The Mādhyaṃkika school of Indian Buddhist philosophy advocates the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā), that is, the absence of intrinsic nature (niḥsvabhāva) in all dharmas. By asserting that dharmas have no intrinsic nature because they always arise dependently (pratītyasamutpanna), Mādhyaṃkikas stress that no entity has an absolute reality. This theory leads to the avoidance of dogmatic extremes such as belief in production and non-production, existence and non-existence, and eternalism and nihilism.

While the doctrine of emptiness remained at the core of Mādhyaṃkika thought, over time two branches developed, which differed in their understanding of how to establish the reality of emptiness, in other words, to prove paramārtha-satya. Later Tibetans called them the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika. The names of these two branches appeared apparently for the first time in Tibetan Buddhist literature of the eleventh century, and not at all in Indian texts.\(^2\)

With regard to the understanding of saṃvṛti-satya, on the other hand, the divisions arose by the eighth century. They are the Yogācāra-Mādhyaṃkika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyaṃkika. \(^3\) This division can be said to have resulted from the problem of whether or not the existence of external entities was to be affirmed from the viewpoint of saṃvṛti-satya. Śāntarakṣita (8th c.) and the Yogācāra-Mādhyaṃkika held the view that saṃvṛti-satya does not admit external reality, while Bhāviveka (5-6th c.) and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyaṃkika held the opposite view. Both the

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\(^2\) See Mimaki 1982: 45.

\(^3\) MAP: tshul gnyis zhes bya ba ni dbu ma dang rnal ’byor spyod pa zhes bya’o // (Ichigo 1985: 303.17)
Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika belonged to the Svātantrika branch of the Mādhyamika school.

The name of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika itself, which has yet to be discovered in Indian Buddhist literature, suggests to us a process of assimilation and synthesis of the Yogācāra school with the Mādhyamika school. Śāntarakṣita says in the Madhyamakālaṃkāra (= MA):

v. 93 Therefore, those who hold the reins of logic while riding the carriage of the two systems attain the stage of a true Mahāyānist. [4]

On that verse his disciple Kamalaśīla (8th c.) comments that “the two systems” refers to the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra. [5]

2. A Brief Explanation of the Central Tenet of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas

Before explaining the central tenet of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas in MA verse 92, Śāntarakṣita in verse 91 alludes to and criticizes the Satyākāra- and Alīkākāra-vāda of the Yogācāra school; however, his epistemological position is akin to that of the Alīkākāravādins.

v. 91 [The Satyākāravāda:] That which is cause and effect is nothing but knowledge. [The Alīkākāravāda:] It is established that knowledge is that which is self-validated [without any substratum]. [6]

v. 92 Based on [that standpoint of] mind-only, one must know the non-existence of external entities. Based on this standpoint [of the lack of intrinsic nature of all dharmaś], one must know that there is no self at all even in that [mind-only]. [7]

The purport of these two verses can be understood by reference to the following verses in MA:

v. 64 One should understand that samvṛti is in essence (1) that which is agreeable and

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[4] MA v. 93:

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tshul gnyis shing rta zhon nas su // rigs pa'i srab skyogs 'ju byed pa//
de dag de phyir ji bzhi'n don // theg pa chen po pa nyid 'thob //
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(Ichigo 1985: 302)


[6] MA v. 91:

```
rgyu dang 'bras bur gyur pa yang // shes pa 'ba' zhiq kho na ste //
rang gis grub pa gang yin pa // de ni shes par gnas pa yin //
```

(Ichigo 1985: 292)

[7] MA v. 92:

```
sems tsam la ni brten nas su // phyi rol dngos med shes par bya //
```

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tshul 'dir brten nas de la yang // shin tu btag med shes par bya //
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(Ichigo 1985: 294)
tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (*avicāryaikaramāṇīya), (2) that which is characterized by arising and decay and (3) whatever has causal efficacy.\(^8\)

v. 65 Although agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as they are not investigated critically, similar successive effects are produced, conditioned by their own successive causes.\(^9\) v. 66 Therefore, it is also correct to say that it would be impossible for samyrti to be causeless.

But if (you claim that) its fundamental cause (*upādāna) is real, you have to explain what it is.\(^10\)

Although all entities have in reality no intrinsic nature, that is, they are empty, they are understood to be characterized by samyrti-satya. The three definitions of samyrti in verse 64, among which the first seems characteristic of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, are captured in the expression "that which is cause and effect" in verse 91. It follows that, since Śāntarakṣita explains samyrti as that which arises dependently, it is clear that it has a cause. The cause, as suggested in verse 65, is the individual series (samtāna) of consciousness arising from the beginningless past.\(^11\) This idea is expressed in verse 91 as "nothing but knowledge," and in verse 92 as "based on [that standpoint of] mind-only one must know the non-existence of external entities." These verses thus attribute samyrti-satya to mind-only. Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita proposes that even mind-only is without intrinsic nature or self. One should not cling to mind-only. This idea can be found in verses 66cd and 92cd in MA mentioned above.

Adopting Buddhist philosophical terminology, the central tenet of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas

\(^{8}\) MA v. 64:

```plaintext
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga' zhting // skye dang 'jig pa'i chos can pa//
don byed pa dag nus rnams kyi // rang bzhin kun rdzob pa yin rtoogs // (Ichigo 1985: 202)
```

\(^{9}\) MA v. 65:

```plaintext
brtags pa ma byas nyams dga' ba'ang // bdag rgyu snga ma snga ma la//
brten nas phyi ma phyi ma yi // 'bras bu de 'dra 'byung ba yin//= (Ichigo 1985: 210)
```

\(^{10}\) MA v. 66:

```plaintext
de phyir kun rdzob rgyu med na // rang min zhes pa'ang legs pa yin//
gal te 'di yi nyer len pa // yang dag yin na de smros shig//= (Ichigo 1985: 210)
```

\(^{11}\) Comments in brackets in this and the following verse are based on MAP ad MAV. Edited in Ichigo 1985: 301.11-21. LA X.592.

```plaintext
phyi rol gyi rgyu dang rkyen rgyu'i mtshan nyid rnam pa lnga dang bdag po'i mtshan nyid rgyu log pas sens tsam nyid du gnas pa ni rnam par rig pa tsam nyid kyi tshul la skye ba med pa gcig yin no // (MAP 301.14-21)
```

```plaintext
dbu ma pa'i lugs kyi skye ba med pa gang yin pa de bstan pa'i phyir phyi dngos med ces bya ba smos te / dngos po rnam phyi rol gyi nge bo nyid du med par ngas bshad do zhes bya ba bar sbyar ro / sens kyang yongs su gzang ma yin zhes bya ba ni dngos po rnam sens kyi nge bo nyid du med par ngas bshad do zhes bya ba bar sbyar ro / ci'i phyir zhe na / lta ba thams cad spangs pa'i phyir te de ltar na dngos po la sogs par lta ba thams cad spangs par 'gyur ro / de'i phyir dngos po rnam s kyi skye ba med pa'i mtshan nyid ni de lta bu kho na yin no // (MAP 301.14-21)
```
can be described by the following scheme, in which arrows indicate both conceptual equivalence and direction of religious progress:

\[
\text{tathya-saṃvṛti} \rightarrow \text{vijñaptimātra (svasaṃvedana)} \rightarrow \text{anātman}
\]

In other words, saṃvṛti is nothing but mind-only (vijnaptimātra) and has no intrinsic nature (anātman). The above scheme reflects Śantaraksīta’s interpretation and evaluation of the four major philosophical schools of Buddhism. He sees a gradual philosophical development from belief in the existence of external objects maintained by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, via the mind-only doctrine of the Yogācāra, to the Mādhyamika’s emptiness, which he considers to be the ultimate stage.

The Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school evolved under the influence of Buddhist logic developed by Dignāga (5-6th c.) and Dharmakīrti (6-7th c.), refuted the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, and adopted the mind-only theory of the Yogācāra as a means (upāya) to attain paramārtha-satya. At the same time, the school consistently maintained and recognized as its fundamental position the Mādhyamika doctrine that all dharma have no intrinsic nature.

Śantaraksīta’s philosophical position can be summarized in his interpretation of the concept of non-production (anupāda). He first turns to the Lankāvatāra-sūtra (=LA) for the definition of non-production from the standpoints of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika and quotes the following two passages:

I maintain that non-production [in the doctrine of the Yogācāra school] means establishment of mind-only [by] the exclusion [of the rest of the five kinds of] causal conditions (hetu-pratyaya) and [by] the denial of cause (kāraṇa).  
Entities do not exist as external realities, nor are they objects contained in the mind. The abandonment of all views is the definition of non-production.

\[\text{LA X.592 in MA V:}\]
\[
\text{rgyu dang rkyen ni rnam log dang} \|
\text{rgyu yang nges par bka\'a pa dang} \|
\text{sems tsam rnam par gzhag pa ni} \|
\text{skye ba med par ngas bstan to} \|
\text{(Ichigo 1985: 300)}
\]

\[\text{LA X.595 in MA V:}\]
\[
\text{dngos po rnams kyi phyi dngos med} \|
\text{sems kyang yongs su gzung na yin} \|
\text{lta ba thams cad spang ba\’i phyir} \|
\text{skye ba med pa\’i ngtshan nyid do} \|
\text{(Ichigo 1985: 300)}
\]
As these verses demonstrate, from the point of view of the Yogacāra school, non-production means the establishment of mind-only doctrine. In contrast, the Mādhyamika school defines it as abandonment not only of the intrinsic nature of internal and external entities but also of all views of Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools. In this regard, it must be noted that the mind-only doctrine of the Yogacāra school is included in “all views.”

