

# Mādhyamikas in the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*

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## 1 Previous studies and the aim of this paper

Japanese scholars have led the discussion of the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* (PPU) of Ratnākaraśānti. Kajiyama [1965] [1969] first described Ratnākaraśānti's position, the Nirākāravāda. Summing up his long years of research, Umino [2002] [2016] translated several of Ratnākaraśānti's texts and analyzed his view. Katsura [1976] gave a synopsis of PPU, which marked the beginning of comprehensive study of the text. He was the first to show that several kinds of Mādhyamikas appeared in PPU. Matsumoto [1980ab] closely analyzed all the Mādhyamikas mentioned by Ratnākaraśānti and examined the debates between Ratnākaraśānti and the Mādhyamikas not only in PPU but also in his other non-tantric writings. Katsura [1981] criticized the identification of Mādhyamika masters proposed by Matsumoto [1980ab]. After a long interval, Moriyama [2013] followed Matsumoto's identification in the context of the argument on causality. One of the points of dispute they discussed is whether Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti accepted external reality or not. These previous studies also discussed the epistemological position of Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla, i.e. whether they are Alīkākaravādin or Satyākāravādin.

Now the study of Ratnākaraśānti enters into a new phase because of the discovery of Sanskrit manuscripts of PPU. In this paper I analyze the passages that mention Mādhyamikas in PPU, using the Sanskrit text edited by Dr. Luo Hong. There are three types of Mādhyamikas in PPU: Bahirarthavādin, Sākārajñānavādin, and Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin. Reading previous studies,<sup>(1)</sup> I noticed that Ratnākaraśānti called Mādhyamikas “pseudo-Mādhyamikas” and regarded himself as true Mādhyamika

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<sup>(1)</sup>Matsumoto [1980a: 150], Umino [2002: 145], and Moriyama [2013: 54].

in some of his other texts. In this connection, Ratnākaraśānti admits the authority of the *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* attributed to Nāgārjuna, and Umino [2002: 14–21] has already pointed out that Ratnākaraśānti treated Nāgārjuna as an authority. Moreover, Ratnākaraśānti evaluates Mādhyamika more highly than Satyākāravādin/Sākāravijñaptimātravādin Yogācāra. On the basis of these points of view, I will consider Ratnākaraśānti's position in Buddhist history.

## 2 Three types of Mādhyamikas

Now let's take a look at the names and characteristics of Mādhyamikas mentioned in PPU. Ratnākaraśānti criticizes three types of Mādhyamikas by name:<sup>(2)</sup>

1. bahirarthavādinō mādhyamikāḥ
2. sākārajñānavādinō mādhyamikāḥ
3. nirākāravijñaptimātravādinō mādhyamikāḥ

According to Ratnākaraśānti's evaluation the first position is worst, the second is much better, and the third is a match for him on the point that the internal image (*ākāra*) is unreal. I will analyze these positions according to this order.

On the three types of Mādhyamika, previous studies show different identifications. Matsumoto [1980ab] identified as follows: Bahirarthavādin is Candrakīrti, Sākārajñānavādin is Śāntarakṣita or Prajñākaragupta, and Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin is Kambala. His identification is based on Indian sources and informative Tibetan materials. Regarding Matsumoto's identification, Katsura [1981] suggested that Bhāviveka and his followers should be included among the Bahirarthavādins because Bhāviveka admits the conventional existence of external objects, and that it is unreasonable for Prajñākaragupta to be a Mādhyamika. Furthermore, there is no textual evidence to prove that Śāntarakṣita stands on Sākārajñānavāda and he should be regarded as Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin. After much argument, Moriyama [2013: 55] referred to the Bahirarthavādin in PPU and pointed out that the Bahirarthavādin Mādhyamika cannot be identified as Bhāviveka because his argument doesn't appear in the works of Ratnākaraśānti.

I will address the problem of identification below. However, it is not easy even using the Sanskrit text because we do not know whether Ratnākaraśānti imagined a particular person when he described Mādhyamikas, or whether he used these categories abstractly.

