# Common scriptural sources cited by Ratnākaraśānti and Kamalaśīla

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### 1. Introductory remarks

Since ancient times, Buddhist philosophers have proved the validity of their views through two main methods: logical reasoning (yukti) and scriptural citations ( $\bar{a}gama$ ). Even after Dignāga (ca. 480–540) and Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) established the so-called Buddhist logic and epistemology, which accepted direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) as the only valid means of cognition (pramāṇa), Buddhist philosophers continued quoting scripture to support their statements. Dignāga incorporated scripture ( $\bar{a}gama$ ) and verbal knowledge (śābda) into inference, whereas Dharmakīrti did not accept  $\bar{a}gama$  as a valid means of cognition. However, he argued that when a scripture is coherent (sambaddha), presents a suitable means for obtaining results (anuguṇopāya), and teaches a proper human aim (puruṣārtha), it is worth investigating whether it is a valid means of cognition. (2)

Ratnākaraśānti (ca. 970–1030), who was active during the last period of the history

<sup>(1)</sup>See PS 2.5a and 5.1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(2)</sup>See PVSV 108,9–16 on PV 1.214. In addition to this, if a scripture passes the following three fold test, then it is reliable, or has a non-belying nature (avisamvāda): it is invalidated neither by (1) direct perception, nor (2) inference that functions by the force of real entities (vastubalapravṛttānumāna), nor (3) inference which depends on scripture (āgamāpekṣānumāna or āgamāśritānumāna). (PVSV 108,20–109,4 on PV 1.215) For details of this issue, see PVSV 108,1–109,22 on PV 1. 214–217; Tillemans 1999: 27–36; Yaita 2005: 443–449; Krasser 2012: 86f., 108–111, 116f. etc.

 $<sup>^{(3)}</sup>$ Ratnākaraśānti states that in the first stage of the three kinds of insight  $(prajn\bar{a})$ , i.e., insight produced through hearing  $(\acute{s}rutamay\bar{\imath})$ , one requires a certain level of examination as well as hearing sutras. (PPU 13,8–12:  $tatra\ bodhisattvapiṭakasya\ prajnaparamitadinam\ anyatamasutrasya\ v\bar{a}$ ,  $ihaiva\ v\bar{a}$ 

of Indian Buddhism, cites various scriptural passages in his  $Praj\tilde{n}ap\bar{a}ramitopadeśa$  (hereafter PPU). Meanwhile, Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), in order to demonstrate scriptural authority and link his views to Buddhist tradition, also quotes a number of passages from Buddhist scriptures or sutras in his works, such as the  $Tattvasamgrahapa\tilde{n}jik\bar{a}$  (hereafter TSP),  $Bh\bar{a}van\bar{a}krama$ , and  $Ny\bar{a}yabindup\bar{u}rvapakṣasamkṣepa$  (hereafter NBPS). When we review the citations of Ratnākaraśānti and Kamalaśīla, we find that they frequently cite the same passages. From this fact, it is possible to distinguish differences between their readings and interpretations of the two cited texts and the intent of their citations, as well as reveal any disagreements between the two authors. As will be discussed in detail later, these passages are used to posit different ideas about the goals of Buddhism.

This paper aims to deal with the above-mentioned works by Ratnākaraśānti and Kamalaśīla, list their common citations, observe why and in what contexts they are cited, consider these two masters' philosophical positions, and examine how these texts have been transmitted, recognized, and interpreted in the history of Buddhist philosophy.

samāhṛtānāṃ nānāsūtrapradeśānām samyag eva śrutvā svayam api ca kvacit kimcid abhyūhya[em. (cf. brtags te T): abhasya Text] yathāśabdārthasambandhasādhano vyañjanato 'rthataś ca samyagniścayo dhāraṇaṃ ca śrutamayī prajñā.) At the stage of insight through reflection (cintāmayī), on the other hand, he thinks that examination through reasoning plays a major role. (PPU 13,15–17: tam evārtham ekākino rahogatasya samyag eva yuktyā vicārayatas tasyārthasya satyatve bhūtatve yuktisādhana evam evaitan nānyathety ekāntaniścayaś cintāmayī prajñā.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(4)</sup>I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Luo Hong, who edited the Sanskrit text of the PPU, for his permission to refer to his unpublished draft of the edition. With regard to the locations of the text, I follow his edition's page number.

<sup>(5)</sup> His teacher Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) describes yukti and āgama as follows: MAV 14,5–20,3: de bas na rigs pa dang lung gi chos thams cad rang bzhin med par khong du chud par bya ba'i phyir rab tu 'bad do // de la lung dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa'i rjes su dpag pa dang bral ba ni dad pas rjes su 'brang ba rnams kyang shin tu yongs su tshim par mi 'gyur bas rigs pa je brjod par bya'o // "Therefore, [further] effort is made through yukti and āgama for the purpose of understanding that all dharmas are void of the intrinsic natures. In that case, a scripture, [when it is used] without inference that functions by the force of real entities (\*vastubalapravrttānumāna), would be totally unsatisfactory even for those who follow [certain scriptural passages] on the basis of their faith. Therefore, yukti should be [first] explained." (For a translation of this portion, see also Ichigo 1985: 119 and Keira 2006: 179.) Kamalašīla basically agrees with Śāntarakṣita's view. He argues that proof through āgama as well as through yukti is necessary: MAP 21,19–21: lung ni rigs pa'i rgyan yin pa'i phyir ro // de lta ma yin na 'di ni rtog ge pa skam[D sgam P, Ichigo] pos brtags pa yin no zhes mi mkhas pa kha cig gis brnyas par yang 'gyur ro // "Because āgama is what decorates yukti. Otherwise (if āgama is never used), certain unintelligent persons might also despise [yukti by stating] that this [proof] is imagined by hollow logicians." (See also Ichigo 1985: 196, n. 6 and Keira 2006: 179)

## 2. Common sources cited by Ratnākaraśānti and Kamalaśīla

# 2.1. Relationship between the two authors

As Kajiyama, Umino, Katsura, and others pointed out, (6) Ratnākaraśānti's works are connected with Kamalaśīla's. There are several similarities between the PPU and BhK, including in their thought, structure, and quotations. The typical example is that both authors cite three verses from the Lańkāvatārasūtra (hereafter LAS), i.e., LAS 10.256–258, though they interpret them differently. It is important to take into account Śāntarakṣita's work when considering Kamalaśīla's thought, quotation policies, and so forth. In this paper, however, we focus on Kamalaśīla's works; he wrote commentaries on Śāntarakṣita's primary works, including the Madhyamakālańkāra (hereafter MA) and Tattvasaṃgraha (hereafter TS), and frequently cites scriptures in his own works. We hypothesize that Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla share almost the same philosophical position.

