

Picture News on The 5th Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies

Co-sponsored by China Tibetology Research Center(CTRC), China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture, Academy of Social Sciences of Tibetan Autonomous Region, the 5th event of the Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies was held in Beijing from August 2 to August 4, 2012.

This seminar has invited 267 scholars in the field of Tibetan Studies from 21 countries and regions including China, Japan, Mongolia, India, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Hungary, Sweden, Germany, Norway, United States, Australia, 191 of whom are Chinese scholars including 10 from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and 76 from other countries.

Themed in the "Social Development in Tibet and the international development trend of international Tibetan Studies", this seminar has set "preserving culture and serving society" as the goal.


A total number of 238 papers had been received. Participants held academic discussion in 11 panels, including "Historical Studies", "Philological, Archeological and Artistic Studies", "Studying dge vdun chos vphel", "Religious Studies", "Sanskrit Studies", "Logic Studies", "Contemporary Political Studies", "Development, Sustainability and Livelihood Security in Tibetan-inhabited Areas (Sociological and Economic)", "Cultural and Literary Studies", "Tibetan Medicine & Pharmacy Studies", and "Linguistic and Information & Technology Studies".

Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies is a regular academic conference at an international level organized every 4 years, with 4 successful seminars held since 1990s, providing a platform for domestic and international scholars to share their academic achievements and exchange with each other.



1. The opening ceremony of The 5th Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies was held in CTRC, in which Sitar, the leader of China Association for Preservation & Development of Tibetan Culture, delivered speech.

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An Examination of the Digression in Chapter 3 of *Prajñāpradīpa*

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1 Introduction

As is well known, *Prajñāpradīpa* (PP), which was written by Bhāviveka¹ (ca. 490/500–570 CE), is one of the most famous and important commentaries on *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (MMK), which was written by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150–250 CE). When we study PP, we must use two translations of it, namely, the Tibetan translation, *Shes rab sgron ma*, (hereafter, PP_tib) and the Chinese translation, *Bān ruò dēng lùn* (《般若灯论》), (hereafter, PP_chin).² PP's original Sanskrit text was lost and is yet to be discovered: therefore, although many scholars have studied PP, many questions remain to be answered. Of course, this is not only because we cannot use the original Sanskrit text, but also because many difficult and unclear discussions are involved.³ Among the recent questions tackled, the problems of PP_chin and the digressions in PP_tib have been aggressively discussed by Kuijp [2006] and Krasser [2011, 2011a]. In particular, Krasser [2011, 2011a] examines the digression in PP_tib chapter 22 (hereafter PP_tib 22) and presents a very interesting hypothesis about the establishment of PP, including the digression. According to him, the digression found in PP_tib 22 was added to the original PP following the correction of errors that Bhāviveka himself made when he discussed the

same topic in his self-commentary, *Tarkajvālā* (TJ),⁴ on his own, very famous Mādhyamika text, *Madhyamakahrdaya kārikā* (MHK). Having examined its contents minutely, Krasser assumes that Bhāviveka wrote the digression to teach beginners or his students how to argue with opponents. This digression was written down by the students and was then inserted into the original PP as the digression. If his hypothesis is correct, it is possible that not only the digression in PP_tib 22, but also the other digressions in PP_tib were added later. In response to such an important and interesting hypothesis, the present author has already discussed how the digressions found in PP_tib are translated in PP_chin, and how this affects the reevaluation of PP_chin.⁵ As a result, it became clear that more than half of the digressions found in PP_tib cannot be found in PP_chin. Therefore, the present author pointed out the possibility that, even if Krasser's hypothesis is correct, we cannot say that all the digressions were added at the same time and that digressions were added on at least two occasions. Of course, such a statement is based on just inference and is not certain.

In the present paper, I consider one digression in PP chapter 3 (hereafter PP 3), where an analysis of the active spheres [of the six sense organs] (*āyatana*) is conducted. Through examining this digression, I want to explore the nature of the digressions in PP and whether or not the hypothesis presented by Krasser also applies to the other digressions in PP.

2 What is a digression?

Before examining the digression involved, we should first think about the question, “What is a digression in PP?”⁶ It is not easy to define it clearly. Of course, we can point out the form of the digression, as Krasser has done. It ends with the representative form in Tibetan translation, “*zhar la bshad pas chog gi skabs nyid dpyad par byavo*,” which means “These digressive discussions would be too much here, and thus we return to the main topic.” In these digressions, questions are presented from opponents belonging to other Indian philosophical schools or Buddhist schools, along with replies from Bhāviveka,⁸ but not all discussions between opponents are recorded as digressions. In some cases, even the obvious digressive discussions from the main topic are not identified as “digressions” in PP_tib. Among the many digressive discussions with opponents, only about 10, as far as we know, are called “digressions” in PP_tib. Moreover, whether a digressive discussion in PP is called a digression does not depend on length at all. Although one digression found in PP_tib chapter 23 (hereafter PP_tib 23) is very short (D223b2/P280b4–D224a1/P281a5), it is still identified as a digression. On the other hand, some discussions with some opponents are very long and apparently wander off the subject, but they are not referred to as digressions. How does this difference occur? Are all the digressions, other than the one in PP_tib 22, explanations for students on how to argue with opponents, written down by a student and later inserted into the original text? Certainly, all the topics handled in the digressions in PP_tib, give us the impression that digressions in PP are written for beginners or students,

because fundamental topics are handled there. Thus, I will focus on one digression in PP, and try to answer the following two questions:

[First question] What kind of purpose is intended by Bhāviveka when a digression in PP is written? In other words, are they all really written in order to teach beginners or students how to argue with opponents?