Next, by quoting two verses attributed to Nāgārjuna’s *Yuktisāti*, Sāntarakṣita traces his idea back to the founder of the Mādhyamika school:

Here, nothing is produced; nothing is annihilated, either. Appearance and disappearance take place only in our mind.  

The four material elements (*mahābhūta*), etc., taught [by the Blessed One] are in fact reduced to consciousness. [But] since that [consciousness] is also refuted by [true] wisdom, is this [reduction] not a false conception?  

The attribution of the two verses quoted here is a matter of controversy. According to our understanding, Sāntarakṣita seems to attribute both of these verses to the LA. Preceding these verses he quotes LA X.256-58 with the words *Lang kar gshegs pa las*, then with the word *yang* he quotes LA X.592 and 595. It is at this point that, with the words *dir yang gsungs pa*, he quotes these two verses. The verses introduced by Sāntarakṣita with *yang* are identified in Kamalaśīla’s MAP as follows: *yang zhes bya ba ni ‘phags pa lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo de nyid las so*, that is, without question they are attributed to LA. The introduction *dir yang gsungs pa* is commented upon by Kamalaśīla as follows: *‘dir yang gsungs pa shes ba ni sens tsam kun rdzob tu smra ba’o // ’phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las gsungs pa’i khungs—* (the *la* after ’phags pa in Ichigo 1985: 303.2 is a misprint and should be deleted), thus attributing the verse to LA. The second of the two verses, however, Kamalaśīla attributes to Nāgārjuna: *‘phags pa klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas gsungs pa’i tshigs su bcad pa gnyis pa—*, specifically the *Yuktisāti*: *‘di ni rigs drug cu pa las gsungs pa yin no*. The first verse seems to match almost exactly LA II .138-X.85. The verse reads

na hy atropatadīya kincid pratayair na niruddhyate /
upayante niruddhyanā pratayā eva kalpitā //

The second verse cannot be located in LA, but matches perfectly *Yuktisāti* 34.


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The translation is from Kajiyama1978: 132.

*YS* v. 21 in MAV:

‘di la skye ba ci yang med // ’gag par ’gyur ba ci yang med //
skye ba dang ni ’gag pa dag // shes pa ’ba’ zhig kho na’o // (Ichigo 1985: 302)

*YS* v. 21 in JNA:

dharmo notpadīya kaścin nāpi kaścin niruddhyate /
upayante niruddhyante partyayā eva kevalā //

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The translation is from Ichigo 1985: 302; JNA 488, 22-23; 545,3-5. The translation is from Kajiyama1978: 132.

*YS* v. 34 in MAV:

‘byung ba che la sogs bshad pa // rnam par shes su yang dag ’de //
de shes pas ni ’bral ’gyur na // log par rnam bbrtogs ma yin nam // (Ichigo 1985: 302)

*YS* v. 34 in JNA 405.1-2:

mahābhūtādī vigānāṃ proktam samavaruddhyate /
taj jīānāṃ vigamaṃ yāti nanu mithyā vikalpitā //

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The attribution of the two verses quoted here is a matter of controversy. According to our understanding, Sāntarakṣita seems to attribute both of these verses to the LA. Preceding these verses he quotes LA X.256-58 with the words *Lang kar gshegs pa las*, then with the word *yang* he quotes LA X.592 and 595. It is at this point that, with the words *dir yang gsungs pa*, he quotes these two verses. The verses introduced by Sāntarakṣita with *yang* are identified in Kamalaśīla’s MAP as follows: *yang zhes bya ba ni ‘phags pa lang kar gshegs pa’i mdo de nyid las so*, that is, without question they are attributed to LA. The introduction *dir yang gsungs pa* is commented upon by Kamalaśīla as follows: *‘dir yang gsungs pa shes ba ni sens tsam kun rdzob tu smra ba’o // ’phags pa lang kar gshegs pa las gsungs pa’i khungs—* (the *la* after ’phags pa in Ichigo 1985: 303.2 is a misprint and should be deleted), thus attributing the verse to LA. The second of the two verses, however, Kamalaśīla attributes to Nāgārjuna: *‘phags pa klu sgrub kyi zhal snga nas gsungs pa’i tshigs su bcad pa gnyis pa—*, specifically the *Yuktisāti*: *‘di ni rigs drug cu pa las gsungs pa yin no*. The first verse seems to match almost exactly LA II .138-X.85. The verse reads

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Yuktiṣṭātikā 21, quoted in MAV. Ichigo 1985: 302; JNA 488, 22-23; 545,3-5. The translation is from Kajiyama1978: 132.

YS v. 21 in MAV:

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---

YS v. 34 in MAV:

‘byung ba che la sogs bshad pa // rnam par shes su yang dag ’de //
de shes pas ni ’bral ’gyur na // log par rnam bbrtogs ma yin nam // (Ichigo 1985: 302)

YS v. 34 in JNA 405.1-2:

mahābhūtādī vijñānāṃ proktam samavaruddhyate /
taj jīānāṃ vigamaṃ yāti nanu mithyā vikalpitā //
These verses tell us that what appears and disappears is nothing but mind and that even the great elements taught by the Blessed One cannot be distinct from mind. The words “consciousness” (vijñāna) and “true wisdom” (jñāna) in the second verse can be interpreted as referring to the knowledge of the Yogācāra and that of the Mādhyamika, respectively. This interpretation can be supported by reference to Ratnakarasānti’s Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (=PPU), in which he defines “true wisdom” as knowledge completely free from error. He regards this “true wisdom” as superior to “consciousness.” 

Although the Yogācāra school was not established at the time of Nāgārjuna, the second of the two verses quoted above clearly criticizes the concept of mind-only. By quoting Nāgārjuna’s verses, Śantaraksīta summarizes his position that saṃvṛti-satya is nothing but mind-only and that mind-only has no intrinsic nature. He affirms the Yogācāra doctrine of mind-only from the standpoint of saṃvṛti-satya but he criticizes it from that of paramārtha-satya.

Śantaraksīta supports his position in the Madhyamakālamkāra-vṛtti (=MAV) by citing three famous verses from the tenth chapter of LA, which also indicates the development, as in MA verse 92, from belief in the existence of external objects, via the mind-only doctrine, to the stage that even mind-only has no intrinsic nature. Professor Yūichi Kajiyama examined Kamalaśīla’s interpretation of these verses as quoted in his Bhāvanākrama and analyzed the meaning of non-manifestation (nirābhāsa) into two stages, viz. the Aṅkākāravāda-Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika. Thus he concluded that Kamalaśīla viewed the doctrinal development of Buddhist philosophy in the following five stages: (1) the Vaibhāṣika, (2) the Sautrāntika, (3) the Satyākāravāda-Yogācāra, (4) the Aṅkākāravāda-Yogācāra, and (5) the Mādhyamika.

3. Similar Ideas Shared by Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra

Jñānagarbha (8th c.) is a pivotal figure in the development of the Mādhyamika school. In his Satyadvayavibhaṅga-vṛtti (=SDVV), he holds that the Mādhyamika position of non-self is to be regarded as higher than the Yogācāra position of mind-only:

v. 32 [The Blessed One], whose self-nature is compassion, seeing [how people had been

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5. PPU: shin tu ma ‘khrl pa’i ye shes (D 143a4; P 162a2-3).
6. Comments in brackets in these verses are based on MAP ad MAV. Edited in Ichigo 1985: 297.5-301.9. LA X.256-58.

7. cittamātraṁ samārūhya bāhyam arthaṁ na kalpayet /
tathatālambane shhitvā cittamātraṁ atikramet //
cittamātraṁ atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet /
nirābhāsasthiyo yogi mahāyānaṁ sa paśyati //
anābhogagatiṁ śāntā prāṇidhānaṁ viśodhitā /
jñānam anātmakaṁ śreṣṭhaṁ nirābhāse na paśyati //

bound by] the fetters of imagination by means of various types of [teachings] such as mind-only, preached bondage and liberation.