The following is a list of quotations common to Ratnākaraśānti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla.

# 2.2. List of quotations in the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa

No.	Quoted texts	Ratnākara- śānti (PPU)	Śāntarakṣita	Kamalaśīla	Other texts
Q1	AKBh 301,7f. (Cf.『雑阿 含経第十三』Taisho no. 99, vol. 2, 91a27f.)	PPU 14,11f.		TSP 14,21f.; 618,22f.	BCAP 187,10f.
Q2	LAS(N) 10.709 (353,3f.); LAS(V) 10.709 (154,3f.)	PPU 34,10- 13; 46,21-24	MAV 194,7–10	BhK I 204,4f., MĀ D222a6f.; P246b3	
Q3	LAS(N) 3.96 (201,14f.), 10.592 (338,11f.); LAS(V) 3.96 (81,31f.), 10.592 (146,9f.)	PPU 35,15–18	MAV 300,10- 13	MAP 301,11- 13	
Q4	Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 21 (Cf. LAS 2.140; 10.85)	PPU 35,20-23	MAV 302,2–5	MAP 303,2f.	Cf. <b>Q15</b> . JN 488,22f.
Q5	Yuktişaşţikā 34	PPU 35,24– 36,2; 49,31– 50,3	MAV 302,6-9	MAP 303,4–16	JN 405,1f.
Q6	LAS(N) 2.175 (116,9f.), 10.167 (287,1f.); LAS(V) 2.173 (48,9f.), 10.167 (118,17f.)	PPU 38,1-4	MAV 174,7–10	MAP 175,8–11	

 $<sup>^{(6)}</sup>$  Kajiyama 2008: 153–162; Kajiyama 2010: 355–362; Umino 2002: 56–61, 308–319; Katsura 1976: 484.

Q7	LAS(N) 2.198 (132,8f.), 10.374 (312,16f.); LAS(V) 2.196 (54,15f.), 10.374 (132,3f.)	PPU 38,5–8	MAV 174,11– 14	MĀ D153b3; P166b7f., MAP 175,12- 21	
Q8	LAS(N) 3.48 (167,16f.), 10.91 (276,7f.); LAS(V) 3.48 (68,16f.), 10.91 (113,13f.)	PPU 38,9–12	MAV 176,1–4	MAP 177,1–14	
<b>Q</b> 9	LAS(N) 3.53 (168,9f.); LAS(V) 3.53 (68,16f.)	PPU 38,13-16	MAV 176,5–8	MAP 177,15– 25	
Q10	LAS(N) 6.5 (229,6f.), 10.638 (344,5f.); LASV 6.5 (93,17f.), 10.638 (149,7f.)	PPU 39,9–12	MAV 304,9–12	MAP 305,3–15	
Q11	Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra (ed. A. Sastri) 5,8f.	$\begin{array}{cc} \text{PPU} & 40,\!17- \\ 20^{(7)} & \end{array}$		TSP 15,14–15; 339,22f.	MH 5.75. Cf. LAS 3.82, 10.500.
Q12	LAS(N) 10.489ab (326,8); LAS(V) 10.489ab (139,19)	PPU 41,4f. <sup>(8)</sup>	MAV 292,22f.	BhK I 203,11	
Q13	Cf. LAS(N) 62,7–10 (Cf. LAS 62,7–10.); LAS(V) 27,10–12	PPU 53,8f.		TSP 41,24	
Q14	LAS(N) 3.96 (201,14f.), 10.592 (338,11f.); LAS(V) 3.96 (81,31f.), 10.592 (146,9f.)	PPU 53,14–17	MAV 300,10- 13	MAP 301,11- 13	Cf. <b>Q2</b> .
Q15	Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 21	PPU 53,21–24	MAV 302,2–5	MAP 303,2f.	Cf. <b>Q4</b> , LAS(N) 2.140, 10.85.
Q16	$\dot{Sa}$ listambhas $\bar{u}$ tra (ed. J. D. Schoening) 403,9–404,1 (6B.8)	PPU 54,1f.		Cf. TSP 13,18f.	BCAP 270,4–6.
Q17	Paramārthagāthā 5 (Yogācārabhūmi, Cintāmayī bhūmi)	PPU 54,8-11 <sup>(9)</sup>		TSP 14,1f., NBPS D93b4f.; P115a4	BCAP 187,13f.
Q18	Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra Taisho no. 99, vol. 2, (『雑阿含経』「勝義空性経」) 92c20f.	PPU 54,19f.		Cf. TSP 14, 10–12	Cf. LAS(N) 10.185 [289,8f.]; LAS(V) 10.185 [119,23f.], AKBh 129,9-11
Q19	LAS(N) 10.568 (335, 15f.); LAS(V) 10.568 (144,22f.)	PPU 57,2–5			
Q20	Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (ed. E. Lamotte) III §7. 47,20–23	PPU 65,8–11		BhK III 1,8f.	

 $<sup>^{(7)} \</sup>mathrm{PPU}$ 40,16: uktaṃ cāryalaṅkāvatāre ...

 $<sup>^{(8)} \</sup>mathrm{PPU}$ 41,3: api coktam bhagavatā ...

 $<sup>^{(9)} \</sup>mathrm{PPU}$ 54,7: uktam cāryalankāvatāre ...

Q21	LAS(N) 10.256 (298, 15f.); LAS(V) 10.256 (124,11f.)	PPU 79,17–20	MAV 296,15– 18	BhK I 210,9f., MAP 297,5– 10, MĀ D157a5; P171a2–4
Q22	LAS(N) 10.257 (298,17– 299,1); LAS(V) 10.257 (124,13f.)	PPU 79,21- 80,2	MAV 298,1–4	BhK I 210, 11f., MĀ D157a5f.; P171a2-4, MAP 299,1- 27
Q23	LAS(N) 10.258 (299,2f.); LAS(V) 10.258 (124,15f.)	PPU 80,3-6	MAV 300,1-4	BhK I 210, 13f., MĀ D157a6; P171a2-4, MAP 301,1-9

#### 2.3. Observations

Quotations from the LAS are the most common. The LAS passages quoted in the PPU, most of which are in verse form, are also quoted either in Śāntarakṣita's Madhya-makālaṅkāravṛtti (hereafter MAV) or Kamalaśīla's works with only one exception (Q19). This suggests that Ratnākaraśānti may have referred to the MAV, and presumably Kamalaśīla's BhK, TSP, and other works when quoting scriptural passages.