[Second question] When was a digression in PP written? Was it, as is generally believed, written at the same time as the PP was written? Alternatively, was it, as Krasser suggests on the basis of the digression in PP_{tib} 22, written and inserted into the original text after the original PP had been written? If the latter is correct, was it inserted into the original PP after TJ had been written?

In order to consider these points, one digression⁹ found in PP 3 has been chosen as an example in the present paper.

3 First question: What is the purpose of the digression in PP?

Krasser [2011a] has already pointed out ten digressions in PP, but if we look at PP more closely, we can find another digression, which has a slightly different expression to that intended by Krasser. This digression¹⁰ can be found in the commentary part in PP 3 v 2, the topic of which is the claim that the seer, the visual sense, and its object have no intrinsic nature.

I will first translate this v 2 and then discuss the digression found there.

Not at all does the visual sense see itself. If the visual sense does not see itself, how will it see any other things [than itself]?¹¹

The assertion that the visual sense cannot see itself is often found in Mādhyamika texts, but why can it be said that the visual sense, which cannot see itself, cannot see any other things either? On this question, Katsura and Siderits refer to the following two possibilities:

(1) The scent of jasmine first pervades the flower and then pervades what comes into contact with the flower. The general principle to be inferred from this is that a property of something can come to pervade something else only if that property first pervades the thing itself. For an object to be seen is for it to be pervaded by the property of being seen. By the general principle just mentioned, this can be so only if vision itself is first pervaded by the property of being seen, but since vision does not see itself, this is not so. It follows that no distinct object can be seen by vision either.

(2) If seeing is the intrinsic nature of vision, then vision must manifest this intrinsic nature independently of other things. This means that vision should be able to see even in the absence of any visible object. For otherwise its manifesting vision would

be dependent on the existence of the visible object. Seeing requires that there be something that is seen, however, in the absence of any visible object, only vision itself could be what vision sees. Vision does not see itself, however. Hence, seeing could not be the intrinsic nature of vision, so it could not be ultimately true that vision sees visible objects.¹²

In either case, it is obvious for the Mādhyamika to think that the visual sense neither sees itself nor other things. After citing this verse from MMK, Bhāviveka first explains it by reconstructing it as an inference having three elements (thesis, reason, and example) in the same way as he always does in this text, PP. Three objections against the argument - from Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and from ordinary people - are then presented, and he rejects them, respectively.¹³

As far as I can tell from reading PP, it seems that Bhāviveka thought it generally enough just to reject these three objections. Thus is he says the following after rejecting the three objections and starting the digression.

[Through discussions thus far] it has been denied that active spheres of the eye and the form (**rūpa*) originate, and that the eye and the form are the perceiver and the perceived, respectively. Therefore, there cannot exist such characters [namely, the perceiver and perceived, the eye and the form]. Thus [any further explanation is] superfluous [in examining this verse]. However, even if it is so [superfluous], [I] understand that there are the differences in the knowledge of hearers, and thus only the assertion should be explained [once again].¹⁴

In reading this commentary, it is obvious that the substantive commentary, or the main refutations of the opponents' objections regarding v 2 by Bhāviveka himself, finishes here. However, Bhāviveka says that more detailed and supplementary discussions should be made, "because there exist some people, whose intelligence is not good and thus who cannot understand this intention well." As far as this expression of Bhāviveka is concerned, the digression in PP 3 seems to be written for beginners or students who are not very intelligent. This digression ends with following passage:

The examination has [already] been too broad and enough; therefore, the main topic should be discussed [from here].¹⁵

This end passage of the digression differs a little from those I have already suggested for the digressions, but the meaning is the same. After the digression is closed by this passage, v 2 is cited again, and then Buddhapālita's commentary is cited. Of course, Buddhapālita's commentary is rejected by Bhāviveka just after its citation finishes. According to this context, this digression in PP 3 was written in order to let beginners or his weaker students understand the true meaning of MMK, although it is unclear whether this digression was intended to teach them how to argue with their opponents as well.

4 Second question: When was this digression written?

4.1 The comparison between PP and MHK/TJ

There is an important reason for my selection of this digression in particular from more than ten digressions in PP: it is that we can find very interesting similarities and differences with the contents of MHK/TJ, like the digression in PP 22, which Krasser has pointed out.¹⁶ Moreover, these similarities and differences seem to give us a key to solving the question about the digression in PP. Of course, this key is not a perfect one, but we must use it patiently in order to find a more reasonable and plausible answer for the question about the digression in PP.