The Blessed One understands action and its fruits and has compassion as the intrinsic nature of his body. He, indeed, having seen people bound by the fetters of imagination in the prison of the cycle of birth and death, became completely free from attachment to entities by means of the progressive teachings — [offered] according to the mentalities [of his listeners] — of the skandhas, dhātus and āyatanas, mind-only and essenslessness of all dharmas, and preached to people about bondage and liberation. 09

He goes on to add that,

In [pure] knowledge as such, the intrinsic nature of [any] entities, [be they] atoms, non-duality [or the like], does not appear. Conventions (*vyavahāra) do not apply to anything which does not appear. Although there is something which appears, there is nothing which is the intrinsic nature of an entity, because neither the assemblage [of atoms] nor the duality [of the grasped and the grasper] are the entity. 09

Jñānagarbha’s statements regarding the order of Buddhist teachings and the lack of intrinsic nature of that which appears remind us of Śāntarakṣita’s position in MA v. 92 presented above. The following passages from Kamalaśīla’s works could be added to bolster our interpretation:

The entrance to mind-only alone is not the entrance to the truth (tattva). 10

Only the entrance to non-dual knowledge is the entrance to the truth (tattva). 10

One cannot understand all at once the lack of intrinsic nature of all dharmas. First, based on [the standpoint of] mind-only, one gradually understands the lack of intrinsic nature of external objects. Therefore, it is said [in LA X.154ab]:

Both the subject and the object are rejected by those who carry out a logical investigation.

09 SDVV:

thugs rje’i bdag nyid de nyid kys // rtog pas bcings pa gzigs nas ni //
sems tsam la sogs bye brag gis // bcings pa thar pa bstan pa mdzad // (SDV v. 32)
bcom ldan ’das las dang ’bras bu mkhyen pa thugs rje’i rang bzhiṅ gyi sku can de nyid kys ’khor ba’i bison rar ’gro ba rtog pa’i lcags srog gis bcings pa la gzigs nas / bsam pa ji lta ba bzhiṅ du phung po dang khams dang skye mched dang / sems tsam dang / chos thams cad bdag med par bstan pa’i rim gyis dngos por ’dzin pa ma lus par sel bar mdzad cing / ’gro ba la bcings pa dang thar pa bstan pa mdzad do // (Eckel 1987: 183.11-21 and 97.14-24)

09 SDVV: shes pa’i bdag nyid la ni rul phra rab dag dang / gnys su med pa’i dngos po’i ngo bo mi snang ngo / mi snang ba la ni tha snyad med do // snang ba gang yin pa de yang dngos po’i ngo bo kho na ma yin te / ’dus pa dang gnys kyang dngos po ma yin pa’i phyir ro // (Eckel 1987: 184.23-27 and 98.27-30)

10 IBhK 217.8: na tu vijñaptimārtāpravesā eva tattvapraśeṣā.

10 IBhK 217.13-14: advayajñānapraśeṣā eva tattvapraśeṣā.
Then, gradually, having examined that even that [mind] is without self, and follow the most profound path.

In the following passage we can see that Haribhadra (9th c.) builds his view on those of his predecessors.

(1) After having established oneself on external objects by repudiating ātman, etc. in the first place, (2) one fixes [one’s mind] on the understanding that the triple realm is mind-only, through the teaching of the imagined, dependent and perfect natures; (3) after that, one indicates the two saṁvyti-satyas with the distinction between the real (tathyā) and the unreal (atathya), being either capable or incapable of real causal efficacy, which are [defined as] what is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically (avicārakaramya) and what depends on its own successively preceding causes, (4) standing on tathya-saṁvyrti, like a magically created person one must practice giving and the rest according to [worldly] appearance (yathādārśānam), (5) and one must cultivate the ultimate non-production. In this manner one must penetrate into the Perfection of Wisdom.

This passage clearly reflects the ideas adopted by Jñānagarbha and Śantaraksita: “the real and the unreal, being either capable or incapable of real causal efficacy” corresponds to verse 12 of the Satyadvayavibhaṅga (=SDV) that is to be quoted later and “what is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically and what depends on its own successive former causes” corresponds to MA verses 64 and 65.

In Śantaraksita and Kamalaśila, who are regarded as representatives of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school, we see the culmination of the development of Mādhyamika philosophy after some six hundred years of evolution. The school was initiated by the pioneer Jñānagarbha and flourished at the time of Śantaraksita and Kamalaśila, who were then succeeded by Haribhadra.

As the preceding discussion shows, Śantaraksita’s philosophical position can be traced back

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MA: ‘di itar gang zhig cig car chos ma lus pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du rtogs par mi nas pa de re zhig sms tsam la brten nas / rim gyis phyi’i don ngo bo nyid med pa nyid la ’jug go / de nyid kyi phyir / rigs pas rnam par lta rnam kyi // gzung dang ‘dez pa ’gag par ’gyur // zhes gsungs so // de’i ’og tu rim gyis sms kyi ngo bo nyid la so sor rtoq na / de yang bdag med pa nyid du khong du chud nas zab mo’i tshul la ’jug par ’gyur te / (D 157a3-4; P 170b8-171a1)

AAA 594.18-25: anupūrveneti aḍāv ātmadīnirākaraṇena bāhye ‘rthe pratiṣṭhāpya, paścāt kalpitaparatantrapari-nispannasvabhāvakathārṇa traiddhātkacittamātrāvagame niyoja, tadanu samyagartthakriyāśu yogyaṃ avyayaṃ tathātathabhedena saṁvytryadadvayam avicārakaramyaṕūrṇapūrṇavakāraṇānādhīṇam nirūṣāya, tathāstavaṃvṛitaṃ sthitvā yathādārśanāṃ māyāpuruṣeṇeva dānādy ācārītavāṃ, paramārdhato ‘nupādaśa ca bhāvavītavyaḥ, ity evaṃ kramaṇa praṇāhāparatītyāyām avatārayitavyaḥ.
to Jñānagarbha; hence, Jñānagarbha should be recognized as the one who took the lead in establishing the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school. Jñānagarbha’s position was not well defined and properly recognized in Tibetan grub mtha’ texts, where he is variously identified as belonging to either the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika or the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika, or sometimes even to the “Lokaprasiddhavargacāri-mādhyamika,” a line to which Candrakīrti also is sometimes assigned.

4. Śāntarakṣita’s View of Saṃvṛti-satya

Since the absence of an intrinsic nature in all dharmas tends to be understood by his opponents as nihilism, Śāntarakṣita counters them in MA as follows:

v. 63ab Therefore, understand all entities as being characterized only by saṃvṛti. ⚫

This assertion raises the question of how saṃvṛti is to be understood. Śāntarakṣita summarizes it in three ways: it is (1) not nothingness, (2) produced by causation, and (3) having the nature of mind and mental states (citta-caitā).

Kamalaśīla further expands Śāntarakṣita’s idea by dividing saṃvṛti into two kinds: (a) mere verbal usage (śabda-vyāvahāra) and (b) dependent origination or causal efficacy. Dependent origination or causal efficacy is well known even to a cowherd, and is that to which the word “convention” refers in common usage (saṃketa). ⚫ Kamalaśīla calls the first of those two kinds of saṃvṛti “mithyā-saṃvṛti” and the second “tathya-saṃvṛti”. They are explained as follows:

The term tathya-saṃvṛti is used because it designates accurately what is accepted [as real by the world]. mithyā-saṃvṛti refers to conceptual constructs — such as God, etc., — which have nothing to do with what is accepted [as real by the world]. ⚫

When Śāntarakṣita uses the term saṃvṛti, he is referring only to tathya-saṃvṛti. He defines it in MA verse 64 quoted above and MAV as follows:

Cf. Mimaki 1982: 28, n.52. The restoration into Skt. of ’Jig rten grags ste spyod pa’i dbu ma pa is of Obermiller, but it is not certain.

MA v. 63ab:

de phyir dngos po ’di dag ni ’/ kun rdzob kho na’i mtsan nyid ’dkzin ’/ (Ichigo 1985: 196)

MAP: sgra’i tha snyad kyi bdag nyid kyi kun rdzob par ’dod dam/ ’on te rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba don bya ba byed pa gnag rdzi yan chad la shin tu grags pa de nyid brda’i dbang gis kun rdzob kyi sgrar brjod ces bya ba rtog pa gyis so’/ (Ichigo 1985: 203.2-5)

MAP: yang dag pa’i kun rdzob ces bya ba ni ji ltar grags pa bzhin nye bar brtags pa’i phyir ro// grags pa las ’das te riogs pa dper na dbang phyug la sosgs par riogs pa gang yin pa de ni log pa’i kun rdzob yin no’// (Ichigo 1985: 205.1-3)
This [type of] samvrti is not mere verbal usage (*šabda-vyavahāra-mātra). Tathya-samvrti is the entities experienced and affirmed which arise dependently and which are not able to withstand any investigation.  

Śāntarakṣita then identifies this concept of samvrti with the second line in Nāgārjuna’s stanza that defines emptiness:

That which arises dependently we call emptiness. That [emptiness] is a dependent designation. Precisely that is the Middle Path.  