On the other hand, there are at least two quotations (Q11 and Q17) that are not found in the available texts of the LAS, though Ratnākaraśānti clearly ascribes them to the LAS. While a verse similar to Q11 can be found in the LAS (LAS 3.82, 10.500), they are not identical. Q11 is actually a quote from the *Bhavasaṃkrāntisūtra*. I address Q17 in the next chapter.

### 3. Problems concerning the Lankāvatārasūtra

# 3.1. The source of the verse teaching the Buddhist theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) Ratnākaraśānti uses **Q17**, which, like **Q11**, he ascribes to the LAS, as follows.

[This sprout as an effect] is neither what is produced merely by a cause, nor what is produced merely by a condition, nor what is produced by both [of them], because an action, desire, and [the nature of] being an agent are not present [in a cause or condition], for an action is not observed in anything at all, and is not connected with anything, because entities are momentary. And [the following] is stated in the *Lańkāvatārasūtra*:

All the conditioned factors are momentary. Why are there actions in what are not steady? [There is no action in them.] [The fact that] these (all the momentary conditioned factors) are produced is [called] "action," and the very same [fact] (their production) is called what is engaged in action

 $(k\bar{a}raka)$ .(10)

Ratnākaraśānti quotes this verse in order to show that all entities are momentary and that no action can be cognized in such entities. As I indicated in the footnotes, this verse is also quoted in the TSP, with the words "stated also by the Bhagavat (i.e., the Buddha)," to confirm that all entities are momentary and there are no permanent entities. (11) It is also quoted in the NBPS, with the words "stated also in a sutra," to confirm that the means of valid cognition  $(pram\bar{a}na)$  has no effect as an action. (12) Here we find that the context of the quote in the PPU is more similar to that in the NBPS than in the TSP.

As shown in the above list, this verse is in the  $Par\bar{a}m\bar{a}rthag\bar{a}th\bar{a}$  (hereafter PG), which is part of the  $Yog\bar{a}c\bar{a}rabh\bar{u}mi$ . According to Schmithausen 1987, there are at least several verses among the PG (which is composed of a total of 44 verses) that are originally from some earlier sources, (13) therefore, it is likely that other PG verses derive from scriptures or paracanonical sources as well. He also points out the possibility that the original verses were written in Middle Indian (Prākrit), due to the existence of surviving variant readings and the fact that this verse is quoted as the Buddha's teaching in the  $Bodhicary\bar{a}vat\bar{a}ra$ -

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(0)</sup>PPU 54,4–12: na hetumātreņa krto na pratyayamātreņa nāpy ubhayena kriyāsamīhākartrītvānām abhāvāt. na hi kriyā kasyacid upalabhyate, nāpi yujyate kṣaṇikatvād bhāvānām. uktam cāryalaṅkāvatāre: kṣaṇikāh sarvasaṃskārāh asthirāṇāṃ kutaḥ kriyā /

bhūtir yaiṣāṃ(a) kriyā saiva kārakaṃ(b) saiva cocyate //(c) iti.

<sup>(</sup>a) yaiṣāṃ PPU (cf. gang yang 'di rnams PPU[T]), TSP, DAṬ, Schmithausen 1987: 506, n. 1394 : yeṣāṃ PG, TSP[Jaisalmer Ms., Pāṭaṇ Ms.], BCAP

<sup>(</sup>b) kārakam PPU, TSP[Krishnamacharya's edition, Shastri's edition], DAT: kārakah PG

<sup>(</sup>c) PG 5 in the  $Yog\bar{a}c\bar{a}rabh\bar{u}mi$  (Wayman 1984: 344); This verse is also quoted in TSP 14,1f., NBPS D93b4f. (Tosaki 1984: 482,3–6), BCAP 189,13f., DAT 134,17f., LAV D19b3, 118a2f., 162b1, 195a2, 203a2, 205b6, 210a3, 226a1, 230a6f. etc. (I would here like to express my gratitude to Ms. Hiroko Matsuoka for informing me that this verse is cited in the LAV.)

<sup>(</sup>I)TSP 13,20–14,2: atha sa tam evambhūtam pratītyasamutpādam kim akṣanikam jagāda. nety āha: calam (TS 1b) iti. calam asthiram kṣanikam iti yāvat. anyasya calatvāyogād iti bhāvah. tatredam uktam bhaqavatā:

ksanikāh sarvasamskārā asthirānām kutah kriyā /

bhūtir yaisām(a) kriyā saiva kārakam saiva cocyate // iti.

<sup>(</sup>a) yaiṣām Jaisalmer Ms., Pāṭaṇ Ms. : yeṣām Shastri's edition, Krishnamacharya's edition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(2)</sup>NBPS D93b5f.; P115a4–6 (Tosaki 1984: 482,8–10): 'dis ni byed pa po dang las la sogs pa'i dngos po yang dag par bkag pas bya ba la sogs pa thams cad kyi khongs su 'dus pa spangs pa'i phyir / bya ba'i mtshan nyid kyi 'bras bu don gzhan du gyur pa bkag pa yin no // "Because [the view that] entities such as an agent and action are [mutually different and] really [existent] is negated by this [statement in the verse], it is [also] refuted that [a process of cognition] consists of all [the mutually different entities] including an action. Therefore, [Dharmakīrti] denies that an effect [of pramāṇa], whose characteristic is [regarded as being] an action, is an entity different [from pramāṇa itself in Nyāyabindu 1.18: tad eva ca pratyakṣaṃ jñānam pramāṇaphalam]."

<sup>(3)</sup> Schmithausen 1987: 223.