The corresponding discussion to that handled in PP 3 can be found in MHK/TJ chapter 3 vv 48–61 ab. In the following table MHK/TJ and PP are compared.

Table 1¹⁷

PP_tib chapter 3		No	MHK/TJ chapter 3 vv38–61ab
Anusam̐dhi & Pūrvapakṣa		1	X
About seeing in the conventional truth [v 1]		2	X
About seeing in the ultimate truth [v 2ab] The visual sense does not see itself.		3	X
About seeing in the ultimate truth [v 2cd] Vision does not see other objects, because it does not even see itself.		4	○ vv 38-42
The criticisms of the three opponents: (a) Kaśmīler Vaibhāṣika (b) Sautrāntika Bhavaśamkrāntisūtra is cited. (c) What ordinary people accept		5	Bhavaśamkrānti-sūtra is cited. X (a), (b), and (c) do not exist.
DIGRESSION	(1) Criticism of Vaibhāṣika = a discussion similar to no.22 of MHK/TJ	6	
	(2) Criticism of Sāṃkhya = a discussion similar to no.21 of MHK/TJ	7	
	(3) Criticism of Naiyāyika = a discussion similar to no.16 of MHK/TJ	8	
Criticism of Buddhapālita		9	X

PP_tib chapter 3	No	MHK/TJ chapter 3 vv38–61ab
The example of the lump light [v 3]	10	X
About seeing [v 4-5ab]	11	X
Starts with criticism of Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika [v 5cd] Criticism of the theory of ātman.	12	○ vv 43-45
Criticism of the theory of Puruṣa of Sāṃkhya [v 6a]	13	○ vv 46-50ab
Criticism of Vaiśeṣika [v 6ab]	14	○ vv 50cd-52ab
Criticism of another opponent [v 6cd] and [v 7]	15	X
X	16	Criticism of Naiyāyika: vv 52cd-53ab.
X	17	Criticism of Sāṃkhya (triguṇa theory): v 53cd
X	18	Criticism of Sāṃkhya: vv 54ab-55ab
X	19	Criticism of Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika: v 55cd
X	20	Criticism of Mahāśaṅkika: v 56ab
X	21	Criticism of Sāṃkhya: vv 56cd-57ab
X	22	Criticism of Abhidharma: vv 57cd-60ab
Discussions about the other sense organs [v 8]	23	○ vv 60cd-61ab

With regard to Table 1, it is obvious that similar discussions are conducted between PP and MHK/TJ: generally, TJ, which was written after PP, discusses most of the topics in much more details than PP does. At any rate, both texts handle the same or similar topics, and basically in the same order.¹⁸ Of course, some topics in PP cannot be found in TJ and vice versa, but because PP and TJ are commentaries on different texts, namely MMK and MHK, respectively, it may be natural that such differences can be found.

Among these differences, the most impressive one can be found in the digression in

PP, namely, parts 6 to 8 in Table 1. Because the order of the discussions in the digression in PP 3 does not coincide with that of MHK/TJ. This digression includes only three (nos. 22, 21, and 16) of the seven objections (nos. 16 to 22) that can be found in the end of a line of discussion in MHK/TJ, and these three objections are arranged in a different order from those in PP.

When we think about this difference, we can normally assume that after Bhāviveka wrote the MHK, he picked on only the three discussions that needed to be referred to in the context in PP and discussed them as the digression in PP. After that, Bhāviveka wrote TJ. It is widely understood among scholars that MHK was written first then PP, and then TJ; however, now that Krasser has suggested the possibility that a digression in PP was inserted into original PP after TJ was written, we must examine whether this digression was truly included in PP from the beginning or added after TJ.

4.2 The flow of the discussions in the digression in PP 3

What should we do in order to determine when this digression was written? If this digression was written after TJ, the discussions found in the digression in PP should be much more detailed and reasonable than those of TJ. Therefore, first, I want to roughly show the flow of discussions in the digression in PP. For Example:

[Vaibhāṣika]: The visual sense grasps the object, which it is not in contact with.

[Bhāviveka]: Your claim is not established, because seeing means knowing. For example, [when it is said that] a king sees something through his spies, it means that a king knows something through his spies. However, if this is so, a king does not see anything through his direct cognition.

[Sāṃkhya]: If it were true what you claim, you would mean that the visual sense grasps the object, which it is in contact with, which is the same as our [Sāṃkhya's] thesis.

[Bhāviveka]: No. My claim is not the same as yours, because we, Mādhyamikas, deny only the claim that the visual sense grasps the object, which it is not in contact with, but do not admit its contrary idea, namely, "the visual sense grasps the object, with which it is in contact." Therefore, we do not accept your claim.

[Sāṃkhya]: But our claim is that the activity of the visual sense comes out toward the object from its resting point [namely, the visual sense] and grasps the object, and thus the visual sense grasps the object. Therefore, our meaning is different from that of Vaibhāṣika.

[Bhāviveka]: Even so, even ordinary people do not admit that the activity of the visual sense comes out toward the object from its resting point.

