64:

*ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhing // skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa //
don byed pa dag nus rnam kyi // rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //* (Ichigo 1985: 202)

⁽⁹⁾ MA v. 65:

*brtags pa ma byas nyams dga' ba'ang // bdag rgyu snga ma snga ma la //
brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yi // 'bras bu de 'dra 'byung ba yin //* (Ichigo 1985: 210)

⁽¹⁰⁾ MA v. 66:

*de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med na // rung min zhes pa'ang legs pa yin //
gal te 'di yi nyer len pa // yang dag yin na de smros shig //* (Ichigo 1985: 210)

⁽¹¹⁾ Comments in brackets in this and the following verse are based on MAP ad MAV. Edited in Ichigo 1985: 301.11-21. LA X.592.

*phyi rol gyi rgyu dang rkyen rgyu'i mtshan nyid rnam pa lnga dang bdag po'i mtshan nyid rgyu log pas sems
tsam nyid du gnas pa ni rnam par rig pa tsam nyid kyi tshul la skye ba med pa gcig yin no //* (MAP 301.11-13)
*dbu ma pa'i lugs kyi skye ba med pa gang yin pa de bstan pa'i phyir phyi dngos med ces bya ba smos te / dngos
po rnam phyi rol gyi ngo bo nyid du med par ngas bshad do zhes bya bar sbyar ro // sems kyang yongs su gzung
ma yin zhes bya ba ni dngos po rnam sems kyi ngo bo nyid du med par ngas bshad do zhes bya bar sbyar ro //
ci'i phyir zhe na / lta ba thams cad spangs pa'i phyir te de ltar na dngos po la sogs par lta ba thams cad spangs
par 'gyur ro // de'i phyir dngos po rnam kyi skye ba med pa'i mtshan nyid ni de lta bu kho na yin no //* (MAP
301.14-21)

can be described by the following scheme, in which arrows indicate both conceptual equivalence and direction of religious progress:

$$tathya-saṃvṛti \rightarrow vijñaptimātra (svasaṃvedana) \rightarrow anātman$$

In other words, *saṃvṛti* is nothing but mind-only (*vijñaptimātra*) and has no intrinsic nature (*anātman*). The above scheme reflects Śāntarakṣita's interpretation and evaluation of the four major philosophical schools of Buddhism. He sees a gradual philosophical development from belief in the existence of external objects maintained by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, via the mind-only doctrine of the Yogācāra, to the Mādhyamika's emptiness, which he considers to be the ultimate stage.

The Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school evolved under the influence of Buddhist logic developed by Dignāga (5-6th c.) and Dharmakīrti (6-7th c.), refuted the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, and adopted the mind-only theory of the Yogācāra as a means (*upāya*) to attain *paramārtha-satya*. At the same time, the school consistently maintained and recognized as its fundamental position the Mādhyamika doctrine that all *dharmas* have no intrinsic nature.

Śāntarakṣita's philosophical position can be summarized in his interpretation of the concept of non-production (*anutpāda*). He first turns to the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (=LA) for the definition of non-production from the standpoints of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika and quotes the following two passages:

I maintain that non-production [in the doctrine of the Yogācāra school] means establishment of mind-only [by] the exclusion [of the rest of the five kinds of] causal conditions (*hetu-pratyaya*) and [by] the denial of cause (*kāraṇa*).⁽¹²⁾

Entities do not exist as external realities, nor are they objects contained in the mind. The abandonment of all views is the definition of non-production.⁽¹³⁾

⁽¹²⁾ Vid. the next note.

⁽¹³⁾ LA X.592:

*hetupratyayavyāvṛtīm kāraṇasya niṣedhanam /
cittamātravyavasthānam anutpādam vadāmi aham //*

LA X.595:

*na bāhyabhāvaṃ bhāvānāṃ na ca cittaparigraham /
sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇaṃ yat tad anutpādalakṣaṇam //*

LA X.592 in MAV:

*rgyu dang rkyen ni rnam log dang // rgyu yang nges par bkag pa dang //
sems tsam rnam par gzhas pa ni // skye ba med par ngas bstan to // (Ichigo 1985: 300)*

LA X.595 in MAV:

*dngos po rnam kyī phyi dngos med // sems kyang yongs su gzung ma yin //
lta ba thams cad spang ba'i phyir // skye ba med pa'i mtshan nyid do // (Ichigo 1985: 300)*

As these verses demonstrate, from the point of view of the Yogācāra school, non-production means the establishment of mind-only doctrine. In contrast, the Mādhyamika school defines it as abandonment not only of the intrinsic nature of internal and external entities but also of all views of Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. In this regard, it must be noted that the mind-only doctrine of the Yogācāra school is included in “all views.”

Next, by quoting two verses attributed to Nāgārjuna’s *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*, Śāntarakṣita traces his idea back to the founder of the Mādhyamika school:

Here, nothing is produced; nothing is annihilated, either. Appearance and disappearance take place only in our mind. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The four material elements (*mahābhūta*), etc., taught [by the Blessed One] are in fact reduced to consciousness. [But] since that [consciousness] is also refuted by [true] wisdom, is this [reduction] not a false conception? ⁽¹⁵⁾

The attribution of the two verses quoted here is a matter of controversy. According to our understanding, Śāntarakṣita seems to attribute both of these verses to the LA. Preceding these verses he quotes LA X.256-58 with the words *Lang kar gshegs pa las*, then with the word *yang* he quotes LA X.592 and 595. It is at this point that, with the words ‘*dir yang gsungs pa*, he quotes these two verses. The verses introduced by Śāntarakṣita with *yang* are identified in Kamalaśīla’s MAP as follows: *yang zhes bya ba ni ‘phags pa lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo de nyid las so*, that is, without question they are attributed to LA. The introduction ‘*dir yang gsungs pa* is commented upon by Kamalaśīla as follows: ‘*dir yang gsungs pa shes ba ni sems tsam kun rdzob tu smra ba’o // ‘phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las gsungs pa’i khungs*—(the *la* after ‘*phags pa* in Ichigo 1985: 303.2 is a misprint and should be deleted), thus attributing the verse to LA. The second of the two verses, however, Kamalaśīla attributes to Nāgārjuna: ‘*phags pa klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas gsungs pa’i tshigs su bcad pa gnyis pa*—, specifically the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*: ‘*di ni rigs drug cu pa las gsungs pa yin no*. The first verse seems to match almost exactly LA II .138-X.85. The verse reads

*na hy atropadyate kiṃcid pratyayair na nirudhyate /
utpadyante nirudhyante pratyayā eva kalpitāḥ //*

The second verse cannot be located in LA, but matches perfectly *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 34.

Cf. Mimaki 1982: n.458.

⁽¹⁴⁾ *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 21, quoted in MAV. Ichigo 1985: 302; JNA 488, 22-23; 545,3-5. The translation is from Kajiyama 1978: 132.

YṢ v. 21 in MAV:

*’di la skye ba ci yang med // ’gag par ’gyur ba ci yang med //
skye ba dang ni ’gag pa dag // shes pa ’ba’ zhig kho na’o // (Ichigo 1985: 302)*

YṢ v. 21 in JNA:

*dharmo notpadyate kaścīn nāpi kaścīn nirudhyate /
utpadyante nirudhyante partyayā eva kevalāḥ //*

⁽¹⁵⁾ YṢ v. 34 in MAV:

*’byung ba che la sogs bshad pa // rnam par shes su yang dag ’du //
de shes pas ni ’bral ’gyur na // log par rnam brtags ma yin nam // (Ichigo 1985: 302)*

YṢ v. 34 in JNA 405.1-2:

*mahābhūtādi vijñāne proktaṃ samavarudhyate /
taj jñāne vigamaṃ yāti nanu mithyā vikalpitam //*

These verses tell us that what appears and disappears is nothing but mind and that even the great elements taught by the Blessed One cannot be distinct from mind. The words “consciousness” (*viññāna*) and “true wisdom” (*jñāna*) in the second verse can be interpreted as referring to the knowledge of the Yogācāra and that of the Mādhyamika, respectively. This interpretation can be supported by reference to Ratnākaraśānti’s *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (=PPU), in which he defines “true wisdom” as knowledge completely free from error. He regards this “true wisdom” as superior to “consciousness.”⁽⁶⁾ Although the Yogācāra school was not established at the time of Nāgārjuna, the second of the two verses quoted above clearly criticizes the concept of mind-only. By quoting Nāgārjuna’s verses, Śāntarakṣita summarizes his position that *saṃvṛti-satya* is nothing but mind-only and that mind-only has no intrinsic nature. He affirms the Yogācāra doctrine of mind-only from the standpoint of *saṃvṛti-satya* but he criticizes it from that of *paramārtha-satya*.