 $pa\tilde{n}jik\bar{a}$  (hereafter BCAP). (14)(15)

Why does Ratnākaraśānti ascribe this verse to the LAS? We need to first consider the possibility that Ratnākaraśānti used Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's works (MAV, TSP, BhK, or others) as references, quoting passages "indirectly" from them rather than "directly" from the originals. The following two cases support this conjecture: (1) the text of Q1 (PPU 14,11–12: sarvaṃ sarvam iti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva pañca skandhā aṣṭādaśa dhātavo dvādaśāyatanāni.), which Ratnākaraśānti recognizes as the Buddha's words, fits better with the text quoted in the TSP than with other corresponding passages, as seen in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (hereafter AKBh); (2) the text of Q13 (PPU 53,8-9: anutpannā mahāmate sarvadharmāḥ sadasator anutpādāt.), which Ratnākaraśānti ascribes to the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, fits better with the text quoted in the TSP than with the corresponding passage in the LAS. (8)

A series of two quotations is commonly seen in PPU 53,7–25 and MAV 300,10–301,5, i.e., LAS 3.96 (10.592) (= Q14) and Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 21 (= Q15). Another series of three quotations is commonly seen in PPU 53,26–55,1 and TSP 13,18–14,12: a passage from the Śālistambhasūtra (= Q16), Paramārthagāthā 5 (= Q17), and a passage from the Paramārthaśūnyatāsūtra (= Q18). As stated above, however, the source of Q17 is not specified in the TSP. From these facts, we can assume the following background as to why Ratnākaraśānti ascribes this quote to the  $Laik\bar{a}vat\bar{a}ras\bar{u}tra$ .

### 3.2. Background of the attribution

We have already seen a case (Q11) where Ratnākaraśānti ascribes a verse to the LAS. Although Q11 is actually a verse from the  $Bhavasamkr\bar{a}ntis\bar{u}tra$ , there are verses that are very similar in content to Q11 in the LAS (i.e., LAS 3.82 and 10.500). Similarly, we can

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(4)</sup>Schmithausen 1987: 508, n. 1401: "PG 5 is quoted at BCAP IX.6 as an utterance of the Buddha and appears to preserve traces of a MI version (see n. 1394)."

 $<sup>^{(5)}</sup>$ Schmithausen 1987: 507, n. 1394: "Since the verse is expressly reported to stem from a Sūtra (see n. 1401), we should perhaps start from a MI  $^*y'$  esam, which was mechanically sanskritized to  $yes\bar{a}m$ , in its turn changed, later on, for reasons of meaning and syntax, into  $yais\bar{a}m$ , which luckily coincides with what was meant in the original." (cf. von Rospatt 1995: 17).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(16)</sup>AKBh 301,7f.: kathaṃ ca sūtre sarvam astīty uktam. sarvam astīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānīti. (Cf. 『雑阿含経第十三』Taisho no. 99, vol. 2, 91a27f.: 佛告婆羅門, 一切者謂十二入處.)

<sup>(7)</sup>TSP 41,23-25: ... tat katham sūtre sadasator utpādah pratiṣiddhah, yathoktam: anutpannā mahāmate sarvadharmāh, sadasator anutpannatvād iti.

<sup>(</sup>IS) LAS 62,7–10: punar aparam mahāmate anutpannān sarvadharmān atītānāgatapratyutpannās tathāgatā bhāṣante. tat kasya hetoh yaduta svacittadṛśyabhāvābhāvāt sadasator utpattivirahitatvān mahāmate anutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ.

assume that Ratnākaraśānti or another person before him cited **Q17** as belonging to the LAS because there is, indeed, a similar verse in it:

A momentary [entity] has no function  $(nirvy\bar{a}p\bar{a}ra)$ , [and] is devoid [of its own nature] and free of action  $(kriy\bar{a})$ . And there are no originations (anutpatti) of factors (dharma). I term [this] the meaning of [the word] "momentary (ksanika)." (9)

Furthermore, we can find a verse similar to Q18 in the LAS (i.e., LAS 10.185). Q18 is cited from the  $Param\bar{a}rthaś\bar{u}nyat\bar{a}s\bar{u}tra$  and is in a series of quotations in the TSP. In the TSP, Q18 is quoted with the words, "uktam  $bhagavat\bar{a}$ ," which are also seen in the case of Q17. We can assume that Ratnākaraśānti recognized that in the TSP, Kamalaśīla had quoted Q17 and Q18 from the same sutra, i.e., the  $Lank\bar{a}vat\bar{a}ras\bar{u}tra$ , for the following reasons: (a) The LAS contains verses similar to both Q17 ( $\approx$  LAS 6.10) and Q18 ( $\approx$  LAS 10.185) and (b) in the TSP, Kamalaśīla quotes both Q17 and Q18 together and regards both as the Buddha's teachings.

Secondly, it is likely that Ratnākaraśānti followed an older tradition of ascribing the verse in question, i.e., Q17, to the LAS. It should be noted that this verse is quoted 16 times in the Laṅkāvatāravṛtti (hereafter LAV), written by Jñānaśrībhadra who was active around the 11th century. In eight of these instances, the same words accompany the verse: "As the [Ārya-]mahāsāṅghikas recite [the following verse]." Although Jñānaśrībhadra does not identify the LAS as the source of this verse, this manner of quoting the same verse numerous times suggests a strong association of Q17 with the LAS. If we presuppose that Jñānaśrībhadra and Ratnākaraśānti are almost contemporaries, though their dates of authorship and relationship are still uncertain, we may say that a tradition of associating the verse in question with the LAS had been formed until the time of

<sup>(9)</sup> LAS 6.10: nirvyāpāram kṣaṇikam viviktam kriyāvarjitam(a) / anutpattiś ca dharmānām kṣaṇikārtham vadāmy aham //

<sup>(</sup>a) kriyāvarjitam von Rospat 1995: 82f., n.183 (byed pa spangs pa T): ksayavarjitam N, V

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>In fact, S. D. Shastri, the editor of the TSP, identifies this quote with LAS 10.185.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(2)</sup>LAV D118a2: ji ltar 'phags pa dge 'dun chen po pa dag klog pa ...; LAV D162b1: ji ltar dge 'dun chen po pa rnams klog pa ...

As for the Mahāsāṅghikas, See Cox 1995: 44: "Shizutani Masao (Shizutani 1978: 113ff., esp. 116) discusses the development of their distinctive doctrinal position in the context of competition with the Mahāsāṅghikas, who are credited with the view that only present factors exist."