[Sāṃkhya]: Bhāviveka denies not only that the visual sense grasps the object that it does not make contact with, but also denies the contrary claim that the visual sense grasps the object that it makes contact with. Your statement is contradictory.

[Bhāviveka]: It is not our fault, because neither claim is ours. [One is Vaibhāṣika's and the other is yours.] What we claim is neither.

[Naiyāyika]: The activity of the visual sense does not come out from the resting point, but a beam of light comes from the visual sense, and then it makes contact with the object and grasps it.

[Bhāviveka]: But even if it is so, even in the conventional truth, the visual sense does not have any beam of light.

[Naiyāyika]: No. We all know that the eye of a cat or an owl has a beam of the light on a dark night, do we not?

[Bhāviveka]: The eye seems to have a beam of the light. In Buddhist doctrine, however, the visual sense cannot be seen. Therefore, what is seen to have a beam of light is not the visual sense, but the eyeballs. Thus your claim is not reasonable.¹⁹

As we can easily see, in PP, these objections from three opponents—Vaibhāṣika, Sāṃkhya, and Naiyāyika—are arranged along a logical path, whereas, in TJ, these objections are arranged at random and the contents are not connected with each other, although we must accept that these explanations in TJ must have been restricted by MHK. Thus, we can say that Bhāviveka put these three objections in order in PP, and the end expression of this digression may mean, "Although many more objections exist than these seven objections, including these three objections in MHK, it is enough to focus on just these three objections among them here."

The most important issue in the present paper, namely, whether this digression was written after TJ or not, remains to be dealt with. In order to resolve it, we must compare the commentary part of TJ, without the verses cited from MHK, with the discussions in the digression in PP 3.

4.3 The first opponent: Vaibhāṣika²⁰

First, I will pick up the initial objection from Vaibhāṣika, which insists that the visual sense grasps the object, which it does not make contact with. In similar discussions found in MHK/TJ, the six sense organs are all dealt with: there, it is claimed that three sense organs - vision, smell, and mind - grasp their objects, which they do not make contact with, whereas the others grasp objects and make contact with them. Ultimately, Vaibhāṣika's claim is denied in MHK/TJ by Bhāviveka in the following way:

"The character of the three, namely, the eye, the ear, and the mind, is that [Thesis:]

[they] do not grasp the object, which they do not make contact with,” [Reason:] because of the sense organs and of the ground of the arising of feeling, [Example:] like the nose and so on.²¹

Here, the portion in quotation marks is what is cited from MHK, and the rest is the commentary from TJ. This commentary in TJ is very simple, and further discussions or explanations cannot be seen. There is a similar inference in PP, as follows:

[Thesis:] In the ultimate truth, the eye does not grasp the object, which it does not make contact with, [Reason:] because of not seeing itself, [Example:] like the nose.²²

The meaning of both inferences in MHK/TJ and PP is exactly the same, although the reasons in both inferences are different because they depend on the context. Moreover, of far greater importance is the fact that the explanation in PP does not end only with this inference. That is, Bhāviveka adds further discussions in the digression in PP 3. The following is the further objection from Vaibhāṣika:

[Objection from Vaibhāṣika:] However, if [Vaibhāṣika] says the following: [Thesis:] The eye grasps the object, which it does not make contact with, [Reason 1:] because it [can] grasp the form, [which is] distant from [the eye], [Reason 2:] because it grasps the object without any relation to the time²³ and human effort, and [Reason 3:] because it grasps the object, which is bigger than [the eye] itself, [Example:] like the mind.²⁴

After this, Bhāviveka refutes this objective inference from Vaibhāṣika minutely, but because of the limitation of space, I will not give the details here. At any rate, what I want to point out by referring to this difference between TJ and PP is that Bhāviveka did not adopt in TJ the similar detailed objections and its refutations as found in PP, even though TJ was written after PP. As I explained before, in most cases, when similar discussions can be found in common between TJ and PP, TJ gives much more detailed discussions on each topic than PP does. Thus, this case is both curious and unusual.

4.4 The second opponent: Sāṃkhya

The second objection is from Sāṃkhya, insisting that the visual sense grasps the object, which it makes contact with. First, I will pick up the discussions from PP, and then from MHK/TJ. There are two discussions in PP, as follows:

[Discussion 1 with Sāṃkhya in PP]

[Objection:] Sāṃkhyas say the following: The eye does not grasp the object, which it does not make contact with. [Therefore] it is the error of establishing what is already established (**siddhasādhana*) [because we, Sāṃkhyas, insist that the eye grasps the object, which it makes contact with].²⁵

[Answer:] [It is not correct.] The property of “the eye grasps the object, which it

does not make contact with” is shown [only] as “what has no intrinsic nature” by it. Therefore, it is not [what is] shown by the meaning of establishing that [the eye] grasps the object, which [it] makes contact with. Thus, [your criticism] is said to rest on non-existing grounds. Or, [Thesis:] it cannot be accepted that the eye grasps the object, which it makes contact with, [Reason:] because of the sense of the organ, [Example:] like the mind....²⁶

[Discussion 2 with Sāṃkhya in PP]