Śāntarakṣita supports his position in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* (=MAV) by citing three famous verses from the tenth chapter of LA,⁽⁷⁾ which also indicates the development, as in MA verse 92, from belief in the existence of external objects, via the mind-only doctrine, to the stage that even mind-only has no intrinsic nature. Professor Yūichi Kajiyama examined Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of these verses as quoted in his *Bhāvanākrama* and analyzed the meaning of non-manifestation (*nirābhāsa*) into two stages, viz. the Alikākāravāda-Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. Thus he concluded that Kamalaśīla viewed the doctrinal development of Buddhist philosophy in the following five stages: (1) the Vaibhāṣika, (2) the Sautrāntika, (3) the Satyākāravāda-Yogācāra, (4) the Alikākāravāda-Yogācāra, and (5) the Mādhyamika.⁽⁸⁾

3. Similar Ideas Shared by Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra

Jñānagarbha (8th c.) is a pivotal figure in the development of the Mādhyamika school. In his *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti* (=SDVV), he holds that the Mādhyamika position of non-self is to be regarded as higher than the Yogācāra position of mind-only:

v. 32 [The Blessed One], whose self-nature is compassion, seeing [how people had been

⁽⁶⁾ PPU: *shin tu ma 'khrul pa'i ye shes* (D 143a4; P 162a2-3).

⁽⁷⁾ Comments in brackets in these verses are based on MAP ad MAV. Edited in Ichigo 1985: 297.5-301.9. LA X.256-58.

*cittamātraṃ samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet /
tathatālabane sthitvā cittamātraṃ atikramet //
cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet /
nirābhāsasthito yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati //
anābhogagatiḥ śāntā prañidhānair viśodhitā /
jñānam anātmakaṃ śreṣṭhaṃ nirābhāse na paśyati //*

⁽⁸⁾ Kajiyama 1978: 132-38.

bound by] the fetters of imagination by means of various types of [teachings] such as mind-only, preached bondage and liberation.

The Blessed One understands action and its fruits and has compassion as the intrinsic nature of his body. He, indeed, having seen people bound by the fetters of imagination in the prison of the cycle of birth and death, became completely free from attachment to entities by means of the progressive teachings — [offered] according to the mentalities [of his listeners] — of the *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*, mind-only and essenslessness of all dharmas, and preached to people about bondage and liberation. ⁽¹⁹⁾

He goes on to add that,

In [pure] knowledge as such, the intrinsic nature of [any] entities, [be they] atoms, non-duality [or the like], does not appear. Conventions (**vyavahāra*) do not apply to anything which does not appear. Although there is something which appears, there is nothing which is the intrinsic nature of an entity, because neither the assemblage [of atoms] nor the duality [of the grasped and the grasper] are the entity. ⁽²⁰⁾

Jñānagarbha's statements regarding the order of Buddhist teachings and the lack of intrinsic nature of that which appears remind us of Śāntarakṣita's position in MA v. 92 presented above. The following passages from Kamalaśīla's works could be added to bolster our interpretation:

The entrance to mind-only alone is not the entrance to the truth (*tattva*). ⁽²¹⁾

Only the entrance to non-dual knowledge is the entrance to the truth (*tattva*). ⁽²²⁾

One cannot understand all at once the lack of intrinsic nature of all dharmas. First, based on [the standpoint of] mind-only, one gradually understands the lack of intrinsic nature of external objects. Therefore, it is said [in LA X.154ab]:

Both the subject and the object are rejected by those who carry out a logical investigation.

⁽¹⁹⁾ SDVV:

*thugs rje'i bdag nyid de nyid kyis // rtog pas bcings pa gzigs nas ni //
sems tsam la sogs bye brag gis // bcings pa thar pa bstan pa mdzad //* (SDV v. 32)

bcom ldan 'das las dang 'bras bu mkhyen pa thugs rje'i rang bzhin gyi sku can de nyid kyis 'khor ba'i btson rar 'gro ba rtog pa'i lcags sgrog gis bcings pa la gzigs nas / bsam pa ji lta ba bzhin du phung po dang khams dang skye mched dang / sems tsam dang / chos thams cad bdag med par bstan pa'i rim gyis dngos por 'dzin pa ma lus par sel bar mdzad cing / 'gro ba la bcings pa dang thar pa bstan pa mdzad do // (Eckel 1987: 183.11-21 and 97.14-24)

⁽²⁰⁾ SDVV: *shes pa'i bdag nyid la ni rdul phra rab dag dang / gnyis su med pa'i dngos po'i ngo bo mi snang ngo // mi snang ba la ni tha snyad med do // snang ba gang yin pa de yang dngos po'i ngo bo kho na ma yin te / 'dus pa dang gnyis kyang dngos po ma yin pa'i phyir ro //* (Eckel 1987: 184.23-27 and 98.27-30)

⁽²¹⁾ IBhK 217.8: *na tu vijñaptimātratāpraveśa eva tattvapraveśaḥ.*

⁽²²⁾ IBhK 217.13-14: *advayajñānapraveśa eva tattvapraveśaḥ.*

Then, gradually, having examined that even that [mind] is without self, and follow the most profound path. ⁽²³⁾

In the following passage we can see that Haribhadra (9th c.) builds his view on those of his predecessors.

(1) After having established oneself on external objects by repudiating *ātman*, etc. in the first place, (2) one fixes [one's mind] on the understanding that the triple realm is mind-only, through the teaching of the imagined, dependent and perfect natures; (3) after that, one indicates the two *saṃvṛti-satyas* with the distinction between the real (*tathya*) and the unreal (*atathya*), being either capable or incapable of real causal efficacy, which are [defined as] what is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (*avicāraikaramya*) and what depends on its own successively preceding causes, (4) standing on *tathya-saṃvṛti*, like a magically created person one must practice giving and the rest according to [worldly] appearance (*yathādarśanam*), (5) and one must cultivate the ultimate non-production. In this manner one must penetrate into the Perfection of Wisdom. ⁽²⁴⁾

This passage clearly reflects the ideas adopted by Jñānagarbha and Śāntarakṣita: “the real and the unreal, being either capable or incapable of real causal efficacy” corresponds to verse 12 of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* (=SDV) that is to be quoted later and “what is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically and what depends on its own successive former causes” corresponds to MA verses 64 and 65.

In Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who are regarded as representatives of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, we see the culmination of the development of Mādhyamika philosophy after some six hundred years of evolution. The school was initiated by the pioneer Jñānagarbha and flourished at the time of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who were then succeeded by Haribhadra. As the preceding discussion shows, Śāntarakṣita's philosophical position can be traced back

⁽²³⁾ MĀ: 'di ltar gang zhig cig car chos ma lus pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rtogs par mi nus pa de re zhig sems tsam la brien nas / rim gyis phyi'i don ngo bo nyid med pa nyid la 'jug go // de nyid kyi phyir / rigs pas rnam par lta rnam kyi // gzung dang 'dzin pa 'gag par 'gyur // zhes gsungs so // de'i 'og tu rim gyis sems kyi ngo bo nyid la so sor rtog na / de yang bdag med pa nyid du khong du chud nas zab mo'i tshul la 'jug par 'gyur te / (D 157a3-4; P 170b8-171a1)

⁽²⁴⁾ AAA 594.18-25: *anupūrveṇeti ādāv ātmādinirākaraṇena bāhye'rthe pratiṣṭhāpya, paścāt kalpitaparatantrapari-niṣpannasvabhāvakathanena traidhātukacittamātrāvagame niyojya, tadanu samyagarthakriyāsu योग्याय योग्याय tathyātathyabhedena saṃvṛtisatyadvayam avicāraikaramyapūrvapūrvasvakāraṇādāhīnaṃ nirdiśya, tathyasaṃvṛtau sthitvā yathādarśanam māyāpuruṣeṇeva dānādy ācaritavyaṃ, paramārthato 'nutpādaś ca bhāvayitavyaḥ, ity evaṃ krameṇa prajñāpāramitāyām avatārayitavyaḥ.*

to Jñānagarbha; hence, Jñānagarbha should be recognized as the one who took the lead in establishing the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school. Jñānagarbha's position was not well defined and properly recognized in Tibetan *grub mtha'* texts, where he is variously identified as belonging to either the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika or the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, or sometimes even to the “**Lokaprasiddhavargacāri-mādhyamika*,” a line to which Candrakīrti also is sometimes assigned.⁽²⁵⁾

4. Śāntarakṣita's View of *saṃvṛti-satya*

Since the absence of an intrinsic nature in all *dharmas* tends to be understood by his opponents as nihilism, Śāntarakṣita counters them in MA as follows:

v. 63ab Therefore, understand all entities as being characterized only by *saṃvṛti*.⁽²⁶⁾

This assertion raises the question of how *saṃvṛti* is to be understood. Śāntarakṣita summarizes it in three ways: it is (1) not nothingness, (2) produced by causation, and (3) having the nature of mind and mental states (*citta-caitta*).