There are 16 citations of this verse: in eight cases, the verse is connected to a sect's name "Mahāsāṅghika" (LAV D19b3, 118a2f., 162b1, 203a2, 205b6, 210a3, 226a1, 230a6f.); in two cases to a proponent's name "Buddhist" (LAV D175b3, 195a2); and in six cases, it is not connected to any particular persons or sect (LAV D62a2, 89b6, 107a5, 178b6, 218a6f., 222b5f.).

Ratnākaraśānti. (22)

# 3.3. Two authors' interpretations of LAS 10.256-258

As I mentioned above, both Kamalaśīla and Ratnākaraśānti cite the same three verses (LAS 10.256–258). When we compare Kamalaśīla's way of understanding them with Ratnākaraśānti's, it becomes evident that the two authors' readings and interpretations considerably differ from one another in accordance with their philosophical positions. More precisely, Kamalaśīla seems to suspect even existence of cognition in the final stage of meditative practice presumably from the standpoint of the Mādhyamikas, whereas Ratnākaraśānti maintains its pure illumination (prakāśamātra) from the standpoint of the Yogācāras or vijñaptimātratā. In what follows, we will observe variant readings of the verses adopted by Kamalaśīla and Ratnākaraśānti, as well as their interpretations of them.

# LAS 10.256: cittamātram samāruhya bāhyam artham na kalpayet / tathatālambane<sup>[23]</sup> sthitvā cittamātram atikramet //<sup>24</sup>

(Kamalasīla) After having reached [the truth of] "mind only," [a yogin] should not have a conception of [the existence of] external objects. Abiding in the [cognition] whose object-support is suchness  $(tathat\bar{a})^{(25)}$  [and whose characteristic is non-duality], <sup>(25)</sup> he should [also] <sup>(27)</sup> go beyond [the position of] "mind only" [that is the grasping aspect]. <sup>(28)</sup>

(Ratnākaraśānti) After having reached [the cognition whose object-support is the state of] "mind only" [that is the second stage of yoga], [29] [a yogin] should not have a conception of [the existence of] external objects[, whose nature is the first stage of yoga]. [30] Abiding in the [cognition whose]

 $<sup>^{\</sup>mbox{\tiny{(22)}}}$  Another commentary on the LAS cites part of this verse:  ${}^*\bar{A}ryala\dot{n}k\bar{a}vat\bar{a}ra-n\bar{a}ma-mah\bar{a}y\bar{a}nas\bar{u}tra-vrtti \ tath\bar{a}gata-hrday\bar{a}la\dot{n}k\bar{a}ra-n\bar{a}ma \ (D224b4,\ 228b3).$ 

<sup>(23)</sup> tathatālambane LAS(N), LAS(V), BhK : tathatārambane PPU

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>LAS(T) D270a1f.: sems tsam la ni gnas nas ni // phyi rol don la mi brtag go / yang dag dmigs la gnas nas ni // sems tsam las ni 'da' bar bya //

<sup>©</sup>Cf. LAS(N) 2.161cd (LAS[V] 2.159cd): tathatālambanaṃ dhyānaṃ tāthāgataṃ śubham and Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra (ed. S. Levi) 19.51ab: tathatālambanaṃ jňānaṃ dvayagrāhavivarjitam. (See also Kajiyama 1978: 137f. and Mimaki 1982: 244. Cf. Ichigo 1985: 185 and 2011: 35.

 $<sup>^{26}</sup>$ BhK I 211,6–8: tato cittam grāhyagrāhakaviviktam advayam eva cittam iti vicārayet. advayalakṣaṇe tathatālambane sthitvā ...

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(27)</sup>BhK I 211,8f.: tad api cittamātram atikramet.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(28)</sup>BhK I 211,9: grāhakam ākāram atikramet.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(29</sup>PPU 81,10f.: cittamātratālambanaṃ jñānaṃ dvitīyāṃ yogabhūmim ity arthaḥ.

 $<sup>^{(30)}</sup>$ PPU 81,11f.: na kalpayed iti tatkalpanāṃ prathamayogabhūmisvabhāvām itarāṃ ca samatikramed ity arthah.

object-support is suchness  $(tathat\bar{a})^{(3)}$  [that is the third stage<sup>(3)</sup> of yoga], (3) [the yogin] should go beyond [the stage of] "mind only."

# LAS 10.257: cittamātram atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet / $nir\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sasthito^{(3)}$ $yog\bar{\imath}$ $mah\bar{a}y\bar{a}nam$ sa $pa\acute{s}yati^{(5)}$ $//^{(5)}$

(Kamalaśīla) After having gone beyond [the position of] "mind only" [in that way, the yogin] should [also]<sup>37)</sup> go beyond the [cognition] without the manifestations [of the two aspects]. [In the meditation,] the yogin, who[, after having abandoned the attachment of the real existence of non-dual cognition,]<sup>38)</sup> abides<sup>39)</sup> in the [mental state in which even non-dual cognition] does not manifests itself,<sup>40)</sup> [intuitionally] sees the Great Vehicle  $(mah\bar{a}y\bar{a}na)$ .

(Ratnākaraśānti) After having gone beyond [the stage of] "mind only" (the second stage of yoga), [the yogin] should go beyond the [cognition whose object-support is suchness] that has no manifestations [of the characteristic features of all *dharmas*]<sup>(4)</sup> (the third stage of yoga). The yogin, who abides in the [cognition] without the manifestations [of the characteristic features of all *dharmas*]

<sup>(31)</sup> PPU 81,13: tathatālambanam jñānam tathatārambanam ...