Thus, Śāntarakṣita regards tathya-samvrti as a synonym for “a dependent designation” (upādāya-prajñapti). But he anticipates a possible objection. An opponent could argue that Śāntarakṣita’s interpretation contradicts the definition of the two satya theory in the Akṣayamati-nirdeśa-sūtra, in which samvrti-satya is defined as that which is explained by words, language and signs. The sūtra says:

What, then, is samvrti-satya? It is (a) all the conventional designations of the world (*loka-vyavahāra) and (b) (all) that is explained by words, language and signs. What is paramārtha-satya? It is the stage where there is no activity of mind, not to mention of words.  

Śāntarakṣita relates his conception of tathya-samvrti with the sūtra’s definition (a) but does not discuss the definition (b) in MAV. He interprets the definition (a) as follows:

The term ‘loka-vyavahāra’ in this [passage of the Akṣayamatinirdeśa] is meant to be the world consisting of sentient beings and that of imanimate beings in the manner of the in-

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9 MA v. 64:  
ma brtags gcig pu nyams dga’ zhung // skye dang ’jig pa’i chos can pa //  
don byed pa dag nus rnam kyi // rang bzihn kun rdzob pa yin rtogs // (Ichigo 1985: 202)  

AV: kun rdzob ‘di ni sgra’i tha snyad tsam gyi bdag nyid ma yin gyi / mthong ba dang ’dod pa’i dngos po rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba rnam ni brtag mi bzod pas yang dag pa’i kun rdzob ste / (Ichigo 1985:204.1-3)  

MK XXIV.18, quoted in MAV(Ichigo 1985: 204.7-10).  

yah pratītyasamutpādah śūnyatām tām pracakṣyahe /  
sa prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā //  
reten cing ’brel par gang ’byung ba // de ni stong pa nyid du bshad //  
de ni rgyur byas gdags pa ste // de nyid dbu ma’i lam yin no // (in MAV)  

10 MAV: de la kun rdzob kyi bden pa gang zhe na / ’jig rten gyi tha snyad ji snyed pa dang / yi ge dang skad dang bdrad bstan pa dag go // don dam pa’i bden pa ni gang la sens kyi rgyu ba yang med na yi ge rnam lta ci smos.  

Ichigo 1985: 204.13-15)  

The second half is found in Pras 374.2:  
paramārthasatyam katamat / yatra jñānasyāpy apracāraḥ kaḥ punar vādo kṣarāṇām /
trinsic natures of the experiencer and the experienced, for [the term ‘vyavahāra’] comprises an action noun (*bhāva-sādhana). It is not of the intrinsic nature of speech, for speech is performed by means of syllables.  

Therefore, the absence of intrinsic nature in all dharmas does not mean nothingness, since even this absence is characterized by *tathya-saṃvyrti as defined above.

Kamalaśīla, on the other hand, considers mere verbal usage to be a form of *mithyā-saṃvyrti. This means that he would term the sūtra’s second definition (b) of saṃvyrti-satyā “mithyā-saṃvyrti.” Why is this aspect of linguistic usage excluded from saṃvyrti-satyā? Kamalaśīla explains:

[*Mithyā-saṃvyrti] does not agree with direct perception (*pratyakṣa), etc. Thus ordinary verbal usage (*śabda-vyavhāra) does not have as its domain the definition of things which arise dependently, since it has only the universal (*sāmānyā) as its domain. That universal, moreover, is nonexistent because its nature is imaginary (*parikalpīta-svabhāva). Therefore, to affirm its existence is to deny the well-established causal efficacy of entities, because the universal cannot possess causal efficacy (*arthakriyā-śakti).

Up to this point, the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika theory of saṃvyrti-satyā can be understood as the logical development of Mādhyamika and Sautrāntika theories. When the question of the origin of the causal process arises, however, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla rely on Yogācāra doctrine. Since saṃvyrti-satyā is explained by Śāntarakṣita as that which arises dependently or as dependent designation, it is clear that it has a cause. But what is the cause? If it has a cause only in the usual sense of the word, then it does not mean much to say that it has a cause. Śāntarakṣita therefore employs the Yogācāra concept of a beginningless series of causes or the karmic substratum, as he suggests in MA verses 65 and 66 mentioned above. Kamalaśīla explains:

In this connection, if it were established that it (saṃvyrti) only has a cause in the usual sense [of the word], then it would be a case of [the fallacy of] proving what has already been proved (*siddha-sādhana), for we claim that the cause of saṃvyrti is a beginningless
Thus, the school identifies the cause with the individual series (samțāna) of moments of consciousness, which exists since the beginningless past. In the ultimate sense such a cause is unreal. Furthermore, Śāntarakṣita proceeds to explain that samvṛti-satya is nothing but mind-only. He says in MAV ad. MA v. 91 mentioned above:

One cannot conceive of the nature of knowledge as something other than a self-validated nature. Even this self-validated nature is just like the form of a dream, an illusion, etc.

This or a similar explanation may, in fact, be the basis for proposing the name Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. Indeed, Śāntarakṣita explains that the bifurcation of the Mādhyamika school into the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika was a result of differing views concerning the characteristics of samvṛti-satya.

5. Bhāviveka’s View of Conventional Tathya-samvṛti

Bhāviveka, regarded as the founder of the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamila, maintains that tathya-samvṛti admits the reality of external entities. He interprets a passage of scripture quoted below, which asserts that the triple world is nothing but mind-only, as merely a critique of “self.”

O, Sons of the Conqueror. Furthermore, it is understood that the triple realm is mind-only. Even the three times [past, present and future] are understood to be similar to mind. That which is mind also is understood to be without extremes and middle.

Prof. Kajiyama aptly summarized Śāntarakṣita’s comments on Bhāviveka’s views as follows:

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[series of] successive causes.

This or a similar explanation may, in fact, be the basis for proposing the name Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. Indeed, Śāntarakṣita explains that the bifurcation of the Mādhyamika school into the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika and the Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika was a result of differing views concerning the characteristics of samvṛti-satya.

MAP: de la gal te spyir rgyu dang bcas pa tsam du gshrub par byed na ni de’i tshé grub pa bsgrub pa yin te / kun rdzob pa’i rgyu snga ma snga ma thog ma med par ’dod pa’i phyir ro / (Ichigo1985: 211.7-9)

MA v. 91:
rgyu dang ‘bras bur gyur ba yang // shes pa ’ba’ zhig kho na ste //
rang gis grub pa gang yin pa // de ni shes par gnas pa yin //
MAV: rang gis grub pa’i ngo bo bor nas shes pa’i ngo bo gzhan rtog pa med do // rang gis grub pa’i rang bzhin yang rmi lam dang sgyu ma la sogs pa’i gzugs bzhin no // (Ichigo 1985: 292.2-8)

The name of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika was used for the first time by Ye shes sde. See Mimaki 1982: 40.

MAV: gang dag gis rgyu dang ‘bras bu’i dngos por dam bcas pas rgo l ba ngan pa thams cad kyi lan btub par ’dod pa’i kun rdzob kyi dngos po de dag gang yin pa de dpvad par bya’o / ci sens dang sens las byung ba tsam gyi bdag nyid kho na’am / ci phyis ’i bdag nyid kyang yin zhe na / (Ichigo 1985: 290.14-17)


MAV: kye rgyal ba’i sras dag gzhan yang khams gsun pa ni sens tsam du rtogs te / dus gsun yang sens dang mthungs par rtogs so // sens de yang mtha’ dang dbus med par khong du chud do. (Ichigo 1985: 296.2-5)
The Buddhas have taught the theory of mind to repudiate the existence of a soul which is conjured up by non-Buddhist philosophers as the subject of actions (kartr) and the enjoyer of their fruits (bhoktr). This opinion of [the Sautrântika-] Mâdhyamika is tantamount to saying that external things can be as real as the mind insofar as conventional truth is concerned, although the soul must be denied. [28]

Śântarakṣita himself, on the other hand, does not admit the existence of an object external to the mind. He maintains instead that samvrî has only the nature of mind and mental states (cittacaitta). [30]

Another instance of Śântarakṣita’s disagreement with Bhâviveka regarding the characteristics of samvrî-satyâ is found in his usage of the term tathya-samvrî. Emptiness or the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas can be understood from the point of view of paramârtha-satyâ as an awareness which goes beyond verbal usage. But, if one must verbally express emptiness in order to lead sentient beings to this awareness, one can only refer to it as “non-production.” Śântarakṣita says in MA:

v. 69 Therefore, there is no entity that can be established in reality.
Therefore, the Tathâgatas preached the non-production (*anutpâda) of all dharmas. [32]

However, adopting the doctrine that the Blessed One had preached the absence of intrinsic nature of all dharmas as non-production posed new problems to Buddhist exegesis. In other words, the attempt to explain or to conceptualize the truth of emptiness, which Śântarakṣita argues goes beyond all verbal usage, raises other questions: (1) If the statement of the Blessed One should be regarded as paramârtha-satyâ, is the teaching of non-production itself the paramârtha-satyâ or not? (2) If the idea of non-production, which should imply the absence of an intrinsic nature in all dharmas, is understood as the negation of production, is that paramârtha-satyâ or not?
Śântarakṣita’s solution clearly shows that non-production both as a teaching and as a negation is only samvrî-satyâ, not paramârtha-satyâ. With regard to the question (1) Śântarakṣita states:

Although non-production, etc., are also implied in tathya-samvrî,

[32] MA v. 69:
de phyir yang dag nyid du na // dngos po gang yang grub pa med ///
de phyir de bzhin gshegs rnams kyis // chos rnams thams cad ma skyes gsungs /// (Ichigo 1985: 222)
v. 70 Some say that this [non-production] is paramārtha[-satya], since it agrees with paramārtha. [But in my view] it [i.e. paramārtha] is that which is completely free from all accumulations of fictional human ideas (*prapañca).