Kamalaśīla further expands Śāntarakṣita's idea by dividing *saṃvṛti* into two kinds: (a) mere verbal usage (*śabda-vyavahāra*) and (b) dependent origination or causal efficacy. Dependent origination or causal efficacy is well known even to a cowherd, and is that to which the word “convention” refers in common usage (*saṃketa*).⁽²⁷⁾ Kamalaśīla calls the first of those two kinds of *saṃvṛti* “*mithyā-saṃvṛti*” and the second “*tathya-saṃvṛti*”. They are explained as follows:

The term *tathya-saṃvṛti* is used because it designates accurately what is accepted [as real by the world]. *mithyā-saṃvṛti* refers to conceptual constructs — such as God, etc., — which have nothing to do with what is accepted [as real by the world].⁽²⁸⁾

When Śāntarakṣita uses the term *saṃvṛti*, he is referring only to *tathya-saṃvṛti*. He defines it in MA verse 64 quoted above and MAV as follows:

⁽²⁵⁾ Cf. Mimaki 1982: 28, n.52. The restoration into Skt. of ‘*Jig rten grags ste spyod pa'i dbu ma pa* is of Obermiller, but it is not certain.

⁽²⁶⁾ MA v. 63ab:

de phyir dngos po 'di dag ni // kun rdzob kho na'i mtshan nyid 'dzin // (Ichigo 1985: 196)

⁽²⁷⁾ MAP: *sgra'i tha snyad kyi bdag nyid kyi kun rdzob par 'dod dam / 'on te rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba don bya ba byed pa gnag rdzi yan chad la shin tu grags pa de nyid brda'i dbang gis kun rdzob kyi sgrar brjod ces bya ba rtog pa gnyis so //* (Ichigo 1985: 203.2-5)

⁽²⁸⁾ MAP: *yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ces bya ba ni ji ltar grags pa bzhin nye bar brtags pa'i phyir ro // grags pa las 'das te rtogs pa dper na dbang phyug la sogs par rtogs pa gang yin pa de ni log pa'i kun rdzob yin no //* (Ichigo 1985: 205.1-3)

This [type of] *saṃvṛti* is not mere verbal usage (**śabda-vyavahāra-mātra*). *Tathya-saṃvṛti* is the entities experienced and affirmed which arise dependently and which are not able to withstand any investigation. ⁽²⁹⁾

Śāntarakṣita then identifies this concept of *saṃvṛti* with the second line in Nāgārjuna's stanza that defines emptiness:

That which arises dependently we call emptiness. That [emptiness] is a dependent designation. Precisely that is the Middle Path. ⁽³⁰⁾

Thus, Śāntarakṣita regards *tathya-saṃvṛti* as a synonym for “a dependent designation” (*upādāya-prajñapti*). But he anticipates a possible objection. An opponent could argue that Śāntarakṣita's interpretation contradicts the definition of the two *satya* theory in the *Akṣayamati-nirdeśa-sūtra*, in which *saṃvṛti-satya* is defined as that which is explained by words, language and signs. The *sūtra* says:

What, then, is *saṃvṛti-satya*? It is (a) all the conventional designations of the world (**loka-vyavahāra*) and (b) (all) that is explained by words, language and signs. What is *paramārtha-satya*? It is the stage where there is no activity of mind, not to mention of words. ⁽³¹⁾

Śāntarakṣita relates his conception of *tathya-saṃvṛti* with the *sūtra*'s definition (a) but does not discuss the definition (b) in MAV. He interprets the definition (a) as follows:

The term ‘loka-vyavahāra’ in this [passage of the *Akṣayamatinirdeśa*] is meant to be the world consisting of sentient beings and that of imanimate beings in the manner of the in-

⁽²⁹⁾ MA v. 64:

*ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhing // skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa //
don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi // rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtogs //* (Ichigo 1985: 202)

MAV: *kun rdzob 'di ni sgra'i tha snyad tsam gyi bdag nyid ma yin gyi / mthong ba dang 'dod pa'i dngos po rten
cing 'brel par 'byung ba rnams ni brtag mi bzod pas yang dag pa'i kun rdzob ste /* (Ichigo 1985:204.1-3)

⁽³⁰⁾ MK XXIV.18, quoted in MAV(Ichigo 1985: 204.7-10).

*yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatām tāṃ pracakṣmahe /
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratīpat saiva madhyamā //
rten cing 'brel par gang 'byung ba // de ni stong pa nyid du bshad //
de ni rgyur byas gdags pa ste // de nyid dbu ma'i lam yin no //* (in MAV)

⁽³¹⁾ MAV: *de la kun rdzob kyi bden pa gang zhe na / 'jig rten gyi tha snyad ji snyed pa dang / yi ge dang skad dang
brda bstan pa dag go // don dam pa'i bden pa ni gang la sems kyi rgyu ba yang med na yi ge rnams lta ci smos.* (Ichigo 1985: 204.13-15)

The second half is found in Pras 374.2: *paramārthasatyaṃ katamat / yatra jñānasyāpy apracāraḥ kaḥ punar
vādo 'kṣarāṇām /*

trinsic natures of the experiencer and the experienced, for [the term ‘vyavahāra’] comprises an action noun (*bhāva-sādhana). It is not of the intrinsic nature of speech, for speech is performed by means of syllables. ⁽³²⁾

Therefore, the absence of intrinsic nature in all *dharmas* does not mean nothingness, since even this absence is characterized by *tathya-saṃvṛti* as defined above.

Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, considers mere verbal usage to be a form of *mithyā-saṃvṛti*. This means that he would term the sūtra’s second definition (b) of *saṃvṛti-satya* “*mithyā-saṃvṛti*.” Why is this aspect of linguistic usage excluded from *saṃvṛti-satya*? Kamalaśīla explains:

[**Mithyā-saṃvṛti*] does not agree with direct perception (**pratyakṣa*), etc. Thus ordinary verbal usage (**śabda-vyavahāra*) does not have as its domain the definition of things which arise dependently, since it has only the universal (**sāmānya*) as its domain. That universal, moreover, is nonexistent because its nature is imaginary (**parikalpita-svabhāva*). Therefore, to affirm its existence is to deny the well-established causal efficacy of entities, because the universal cannot possess causal efficacy (**arthakriyā-śakti*). ⁽³³⁾

Up to this point, the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika theory of *saṃvṛti-satya* can be understood as the logical development of Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika theories. When the question of the origin of the causal process arises, however, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla rely on Yogācāra doctrine. Since *saṃvṛti-satya* is explained by Śāntarakṣita as that which arises dependently or as dependent designation, it is clear that it has a cause. But what is the cause? If it has a cause only in the usual sense of the word, then it does not mean much to say that it has a cause. Śāntarakṣita therefore employs the Yogācāra concept of a beginningless series of causes or the karmic substratum, as he suggests in MA verses 65 and 66 mentioned above. Kamalaśīla explains:

In this connection, if it were established that it (*saṃvṛti*) only has a cause in the usual sense [of the word], then it would be a case of [the fallacy of] proving what has already been proved (**siddha-sādhana*), for we claim that the cause of *saṃvṛti* is a beginningless

⁽³²⁾ MAV: *sems can dang snod kyi bdag nyid kyi 'jig rten (=sattva-bhājana-ātmaka-loka) myong bar bya ba dang myong ba'i ngo bo'i tshul (svabhāva-vṛtti) 'dir (atra) 'jig rten gyi tha snyad (=loka-vyavahāra) du dgongs pa (=abhīpreta) ste / byed pa'i sgrub pa yongs su bzang ba'i phyir ro (=bhāva-sādhana-parigrahāt) // brjod pa'i ngo bo ni ma yin te / de ni yi ge la sogs pas brjod pa'i phyir ro //* (Ichigo 1985: 206.1-4) Cf. Hideyo Ogawa, Two Truths Theory: What is vyavahāra? Languages as a pointer to the truth, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (forthcoming).

⁽³³⁾ MAP: *gal te phyogs dang po lta bu yin na ni de'i tshes mngon sum la sogs pas gnod pa yin te / 'di ltar sgra'i tha snyad ni spyi tsam gyi spyod yul can yin pa'i phyir rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i dngos po'i mtshan nyid kyi yul can ma yin no / spyi de yang kun tu brtags pa'i ngo bo yin pa'i phyir dngos po med pa yin na de'i ngo bo nyid du khas len pas dngos po rnam kyi don bya ba byed pa shin tu grags pa la skur par 'gyur te / spyi ni don byed mi bzod pa'i phyir ro //* (Ichigo 1985: 203.6-12)

[series of] successive causes. ⁽³⁴⁾

Thus, the school identifies the cause with the individual series (*saṃtāna*) of moments of consciousness, which exists since the beginningless past. In the ultimate sense such a cause is unreal. Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita proceeds to explain that *saṃvṛti-satya* is nothing but mind-only. He says in MAV ad. MA v. 91 mentioned above:

One cannot conceive of the nature of knowledge as something other than a self-validated nature. Even this self-validated nature is just like the form of a dream, an illusion, etc. ⁽³⁵⁾

This or a similar explanation may, in fact, be the basis for proposing the name Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. ⁽³⁶⁾ Indeed, Śāntarakṣita explains that the bifurcation of the Mādhyamika school into the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika was a result of differing views concerning the characteristics of *saṃvṛti-satya*. ⁽³⁷⁾

5. Bhāviveka's View of Conventional *Tathya-saṃvṛti*

Bhāviveka, regarded as the founder of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, maintains that *tathya-saṃvṛti* admits the reality of external entities. He interprets a passage of scripture quoted below, which asserts that the triple world is nothing but mind-only, as merely a critique of “self.”