 $<sup>^{(2)}</sup>$ Ratnākaraśānti understands that LAS 10.256–258 presents the four stages of yogic practice, and he positions them on the Bodhisattva's training path. These four stages are as follows: (1) the stage where a yogin meditates on every possible object  $(y\bar{a}vadbh\bar{a}vikat\bar{a}lambana)$  (LAS 10.256b), (2) the stage where the yogin meditates on the truth of "mind only"  $(yath\bar{a}vadbh\bar{a}vikacittam\bar{a}trat\bar{a}lambana)$  (LAS 10.256a), (3) the stage where the yogin meditates on suchness  $(tathat\bar{a})$  of all the dharmas  $(y\bar{a}vadbh\bar{a}vikasarvadharma-tathat\bar{a}lambana)$  (LAS 10. 256c), and (4) the stage where there are neither objects of meditation nor manifestations.  $(an\bar{a}lambana$  or  $nir\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa)$  (LAS 10. 257c). According to Umino 2002: 293, this system is based on the Yogācāra school's traditional classification. Hayashima 1977 points out the relationship between Ratnākaraśānti's four yoga stages and the Yogācāra school's theory of  $trisvabh\bar{a}va$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(33)</sup>PPU 81,13f.: tathatārambaṇam tṛtīyā yogabhūmir ity arthaḥ.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(34)</sup>nirābhāsasthito LAS(N), LAS(V) : nirābhāse sthito PPU : nirābhāse sthīto (sic) BhK

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm Sh}{\rm LAS}(T)$  D270a2f.: sems tsam las ni 'das na ni // snang ba med las 'da' bar bya // rnal 'byor snang ba med gnas na // theg pa chen po mi mthong ngo //

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(57)</sup>BhK I 211,10–12: evam cittamātram atikramya tad api dvayanirābhāsam yaj jñānam tad atikramet.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(38)</sup>BhK I 211,14f.: tatrāpy advayajñāne vastutvābhiniveśam tyajet.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(39)</sup>BhK I 211,15f.: advayajñānanirābhāsa eva jñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(40)</sup>BhK I 211,19f.: tathā cādvayajñāna**nirābhāse** jñāne yadā **sthito yogī** tadā paramatattve sthitatvāt, **mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati**.

<sup>(</sup>III) PPU 81,17f.: atra ca **nirābhāsam** iti dharmanimittair nirābhāsam tathatārambaṇam ity arthah.

and  $dharmat\bar{a}$  (the fourth stage of yoga)], (42) [intuitionally] sees the Great Vehicle  $(mah\bar{a}y\bar{a}na)$ . (43)(44)

LAS 10.258: anābhogagatih śāntā pranidhānair viśodhitā /

 $j n \bar{a} n a m \bar{a} t m a k a m^{(46)} \hat{s} r e s t h a m^{(47)} n i r \bar{a} b h \bar{a} s e n a p a \hat{s} y a t i^{(48)} //^{(49)50}$ 

(Kamalaśīla) [The yogin's] state, which does not require his [further] volitional effort, is quiet and purified by his vows. The yogin] sees the [so-called] "supreme" cognition [also] as devoid of its essential nature by the [cognition where even the non-duality] does not manifest itself (nirbhāsena paśyati). [50] (50]

(Ratnākaraśānti) [The yogin's] going ahead [with the Great Vehicle] or the destination [that the yogin is to reach with the Great Vehicle  $^{[50]}$  (gati)  $^{[50]}$  does not require his [further] volitional effort,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(2)</sup>PPU 81,19-21: nirābhāse sthito dharmadharmatānimittair atyantanirābhāse darśane sthitaḥ san, caturthyām yoqabhūmau sthitvety arthah.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(3)</sup>PPU 81,22–82,1: sa iti caturthyāṃ yogabhūmau sthito yogī mahāyānaṃ paśyati. yāty aneneti yānam mārgaḥ. śrāvakapratyekabuddhayānaprativiśiṣṭatvān mahāyānaṃ bodhisattvānām anāsravo mārgah.

<sup>(44)</sup> PPU 82,2: paśyati sākṣātkaroti.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(45)</sup> anābhogagatiḥ LAS(N), LAS(V), BhK : anābhogā gatiḥ PPU

 $<sup>^{(46)}</sup>$ anātmakaṃ LAS(N), LAS(V) :  $nir\bar{a}tmakaṃ$  BhK, PPU

 $<sup>\</sup>mbox{\em (47)}\mbox{\em srestam}$  LAS(N), LAS(V), BhK :  $\mbox{\em srestam}$  PPU

<sup>(</sup>M) nirbhāse na paśyati LAS(N), LAS(V) (cf. snang ba med tshe mi mthong ngo LAS(T), snang ba med la mi mthong ngo MAV, MĀ): nirbhāsena paśyati BhK: mahāyānena paśyati PPU

 $<sup>^{(8)}</sup>LAS(T)$  D270a3f.: lhun gyis grub rtogs zhi ba ste // smon lam dag gis rnam par sbyangs // bdag med ye shes mchog yin te // snang ba med tshe mi mthong ngo //

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>If we read the text as the original one was, we can translate LAS 10.258 as follows: "[The yogin's] state, which does not require his [further] volitional effort, is quiet and purified by his vows. The supreme and selfless cognition [in that state] does not see [anything such as duality] as long as it does not manifest itself." (See also Suzuki 1999: 247 and Ichigo 1985: 185.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(5)</sup>BhK I 214,9f.: sā ca tādṛśī yoginām avasthānalakṣaṇā **gatir anābhogā**, tataḥ param draṣṭavyasyābhāvāt. Cf. BhK I 218,5: ato 'parasya draṣṭavyasyābhāvād **anābhogā**, BhK I 217,14f.: sā ceyaṃ yoginām avasthā kuto viśodhiteti.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>[2]</sup>BhK I 218,5f.: sarvavikalpābhāvāt śānteti. Cf. BhK I 214,10f.: śānteti bhāvābhāvādivikalpalaksanasya prapañcasyopaśamāt.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>[5]</sup>BhK I 217,15–18: mahākaruṇayā yat sarvasattvārthakaraṇāya bodhisattvena praṇihitam, tataḥ **praṇidhāna**balād uttarottaradānādikuśalābhyāsāt, sā tathā viśuddhā jātā ...

 $<sup>^{64}</sup>$ BhK I 218,2f.: yasmād yad advayalakṣaṇaṃ **jñānam** advayavādināṃ **śreṣṭhaṃ** paramārthenābhimataṃ tad api ...

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(55)</sup>BhK I 218,3f.: tad api **nirātmakaṃ** niḥsvabhāvam ... paśyati yogī.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>BhK I 218,4f.: advaya**nirābhāsena** jñānena paśyati yogī.

 $<sup>^{69}</sup>$  For Kamalası̃la's interpretation of LAS 10.256–258, see Kajiyama 1978: 134–140, Kajiyama 2010: 358–362, Ichigo 1982: 202–204 with n. 48, Ichigo 2011: 35–43, Mimaki 1982: 243f., Keira 2004: 75–78, etc.