Paramārtha[-satya] is that which cuts off the net of all accumulations of fictional human ideas such as existence and non-existence, production and non-production, emptiness and non-emptiness, etc. 

6. Difference over the Concept of Tathya-samvṛtī between Śāntarakṣita and Bhāviveka

Thus, when Śāntarakṣita uses the term “paramārtha,” he is referring only to that which is not susceptible to explanation; language, therefore, is completely excluded. So, even the teaching of non-production by the Blessed One is regarded as only tathya-samvṛti.

Śāntarakṣita’s reason for referring to this problem here in MA seems to be that Bhāviveka classified the teaching of the non-production as paramārtha-satya. Bhāviveka divides paramārtha-satya into two types, viz. pāramārthika-paramārtha-satya and sāṅkṣetika-paramārtha-satya, according to the terminology used in Avalokitavrata’s Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā. In Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā, the first of those two types of paramārtha-satya is called “that which is attained without conscious effort” (mngon par ‘du byed pa med par ’jug pa) and the second “that which is attained by conscious effort” (mngon par ‘du byed pa dang bcas par ’jug pa).

Bhāviveka, furthermore, understands that the first ‘ultimate’ type of paramārtha-satya is expressed in Nāgārjuna’s MK XVIII.9 and the second ‘conventional’ type in MK XVIII. 10. He further divides the second type into three levels: (1) non-conceptual knowledge, (2) the teaching of non-production, and (3) wisdom obtained by learning, investigation and meditation. Bhāviveka regards the teaching of non-production as an excellent means to attain non-conceptual knowledge.

But for the ladder of samvṛtī-satya, the learned man would not be able to mount the top of the palace of [paramārtha-]satya.

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[92] MAV: skye ba med pa la sogs pa yang yang dag pa’i kun rdzob tu gtogs pa yin du zin kyang / dam pa’i don dang mthun pa’i phyir /’di ni dam pa’i don zhes bya / yang dag tu na spros pa yi // tshogs rumns kun las de grol yin / (MV v. 70)

don dam pa ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa dang / skye ba dang mi skye ba dang / stong pa dang mi stong pa la sogs pa spros pa’i dra ba mtha’ dag spangs pa’o // (Ichigo 1985: 230.2-232.1)

[93] Ppra-ṭīkā (D Za236a4-b2, 236b2-7; P 282a4-b2, 282b2-8). See Nozawa 1953: 18-38, Ejima 1980: 24-25.

[94] MHV (D60b4-5; P64a7-8).

However, as long as the second level of the ‘conventional’ paramārtha-satya (i.e., the teaching of non-production) depends on the twelve bases (āyatana) of cognition, it cannot be denied that essentially it belongs to the category of saṁvyti. Although Bhāviveka applies the term “tathya-saṁvyti” to the second level of paramārtha-satya, he no doubt evaluates it highly since he considers it to be a means which leads to the first level of paramārtha-satya (i.e. non-conceptual knowledge). This implies that Bhāviveka considered the teaching of non-production, distinct from general verbal convention, to be something belonging to paramārtha-satya. This position created the opportunity for Bhāviveka’s successors to criticize him. In setting the first level of paramārtha-satya beyond the second level, Bhāviveka seemed to think that, even having affirmed “production” as worldly verbal convention, “non-production” could be established on the level of paramārtha-satya.

7. Jñānagarbha’s View of the Concept of Anutpāda

Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita and others pointed out that Bhāviveka’s position is inconsistent with Nāgārjuna’s idea that the paramārtha-satya cannot be taught without relying on verbal convention (vyavahāra). In SDV and its commentary SDVV, Jñānagarbha says:

v. 9ab Negation of production, etc., is also (api) postulated [as paramārthasatya], since it agrees with reality. The reason is that it negates that entity which is imagined as real production, etc. We postulate [this negation] as paramārtha[satya], since the other [school, Yogācāra] understands [it] as nothing but reality. The word “also (api)” has a cumulative [qualifying] meaning. However, when it is investigated by reason [the negation of production is] nothing but saṁvyti[satya]. If asked the reason why, [we reply]:

v. 9cd Because of the non-existence of the object to be negated, it is clear there is in reality no negation.

For negation does not take place if there is no object to be negated, and it is not reasonable to negate that which has no object. If [someone objects that] the object to be negated is that

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yang dag kun rdzob rnams kyi skas // med par yang dag khang pa yi //
steng du 'gro bar bya ba ni // mkhas la rung ba ma yin no // (Ichigo 1985: 232.4-7)

MH III.9: byams dang snying rje che bsagom dang // sems can sdu dang smin byed dang // skye mched bcu gnyis brten pa yi // shes rab brdar btags shes par bya // (Ejima 1980: 271)

MK XXIV.10ab: vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na deśyate /
which is imagined by [our] opponents to be real — such as the production of form and the rest — which are [merely ideas] caused by conceptualization, then:

v. 10ab How could the negation of the imagined nature be the non-imagined [nature]?
Since the object to be negated is only the imagined [nature], the negation [of it] will also be the imagined nature, just like the negation of the darkness [of complexion] and so forth of the son of a barren woman. Even though there is no negation of real [production, etc.], there is no existence of production, etc., since non-production, etc., is not pervaded by the negation [of production, etc.,] and there is no evidence to prove the existence of the latter (i.e., production, etc.).

10c Therefore, this is *samyrti* [satya].
“This” refers to the absence of real production, etc.

v. 10d [It is] neither *paramarthasatya* nor real.\(^{80}\)

Production, etc. which are the objects of the negation are not real, for they are imagined. Since there is no real object to be negated, it is logically unreasonable to negate it. The negation of the imagined entity is itself nothing but imagination. Therefore, it is correct to say that the negation of production, etc., belongs to *samyrti-satya*, not to *paramarthasatya*.

\(^{80}\) SDVV:

\begin{verbatim}
skyé la sogs pa bkag pa yang // (SDV 9a)
yang dag par skyé ba la sogs par rtog pa'i dngos po bkag pa'i gtan tshigs kyis /
yang dag pa dang mthun phyir 'dod // (SDV 9b)
don dam pa yin par kho bo cag 'dod do // gzhan dag ni yang dag pa kho nar 'dzin pas /yang zhes bya ba ni bsdu ba'i don to //
de yang rigs pas dpya'd na kun rdzob kho na ste /ci'i phyir zhe na /
dgag bya yod pa ma yin pas //yang dag tu na bkag med gsal // (SDV 9cd)**
dgag bya med na bkag pa mi 'byung ba'i phyir te /yal med pa'i bkag pa mi rigs pa'i phyir ro //
gal te gzugs la sogs pa la skyé ba la sogs par rnam par rtog pa'i rgyu can pha rol pos dngos po yang dag pa nyid
da brtags pa yang yin pa de dgag bya nyid yin no zhe na /gal te de lta na /
brtags pa'i rang gi ngo bo yi //bkag pa brtags min ji lur 'gyur // (SDV 10ab)
dgag bya brtags pa yang du zin na /bkag pa yang brtags pa nyid du 'gyur te /mo gsham gyi bu'i sngo bsangs nyid la
sogs pa bkag pa bzhi'n no //yang dag pa bkag pa med kyang skyé ba la sogs pa yod par mi 'gyur te /bkag pas skyé
ba med pa la sogs pa la ma khyab pa'i phyir dang /de yod pa'i rigs pa med pa'i yang phyir ro //
de bas 'di ni kun rdzob ste // (SDV 10c)
yang dag par na skyé ba med ces bya ba la sogs pa'o //
yang dag don yin yang dag min // (SDV 10d)** (Eckel 1987: 161.3-28 and 76-77)
\end{verbatim}

\(^{**}\) Cited in AAA 45.6: *nisedhyābhāvataḥ spaśaṭam na nisedho 'sti tatvataḥ.*

\(^{*}\) For v. 10d text runs: *yang dag don yin yand dag min,* but according to Mimaki 1982: 4: *yang dag don min yand dag min,* which I follow.
8. Śāntarakṣita’s View of the Concept of Anutpāda

Jñānagarbha’s view reminds us of that discussed by Śāntarakṣita in MA:

v. 71 Since there is no production and the like, there can be no non-production and the like. Since that [production] has been rejected as the substantial referent [of verbal expression], there can be no verbal expression with reference to [non-production].

v. 72 The negative particle (nañ) cannot be rightly applied without its referent (nirviṣaya). Or if [it were applied] depending on conceptual construction (vikalpa), it would be conventional (sāṃvṛti), not real.