O, Sons of the Conqueror. Furthermore, it is understood that the triple realm is mind-only. Even the three times [past, present and future] are understood to be similar to mind. That which is mind also is understood to be without extremes and middle. ⁽³⁸⁾

Prof. Kajiyama aptly summarized Śāntarakṣita's comments on Bhāviveka's views as follows:

⁽³⁴⁾ MAP: *de la gal te spyir rgyu dang bcas pa tsam du sgrub par byed na ni de'i tshe grub pa bsgrub pa yin te / kun rdzob pa'i rgyu snga ma snga ma thog ma med par 'dod pa'i phyir ro /* (Ichigo1985: 211.7-9)

⁽³⁵⁾ MA v. 91:

*rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur ba yang // shes pa 'ba' zhig kho na ste //
rang gis grub pa gang yin pa // de ni shes par gnas pa yin //*

MAV: *rang gis grub pa'i ngo bo bor nas shes pa'i ngo bo gzan rtog pa med do // rang gis grub pa'i rang bzhin yang rmi lam dang sgyu ma la sogs pa'i gzugs bzhin no //* (Ichigo 1985: 292.2-8)

⁽³⁶⁾ The name of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika was used for the first time by Ye shes sde. See Mimaki 1982: 40.

⁽³⁷⁾ MAV: *gang dag gis rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por dam bcas pas rgol ba ngan pa thams cad kyi lan btob par 'dod pa'i kun rdzob kyi dngos po de dag gang yin pa de dpyad par bya'o / ci sems dang sems las byung ba tsam gyi bdag nyid kho na'am / ci'i phyi'i bdag nyid kyang yin zhe na /* (Ichigo 1985: 290.14-17)

⁽³⁸⁾ *Lokottaraparivarta*: D 178b4-5, P 179b8-180a1, Taisho No. 278, 642a14-15, No. 279, 288c5-6. Cited in IBhK: *punar aparāṃ, bho jinaputra, cittamātraṃ traidhātukam avatarati, tac ca cittam anantamadhyatayāvatarati.* (Tucci 1958: 217)

MAV: *kye rgyal ba'i sras dag gzan yang khams gsum pa ni sems tsam du rtogs te / dus gsum yang sems dang mtshungs par rtogs so // sems de yang mtha' dang dbus med par khong du chud do.* (Ichigo 1985: 296.2-5)

The Buddhas have taught the theory of mind to repudiate the existence of a soul which is conjured up by non-Buddhist philosophers as the subject of actions (*karṭṛ*) and the enjoyer of their fruits (*bhoktr*). This opinion of [the Sautrāntika-] Mādhyamika is tantamount to saying that external things can be as real as the mind insofar as conventional truth is concerned, although the soul must be denied. ⁽³⁹⁾

Śāntarakṣita himself, on the other hand, does not admit the existence of an object external to the mind. He maintains instead that *saṃvṛti* has only the nature of mind and mental states (*citta-caitta*). ⁽⁴⁰⁾

Another instance of Śāntarakṣita's disagreement with Bhāviveka regarding the characteristics of *saṃvṛti-satya* is found in his usage of the term *tathya-saṃvṛti*. Emptiness or the absence of intrinsic nature of all *dharmas* can be understood from the point of view of *paramārtha-satya* as an awareness which goes beyond verbal usage. But, if one must verbally express emptiness in order to lead sentient beings to this awareness, one can only refer to it as "non-production." Śāntarakṣita says in MA:

v. 69 Therefore, there is no entity that can be established in reality.

Therefore, the Tathāgatas preached the non-production (**anutpāda*) of all *dharmas*. ⁽⁴¹⁾

However, adopting the doctrine that the Blessed One had preached the absence of intrinsic nature of all *dharmas* as non-production posed new problems to Buddhist exegesis. In other words, the attempt to explain or to conceptualize the truth of emptiness, which Śāntarakṣita argues goes beyond all verbal usage, raises other questions: (1) If the statement of the Blessed One should be regarded as *paramārtha-satya*, is the teaching of non-production itself the *paramārtha-satya* or not? (2) If the idea of non-production, which should imply the absence of an intrinsic nature in all *dharmas*, is understood as the negation of production, is that *paramārtha-satya* or not?

Śāntarakṣita's solution clearly shows that non-production both as a teaching and as a negation is only *saṃvṛti-satya*, not *paramārtha-satya*. With regard to the question (1) Śāntarakṣita states:

Although non-production, etc., are also implied in *tathya-saṃvṛti*,

⁽³⁹⁾ Kajiyama 1978: 131.14-20. Śāntarakṣita quotes MH V.28cd in his discussion. MH V.28cd in MAV: *bstan bcos las sems tsam mo zhes gsungs pa ni byed pa po dang za ba po dgag pa'i phyir ro* (Ichigo 1985: 290.19-20). *sāstr'eva* (sic! Read *sāstre ca?*) *cittamātroktiḥ karṭṛ-bhoktr-ṇiṣedhitah* / (Mimaki 1982: 460)

⁽⁴⁰⁾ MAV: *ci sems dang sems las byung ba tsam gyi bdag nyid kho na'am* / (Ichigo 1985: 290.15-16)

⁽⁴¹⁾ MA v. 69:

de phyir yang dag nyid du na // dngos po gang yang grub pa med //

de phyir de bzhin gshegs rnam kyis // chos rnam thams cad ma skyes gsungs // (Ichigo 1985: 222)

v. 70 Some say that this [non-production] is *paramārtha[-satya]*, since it agrees with *paramārtha*. [But in my view] it [i.e. *paramārtha*] is that which is completely free from all accumulations of fictional human ideas (**prapañca*).

Paramārtha[-satya] is that which cuts off the net of all accumulations of fictional human ideas such as existence and non-existence, production and non-production, emptiness and non-emptiness, etc. ⁽⁴²⁾

6. Difference over the Concept of *Tathya-saṃvṛti* between Śāntarakṣita and Bhāviveka

Thus, when Śāntarakṣita uses the term “*paramārtha*,” he is referring only to that which is not susceptible to explanation; language, therefore, is completely excluded. So, even the teaching of non-production by the Blessed One is regarded as only *tathya-saṃvṛti*.

Śāntarakṣita’s reason for referring to this problem here in MA seems to be that Bhāviveka classified the teaching of the non-production as *paramārtha-satya*. Bhāviveka divides *paramārtha-satya* into two types, viz. *pāramārthika-paramārtha-satya* and *sāṃketika-paramārtha-satya*, according to the terminology used in Avalokitavrata’s *Prajñāpradīpa-tīkā*. ⁽⁴³⁾ In Bhāviveka’s *Tarkajvālā*, the first of those two types of *paramārtha-satya* is called “that which is attained without conscious effort” (*mngon par ‘du byed pa med par ‘jug pa*) and the second “that which is attained by conscious effort” (*mngon par ‘du byed pa dang bcas par ‘jug pa*). ⁽⁴⁴⁾

Bhāviveka, furthermore, understands that the first ‘ultimate’ type of *paramārtha-satya* is expressed in Nāgārjuna’s MK XVIII.9 and the second ‘conventional’ type in MK XVIII. 10. He further divides the second type into three levels: (1) non-conceptual knowledge, (2) the teaching of non-production, and (3) wisdom obtained by learning, investigation and meditation. Bhāviveka regards the teaching of non-production as an excellent means to attain non-conceptual knowledge.

But for the ladder of *saṃvṛti-satya*, the learned man would not be able to mount the top of the palace of [*paramārtha-*]satya. ⁽⁴⁵⁾

⁽⁴²⁾ MAV: *skye ba med pa la sogs pa yang yang dag pa’i kun rdzob tu gtogs pa yin du zin kyang / dam pa’i don dang mthun pa’i phyir // ‘di ni dam pa’i don zhes bya // yang dag tu na spros pa yi // tshogs rnams kun las de grol yin //* (MV v. 70)

don dam pa ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa dang / skye ba dang mi skye ba dang / stong pa dang mi stong pa la sogs pa spros pa’i dra ba mtha’ dag spangs pa’o // (Ichigo 1985: 230.2-232.1)

⁽⁴³⁾ Ppra-tīkā (D Za236a4-b2, 236b2-7; P 282a4-b2, 282b2-8). See Nozawa 1953: 18-38, Ejima 1980: 24-25.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ MHV (D60b4-5; P64a7-8).