 $<sup>^{\</sup>text{(5)}}$ PPU 82,4f.: atha tena mahāyānena kīdṛśī gatiḥ. kiṃ vā tena sa yātīty atas tṛtīyāṃ gāthām āha.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(5)</sup>PPU 82,5f.: anābhogā gatir iti lokottarāsu bhūmiṣv anābhogenaiva[em.: anābhogenaivaṃ Ms. A] saṃcārāt. Also Madhyamakālaṅkāravṛtti-madhyamapratipadāsiddhi (D4072; P5573) D19a3: 'jug pa ni sa gong ma gong mar 'phar ba'o // "'Going ahead' means moving to higher stages."

is quiet<sup>[6]]</sup> and purified by his vows.<sup>[6]]</sup> [The yogin intuitionally] sees<sup>[6]]</sup> the supreme and selfless<sup>[6]]</sup> cognition (i.e., Buddha's wisdom<sup>[6]]</sup> through the Great Vehicle (mahāyānena paśyati).<sup>[6]]</sup>

### 4. Kamalaśīla and Ratnākaraśānti's philosophical positions

### 4.1. Kamalaśīla

According to Kajiyama 1978, Kamalaśīla, quoting and interpreting LAS 10.256–258 in his BhK, intended to extract the following four stages of meditation from the three verses: (1) the stage in which one overcomes the view that external objects are real entities (i.e., the positions of the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntika) (LAS 10.256ab), (2) the stage in which one overcomes the view that only mind with two kinds of aspects ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ) is real (i.e., the position of the Yogācāras, specifically the Sākāravādins) (LAS 10.256d–257a), (3) the stage in which one overcomes the view that non-dual cognition ( $advayajn\bar{a}na$ ) is real, but  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$  and duality ( $gr\bar{a}hya$  and  $gr\bar{a}haka$ ) of cognition are unreal (i.e., the position of the Yogācāra school, specifically the Nirākāravādins) (LAS 10.257b), (4) the final stage, in which neither non-dual cognition nor illumination of cognition manifest themselves and they are devoid of essential natures (i.e., the position of the Mādhyamikas) (LAS 10.257c, 258cd). (57)

### 4.2. Ratnākaraśānti

Unlike Kamalaśīla, Ratnākaraśānti understands "selfless and supreme cognition" (LAS 10.258c:  $j\bar{n}\bar{a}nam\ an\bar{a}tmakam\ \acute{s}reṣṭham$ ) to mean that cognition has no manifestations ( $nir\bar{a}bh\bar{a}sa$ ) of aspects ( $\bar{a}k\bar{a}ra$ ) as object-supports ( $\bar{a}lambana$ ). This is different from the absence of cognition and is called "pure illumination" ( $prak\bar{a}\acute{s}am\bar{a}tra$ ). Ratnākaraśānti considers  $prak\bar{a}\acute{s}am\bar{a}tra$  with no true  $\bar{a}k\bar{a}ras$  to be the supreme state. (68) Regarding the re-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(60)</sup>PPU 82,6: śāntā niskleśatvān nirvikalpatvāc ca.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(6)</sup>PPU 82,7: **pranidhānair višodhitā** hīnabodhau pātapratisedhārtham.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>[62]</sup>PPU 82,9f.: tat tena **mahāyānena** sa yogī **paśyati**, sākṣātkaroti yātīty arthaḥ.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(63)</sup>PPU 82,8: jñānaṃ nirātmakam atyantanirābhāsatvāt.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup>PPU 82,9: buddhabodhir ity arthaḥ.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(65)</sup>PPU 82,8f.: śreṣṭaṃ savāsanasarvāvaraṇaprahāṇāt.

 $<sup>^{66}</sup>$  For Ratnākaraśānti's interpretation of LAS 10.256–258, see Kajiyama 2008: 160f.

<sup>(67)</sup> Kajiyama 1978: 140

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>[68]</sup>See Kajiyama 2008: 162. Cf. PPU 50,5–7: *iyāms tu višeṣah. yat tat prakāśamātram dharmāṇām nijam rūpam tad dravyato 'stīti yogācārāh. tad api dravyato nāstīti mādhyamikāh.* "However, the difference [between the two schools] is just as follows. The Yogācāras [state that] the pure illumination [in a cognitive process] that is factors' innate nature exists in reality, [whereas] the Mādhyamikas [state that] even that (the pure illumination) does not exist in reality."

lationship between ultimate enlightenment (paramārthasambodha) and existence of mind, Ratnākaraśānti states as follows:

To realize that the [cognition] of all the factors, whose basis ( $\acute{s}ar\bar{\imath}ra$ ) is [pure] illumination ( $prak\bar{a}\acute{s}a$ ), is void of the duality (i.e.,  $gr\bar{a}hya$  and  $gr\bar{a}haka$ ) is precisely ultimate enlightenment. Therefore, it is not right that the extinction ( $k\dot{s}aya$ ) of mind and mental concomitants (caitta) [is ultimate enlightenment].

In addition, he denies the absence of mind and mental concomitants in connection with the stream of mind and store-consciousness ( $\bar{a}layavij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ).

And the basis characterized by the stream of mind and mental concomitants does not perish. [That basis] is called "store-consciousness" ( $\bar{a}layavij\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ) as long as the seeds of factors tending toward the fluxes ( $s\bar{a}sravadharma$ ) are not gone, and when [the seeds of factors tending toward the fluxes] are gone, then [the basis is called] "the elements not tending toward the fluxes ( $an\bar{a}sravadh\bar{a}tu$ )," "the body for liberation ( $vimuktik\bar{a}ya$ )," or "the dharma body ( $dharmak\bar{a}ya$ )." Also for that reason, it is not right that the extinction of mind and mental concomitants [is ultimate enlightenment].

He further states that the three jewels (dharmaratna, bodhisattvasamgharatna, buddharatna), the most basic elements of Buddhism, cannot be established if the existence of non-erroneous super-mundane cognition ( $lokottaraj\tilde{n}\bar{a}na$ ) is not accepted. While Ratnākaraśānti consistently maintains the existence of pure illumination and argues for the stream of mind as the basis of cognition, he considers the view that even the existence of mind and mental concomitants should be denied to be extreme, and refutes it.