If there is no production, etc., it is impossible to apply words to explain it. Therefore, because what is objectless is negated, there can be no non-production, etc., for there is not even production. ⁴⁸

In other words, Śāntarakṣita asserts that because “production” has been repeatedly negated, there can be no “non-production.” Since “production” does not exist, it is not appropriate to apply a negative particle nañ or “non-” to “production” which does not exist. If “non-production” arises depending on conceptual construction (vikalpa), it is nothing but sāṃvṛti-satya.

Kamalaśīla comments on “non-production” as follows:

“Non-production, etc.” means the conceptualization (*vikalpa) of non-production, etc., or the determination of the nature of entities by [such] conceptualization. The word “etc.” includes cessation, final peace and so on. ⁵⁰

As these comments suggest, for Śāntarakṣita “non-production” is a conceptual construct. Sim-

⁴⁸ MAV:

skye ba la sogs med pa’i phyir // skye ba med la sogs mi srid //
de yi ngo bo bkag pa’i phyir // de yi tshig gi sgra mi srid // (MA v. 71)
yul med pa la dgag pa yi // sbyor ba legs pa yod ma yin //

rnam par rtog la brten na yang // kun rdzob par ’gyur yang dag min // (MA v. 72)
skye ba la sogs med na de rjod pa’i sgra’i sbyor ba mi ’thad do // de bas na yul med pa la dgag pa’i phyir skye ba

yang med pas skye ba med pa la sogs pa mi srid do // (Ichigo 1985: 234.2-236.3)

MV 72 is cited in AAA.

na ca nirviṣayaḥ sādhuḥ prayogo vidyate nañañ
vikalpāpāśrayatvā vā sāṃvṛtāḥ syān na tātvikāḥ (AAA 45.7-8, 838.17-18)

⁵⁰ MAP:
skye ba med pa la sogs par rnam par rtog pa dang / rnam par rtog pas dngos po rnam kyi ngo bo rnam par gzhag pa ni skye ba med pa la sogs pa’o // sogs pa’i sgras ni ’gog pa dang zhi ba la sogs pa bsdu’o // (Ichigo 1985:233.1-3)
ilarly, non-production originally refers to the absence of intrinsic nature; therefore one cannot
determine its intrinsic nature. Non-production does not satisfy the definition of *paramārtha-
satya* which is free from the net of fictional human ideas (*prapañca*). Since production and
non-production and existence and non-existence are nothing but fictions created by the human
mind, they are relative concepts depending only on ideas. Śāntarakṣita’s observations on *saṃvṛti-
satya* seem to derive from experience of meditation. He penetrates into the nature of our ordinary
world on the basis of his profound religious insight. For Śāntarakṣita, in sum, our everyday world
of *saṃvṛti-satya* is that which arises dependently, that which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only
as long as it is not investigated critically, and that which has the nature of mind and mental states
arising from the individual series of consciousness since the beginningless past.

9. Jñānagarbha’s View of *Saṃvṛti-satya*

Since Śāntarakṣita’s idea of *saṃvṛti-satya* seems very much in accordance with that of
Jñānagarbha, in what follows I translate with some comments of my own the key passages
concerning *saṃvṛti-satya* from Jñānagarbha’s SDV and SDVV. First, he defines the two *satyas* as
follows:

v. 3 Between the two *satyas*, conventional (*saṃvṛti*) and ultimate (*paramārtha*), which
are preached by the Sage, only that which is as it appears (*ji ltar snang ba*) is *saṃvṛti*; otherwise it is the other (i.e. *paramārtha*).  

The commentary explains:

["The other"] means *paramārtha-satya*. *Saṃvṛti-satya* is ascertained in accordance with the experience of [ordinary] people including a female cowherd, etc. But it is not [ascertained] in reality, because the meaning of an entity is determined [only] in accordance with experience.  

Subsequently he explains *saṃvṛti-satya* as follows:

If asked what is so-called *saṃvṛti*, we reply:

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50 SDV v. 3:

kun rdzob dang ni dam pa’i don // bden gnyis thub pas gsungs pa la //
ji ltar snang ba ’di kho na // kun rdzob gzhan ni cig shos yin // (Eckel 1987: 156.1-5 and 70-71)

52 SDVV: don dam pa’i bden pa zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go // ji ltar ba lang rdzi mo la sogs pa yan chad kys mthong ba de ltar kun rdzob tu bden pa rnam par gnas kyi yang dag par ni ma yin te / mthong ba dang mthun par dngos po’i don nges par ’dzin pa’i phyir ro / (Eckel 1987: 156.6-9 and 71)
v. 15ab It is maintained that *samvṛti* is that which covers reality or that in which it is covered. The concealment of the reality by or in one’s mind, [and the affirmation of] what is thus generally accepted [to be real] by the world, is maintained to be *samvṛti*. In a sūtra (LA X.429) it is said:

Entities arise from the point of view of *samvṛti*. From the point of view of *paramārtha*, they have no intrinsic nature. Error with respect to the absence of an intrinsic nature is postulated as *tathya-samvṛti*.

v. 15cd Therefore, [from the point of view of *samvṛti*] all these are real. From the point of view of *paramārtha* they are not real.

All these things are real from the point of view of *samvṛti*. This means that they are real [only] in the sense generally accepted by the world.  

Moreover, Jñānagarbha explains:

v. 21ab This [*samvṛti-satya*] is not to be investigated critically because its nature [exists] as it appears.

We find this developed in Śāntarakṣita’s sub-commentary on this half-verse, which states:

“Because its nature [exists] as it appears” means [that it has a nature] which is agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically. As for this *samvṛti*-satya, it is not to be investigated, or not to be examined.

Further on in SDV Jñānagarbha adds:

v. 28 The phenomenon which appears is never rejected. It is not reasonable to reject...
anything which is experienced.  

As the preceding passages suggest, Śāntarakṣita owes one of his definitions of samvṛti-satya (i.e., avicārakaramanīya, in MA 64) to Jñānagarbha’s basic idea of samvṛti-satya “as it appears.”

This being the nature of samvṛti-satya, should we then also regard as samvṛti-satya the double moon that appears to those who have defective vision? Partly, in response to this issue, Jñānagarbha distinguishes two types of samvṛti, namely real and unreal. These correspond to the classification of Kamalaśīla discussed above. The criteria for Jñānagarbha’s classification are two: (1) whether or not it is of the nature of imagination (parikalpita-svabhāva), and (2) whether or not it has causal efficacy (arthakriyā). Thus, tathya-samvṛti is defined as that which is not of the nature of imagination and which has causal efficacy. This definition furthermore corresponds to Śāntarakṣita’s own in MA 64.

Jñānagarbha refines his position as follows:

Samvṛti is divided into two kinds by the fact that it is real or unreal.

v. 8 A bare entity devoid of the imagined object and co-arising dependently is known as real samvṛti. Unreal [samvṛti] is the imagined [object].

“The imagined object” implies “production [and duration] etc.,” “the appearance of [ideas in] knowledge” and “the transformation (parināma) of the predominant cause (pradhāna) and the gross elements (bhūta)” [which are postulated as] real [by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools] and so forth. [Tathya-samvṛti-satya is] that which is devoid of these. Something is a bare entity because its causal efficacy is as it appears. [An entity which] arises conditioned by causes and conditions is to be known as tathya-samvṛti-satya. Indeed, all entities which appear from a cause, in the knowledge of unwise men as well as [that of wise men], are understood as tathya-samvṛti-satya, for they are entities determined in conformity with that which appears in knowledge. [Such notions as] “production,” etc., have no counterpart in reality, but are things merely imagined, and are dependent on an established theory. Otherwise, the dispute [on the subject of production, etc.] would not occur. As for the thing which appears in the knowledge of both the opponent and the pro-

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60 SDV v. 28:

snang ba’i nga bo gang yin pa // de ni ’gog pa ma yin nyid //
nyams su myong ba gang yang ni // dgag par rigs pa ma yin no // (Eckel 1987: 181.7-10 and 95).

Cited in AAA:
nirbhāsate hi yad rūpaṁ naiva tat pratisidhyate,
ponent, no dispute will occur. If it does occur, it is contradicted by direct perception, etc. Production, etc., postulated as real, are [known as]mithyā-sanvṛti-satya, since they are constructed by conceptualization.  57

The twelfth verse of SDV and its commentary qualify the above:

v. 12 Although [all knowledge is] the same as regards [the nature of] appearance, sanvṛti-
satya] is divided into real and unreal [sanvṛti-satya], depending on whether or not it has causal efficacy.