⁽⁴⁵⁾ MH III.12 (between 11 and 12), cited in AAA 169.19-20; MAV.

tathyasamvṛtisopānam antareṇa vipaścitaḥ /

tattvaprāsādaśikharārohaṇaṃ na hi yujyate // (cited in AAA, Ejima 1980: 271)

However, as long as the second level of the ‘conventional’ *paramārtha-satya* (i.e., the teaching of non-production) depends on the twelve bases (*āyatana*) of cognition,⁽⁴⁶⁾ it cannot be denied that essentially it belongs to the category of *saṃvṛti*. Although Bhāviveka applies the term “*tathya-saṃvṛti*” to the second level of *paramārtha-satya*, he no doubt evaluates it highly since he considers it to be a means which leads to the first level of *paramārtha-satya* (i.e. non-conceptual knowledge). This implies that Bhāviveka considered the teaching of non-production, distinct from general verbal convention, to be something belonging to *paramārtha-satya*. This position created the opportunity for Bhāviveka’s successors to criticize him. In setting the first level of *paramārtha-satya* beyond the second level, Bhāviveka seemed to think that, even having affirmed “production” as worldly verbal convention, “non-production” could be established on the level of *paramārtha-satya*.

7. Jñānagarbha’s View of the Concept of *Anutpāda*

Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and others pointed out that Bhāviveka’s position is inconsistent with Nāgārjuna’s idea that the *paramārtha-satya* cannot be taught without relying on verbal convention (*vyavahāra*).⁽⁴⁷⁾ In SDV and its commentary SDVV, Jñānagarbha says:

v. 9ab Negation of production, etc., is also (*api*) postulated [as *paramārthasatya*], since it agrees with reality.

The reason is that it negates that entity which is imagined as real production, etc. We postulate [this negation] as *paramārtha[satya]*, since the other [school, Yogācāra] understands [it] as nothing but reality. The word “also (*api*)” has a cumulative [qualifying] meaning.

However, when it is investigated by reason [the negation of production is] nothing but *saṃvṛti[satya]*. If asked the reason why, [we reply]:

v. 9cd Because of the non-existence of the object to be negated, it is clear there is in reality no negation.

For negation does not take place if there is no object to be negated, and it is not reasonable to negate that which has no object. If [someone objects that] the object to be negated is that

yang dag kun rdzob rnam kyī skas // med par yang dag khang pa yi //
steng du 'gro bar bya ba ni // mkhas la rung ba ma yin no // (Ichigo 1985: 232.4-7)

⁽⁴⁶⁾ MH III.9:

byams dang snying rje che bsgom dang // sems can sdud dang smin byed dang //
skye mched bcu gnyis brten pa yi // shes rab brdar btags shes par bya // (Ejima 1980: 271)

⁽⁴⁷⁾ MK XXIV.10ab: *vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate /*

which is imagined by [our] opponents to be real — such as the production of form and the rest — which are [merely ideas] caused by conceptualization, then:

v. 10ab How could the negation of the imagined nature be the non-imagined [nature]? Since the object to be negated is only the imagined [nature], the negation [of it] will also be the imagined nature, just like the negation of the darkness [of complexion] and so forth of the son of a barren woman. Even though there is no negation of real [production, etc.], there is no existence of production, etc., since non-production, etc., is not pervaded by the negation [of production, etc.], and there is no evidence to prove the existence of the latter (i.e., production, etc.).

10c Therefore, this is **saṃvṛti[satya]*.

“This” refers to the absence of real production, etc.

v. 10d [It is] neither **paramārtha[satya]* nor real.⁽⁴⁸⁾

Production, etc. which are the objects of the negation are not real, for they are imagined. Since there is no real object to be negated, it is logically unreasonable to negate it. The negation of the imagined entity is itself nothing but imagination. Therefore, it is correct to say that the negation of production, etc., belongs to *saṃvṛti-satya*, not to *paramārtha-satya*.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ SDVV:

skye la sogs pa bkag pa yang // (SDV 9a)
yang dag par skye ba la sogs par rtog pa'i dngos po bkag pa'i gtan tshigs kyis /
yang dag pa dang mthun phyir 'dod // (SDV 9b)
don dam pa yin par kho bo cag 'dod do // gzhan dag ni yang dag pa kho nar 'dzin pas / yang zhes bya ba ni bsdu
ba'i don to //
de yang rigs pas dpyad na kun rdzob kho na ste / ci'i phyir zhe na /
dgag bya yod pa ma yin pas // yang dag tu na bkag med gsal // (SDV 9cd)^()*
dgag bya med na bkag pa mi 'byung ba'i phyir te / yul med pa'i bkag pa mi rigs pa'i phyir ro //
gal te gzugs la sogs pa la skye ba la sogs par rnam par rtog pa'i rgyu can pha rol pos dngos po yang dag pa nyid
du brtags pa gang yin pa de dgag bya nyid yin no zhe na / gal te de lta na /
brtags pa'i rang gi ngo bo yi // bkag pa brtags min ji ltar 'gyur // (SDV 10ab)
dgag bya brtags pa yin du zin na / bkag pa yang brtags pa nyid du 'gyur te / mo gsham gyi bu'i sngo bsangs nyid la
sogs pa bkag pa bzhin no // yang dag pa bkag pa med kyang skye ba la sogs pa yod par mi 'gyur te / bkag pas skye
ba med pa la sogs pa la ma khyab pa'i phyir dang / de yod pa'i rigs pa med pa'i yang phyir ro //
de bas 'di ni kun rdzob ste // (SDV 10c)

yang dag par na skye ba med ces bya ba la sogs pa'o //

*yang dag don yin yang dag min // (SDV 10d)^(**) (Eckel 1987: 161.3-28 and 76-77)*

^(*) Cited in AAA 45.6: *niṣedhyābhāvataḥ spaṣṭaṃ na niṣedho 'sti tattvataḥ*.

^(**) For v. 10d text runs: *yang dag don yin yang dag min*, but according to Mimaki 1982: 4: *yang dag don min yang dag min*, which I follow.

8. Śāntarakṣita's View of the Concept of *Anutpāda*

Jñānagarbha's view reminds us of that discussed by Śāntarakṣita in MA:

v. 71 Since there is no production and the like, there can be no non-production and the like. Since that [production] has been rejected as the substantial referent [of verbal expression], there can be no verbal expression with reference to [non-production].

v. 72 The negative particle (*nañ*) cannot be rightly applied without its referent (*nirviṣaya*). Or if [it were applied] depending on conceptual construction (*vikalpa*), it would be conventional (*sāmvṛta*), not real.

If there is no production, etc., it is impossible to apply words to explain it. Therefore, because what is objectless is negated, there can be no non-production, etc., for there is not even production. ⁽⁴⁹⁾

In other words, Śāntarakṣita asserts that because “production” has been repeatedly negated, there can be no “non-production.” Since “production” does not exist, it is not appropriate to apply a negative particle *nañ* or “non-” to “production” which does not exist. If “non-production” arises depending on conceptual construction (*vikalpa*), it is nothing but *samvṛti-satya*.

Kamalaśīla comments on “non-production” as follows:

“Non-production, etc.,” means the conceptualization (**vikalpa*) of non-production, etc., or the determination of the nature of entities by [such] conceptualization. The word “etc.” includes cessation, final peace and so on. ⁽⁵⁰⁾

As these comments suggest, for Śāntarakṣita “non-production” is a conceptual construct. Sim-

⁽⁴⁹⁾ MAV:

*skye ba la sogs med pa'i phyir // skye ba med la sogs mi srid //
de yi ngo bo bkag pa'i phyir // de yi tshig gi sgra mi srid // (MA v. 71)
yul med pa la dgag pa yi // sbyor ba legs pa yod ma yin //
rnam par rtog la brten na yang // kun rdzob par 'gyur yang dag min // (MA v. 72)*

skye ba la sogs med na de rjod pa'i sgra'i sbyor ba mi 'thad do // de bas na yul med pa la dgag pa'i phyir skye ba yang med pas skye ba med pa la sogs pa mi srid do // (Ichigo 1985: 234.2-236.3)

MV 72 is cited in AAA.

*na ca nirviṣayaḥ sādhuḥ prayogo vidyate nañāḥ
vikalpāpāśrayatve vā sāmvṛtaḥ syān na tātvikāḥ (AAA 45.7-8, 838.17-18)*

⁽⁵⁰⁾ MAP: *skye ba med pa la sogs par rnam par rtog pa dang / rnam par rtog pas dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo rnam par gzhag pa ni skye ba med pa la sogs pa'o // sogs pa'i sgras ni 'gog pa dang zhi ba la sogs pa bsdu'o // (Ichigo 1985:233.1-3)*

ilarly, non-production originally refers to the absence of intrinsic nature; therefore one cannot determine its intrinsic nature. Non-production does not satisfy the definition of *paramārtha-satya* which is free from the net of fictional human ideas (*prapañca*). Since production and non-production and existence and non-existence are nothing but fictions created by the human mind, they are relative concepts depending only on ideas. Śāntarakṣita's observations on *saṃvṛti-satya* seem to derive from experience of meditation. He penetrates into the nature of our ordinary world on the basis of his profound religious insight. For Śāntarakṣita, in sum, our everyday world of *saṃvṛti-satya* is that which arises dependently, that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically, and that which has the nature of mind and mental states arising from the individual series of consciousness since the beginningless past.