### 5. Conclusion

These observations have shown that a number of scriptural passages that Ratnākaraśānti cites in the PPU are also quoted in Śāntarakṣita's MAV and Kamalaśīla's works such as the BhK and TSP. Thus, we can assume that Ratnākaraśānti referred to those works when quoting those passages. Among the passages cited both in the PPU and Kamalaśīla's

 $<sup>^{\</sup>text{\tiny [M]}}$ PPU 57,23–58,1: sarvadharmāṇāṃ prakāśaśarīrasya dvayaśūnyatāyā yad vedanaṃ sa eva paramārthasambodha iti na yuktaś cittacaittānāṃ kṣayaḥ.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(7)</sup>PPU 58,3-7: akṣayaś ca cittacaittasaṃtānalakṣaṇa āśrayo 'kṣফṇeṣu sāsravadharmabījeṣv[em. sāsravo Text: sāśrave dharmabījeṣv Ms. A] ālayavijñānam ucyate. kṣফṇeṣv anāsravo dhātur vimuktikāyo dharma-kāyaś cocyate. tato 'pi na yuktaś cittacaittānāṃ kṣayaḥ.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>(7)</sup>PPU 58,11–14: abhrāntasya ca lokottarasya jñānasya pramuditādibhūmiṣv anabhyupagame prajñāpāramitākhyaṃ dharmaratnaṃ bodhisattvasaṃgho buddharatnaṃ ca pratyākhyātaṃ syāt, abhyupagame tu na yuktaś cittacaittanirodhaḥ sambodhaḥ.

works, the most common are verses from the LAS.

There are at least two quotations (Q11 and Q17) with no identical parallels in available texts of the LAS, despite the fact that Ratnākaraśānti explicitly ascribes them to the LAS. One of those two (Q17) is the verse regarding the theory of momentariness. Ratnākaraśānti may have ascribed Q17 to the LAS for the following reasons:

- (1) Since LAS 6.10 is similar in content to **Q17**, he might have equated the two, as in the case of **Q11**.
- (2) There seems to be some relationship between **Q17** and Jñānaśrībhadra's LAV; from the fact that **Q17** is quoted 16 times in the LAV, it can be assumed that there was a custom of ascribing **Q17** to the LAS at the time of Ratnākaraśānti and Jñānaśrībhadra.

Both Ratnākaraśānti and Kamalaśīla quote LAS 10.256–258 and interpret those verses from their respective philosophical perspectives. Kamalaśīla cites the verses to maintain the four stages, evaluating Buddhist epistemological theories from doxographical viewpoint, whereas Ratnākaraśānti connects the verses with the other four stages of yogic practice.

Kamalaśīla states that even "the supreme cognition" does not exist, because it is ultimately void of any essential nature. He goes beyond the views of the so-called Sākākavādins, who believe that only mind with aspects really exists, and Nirākāravādins, who believe that only pure illumination of cognition really exists, and holds the position that all factors are void of essential natures. For Ratnākaraśānti, selfless and supreme cognition is different from the non-existence of cognition itself, and should be understood as cognition where aspects as object-supports never manifest themselves. Ratnākaraśānti also expresses it as "the pure illumination" (prakāśamātra). If one does not accept the reality of selfless and supreme cognition, it would ensue that ultimate enlightenment,  $\bar{a}layavijn\bar{a}na$ , and the three jewels of Buddhism are not established.

### Bibliography

# 1. Primary Literature and Abbreviations

AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Vasubandhu): P. Pradhan (ed.), Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, Patna 1967.

BhK I Bhāvanākrama, Book I (Kamalaśīla): G. Tucci (ed.), Minor Buddhist Texts, Part II, Roma 1958.

BhK III Bhāvanākrama, Book III (Kamalaśīla): see BhK I.

BCAP Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (Prajňākaramati): P. L. Vaidya (ed.),
Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva with the Commentary Pañjika of
Prajňākaramati, Darbhanga 1960.

D sDe dge edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka

DAŢ Dravyālaṅkāraṭīkā (Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra): Muni Shri Jambuvijayaji (ed.), Ācārya Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra's Dravyālaṅkāra. With Auto-Commentary, Ahmedabad 2001.

JN Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali (Jñānaśrīmitra): A. Thakur (ed.), Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali (Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra), Patna 1987.

LAS  $Laik\bar{a}vat\bar{a}ras\bar{u}tra$ : see LAS(N).

LAS(N) Lankāvatārasūtra: B. Nanjio (ed.), The Lankāvatāra sūtra, Kyoto 1923.

LAS(V) Lankāvatārasūtra: P. L. Vaidya (ed.), The Saddharmalankāvatārasūtra, Darbhanga 1963.

LAS(T) Lankāvatārasūtra, Tibetan Translation, D107; P775.

LAV Lankāvatāravrtti (Jnānaśrībhadra): (Tib.) D4018; P5519.

MA Madhyamakālankārakārikā (Śāntarakṣita): M. Ichigo (ed.), Madhyamakālankāra of Śāntarakṣita with his own commentary or Vṛtti and with the subcommentary or Panjikā of Kamalasīla, Kyoto 1985.

MAP  $Madhyamak\bar{a}lank\bar{a}rapanjik\bar{a}$  (Kamalaśila): see MA. MAV  $Madhyamak\bar{a}lank\bar{a}ravrtti$  (Śantarakṣita): see MA.

 ${\rm M\bar{A}}$   $Madhyamak\bar{a}loka$  (Kamalaśīla): (Tib.) D3887; P5287.

MH Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (Bhāviveka): Chr. Lindtner (ed.), Madhyamakahrdaya of Bhavya, Adyar 2001.

NBPS Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣepa (Kamalaśīla): (Tib.) D4232; P5731. See also Tosaki 1984.

P Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka

PG Paramārthagāthā, part of the Yogācārabhūmi, Cināmayī bhūmi (unknown or Asaṅga?): see Wayman 1984: 333–352. (See also Schmithausen 1987: 223–241 with n. 1394–1495.)

PS 2 Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga), chapter 2: H. Lasic, H. Krasser, E. Steinkellner (eds.), Jinendrabuddhi's Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 2. Part I: Critical Edition, Beijing-Vienna 2012.

PS 5 Pramāṇasamuccaya, chapter 5: see Pind 2016.

T Tibetan translation

Taisho Taisho Shinshū Daizokyo (the Taisho Chinese Tripiṭaka)

TS  $Tattvasaṃgrahak\bar{a}rik\bar{a}$  (Śāntarakṣita): S. D. Shastri (ed.),

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TSP Tattvasaṃgrahapanjikā (Kamalaśīla): see TS.

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