[Objection:] What does “grasping what [the eye] makes contact with” mean? If you (Sāṃkhya) say that [the eye] goes out toward the side of the object from [its] resting place,²⁷

[Answer:] [It is not correct.] [Thesis:] In the ultimate truth, the activity of the eye does not go out from its resting point, namely cognition, another form of the eye, [Reason:] because of the activity, [Example:] like the activities of the other sense organs like the nose and so on [which do not go out from their resting places]. In the same way, [Thesis:] In the ultimate truth, the form is not the object which the visual sense grasps, [Reason:] because of having the cause, [Example:] like a sound...²⁸

A similar discussions can be found in MHK/TJ, as follows:

[Discussion with Sāṃkhya in MHK/TJ]

Sāṃkhyas say the following: We accept that the five sense organs except for the mind grasp [the object] by touching it. That is, the activity of the visual sense, after going out [toward the object] from its dependent position, grasps the object.²⁹

In order to deny [such an objection from Sāṃkhyas], the following is said [in MHK]: “[Thesis:] The eye does not make contact with the object, [Reason 1:] because of the sense organ, [Example 1:] like a mind, or [Reason 2:] because of the cause [of grasping the object] or [Reason 3:] because of what has a cause [of grasping the object], [Example 2:] like the form.”³⁰

Because the inference in TJ is the verse cited from MHK, only the objection from Sāṃkhya in TJ is the original commentary part of TJ. At first glance, the TJ’s commentary is much shorter and simpler than PP’s. Moreover, the most interesting or curious thing is its thesis in TJ, because although the thesis, “the activity of the visual sense, after going out [toward the object] from its dependent position, grasps the object”, is referred to in the commentary part in TJ, there is no mention of it when Bhāviveka answers for the objection. On the other hand, in [Discussion 2 with Sāṃkhya in PP], this thesis is picked up as one topic and explained much further by using inferences.

4.5 The third opponent: Naiyāyika

The third opponent is Naiyāyika. The discussion with Naiyāyika in PP consists of

two parts as follows:

[Discussion 1 with Naiyāyika in PP]

[Objection:] Some people insist that a beam of light comes out from the visual sense toward the object and thus the visual sense can grasp it.

[Answer:] [I] give the answer to such people as follows: [Thesis:] It should be understood that even in the conventional truth, the visual sense does not have a beam of light, [Reason:] because it is the cause of recognizing the form (**rūpa*), [Example:] like the form itself (**rūpa*).³¹

[Discussion 2 with Naiyāyika in PP]

[Objection:] If [Naiyāyikas] claim the following:

[Thesis:] The visual sense has a beam of light, [Reason:] because of the visual sense, [Example:] like the eyes of a cat etc., which act in the night.

[Answer:] It is not reasonable, [Reason 1:] because the visual sense cannot be seen, [Reason 2:] because, even if it is not the visual sense but its resting place (=the eyeballs) that has a beam of light, the example is not be established, and [Reason 3:] because there is [a logical failure of] an antinomic reason (**viruddhavyabbicārin*).³²

Similar discussions can be found in MHK/TJ, as follows:

[Discussion 1 with Naiyāyika in MHK/TJ]

[Objection:] Some people (Naiyāyikas) think that [the visual sense] can recognize [the object] after a beam of light reaches the object.

[Answer:] [I] answer in order to deny it as follows: "It is not reasonable that the visual sense has a beam of light, because [it is] a sense organ, like other sense organs" [which is said in MHK]. This verse can be reconstructed as follows. [Thesis:] It is not reasonable for the visual sense to have a beam of light, [Reason:] because [it is] a sense organ, [Example:] like other sense organs. [In other words] the sense of sound can hear sound that is distant, and the mind can also know [distant] objects, but these [sense organs] do not have a beam of light. The visual sense is like these. Therefore, it is not reasonable that it (= the visual sense) has a beam of light.³³

[Discussion 2 with Naiyāyika in MHK/TJ]

[Objection:] [Someone asks that] if, as you claim, the visual sense does not have a beam of light, how is it possible that a cat or an owl can create light from the visual sense like a shining lamp in the dark?

[Answer:] In order to answer, I say this: "The eyeballs of nocturnal animals can be seen, but their visual sense cannot be seen" [which is said in MHK]. About this verse, [Thesis:] the eyeballs of the nocturnal animal can be seen, but the visual sense cannot be seen, [Reason:] because it (the visual sense) cannot be seen [according to Buddhist