<sup>(2)</sup>PPU: tatra bahirarthavādināḥ sākārajñānavādināś ca mādhyamikāḥ śāstrāgamabahirbhūtāḥ pramāṇair api prāg eva nirastāḥ / nirākāravijñaptimātravādināḥ pariśiṣyante /

First, I will introduce the different Mādhyamika positions discussed in PPU, and then I will try to show possible candidates according to the results of modern studies.

## 2.1 The Bahirarthavādin Mādhyamika

The Bahirarthavādin Mādhyamika appears twice in PPU and once in Ratnākaraśānti's *Madhyamakālamkāropadeśa* (MAU). On every occasion, this Mādhyamika asserts the same point that there are external objects of cognition in the conventional level. In MAU<sup>(3)</sup> and on the second appearance in PPU,<sup>(4)</sup> which is more detailed than the first, the Bahirarthavādin presents the following arguments:

On external objects

pakṣa External objects exist conventionally.

hetu Because they are admitted by ordinary people in this world.

dr̥ṣṭānta Just like mind (*citta*) and mental events (*caitta*).

On mind and mental events

pakṣa Mind and mental events are false cognitions.

hetu Because they are self-cognition (*svavedana*), which is impossible.

dr̥ṣṭānta For instance a sword cannot cut itself.

On awakening Cessation of mind and mental events is the awakening (*sambodha*).

Regarding the first point, we could say that Mādhyamikas since Jñānagarbha who knew Dharmakīrti's definition of existence in terms of *arthakriyā* should introduce the concept of *arthakriyā* in the discussion of external reality. However, the Bahirarthavādin

<sup>(3)</sup>MAU (D228b3–6, P263a8–b5): gañ yañ dbu ma pa kha cig na re 'jig rten la (D las) grags pa ni kun rdzob yin te / phyi rol gyi don yañ 'jig rten la grags pa yin (P omits pa yin) pas / sems dañ sems las byuñ ba bzin du de yañ kun rdzob tu yod pa yin no // sems dañ sems las byuñ ba ni 'khrul pa yin te / rañ gi rig pa 'gal ba'i phyir ral gri'i sos rañ mi gcod pa bzin no // gzan rig pa yañ bsld pa tsam du 'u bu cag gñi ga 'dod do // de bas na 'khrul pa zad pas don dam pa rtogs (P rtog) pa'i phyir ro // sañ rgyas pa rnams ni sems dañ sems las byuñ ba zad pa ñid do // gañ gi tshe de rnams kyi skye ba de'i tshe chos thams cad skye ba med pa'i don dam par rjes su byed pa thob pas myoñ bar gzag (P bzag) go // mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pa ni sems can sna tshogs pa'i don bya ba'i phyir gzugs byin gyis brlabs te gzag (P bzag) nas / yañ dag pa'i byañ chub mñon du byed do zer ba dag ni smad pa las kyañ smad par 'gyur ba yin te /

<sup>(4)</sup>PPU: yat tu mādhyamika eva kaścīd āha / lokapratītiḥ saṃvṛtiḥ pratītiś ca loke bahirartha itī so 'pi saṃvṛtyāsti cittacaittavat // bhrāntās tu cittacaittāḥ / svavedane 'ser iva (or 'sir eva) svacchedane virodhāt / paravedanasya ca viplavamātratvād ubhayasammatāt // tasmād bhrāntikṣayaḥ paramārthasambodhaś ca buddhānāṃ cittacaittakṣaya eva // yadā hi teṣāṃ atyantam abhāvas tadā tair dharmānāṃ atyantābhāvaḥ paramārthaḥ sārūpyalābhād vidito bhavati // apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇaṃ tu viśvārthakaraṇāya rūpakāyam adhiṣṭhāya paścāt paramārthasambodhād iti //

Mādhyamika under discussion simply says that external objects exist conventionally. Therefore, he may be located before the period of Dharmakīrti or he may be one who was not interested at all in Dharmakīrtian ontology. Considering this, both Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti can be candidates for the Bahirarthavādin because both of them are known to argue that external objects exist from the conventional point of view.<sup>(5)</sup>

Regarding the second point, there is no doubt that Candrakīrti strongly denied the theory of self-cognition;<sup>(6)</sup> Bhāviveka's attitude toward it, however, is not yet clear. Recently, several studies<sup>(7)</sup> have argued that Bhāviveka denied the Yogācāra idea that cognition possesses two aspects, viz. appearance of an object and that of cognition. But those studies refrain from commenting on Bhāviveka's attitude toward self-cognition because Bhāviveka didn't directly mention self-cognition itself in the context of the two aspects of cognition. As a result, Candrakīrti seems to be a better candidate for the Bahirarthavādin Mādhyamika, if Candrakīrti was famous for his criticism of self-cognition at Ratnākaraśānti's time.