9. Jñānagarbha's View of *Saṃvṛti-satya*

Since Śāntarakṣita's idea of *saṃvṛti-satya* seems very much in accordance with that of Jñānagarbha, in what follows I translate with some comments of my own the key passages concerning *saṃvṛti-satya* from Jñānagarbha's SDV and SDVV. First, he defines the two *satyas* as follows:

v. 3 Between the two *satyas*, conventional (**saṃvṛti*) and ultimate (**paramārtha*), which are preached by the Sage, only that which is as it appears (*ji ltar snang ba*) is **saṃvṛti*; otherwise it is the other (i.e. *paramārtha*).⁽⁵¹⁾

The commentary explains:

[“The other”] means *paramārtha-satya*. *Saṃvṛti-satya* is ascertained in accordance with the experience of [ordinary] people including a female cowherd, etc. But it is not [ascertained] in reality, because the meaning of an entity is determined [only] in accordance with experience.⁽⁵²⁾

Subsequently he explains *saṃvṛti-satya* as follows:

If asked what is so-called *saṃvṛti*, we reply:

⁽⁵¹⁾ SDV v. 3:

*kun rdzob dang ni dam pa'i don // bden gnyis thub pas gsungs pa la //
ji ltar snang ba 'di kho na // kun rdzob gzhan ni cig shos yin //* (Eckel 1987: 156.1-5 and 70-71)

⁽⁵²⁾ SDVV: *don dam pa'i bden pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go // ji ltar ba lang rdzi mo la sogs pa yan chad kyis mthong ba de ltar kun rdzob tu bden pa rnam par gnas kyi yang dag par ni ma yin te / mthong ba dang mthun par dngos po'i don nges par 'dzin pa'i phyir ro /* (Eckel 1987: 156.6-9 and 71)

v. 15ab It is maintained that *saṃvṛti* is *tha* which covers reality or that in which it is covered.

The concealment of the reality by or in one's mind, [and the affirmation of] what is thus generally accepted [to be real] by the world, is maintained to be *saṃvṛti*. In a *sūtra* (LA X.429) it is said:

Entities arise from the point of view of *saṃvṛti*. From the point of view of *paramārtha*, they have no intrinsic nature. Error with respect to the absence of an intrinsic nature is postulated as *tathya-saṃvṛti*.

v. 15cd Therefore, [from the point of view of *saṃvṛti*] all these are real. From the point of view of *paramārtha* they are not real.

All these things are real from the point of view of *saṃvṛti*. This means that they are real [only] in the sense generally accepted by the world.⁽⁵³⁾

Moreover, Jñānagarbha explains:

v. 21ab This [*saṃvṛti-satya*] is not to be investigated critically because its nature [exists] as it appears.⁽⁵⁴⁾

We find this developed in Śāntarakṣita's sub-commentary on this half-verse, which states:

“Because its nature [exists] as it appears” means [that it has a nature] which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically. As for this *saṃvṛti[-satya]*, it is not to be investigated, or not to be examined.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Further on in SDV Jñānagarbha adds:

v. 28 The phenomenon which appears is never rejected. It is not reasonable to reject

⁽⁵³⁾ SDVV: *ci ste kun rdzob ces bya ba 'di ci zhig yin zhe na //*

gang zhig gis sam gang zhig la // yang dag sgrib byed kun rdzob bzhed // (SDV 15ab)

blo gang zhig gis sam blo gang zhig la yod na yang dag pa sgrib par byed pa 'jig rten na grags pa de lta bu ni kun rdzob tu bzhed de / mdo las ji skad du /

dngos mams skye ba kun rdzob tu // dam pa'i don du rang bzhin med //

rang bzhin med la 'khrul pa gang // de ni yang dag kun rdzob 'dod //

ces gsungs pa lta bu'o //

des na 'di kun bden pa ste // dam pa'i don du bden ma yin // (SDV v. 15cd)

kun rdzob des na 'di kun thams cad bden pa yin no // ji ltar 'jig rten na grags pa de ltar bden no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste / (Eckel 1987: 170.30-171.14 and 85)

⁽⁵⁴⁾ SDV v. 21ab: *ji ltar snang bzhin ngo bo'i phyir // 'di la dpyad pa mi 'jug go //* (Eckel 1987: 175.7-8 and 89)

⁽⁵⁵⁾ SDVP: *ji ltar snang bzhin ngo bo'i phyir // zhes bya ba ni / ma brtags na nyams dga' ba yin pa'i phyir ro // kun rdzob 'di la dpyad pa ste // brtag pa mi 'jug go //* (D 38b6; P31a7)

anything which is experienced.⁵⁶

As the preceding passages suggest, Śāntarakṣita owes one of his definitions of *saṃvṛti-satya* (i.e., *avicāraikaramaṇīya*, in MA 64) to Jñānagarbha's basic idea of *saṃvṛti-satya* "as it appears."

This being the nature of *saṃvṛti-satya*, should we then also regard as *saṃvṛti-satya* the double moon that appears to those who have defective vision? Partly, in response to this issue, Jñānagarbha distinguishes two types of *saṃvṛti*, namely real and unreal *saṃvṛti*. These correspond to the classification of Kamalaśīla discussed above. The criteria for Jñānagarbha's classification are two: (1) whether or not it is of the nature of imagination (*parikalpita-svabhāva*), and (2) whether or not it has causal efficacy (*arthakriyā*). Thus, *tathya-saṃvṛti* is defined as that which is not of the nature of imagination and which has causal efficacy. This definition furthermore corresponds to Śāntarakṣita's own in MA 64.

Jñānagarbha refines his position as follows:

Saṃvṛti is divided into two kinds by the fact that it is real or unreal.

v. 8 A bare entity devoid of the imagined object and co-arising dependently is known as real *saṃvṛti*. Unreal [*saṃvṛti*] is the imagined [object].

"The imagined object" implies "production [and duration] etc.," "the appearance of [ideas in] knowledge" and "the transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the predominant cause (*pradhāna*) and the gross elements (*bhūta*)" [which are postulated as] real [by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools] and so forth. [*Tathya-saṃvṛti-satya* is] that which is devoid of these. Something is a bare entity because its causal efficacy is as it appears. [An entity which] arises conditioned by causes and conditions is to be known as *tathya-saṃvṛti-satya*. Indeed, all entities which appear from a cause, in the knowledge of unwise men as well as [that of wise men], are understood as *tathya-saṃvṛti-satya*, for they are entities determined in conformity with that which appears in knowledge. [Such notions as] "production," etc., have no counterpart in reality, but are things merely imagined, and are dependent on an established theory. Otherwise, the dispute [on the subject of production, etc.] would not occur. As for the thing which appears in the knowledge of both the opponent and the pro-

⁵⁶ SDV v. 28:

snang ba'i ngo bo gang yin pa // de ni 'gog pa ma yin nyid //

nyams su myong ba gang yang ni // dgag par rigs pa ma yin no // (Eckel 1987: 181.7-10 and 95).

Cited in AAA:

nirbhāsate hi yad rūpaṃ naiva tat pratiśidhyate,

vedyamānasya no yuktaṃ kasyacit pratiśedhanam // (93.9-10). Mimaki 1982: 200, n. 527.

ponent, no dispute will occur. If it does occur, it is contradicted by direct perception, etc. Production, etc., postulated as real, are [known as] *mithyā-saṃvṛti-satya*, since they are constructed by conceptualization. ⁽⁵⁷⁾

The twelfth verse of SDV and its commentary qualify the above:

v. 12 Although [all knowledge is] the same as regards [the nature of] appearance, *saṃvṛti[-satya]* is divided into real and unreal [*saṃvṛti-satya*], depending on whether or not it has causal efficacy.