doctrine]. Therefore, such understanding is faulty.³⁴

Both discussions found in PP and MHK/TJ are very similar, but there is one interesting difference between MHK/TJ and PP. It can be found in the second discussion of PP and MHK/TJ. In MHK/TJ, Bhāvivēka insists that it is not the visual sense but the eyeballs of nocturnal animals that can be seen [as having a beam of light, in the level of the conventional truths], in order to refute Naiyāyika's claim that the visual sense has a beam of light. On the other hand, according to PPT, the second reason [in Discussion 2 with Naiyāyika in PP], which is strengthened here by underlining, is said in light of the following objection from Naiyāyika: "even if we (Naiyāyikas) accept such a claim by Bhāvivēka, that the eyeballs have a beam of light, there is no problem about our (Naiyāyika's) own inference." If this commentary in PPT (D 16b7-17a2; P 19a3-5) is correct, it seems that the discussion in PP gets one step further than that in MHK/TJ, based on the premise of Bhāvivēka's answer [in Discussion 2 with Naiyāyika in MHK/TJ]. Namely, we can infer the developmental process between MHK, TJ, and PP as follows: First, Bhāvivēka claimed in TJ that the eyeballs of the nocturnal animal can be seen as having a beam of light, only in order to reject the claim that the visual sense has a beam of light. However, after that, Naiyāyika insists that even if he accepts such an answer from Bhāvivēka, there is no problem about Naiyāyika's inference; therefore, Bhāvivēka's refutation is not reasonable. Thus, in order to refuse Naiyāyika's claim, Bhāvivēka picks up this topic again in the digression of PP.³⁵

Of course, this is just my inference, and is not certain at all. For example, the counter assumption is also possible: that Bhāvivēka had over-reached in the digression of PP, and thus in TJ he remove it. Either assumption is possible, and thus we should think about why such a difference occurred.

If we try to solve these curious differences between PP and TJ, is it reasonable that we think that the digression in PP 3 was written after TJ?

5 Conclusions

As we have examined above, there exists some reason to believe that the digression found in PP 3 was not included in the original PP from the beginning and was written after TJ, though we cannot say so with absolute certainty. All I can say is the following:

1. The digression found in PP 3 was written for beginners or weaker students, thought it is not certain whether this digression was written in order to teach them how to argue with opponents.
2. The digression, including discussions with three opponents in PP 3, is based on the discussion of three of seven additional objections included in MHK 3 vv 52cd-60ab, and Bhāvivēka put these three discussions in order in PP, following a logical sequence.
3. These discussions with three opponents found in the digression in PP 3 are much

more detailed than in TJ. In particular, it seems that the discussion with Naiyāyika in PP was written independently of the discussion in MHK/TJ. Therefore, we cannot entirely deny the possibility that the digression in PP 3 was written after the original PP and was inserted after TJ had been written.

Abbreviations

D: sDe dGe ed.

MHK: *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* by Bhāviveka. chapter 3: Ejima [1980] pp. 268-362.

MMK: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* by Nāgārjuna—Saigusa [1985].

P: Peking ed.

PP: *Prajñāpradīpa* by Bhāviveka.

PP_chin: *Prajñāpradīpa* Chinese translation—T30, no.1566 p.51-136.

PP_tib: *Prajñāpradīpa* Tibetan translation—D no. 3853, Tsha 45b4-259b3; P [95]. no. 5253, Tsha 53b3-326a6.

PPT: *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* by Avalokitavṛata. (tib.) D. (3859) wa 1-287a7 7a 1-338a7 za 1-341a7, P. [96-7] (5259) wa 1-333a6 7a 1-394a5 za 1-406a8.

PrasP: *Prasannapadā* by Candrakīrti – Poussin [1903-13].

T: Taishō Daizō Kyō.

TJ: *Tarkajvālā* by Bhāviveka – D no. 3856, Dza 40b7-329b4; P [96] no. 5256, Dza 43b7-380a7.

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Notes:

1. With respect to Bhāviveka's name, I have followed the suggestions of Ejima [1990].
2. PP_tib was translated in the early ninth century by Kluvi rgyal mtshan and Jñānagarbha, and PP_chin was translated in 630–632 CE by Prabhākaramitra, who is said to have studied Yogācāra theory in Nālanda, which was famous as a center of Buddhism at that time, and then reached China through central Asia. According to Kuwayama [1983], it is possible that he met Xuánzàng (玄奘), who is the most famous and important Chinese Buddhist monk, just before Xuánzàng left for India, and influenced him to directly go to Nālanda. PP_chin has been said to be very poor in comparison with PP_tib, so only the Tibetan translation has been generally used in academic study. However, recently Kuijp [2006] suggested the importance of PP_chin. The present author refers to the reevaluation of PP_chin in Akahane [2013].
3. Although we do not have a complete translation to a modern language from PP_tib, Hatani translated PP from PP_chin into old-style Japanese. Thanks to this translation, most Japanese scholars can now access PP_chin easily. However, his translation is rather old, which creates problems for academics. It should be translated again into a modern language (see, Hatani [1930]).
4. It has remained a hot topic whether TJ is a self-commentary by Bhāviveka. Some scholars insist that there were two Bhāvivekas in Buddhist history. One is the author of PP, whereas, the other is the author also known as Bavya, who wrote some parts of TJ. The discussion on Bhāviveka's authorship is summarized in Krasser [2011] pp. 221–222. Buddhist scholars have been unable to decide which interpretation is the more reasonable one, but I think that Krasser [2011] reasonably insists that the author of PP and TJ are the same person; therefore, in the present paper, I have adopted the idea of one Bhāviveka.
5. See, Akahane [2013].
6. Similar "digressions" can be found in many other Indian Buddhist or other philosophical

texts. It seems that the reasons for such digressions vary. I would have examined all digressions in order to make clear how they were used, but due to limitations of space and time, for the present paper, I focus on one digression found in PP. We should acknowledge that the examples in PP are not necessarily representative of digressions on the whole.