Although knowledge is the same in regard to having an appearance of a clear image, ordinary people understand water, etc., to be real and mirages, etc., to be unreal by determining whether or not their appearance misrepresents their causal efficacy. The nature of these two [sanvṛti-satyas] is strictly speaking the same, in the sense that [they both] are devoid of intrinsic nature. They are distinguished by determining whether or not they are as they appear. Whether [their appearance] misrepresents causal efficacy or not is [determined by the] way it is known [in the world], since even [causal efficacy] has no [intrinsic] nature.  58

Jñāṇagarbha’s view of sanvṛti-satya can be summarized as follows:

Tathya-sanvṛti-satya is that which is not of the nature of imagination, arises dependently,

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57 SDVV: kun rdzob de ni yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin pa’i bye brag gis rnam pa gnyis te / de la brtags pa’i don gis dben gyur pa /// dngos tsam brten nas gang skyes te // yang dag kun rdzob shes par bya // (SDV v. 8abc) brtags pa’i don ni yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa dang / rnam par shes pa snang ba dang / gtsos bo dang ’byang ba’i yongs su ’gyur ba la sogs pa ste / de dag gis dben pa’o /// dngos po tsam gang yin pa ni ji tar snang ba bzhin du don byed nus pa’i phyir ro / / rgya dang rkyen rnam s la brten nas skyes pa de ni yang dag pa’i kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin par shes par bya ste / ’di ltar byis pa yan chad kyi shes pa la mthun par don ji snyed rgyu las snang ba de ni yang dag pa’i kun rdzob yin par rgyis te / shes pa la snang ba dang mthun par dngos po gnas pa’i phyir ro / / yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa ni ni snang ste / ji lta bur yang rung ba’am / grub pa’mtha’ la brten nas srgo btags pa’ba’ zhis tu zad do // de lia ma yin na ni rtsod pa med par thal ba kho nar ’gyur ro / / rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba’i shes pa la snang ba’i cha la ni rtsod pa su yang med do / / rtsod par byed na ni mngon sum la sogs pas gnod par ’gyur ro / / yang dag min ni kun brtags yin /// (SDV v. 8d) yang dag par skye ba la sogs pa gang yin pa de ni rtog pa’i bzos sbyar ba ste / de ni yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun rdzob kyi bden pa’o / ni zhes bya ba ni bsnan pa’i don tam go rims bzlog pa’o /// (Eckel 1987: 160.2-28 and 75-76)

58 SDVV: snang du ’dra yang don byed dag // nus pa’i phyir dang mi nus phyir / / yang dag yang dag ma yin pas /// kun rdzob kyi ni dbye ba bya /// (SDV v. 12) zhes bya ba’i / shes pa gsal ba’i rnam pa snang ba can du’ dra yang / ji ltar snang ba bzhin du don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yin par nges par byas nas chu la sogs pa dang smig rgyu la sogs pa dang ’jig rten gis yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin par rto gs so /// dngos su na gnyis ni ngo bo nyid med pa nyid du ngo bo nyid mshungs pa kho na’o / ji ltar snang ba bzhin du ni rnam par gnas so / / don byed pa la slu ba dang mi slu ba yang ji ltar grags pa kho na bzhin te / de yang ngo bo nyid med pa’i phyir ro /// (Eckel 1987: 163.21-164.3 and 79)
has causal efficacy, and appears in the knowledge of men, whether they be wise or not. On the other hand, mithyā-samvyrti-satya has been explained as that which is of the nature of imagination and which possesses no causal efficacy.

Thus, we can easily understand that Jñānagarbha’s view is reflected in the definition of samvyrti-satya adopted by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

Furthermore, as discussed above, Jñānagarbha defines samvyrti-satya as that which is exactly as it appears. Commenting on this view, Śāntarakṣita says:

The statement “samvyrti is that which is exactly as it appears” refers to direct perception (*pratyakṣa).

And, Jñānagarbha, explaining verse 30 of SDV, says:

This body of color-form, etc., undefiled by the evils of conceptualization, is by nature dependent on others, and is only an appearance of knowledge. [Nevertheless] it cannot be rejected, and if one were to reject it, one would certainly undermine [the validity of] direct perception, etc.

In the Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla, we find the following related passage:

Among [the three natures (trisvabhāva)], the dependent nature (*paratantra-svabhāva) is that which is acceptable only as long as it is not investigated critically, which is exactly as it appears, and which arises dependently.

Combining the points raised in the preceding discussions, we find the following synonyms of tathya-samvyrti:

\[
\text{tathya-samvyrti} = \text{ji tar snang ba (yathādarśanam = yathāpratibhāsanam = yathāpratyakṣam) = pratītyasamutpāda = paratantrasvabhāva = vijñaptimātra = avicāraikaramaṇīya}
\]

This list of synonyms enables one to appreciate the manner in which the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school integrates its epistemology with the theory of the two satyas.

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\(\text{SDVP: kun rdzob ni ji ltar snang ba bzhiñ zhes bya ba ni mngon sum zhes bya ba’i tha tshig go/ (D44b4; P38b7-8)}\)

\(\text{SDVV: gzugs la sogs pa’i lus rtog pa’i nyes pas ma sbags pa gzhan gyi dbang gi bdag nyid rnam par shes pa tsam snang ba dgag par mi nus pa ‘ba’ zhiq tu ma zad kyi / byed na byed pa po la mngon sum la sogs pas phyir gnod pa kho na byed do/ (Eckel 1987: 181.28-31 and 96)}\)

\(\text{MĀ: de la dangos po ma brtags na grags pa ji ltar snang ba sgyu ma bzhiñ du brten nas byung ba gang yin pa de ni gzhan gyi dbang gi ngo bo nyid yin no/ (D 150a4; P 162b6-7)}\)
10. Conclusion

(1) Śāntarakṣita’s criticism of the Yogacāra-vādin

Śāntarakṣita indicated in MA 66cd and 92cd that Yogacāra theory of mind-only should be based on the theory of non-self. According to him, mind-only possesses neither a single nor a plural intrinsic nature; since it is not real, we should not cling to it. He thought highly of the mind-only theory, yet primarily he regarded it as a means to attain the ultimate goal, i.e. the Mādhyamika stage. In the process of establishing emptiness, he rejected the theories that maintained the existence of external objects, including the Mādhyamika Bhāviveka’s view, while he likewise criticized the mind-only and other theories of the Yogacāra school.

Let us take a brief look at the criticism of the Yogacāra theories discussed in MA and MAV:

v. 44 Or [the Yogacāra school holds that,] being produced by ripening of latent impressions (*vāsanā) which belong to the [same] individual series (*saṃtāna) since the beginningless past, phantom images appear but their intrinsic natures are like those of illusions because of an erroneous cognition (*bhrāntī).

v. 45 Even though we appreciate this [doctrine], let us consider whether [in the theory proposed] the essence of the [images should be taken to be] real or something agreeable and tacitly accepted only as it is not investigated critically (*avicāraikaraṇaṇīya).

Śāntarakṣita’s criticism is directed at both the Satyākāravāda and the Alīkākāravāda of the Yogacāra school. Both maintain that the image (*ākāra), which is the object of knowledge, is the result of an error produced through the ripening of latent impressions since the beginningless past. But the basic difference between the two Yogacāra theories lies in whether they consider the image to be real or whether they think it to be something agreeable and tacitly accepted only as long as it is not investigated critically. The former view is held by the Satyākāravāda, the latter by the Alīkākāravāda. The image here refers to the image of blue, etc., as Kamalaśīla points out in MAP. Śāntarakṣita’s criticism of the theory proposed by the Satyākāravādins is focused

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62 MV v. 44:

* ci ste thog ma med rgyud kyi // bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi //
* rnam pa dag ni snang ba yang // nor bas sgyu ma'i rang bzhin 'dra // (Ichigo 1985: 120)

MV v. 45:

* de dge 'on kyang de dag gi / dngos de yang dag nyid dam ci //
* 'on te ma brtags gcig pa na // dga' bar khas len 'di bsam mo // (Ichigo 1985: 124)

63 The theory of atoms is refuted in verse 11-13 of the MA. Ichigo 1985: 56-59.
on the incompatibility of the unitary cognition with the plurality of real images. As long as the Satyākāravādins hold to the reality of the images, that reality inevitably implies the spacious expansion (deśavitānāvasthita) or non-dimensional contiguity in space (deśanairantaryāvasthāna).

To counter this position, Śaṅkara employed a critique based on the criticism of the theory of atoms. He seems to be the only philosopher to have proposed such an approach.

v. 49 If you admit that cognition [consists of as many parts] as the number of [its manifold] forms, then it would be difficult [for you] to avoid the same kind of criticism which is made regarding [the reality of] atoms.  

The Satyākāravādins can neither solve the contradiction nor reasonably explain the process of perception and Śaṅkara attacks them on these points.

Śaṅkara then turns to the theory proposed by the Alīkāravādins:

v. 52 [The Alīkāravāda holds that cognition] does not intrinsically possess these images, but by the force of an error they appear in cognition, although in reality the latter is endowed with no images.  