## 2.2 The Sākārajñānavādin Mādhyamika

According to Ratnākaraśānti, illumination (*prakāśa*) is real but the internal image (*ākāra*) is unreal, while for the Sākārajñānavādin both illumination and the image are real.<sup>(8)</sup> Now, the Sākārajñānavādin argues that if illumination and the image were distinct from each other, then no image would ever illuminate itself or manifest, which is absurd; therefore, illumination and the image must be identical with each other. Consequently, the image is as real as illumination, or else illumination is as unreal as the image.

The name "Sākārajñānavādin" in PPU easily recalls the Sautrāntika. And we know that Bhāviveka held the Sautrāntika position in the conventional level. In fact, Kajiyama [1982: 225] once concluded that the conventional position of Bhāviveka shows a certain stage of Sautrāntika between Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti. Recently Saito [2006: 104] has argued that Bhāviveka's theory of perception more or less agrees with the Sautrāntika's.<sup>(9)</sup>

<sup>(5)</sup>Cf. Matsumoto [1980a: 156–164], Ichigo [1988: 267–272], and Akahane [2012].

<sup>(6)</sup>*Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.72–77, *Prasannapadā* chapter 1 (de la Vallée Poussin edition: 61–63, MacDonald edition and translation: Section 96). Kellner [2011: 417–419] is arguing about *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.73.

<sup>(7)</sup>Saito [2008ab], Kellner [2010: 226–227 and n. 72], and Katsura [2014: 6]. See also Kajiyama [1982].

<sup>(8)</sup>PPU: kecit tu yogācārāḥ kecit ca mādhyamikāḥ sākārajñānavādināḥ tad āhuḥ / alikānalīkayor nīlaprakāśayor tādātmyānupapattir viruddhadharmādhyāsāt / tādātmyābhāve ca na nīlaṃ prakāśet / tasmāt prakāśasyātmaiva nīlaṃ / vastubhūtaṃ ca nīlaṃ anāropitaṃ vā / vastubhūtād anāropitād vā prakāśād avyāyirekāḍ iti //

<sup>(9)</sup>Saito [2006: 104]: Secondly, this theory of perception of Bhāviveka's more or less agrees with that of

However, it is to be noted that the above argument of Sākārajñānavādin in PPU is usually given by the Satyākāravādin of the Yogācāra school such as Jñānaśrīmitra.<sup>(10)</sup> The Sākārajñānavādin Mādhyamika in PPU emphasizes the reality of the internal image. Further, it may be that Mādhyamikas like Bhāviveka did not argue whether the internal image is real or not at his time. Therefore, it is impossible to identify the Sākārajñānavādin Mādhyamika with Bhāviveka. Possible candidates for the Sākārajñānavādin Mādhyamika in PPU might be later Mādhyamikas. At least, it is important that Ratnākaraśānti introduced the argument of the Sākārajñānavādin to prove that the mental image is unreal.

### 2.3 The Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika

The Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika in PPU insists that everything is unreal.<sup>(11)</sup> The point at issue is the unreality of illumination. Of course, for Ratnākaraśānti the internal image is unreal, since he is also a Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin. For this Mādhyamika, however, not only the image but also illumination is unreal. Even emptiness is unreal. Ratnākaraśānti calls this position “pseudo-Mādhyamika (*dBu ma ltar snan ba*)” in other works, i.e. MAU and the *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti* (*-madhyamapratipadāsiddhi*) (MAV).<sup>(12)</sup> All Mādhyamikas share the position that everything is unreal from the absolute point of view. But this argument regarding illumination and the image occurred famously in Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla’s works. So when Ratnākaraśānti in PPU refers to Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika, and also Sākārajñānavādin mentioned above, it may be possible that he meant Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

We would need more time to discuss later Mādhyamikas’ position on internal images in detail; however, I would like to bring in some materials. Towards the end of his *Tarkabhāṣā* Mokṣākaragupta quotes *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* verse 49 to show the fault of Sākāravādin.<sup>(13)</sup> Here we can infer that Mokṣākaragupta took the position of Śāntarakṣita

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the so-called “mDo sde [spyod pa’i] dBu ma pa (\*Sautrāntika-Mādhyamika)” as depicted in the Tibetan doxographical tradition.