Although knowledge is the same in regard to having an appearance of a clear image, ordinary people understand water, etc., to be real and mirages, etc., to be unreal by determining whether or not their appearance misrepresents their causal efficacy. The nature of these two [*saṃvṛti-satyas*] is strictly speaking the same, in the sense that [they both] are devoid of intrinsic nature. They are distinguished by determining whether or not they are as they appear. Whether [their appearance] misrepresents causal efficacy or not is [determined by the] way it is known [in the world], since even [causal efficacy] has no [intrinsic] nature. ⁽⁵⁸⁾

Jñānagarbha's view of *saṃvṛti-satya* can be summarized as follows:

Tathya-saṃvṛti-satya is that which is not of the nature of imagination, arises dependently,

⁽⁵⁷⁾ SDVV: *kun rdzob de ni yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin pa'i bye brag gis mam pa gnyis te / de la brtags pa'i don gyis dben gyur pa // dngos tsam brten nas gang skyes te // yang dag kun rdzob shes par bya //* (SDV v. 8abc)

brtags pa'i don ni yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa dang / rnam par shes pa snang ba dang / gtso bo dang 'byung ba'i yongs su 'gyur ba la sogs pa ste / de dag gis dben pa'o // dngos po tsam gang yin pa ni ji ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed nus pa'i phyir ro // rgyu dang rkyen mams la brten nas skyes pa de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin par shes par bya ste / 'di ltar byis pa yan chad kyi shes pa la mthun par don ji snyed rgyu las snang ba de ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob yin par rigs te / shes pa la snang ba dang mthun par dngos po gnas pa'i phyir ro // yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa ni mi snang ste / ji lta bur yang rung ba'am / grub pa'i mtha' la brten nas sgro btags pa 'ba' zhig tu zad do // de lta ma yin na ni rsod pa med par thal ba kho nar 'gyur ro // rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba'i shes pa la snang ba'i cha la ni rsod pa su yang med do // rsod par byed na ni mngon sum la sogs pas gnod par 'gyur ro //

yang dag min ni kun brtags yin // (SDV v. 8d)

yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa gang yin pa de ni rtog pa'i bzos sbyar ba ste / de ni yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o // ni zhes bya ba ni bsnan pa'i don tam go rims bzlog pa'o // (Eckel 1987: 160.2-28 and 75-76)

⁽⁵⁸⁾ SDVV:

snang du 'dra yang don byed dag // nus pa'i phyir dang mi nus phyir //

yang dag yang dag ma yin pas // kun rdzob kyi ni dbye ba byas // (SDV v. 12)

zhes bya ba'o / shes pa gsal ba'i rnam pa snang ba can du 'dra yang / ji ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yin par nges par byas nas chu la sogs pa dang smig rgyu la sogs pa dag 'jig rien gyis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rtogs so // dngos su na gnyis ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du ngo bo nyid mtshungs pa kho na'o // ji ltar snang ba bzhin du ni rnam par gnas so // don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yang ji ltar grags pa kho na bzhin te / de yang ngo bo nyid med pa'i phyir ro // (Eckel 1987: 163.21-164.3 and 79)

has causal efficacy, and appears in the knowledge of men, whether they be wise or not. On the other hand, *mithyā-saṃvṛti-satya* has been explained as that which is of the nature of imagination and which possesses no causal efficacy.

Thus, we can easily understand that Jñānagarbha's view is reflected in the definition of *saṃvṛti-satya* adopted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

Furthermore, as discussed above, Jñānagarbha defines *saṃvṛti-satya* as that which is exactly as it appears. Commenting on this view, Śāntarakṣita says:

The statement “*saṃvṛti* is that which is exactly as it appears” refers to direct perception (**pratyakṣa*).⁽⁵⁹⁾

And, Jñānagarbha, explaining verse 30 of SDV, says:

This body of color-form, etc., undefiled by the evils of conceptualization, is by nature dependent on others, and is only an appearance of knowledge. [Nevertheless] it cannot be rejected, and if one were to reject it, one would certainly undermine [the validity of] direct perception, etc.⁽⁶⁰⁾

In the *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla, we find the following related passage:

Among [the three natures (*trisvabhāva*)], the dependent nature (**paratantra-svabhāva*) is that which is acceptable only as long as it is not investigated critically, which is exactly as it appears, and which arises dependently.⁽⁶¹⁾

Combining the points raised in the preceding discussions, we find the following synonyms of *tathya-saṃvṛti*:

tathya-saṃvṛti = *ji tar snang ba* (**yathādarśanam* = **yathāpratibhāsanam* = **yathāpratyakṣam*) = *praṭīyasamutpāda* = *paratantrasvabhāva* = *vijñaptimātra* = *avicāraikaramaṇīya*

This list of synonyms enables one to appreciate the manner in which the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school integrates its epistemology with the theory of the two *satyas*.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ SDVP: *kun rdzob ni ji ltar snang ba bzhin zhes bya ba ni mngon sum zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*// (D44b4; P38b7-8)

⁽⁶⁰⁾ SDVV: *gzugs la sogs pa'i lus rtog pa'i nyes pas ma sbags pa gzhan gyi dbang gi bdag nyid rnam par shes pa tsam snang ba dgag par mi nus pa 'ba' zhig tu ma zad kyi/byed na byed pa po la mngon sum la sogs pas phyir gnod pa kho na byed do*// (Eckel 1987: 181.28-31 and 96)

⁽⁶¹⁾ MĀ: *de la dngos po ma brtags na grags pa ji ltar snang ba sgyu ma bzhin du brten nas byung ba gang yin pa de ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yin no*// (D 150a4; P 162b6-7)

10. Conclusion

(1) Śāntarakṣita's criticism of the Yogācāra-vādin

Śāntarakṣita indicated in MA 66cd and 92cd that Yogācāra theory of mind-only should be based on the theory of non-self. According to him, mind-only possesses neither a single nor a plural intrinsic nature; since it is not real, we should not cling to it. He thought highly of the mind-only theory, yet primarily he regarded it as a means to attain the ultimate goal, i.e. the Mādhyamika stage. In the process of establishing emptiness, he rejected the theories that maintained the existence of external objects, including the Mādhyamika Bhāviveka's view, while he likewise criticized the mind-only and other theories of the Yogācāra school.

Let us take a brief look at the criticism of the Yogācāra theories discussed in MA and MAV:

v. 44 Or [the Yogācāra school holds that,] being produced by ripening of latent impressions (**vāsanā*) which belong to the [same] individual series (*saṃtāna*) since the beginningless past, phantom images appear but their intrinsic natures are like those of illusions because of an erroneous cognition (**bhrānti*).

v. 45 Even though we appreciate this [doctrine], let us consider whether [in the theory proposed] the essence of the [images should be taken to be] real or something agreeable and tacitly accepted only as it is not investigated critically (**avicāraikaramaṇīya*). ⁽⁶²⁾

Śāntarakṣita's criticism is directed at both the Satyākāravāda and the Alīkākāravāda of the Yogācāra school. Both maintain that the image (*ākāra*), which is the object of knowledge, is the result of an error produced through the ripening of latent impressions since the beginningless past. But the basic difference between the two Yogācāra theories lies in whether they consider the image to be real or whether they think it to be something agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically. The former view is held by the Satyākāravāda, the latter by the Alīkākāravāda. The image here refers to the image of blue, etc., as Kamalaśīla points out in MAP. ⁽⁶³⁾ Śāntarakṣita's criticism of the theory proposed by the Satyākāravādins is focused

⁽⁶²⁾ MV v. 44:

*ci ste thog ma med rgyud kyi // bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi //
rnam pa dag ni snang ba yang // nor bas sgyu ma'i rang bzhin 'dra //* (Ichigo 1985: 120)

MV v. 45:

*de dge 'on kyang de dag gi / dngos de yang dag nyid dam ci //
'on te ma brtags gcig pu na // dga' bar khas len 'di bsam mo //* (Ichigo 1985: 124)

⁽⁶³⁾ The theory of atoms is refuted in verse 11-13 of the MA. Ichigo 1985: 56-59.

on the incompatibility of the unitary cognition with the plurality of real images. As long as the Satyākārvādins hold to the reality of the images, that reality inevitably implies the spacious expansion (*deśavitānāvasthita*) or non-dimensional contiguity in space (*deśanairantaryāvasthāna*).

To counter this position, Śāntarakṣita employed a critique based on the criticism of the theory of atoms. He seems to be the only philosopher to have proposed such an approach.

v. 49 If you admit that cognition [consists of as many parts] as the number of [its manifold] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avoid the same kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms. ⁽⁶⁴⁾

The Satyākārvādins can neither solve the contradiction nor reasonably explain the process of perception and Śāntarakṣita attacks them on these points.