7. This is the Tibetan translation. We know the Sanskrit phrase for it from *Prasannapadā* (PrasP), whose original Sanskrit text can be used: iti alam prasaṅgena prakṛtam eva vyākhyāsyāmaḥ (p.369 ll.4–7). The Chinese translation for the same sentence is: 且置是事, 今还说我本宗, which is used at the digression in PP_chin 22 (p.119c28–29). We can also find other variations of this expression.

8. Bhāviveka does not refer to the opponents' names in many cases in PP_tib, but sometime, PP_chin or Avalokitavrata, who was active around 700 CE and is the author of the only large commentary on PP, *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (PPT), gives us some tips about opponents' names, though these references are not always correct. Even if we cannot find the reference in both, in some cases such opponents' names are made clear by many modern scholars.

9. There is the possibility that other digressions exist in PP_chin.

10. This digression can also be found in PP_chin. (T30 no.1566: 66b23–67a4). There is no obvious expression to show that this is the digression, however.

11. svamātmānaṃ darśanaṃ hi tat tam eva na paśyati /
na paśyati yad ātmānaṃ kathaṃ draśyati tatparān // (MMK chapter 3 v 2)

12. Katsura and Siderits [2005] pp.146–147.

13. In the present paper, I do not refer to these three objections, because they are not the main point here, and because of limited space.

14. mig dang gzugs kyi skye mched kyi skye ba bkag pavi phyir dang / mig dang gzugs dag gi lta ba po dang / lta ba nyid bkag pavi phyir devi khyad par mi srid pas chog mod kyi / von kyang nyan pavi skye bovi blo gros dbye bar vdod pas phyogs tsam zhig bshad par byavo // (PP_tib: D.77a5–6, P.93a2–3)

15. dpyad pa rnam par vphros pas chog gi skabs nyid kyi dbang du byavo // (PP: D.78a6; P.94a6–7)

16. See, Krasser [2011] and [2011a].

17. "○" shows that the same discussion as that in PP exists in TJ, and "X" shows that the same discussion as that in PP or in MHK/TJ does not exist in TJ. About the Anusamdhī & Pūrvapakṣa in no. 1 in PP_tib, see Akahane et al [2012].

18. The contents of PP and TJ are very similar, but not identical. Generally, TJ discusses most of the topics more broadly than PP does. This is regarded as natural because it is well known that TJ was written after PP.

19. The explanation for some of these discussions depends on my understanding, which is based on PP_tib and PP_chin and not on the verbal translation.

20. Nozawa [1956] and Nōnin [1987] both say that this opponent is Vaiśeṣika. Both probably follow the interpretation found in PPT, where this opponent is referred to as vBye brag pa. A Tibetan word, vByed brag pa is the translation of the Sanskrit word Vaiśeṣika; however, it is also sometimes the translation of Vaibhāṣika. Other Tibetan translations, vBye brag tu smra ba and vBye brag smra ba, are also translations of Sanskrit words, Vaiśeṣika and Vaibhāṣika. As far as the objection is concerned, it is not from Vaiśeṣika but from Vaibhāṣika, because the insistence that the visual sense grasps the object, which it does not make contact with, is from Vaibhāṣika, and a similar claim can be found in TJ, where the claim is from Chos mngon pa pa (*Abhidharmavādin), namely Vaibhāṣika. Ejima thinks that this opponent is Vaibhāṣika (see, Ejima [1980] p.463 n.(20)).

21. mig rna yid kyi mtshan nyid gsum // yul dang ma phrad vdzin ma yin // zhes bya ba ni dbang po yin pavi phyir dang / sems skye bavi rgyu yin pavi phyir / dper na sna la sogs pa bzhin no // (TJ: D71a3–4; P75b6–7).

If these three sense organs grasp the objects, which they do not make contact with, the nose also grasps the object, which it does not make contact with, because these three sense organs and the nose are the same thing — the sense organ — and thus they should all have the same characteristics.

22. yang na don dam par mig ni yul ma phrad pa vdzin pa yin par mi vdod de / da ltar gyi yul mngon sum pa yin pavi phyir dper na sna tshogs pa bzhin no // (PP: D77b3-4; P93b1-2).

23. Vaibhāṣika insists that constituent elements will always exist in the past, the present, and the future. Therefore, at any time, the visual sense can grasp them.

24. ci ste mig ni yul ma phrad pa vdzin pa yin te / gzugs bar du chod pa vdzin pavi phyir dang / rtsol ba tha dad pa med pa dang / dus tha dad pa med par vdzin pavi phyir dang / rang las lhag pavi yul vdzin pavi phyir dang / dper na yid bzhin no zhe na / (PP: D77b4-5; P93b2-3).

25. Grangs can dag mig ni yul dang ma phrad pa vdzin pa ma yin te zhes bya ba de ni grub pa la sgrub pa yin no zhes zer na / (PP: D77b7; P93b5-6).