<sup>(10)</sup>As the latest research, Tomlinson [2018: 356–360] efficiently summarized the argument between Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrīmitra. Furthermore, the article analyzed the Tantric writing of Ratnākaraśānti in order to clarify its context.

<sup>(11)</sup>PPU: teṣām api kutaḥ prakāśo ’likaḥ / alikāvyatirekān nilādyākāravād iti cet / ... / atha vā śūnyatayā vyabhicārād anekāntaḥ / sāpy aliketi cet / ....

<sup>(12)</sup>See n. 15 and 16.

<sup>(13)</sup>Final section of the *Tarkabhāṣā*, Rangaswami edition [1952: 70–71] (Cf. Kajiyama [1966: 150–151] [1978: 542–543]): yatra hi lokasya bāhyārthavyavahāras tad eva sākāravādinō jñānam, tato yat tasya bahirbhāve bādhaḥ tad evāntarbhāve ’pi bādhaḥ / na hi sthūlam ekam anekaṃ ca paramāṇurūpam apīṣyate / vijñānātmaṅkānam ayam ākāro yady ekaḥ sthūlo yadi vānekaḥ paramāṇuśo bhinnāḥ ubhay-

as Nirākāravijñaptimātravāda. In addition it is known that Kamalaśīla called himself a “Nirākāravijñānavādin” in his commentary on *karmaphalasaṃbandhaparīkṣā* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha*.<sup>04</sup> However, the situation is not simple. In the same chapter it seems that Kamalaśīla also took the position of a Sākāravādin and criticized a Nirākāravādin.

Here the most important point is that the Mādhyamika takes neither a Sākāra nor a Nirākāra position ultimately. In his analysis of the later Mādhyamikas, Ichigo [2015] concludes that Nirākāravāda was a rival of Śāntarakṣita and that Haribhadra criticized Nirākāravāda to prove the validity of Mādhyamika view of the world.

In the end of this section, it should be emphasized why Ratnākaraśānti criticized Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika in PPU. It should be clear that Ratnākaraśānti did it to prove that illumination is real. In other words, the aim of criticizing the Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika in PPU is to prove bare illumination (*prakāśamātra*). As I mentioned above, the aim of criticizing the Sākārajñānavādin Mādhyamika in PPU is to prove that images are unreal. This is an important difference, and we should pay attention to the intention of each of Ratnākaraśānti’s criticisms.

### 3 Intention of criticizing Mādhyamikas

Ratnākaraśānti tries to establish his standpoint by distinguishing himself from other schools of Buddhism. In MAU he presents four opponents by name: Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, pseudo-Mādhyamika, and Yogācāra.<sup>05</sup> When he actually criticizes them, the

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athāpi bāhyārthapakṣabhāvidūṣaṇam aśakyam uddhartum / [\*- Lack of Sanskrit: *dBu ma rgyan du / bdag ñid chen po bodhisatva yis //*

*ci ste rnam pa'i grañs bzin du // rnam par śes pa khas len na //*

*de tshe rdul phran 'drar gyur pa'i // dpyad pa 'di las bzlog par dka' //* (*Madhyamakālamkāra* verse 49)

*zes gsuñs so // -\** na hi tad vijñāne bahirbhāvanibandhanaṃ dūṣaṇam / yena tad bhāvena bhavet / mūrtinimittaṃ bādhaḥ; nāmūrte vijñānātmani ity api nissāram / sākāratāyāṃ vijñānasyāpi mūrtatvāt / ayam eva hi deśāvitānavā(n ākāro) mūrtir iti //