Śāntarakṣita then turns to the theory proposed by the Alīkākārvādins:

v. 52 [The Alīkākārvāda holds that cognition] does not intrinsically possess these images, but by the force of an error they appear in cognition, although in reality the latter is endowed with no images. ⁽⁶⁵⁾

Alīkākāra or *nirākāra* means that cognition is not endowed with real images. The Alīkākārvādins maintain that cognition without images perceives unreal images which are both produced by error and considered to be of imagined nature. But it is a contradiction to hold that the image is cognized but that cognition is not endowed with images. So, Śāntarakṣita criticizes the idea of the Alīkākārvādins that cognition is something clearly different from the image.

v. 54 Indeed, if an item X (e.g. the image “blue”) does not exist in Y (e.g. the cognition “blue”), X cannot be perceived in Y. Just as we neither [feel] pleasure in unpleasurable things, nor [see] non-white color in white things. ⁽⁶⁶⁾

v. 59 If it (the image) were unreal, its cognition would [always] appear as cognition without

⁽⁶⁴⁾ MA v. 49:

*ci ste rnam pa'i grangs bzhin du // rnam par shes pa khas len na //
de tshes rdul phran 'drar 'gyur ba // dpyad pa 'di las bzlog par dka' //* (Ichigo 1985: 136)

⁽⁶⁵⁾ MA 52:

*ci ste ngo bo nyid du de'i // rnam pa 'di dag med pa ste //
yang dag tu na rnam med pa'i // rnam par shes la nor bas snang //* (Ichigo 1985: 146)

⁽⁶⁶⁾ MA v. 54:

*'di ltar gang la dngos gang med // de la de shes yod ma yin //
bde ba min la bde sogs dang // dkar ba rnam la'ang mi dkar bzhin //* (Ichigo 1985: 148)

an image. [But] cognition, like a pure crystal, would not perceive [any object]. ⁽⁶⁷⁾

(2) Haribhadra's View

Lastly, I would like to show the difference of standpoint between the Alīkākāravāda of the Yogācāra and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school by referring to Haribhadra's view. Both admit that the state of *paramārtha-satya* is the appearance of non-dual true wisdom (consciousness) just as illusion. However, the Alīkākāravādins regard non-dual wisdom, though they say it is illusion, as true. On the other hand, Haribhadra maintains that even non-dual true wisdom is not true, i.e., *tathya-saṃvṛti*.

Haribhadra can be called **niḥsvabhāva-śūnyatāvādin* because he understands all *dharmas* in the following manner:

(All *dharmas* are) in reality (*tattvatas*) free from the consideration of existence and non-existence, agreeable and tacitly accepted as long as they are not investigated critically, and internally as well as externally devoid of the core like the stem of the plantain tree. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

His primary opponent (*mukhyaḥ pratipakṣaḥ*) is introduced in the following manner:

Thus, the kings of yogins (*yogisāḥ*) who understand by reasoning and scripture (*yuktyāgama*) [the truth of] illusion-like non-dual mind (*māyopamādvayacitta*), and who think that they are ready for knowing reality and unreality, having determined, by the wisdom obtained by hearing and thinking, that the illusion-like non-dual mind is nothing but *tathya-saṃvṛti* by nature, and cultivating [that non-dual mind] by means of the respectful, continuous, and long-time specific cultivation (*bhāvanā*) in the course of eight *abhisamayas* beginning with omniscience (*sarvākārajñatā*) through the nature of *dharmas* (*dharmatā*), i.e. dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*), cause the stream of the illusion-like non-dual consciousness-only (*māyopama-advaya-vijñāna-mātra*), which is deprived of all conceptual imaginings (*sakala-vikalpa*) and which lasts until [the end of] life; they are precisely the primary opponents [for us Mādhyamikas]. ⁽⁶⁹⁾

⁽⁶⁷⁾ MA v. 59:

de med na ni shes de yang // rnam pa med pa nyid kyis 'gyur //
shel sgong dag pa 'dra ba yin // shes pa rab tu tshor ba med // (Ichigo 1985: 154)

⁽⁶⁸⁾ AAA 640. 6-8: *tattvato bhāvābhāvaparāmarśarahitān avicāraramaṇīyān antarbahis sāraviraḥṇaḥ kadalīskandhanibhān sarvabhāvān.*

⁽⁶⁹⁾ AAA 641. 18-24: *tataś ca yuktyāgamābhyāṃ parividitāmāyopamādvayacittāḥ tattvātattvāboddhābhyudyatama-tayo 'dvayaṃ māyopamaṃ cittam tathya-saṃvṛtirūpam eva śrutacintāmayena jñānena vyavasthāpya pratītya-*

The expression ‘the illusion-like non-dual consciousness-only’ immediately reminds us of the Nirākāra-vijñānavāda but it can apply to Haribhadra, too, who belongs to the line of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. Then what is the difference between the two schools? It is the content of ‘understanding things as they really are’ (AAA 640, 21: *yathābhūta-padārthāvagama*) or ‘seeing reality’ (*tattvadarśana*).

I have already mentioned that if you want to express emptiness (*sūnyatā*) by words, you can do so only by means of ‘non-production’ (*anutpāda*). And if you want to express emptiness visually, the expression will be ‘non-seeing’ (*adarśana*); in this connection, Haribhadra gives his own interpretation. His view that non-seeing means seeing the reality is doubtless based upon a passage of the *Dharmasaṅgīti-sūtra* (法集經 Taisho vol. 17, No. 761, p. 673b21: 名為不見世尊是名正見正法) Both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla quote it and state as follows:

[Śāntarakṣita] “Ultimately, objects of perception, etc., are not cognized” (MAV286-287) and “The Exalted One, non-seeing of any *dharma* is true seeing.” (ŚS 264: *adarśanaṃ bhagavan sarvadharmāṇaṃ darśanaṃ (sic?) samyagdarśanam.*)

[Kamalaśīla] “What is ‘seeing of *paramārtha*’? It is non-seeing of any *dharma*.” (BhK I 212: *katamaṃ paramārthadarśanam / sarvadharmāṇāṃ adarśanam.*)

As far as the Sanskrit version is concerned, the object of ‘non-seeing’ is ‘any *dharma*=all *dharma*s’. On the other hand, Haribhadra says the following:

“Non-seeing of any *pāramārthika* thing through the eye of wisdom is precisely meant to be the ultimate seeing of reality.”⁽⁷⁰⁾

In this way, Haribhadra changed the object of ‘non-seeing’ from ‘any *dharma*=all *dharma*s’ to ‘any *pāramārthika* thing.’ By mentioning ‘*pāramārthika* thing’ Haribhadra should have had in his mind ‘the illusion-like non-dual mind/consciousness-only’ of Nirākāravādins. And by adding ‘meant to be’ (*abhipreta*), he interprets it to be the hidden intention of the *Sūtra* that justifies his own view.

We can see the uniqueness of Haribhadra among those who succeeded the line of Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas in the fact that he read *kasyacit pāramārthikasya bhāvasya* in the place of *sarvadharmāṇāṃ* in the *Dharmasaṅgīti-sūtra*. Furthermore, that symbolically indicates the fundamen-

samutpādadharmatayā sarvākārajñatādy-aṣṭābhisamayakrameṇa sādaranirantaradīrghakālaviśeṣabhāvanayā bhāvayantaḥ saṃhṛtasakalavikalpam ā bhavam anubaddhaṃ māyopamādvayavijñānamātra-prabandham āśādayanti yogīsāḥ | sa eva mukhyaḥ pratipakṣaḥ |

⁽⁷⁰⁾ AAA 640. 23-25: *kasyacit pāramārthikasya bhāvasya prajñācakṣuṣā adarśanam eva paramaṃ tattvadarśanam abhipretam.*

tal difference between Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras.

Abbreviations

AAA: *Abhisamayālaṃkāṛālokā* of Haribhadra. See Wogihara 1932.

D: Derge edition.

IBhK: First *Bhāvanākrama* of Kamalaśīla. See Tucci 1958.

JNA: *Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*. See Thakur.

LA: *Lankāvatāra-sūtra*. See Vaidya.

MA: *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā* of Śāntarakṣita. See Gómez and Silk.

MĀ: *Madhyamakāloka* of Kamalaśīla. D 3887 (Sa 133b4-244a7); P 5287(Sa 133b2-275a4).

MAP: *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla. See Ichigo 1985.

MAV: *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-vṛtti* of Śāntarakṣita. See Ichigo 1985.

MH: *Madhyamakahr̥daya-kārikā* of Bhāviveka. D 3855 (Dza 1b1-40b7); P 5255(Dza 1a1-43b7).

MHV: *Madhyamakahr̥daya-vṛtti Tarkajvālā* of Bhāviveka. D 3856 (Dza 40b7-329b4); P 5256(Dza 43b7-380a7).

MK: *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna. Edited with the *Prasanapadā*.

P: Peking Edition.

Ppra: *Prajñāpradīpa Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti* of Bhāviveka. D3853 (Tsha 45b4-259b3); P 5253(Tsha 53b3-326a6).

Ppra-ṭīkā: *Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā* of Avalokitavrata. D 3859 (Wa 1b1-Za 341a7); P 5259 (Wa 1a1-Za405b7).

PPU: *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* of Ratnākaraśānti. D 4079 (Hi 133b7-162b1), P 5579(Ku 151a4-184b6)

Pras: *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti. See de La Vallée Poussin.

SDV: *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-kārikā* of Jñānagarbha. See Eckel 1987.

SDVP: *Satyadvayavibhaṅga-pañjikā* of Śāntarakṣita. D 3883(Sa 15b2-52b7); P 5283(Sa 1a1-48b7).

SDVV: *Satyadvaya vibhaṅga-vṛtti* of Jñānagarbha. See Eckel 1987.

ŚS: *Śikṣāsamuccaya* of Śāntideva, ed. by Cecil Bedall, Commissionnaires de l'Academie imperial des sciences, St. Pétersbourg, 1902.

[]: Material added on the basis of the commentaries.

(): Material added by the translator.

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