Alīkāra or nirākāra means that cognition is not endowed with real images. The Alīkāravādins maintain that cognition without images perceives unreal images which are both produced by error and considered to be of imagined nature. But it is a contradiction to hold that the image is cognized but that cognition is not endowed with images. So, Śaṅkara criticizes the idea of the Alīkāravādins that cognition is something clearly different from the image.

v. 54 Indeed, if an item X (e.g. the image “blue”) does not exist in Y (e.g. the cognition “blue”), X cannot be perceived in Y. Just as we neither [feel] pleasure in unpleasurable things, nor [see] non-white color in white things.

v. 59 If it (the image) were unreal, its cognition would [always] appear as cognition without

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60 MA v. 49:  

*ci ste rnam pa’i grangs bzhin du*/ rnam par shes pa khas len na/  
de tshe rdul phran ‘drar ’gyur ba// dpyad pa ’di las bzlog par dka’// (Ichigo 1985: 136)

60 MA 52:  

*ci ste ngo bo nyid du de’i// rnam pa ’di dag med pa ste//  
yang dag tu na rnam med pa’i// rnam par shes la nor bas snang// (Ichigo 1985: 146)

60 MA v. 54:  

’di ltar gang la dngos gang med// de la de shes yod ma yin//  
bde ba min la bde sogs dang// dkar ba rnam la’ang mi dkar bzhin// (Ichigo 1985: 148)
an image. [But] cognition, like a pure crystal, would not perceive [any object].

(2) Haribhadra’s View

Lastly, I would like to show the difference of standpoint between the Alikākāravāda of the Yogācāra and the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika school by referring to Haribhadra’s view. Both admit that the state of paramārtha-satya is the appearance of non-dual true wisdom (consciousness) just as illusion. However, the Alikākāravādins regard non-dual wisdom, though they say it is illusion, as true. On the other hand, Haribhadra maintains that even non-dual true wisdom is not true, i.e., tathya-saṃvrṭī.

Haribhadra can be called *niḥsvabhāva-śūnyatāvādin because he understands all dharmas in the following manner:

(All dharmas are) in reality (tattvatas) free from the consideration of existence and non-existence, agreeable and tacitly accepted as long as they are not investigated critically, and internally as well as externally devoid of the core like the stem of the plantain tree.

His primary opponent (mukhyah pratipakṣah) is introduced in the following manner:

Thus, the kings of yogins (yogiśāḥ) who understand by reasoning and scripture (yuktyāgama) [the truth of] illusion-like non-dual mind (māyopamādvayacitta), and who think that they are ready for knowing reality and unreality, having determined, by the wisdom obtained by hearing and thinking, that the illusion-like non-dual mind is nothing but tathya-saṃvrṭī by nature, and cultivating [that non-dual mind] by means of the respectful, continuous, and long-time specific cultivation (bhāvanā) in the course of eight abhisamayas beginning with omniscience (sarvākāra-jñātā) through the nature of dharmas (dharmatā), i.e. dependent arising (pratītyasamutpāda), cause the stream of the illusion-like non-dual consciousness-only (māyopama-advaya-vijñāna-mātra), which is deprived of all conceptual imaginings (sakala-vikalpa) and which lasts until [the end of] life; they are precisely the primary opponents [for us Mādhymikas].

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67 MA v. 59:

de med na ni shes de yang // rnam pa med pa nyid kyis ’gyur //
shel sgong dag pa ’dra ba yin // shes pa rab ta tshor ba med // (Ichigo 1985: 154)

68 AAA640. 6-8: tattvato bhāvabhāvaparāmarśarahitān avicāraramanītān antarbahis sāravirahināḥ kadāliskandha-nibhān sarvabhāvān.

69 AAA 641. 18-24: tataś ca yuktyāgamābhivyāḥ parividitamāyopamādvayacittāb tattvātattvāvabodhābhudyatama -tayo ’dvayaṃ māyopamaṃ citatām tathyaśaṃvrṭārūpam eva śrutācintāmyayena jñāṇena vyavasthāpya pratītya-
The expression ‘the illusion-like non-dual consciousness-only’ immediately reminds us of the Nirākāra-vijñānavāda but it can apply to Haribhadra, too, who belongs to the line of the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika. Then what is the difference between the two schools? It is the content of ‘understanding things as they really are’ (AAA 640, 21: yathābhūta-padarthavagama) or ‘seeing reality’ (tattvadarśana).

I have already mentioned that if you want to express emptiness (śunyatā) by words, you can do so only by means of ‘non-production’ (anutpāda). And if you want to express emptiness visually, the expression will be ‘non-seeing’ (adarśana); in this connection, Haribhadra gives his own interpretation. His view that non-seeing means seeing the reality is doubtless based upon a passage of the Dharmasaṅgīti-sūtra (法集経 Taisho vol. 17, No. 761, p. 673b21: 名為不見世尊是名正見正法) Both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla quote it and state as follows:

[Śāntarakṣita] “Ultimately, objects of perception, etc., are not cognized” (MAV286-287) and “The Exalted One, non-seeing of any dharma is true seeing.” (ŚS 264: adarśanāṃ bhagavan sarvadharmanāṃ darśanāṃ (sic?) samyagdarśanām.)

[Kamalaśīla] “What is ‘seeing of paramārtha’? It is non-seeing of any dharma.” (BhK I 212: katamaṇḍ paramārthadarśanāṃ / sarvadharmanāṃ adarśanām.)

As far as the Sanskrit version is concerned, the object of ‘non-seeing’ is ‘any dharma=all dharmas’. On the other hand, Haribhadra says the following:

“Non-seeing of any pāramārthika thing through the eye of wisdom is precisely meant to be the ultimate seeing of reality.”

In this way, Haribhadra changed the object of ‘non-seeing’ from ‘any dharma=all dharmas’ to ‘any pāramārthika thing.’ By mentioning ‘pāramārthika thing’ Haribhadra should have had in his mind ‘the illusion-like non-dual mind/consciousness-only’ of Nirākāravādins. And by adding ‘meant to be’ (abhipreta), he interprets it to be the hidden intention of the Sūtra that justifies his own view.

We can see the uniqueness of Haribhadra among those who succeeded the line of Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas in the fact that he read kasyacit pāramārthikasya bhāvasya in the place of sarvadharmanāṃ in the Dharmaksāngīti-sūtra. Furthermore, that symbolically indicates the fundamen-

\[\text{samutpādadharmanām sarvakārajñātādy-aṣṭāḥhisamayakramaṇaḥ sadarāṣṭottara-vardhakālaviśeṣabhāvanayā bhāvavantāḥ samḥṛṣṭasakalavikalpayam ā bhavam anubaddham māyopamādhavavijñānamātra-prabanḍham āsādayantī yogīsāḥ | sa eva mukhyat pratiṣaṅkaḥ |}

\[\text{AAA 640. 23-25: kasyacit pāramārthikasya bhāvasya prajñācakṣuṣā adarśanam eva paramaṇye tattvadarśanam abhipretam.}\]
tal difference between Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras.

**Abbreviations**

AAA: *Abhisamayālaṃkārāloka* of Haribhadra. See Wogihara 1932.

D: Derge edition.


MA: *Madhyamakālaṃkāra-kārikā* of Śāntarakṣita. See Gómez and Silk.

MĀ: *Madhyamakaloka* of Kamalaśīla. D 3887 (Sa 133b4-244a7); P 5287(Sa 133b2-275a4).


MH: *Madhyamakahṛdaya-kārikā* of Bhāviveka. D 3855 (Dza 1b1-40b7); P 5255(Dza 1a1-43b7).

MHV: *Madhyamakahṛdaya-vṛtti Tarkajvālā* of Bhāviveka. D 3856 (Dza 40b7-329b4); P 5256(Dza 43b7-380a7).

MK: *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna. Edited with the *Prasanpadā*.


Ppra: *Prajñāpradīpa Mūlamadhyamaka-vṛtti* of Bhāviveka. D3853 (Tsha 45b4-259b3); P 5253(Tsha 53b3-326a6).

Ppra-ṭīkā: *Prajñāpradīpa-ṭīkā* of Avalokitavrata. D 3859 (Wa 1b1-Za 341a7); P 5259 (Wa 1a1-Za405b7).

PPU: *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* of Ratnākaraśānti. D 4079 (Hi 133b7-162b1), P 5579(Ku 151a4-184b6)

Pras: *Prasanpadā* of Candrakīrti. See de La Vallée Pousin.


SDVP: *Satyadvayavibhāṅga-panjikā* of Śāntarakṣita. D 3883(Sa 15b2-52b7); P 5283(Sa 1a1-48b7).


ŚS: *Śīkṣāsamuccaya* of Śāntideva, ed. by Cecil Bedall, Commissionnaires de l’Academie imperial des sciences, St. Pétersbourg, 1902.

[ ]: Material added on the basis of the commentaries.

( ): Material added by the translator.
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