<sup>04</sup>*Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā*, Śāstrī edition [1968: 226]: yacobhayor doṣo na tatraikaś codyo yuktaḥ. tena yad atrottaram bhavatas tad asmākam api bhaviṣyati. tathā hi sākārapakṣe bhavātāvaśyam “ākārāṇāṃ alikatvaṃ sahopalambhaniyamād vaikajñānāvvyatirekitvaṃ saty api bhedo” ity uttaram upavarṇānyam. tad evāsmākaṃ bhaviṣyati. nirākārapakṣe ‘pi “pūrvahetukṛta eva pratiniyatārthābodbhakaḥ svabhāvo jñānasya” iti varṇānyam. tadaitad asmākam api nirākāravijñānavādināṃ bauddhānām uttaram bhaviṣyatīty acodyam etat samādhānam iti parihārah. Cf. Watanabe [1967: 25], Shimizu [1983: 24], Nishizawa [1995: 22], and Funayama [2007: 191, n. 24].

<sup>05</sup>MAU (D226b4–5, P261a1–3): gzan dag sañs rgyas pa rnam pa'i don rig par 'dod pa ni Bye brag tu smra ba'o / (1) gañ zig rnam pa med pa'i śes pas sñon po la sogs pa'i don rig par 'dod pa ni Bye brag tu smra ba'o // (2) gañ zig don gyis phan btags pa'i gzugs brñan gyi rnam pa ñams su myoñ ba don rig par 'dod pa ñid ni mDo sde pa'o // (3) gzan dBu ma ltar snañ ba'i phyogs gsum dañ / (4) rNal 'byor spyod pa'i phyogs

order of the last two is changed: Yogācāra, then pseudo-Mādhyamika. Of course, this “Yogācāra” criticized by Ratnākaraśānti in MAU stands for Sākāravijñaptimātravāda or Satyākāravāda.

We must first pay attention to the expression “pseudo-Mādhyamika (*dBu ma ltar snañ ba*).” In Ratnākaraśānti’s MAV, we find the same name listed as one of the Buddhist schools; he refers to Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra or Mādhyamika who advocates the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), and pseudo-Mādhyamika.<sup>(6)</sup> Ratnākaraśānti defines pseudo-Mādhyamika as one who emphasizes that everything is unreal, which reminds us of the third Mādhyamika who is referred to as the Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin in PPU, and who does not admit the reality of illumination. Then Ratnākaraśānti emphasizes in the MAV that the true Mādhyamika should advocate the three natures. If someone cannot explain that, he is a pseudo-Mādhyamika. In other words, someone who admits the three natures and bare illumination is the true Mādhyamika, who turns out to be Ratnākaraśānti himself.

According to Moriyama [2013: 53–54]<sup>(7)</sup> Ratnākaraśānti substantiates his understanding of Madhyamaka by relying upon Nāgārjuna’s *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* 24.18. As Moriyama says “Commenting on this famous stanza about emptiness, Ratnākaraśānti equates “dependent origination” (*pratītyasamutpāda*) with other-dependent nature (*paratantrasvabhāva*), and “emptiness” (*śūnyatā*) with the absence of imagined nature. Moreover, he connects “dependent designation” (*prajñaptir upādāya*) with the Yogācāra concept of the imagination of non-existence (*abhūtaparikalpa*) that functions by constructing various everyday objects in accordance with latent impressions. In this manner, he harmonizes the Yogācāra doctrine of three natures (*trisvabhāva*) with Nāgārjuna’s claim.” From this source we know that Ratnākaraśānti calls himself a “Mādhyamika,” that is, a true Mādhyamika—like Nāgārjuna who, on this interpretation, admits the three natures.

In PPU Ratnākaraśānti considers that the Mādhyamika who emphasizes that every-

bzi / tshad ma dañ luñ dañ bstan bcos la mkhas pa rnam kyis (P kyi) sun dbyuñ bar bya ste /

<sup>(6)</sup>MAV (D120a2–4, P237b7–238a2): de lta bas na / de ñid rañ bzin gsum ’dod par gyur pa yin te / tshul ’di ni dbu ma par rigs so // de lta bas na sañs rgyas pa bzi ji ltar yin / (1) gañ žig rnam pa med pa’i šes pas sñon po la sogs pa’i don rig par ’dod pa ni Bye brag tu smra ba’o // (2) gañ žig don gyis (P gyi) phan btags pas gzugs brñan gyi rnam pa ñams su myoñ bas don rig par ’dod pa ñid ni mDo sde pa’o // (3) yañ gañ žig rnam par šes pa las phyi’i don (P omits don) sñon po la sogs pa mi ’dod kyi / ’on kyañ ’di dag rnam par šes pa ñid yin mod kyi / thog ma med pa’i bag chags kyi stobs kyis (P kyi) sñon po la sogs pa bskyed pa yin par smra ba de dag ni rnal ’byor spyod pa pa yin la rañ bzin gsum du smra ba (P bas) ni dBu ma pa’o // (4) yañ gañ žig thams cad brdzun par smra ba ni dBu ma ltar snañ ba yin no //

<sup>(7)</sup>Also see Luo [2018: 578–582].

thing is unreal is opposed to him only on the point of bare illumination (*prakāśamātra*).<sup>08</sup> This is the difference between the true Mādhyamika and the pseudo-Mādhyamika. Furthermore Ratnākaraśānti seems to evaluate the Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika more highly than the Sākāravijñaptimātravādin Yogācāra, which may explain why he called himself “Mādhyamika.”

In this connection I would like to explain Ratnākaraśānti’s intention of quoting *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* (YṢ) in PPU.<sup>09</sup> Frequently he quotes YṢ as one of his *āgamas*. For instance, YṢ verse 34cd is quoted when he authorizes his position about the reality of illumination in conversation with Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika. In other words Ratnākaraśānti wants to show that the Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin Mādhyamika is contradicted by Nāgārjuna’s own statement in YṢ. In fact it is hard to prove Ratnākaraśānti’s position by citing the YṢ in this case; still Ratnākaraśānti resorts to the authority of Nāgārjuna. In this way Ratnākaraśānti tries to show that he belongs to the stream of scholars initiated by Nāgārjuna. Ratnākaraśānti was in sympathy with Mādhyamika.

#### 4 Conclusion

In this paper, I have described three types of Madhyamaka positions in PPU and why these positions were criticized by Ratnākaraśānti. His criticism of the Mādhyamikas had an indispensable role in proving his own position, namely, that the internal image (*ākāra*) is not real but bare illumination (*prakāśamātra*) is real. Ratnākaraśānti called these Mādhyamikas pseudo-Mādhyamikas in his other non-tantric writings, while Ratnākaraśānti thought of himself as a real Mādhyamika who belonged to the lineage of Nāgārjuna. According to Ratnākaraśānti real Mādhyamikas should resort to the theory of the three natures (*trīsvabhāva*), the core doctrine of Yogācāra.

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<sup>08</sup>PPU: iyāms tu viśeṣaḥ / yat tat prakāśamātraṃ dharmāṇāṃ nijaṃ rūpaṃ tad dravyato ’stīti yogācārāḥ / tad api dravyato nāstīti mādhyamikāḥ /

<sup>09</sup>Cf. Umino [2002: 14–21], Isaacson [2013: 1041–1043], and Luo [2018: 594].



## Mādhymikas in PPU

Name	External object	Ākāra	Prakāśa	Description
Bahirarthavādin	real	–	–	nirākārajñāna
Sākārajñānavādin	–*	real	real	ākāra = satya
Nirākāravijñaptimātravādin	unreal	unreal	unreal	ākāra & prakāśa = alika
Ratnākaraśānti	unreal	unreal	real	ākāra = alika, prakāśamātra

\*No description that external object is inferred in PPU.

## Abbreviation

MAU: *Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa* of Ratnākaraśānti; D4085, P5586.

MAV: *Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti(-madhyamapratīpadāsiddhi)* of Ratnākaraśānti; D4072, P5573.

PPU: *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* of Ratnākaraśānti; Luo, Hong. *Ratnākaraśānti's Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, Sanskrit texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region, China Tibetology Publishing House, Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, Beijing-Vienna forthcoming.

YṢ: *Yuktiśaṣṭikā* of Nāgārjuna; Scherrer-Schaub, Cristina Anna. *Yuktiśaṣṭikāvṛtti: Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maître indien Candrakīrti*, Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques 25, Bruxelles 1991.

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**keywords:** *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, Ratnākaraśānti, Mādhyamika