26. mig yul ma phrad pa vdzin pa nyid kyi chos stong pa nyid du bstan pas yul phrad pa vdzin pa yin no zhes bsgrub pavi tshul gyis ma bstan pavi phyir gnas ma yin pa la dbugs vbyin to zhes brjod par byavo // gzhan yang mig ni yul phrad pa vdzin pa yin par mi vdod de / dbang po yin pavi phyir dper na yid bzhin no //... (PP: D77b7-78a1; P93b6-8).

27. phrad pa vdzin pa zhes bya bavi don kyang gang yin / gal te gnas nas yul gyi phyogs su song ste vdzin par byed pavo zhe na / (PP: D78a1-2; P 93b8-94a1).

28. don dam par mig gi vjug pa ni / mig gi rnam par shes pavi rnam grangs kyi gnas nas phyi rol tu mi vgro ste / vjug pa yin pavi phyir / dper na sna la sogs pavi dbang povi vjug pa bzhin no // de bzhin du don dam par gzugs ni mig gi dbang po yul phrad pa vdzin pavi gzung ba ma yin te / rgyu can yin pavi phyir dper na sgra la sogs pa bzhin no //... (PP: D78a2-3; P94a1-2).

29. Grangs can dag yid ma gtogs pavi dbang po lnga po dag ni yul dang phrad nas vdzin par vdod de / vdi ltar mig la sogs pavi vjug pa ni gnas nas phyi rol du vphos nas yul vdzin par byed do zhes zer ba (TJ: D70b4-5; P75a7-8).

30. (... zhes zer ba) dgag pavi phyir /
mig ni yul dang phrad ma yin // dbang po yin phyir yid bzhin dang //
rgyun phyir rgyu dang ldan pavi phyir // yang na gzugs la sogs pa bzhin //
zhes bya bar smras so // (TJ: D70b5-6; P75a8-b1).

31. gang dag la mig gi vod zer yul gyi phyogs su song ste / yul vdzin par byed do snyam pavi blo gros yod pa de dag la yang vdi skad ces brjod par bya ste / tha snyad du yang mig gi dbang po ni vod zer dang bcas pa ma yin par shes par bya ste | gzugs dmigs pavi rgyu yin pavi phyir dper na gzugs bzhin no // (PP: D94a3-5; P 78a4-5).

It is obvious that the visual sense is the cause of recognizing the rūpa. On the other hand, the form is also the cause of the visual sense recognizing it, because if the form is not there, we cannot see it. However, as all people can accept, the form does not have a beam of light. Thus, the other cause, namely, the visual sense, should not have a beam of light. Therefore, the reason and example here are valuable.

32. gal te mig gi dbang po ni vod zer dang bcas pa kho na yin te / mig gi dbang po yin pavi phyir dper na / byi ba la sogs pa mtshan mo rgyu bavi mig bzhin no zhe na / de ni rigs pa ma yin te / mig gi dbang po ni bstan du med pavi phyir dang | devi gnas vod zer dang bcas pa nyid yin du zin na yang dpe ma grub pavi phyir dang / vgal ba vkhrul pa med pavi gnod pa yod pavi phyir ro // (PP: D94a5-6; P78a5-6).

In PP_chin, there are only two reasons except for the third reason:

33. kha cig mig gi vod zer yul gyi phyogs su song nas vdzin par byed do snyam du sems pa de dgag pavi phyir bshad pa / mig ni vod zer ldan mi rigs // dbang po yin phyir dbang gzhan bzhin // zhes bya

ba ni mig ni vod zer dang ldan par mi rigs te / dbang po yin pavi phyir dbang po gzhan bzhin te / ji ltar rna bas kyang sgra thag ring po na vdug pa thos la / yid kyi kyang yul dpag tshad stong gis bskal pa dag kyang shes mod kyi / de dag vod zer dang ldan pa ma yin pa de bzhin du mig kyang de dang vdra bas de vod zer dang ldan par mi rigs so // (TJ: D69b4-6; P74a4-6).

34. gal te de ltar mig gi dbang po vod zer dang ldan pa ma yin na vo na ji ltar byi la dang vug pa dag mun khrod na mig dag las sgron ma ltar vbar ba vbyung bar snang zhe na / devi phyir bshad pa / mtshan mo rgyu bavi mig vbras snang // dbang po snang ba ma yin no // zhes bya ba ni mun khrod na mtshon mo rgyu ba rnams kyi mig gi vbras bu snang bar zad kyi dbang po ni mi snang ste / de ni bstan du med pa yin pavi phyir ro // devi phyir rnam par rtog pa de yang bzang po ma yin no // (TJ: D69b6-7; P74a6-8).

35. In PP, the objection from Naiyāyika is composed as the perfect inference, having three components (thesis, reason, and example), and in the answer section, three reasons, why the opponent's inference is unreasonable are produced. On the other hand, in TJ, the objection from Naiyāyika is not presented as an inference and the inference, which is presented as his answer, is an imperfect one, with only two components (thesis and reason), lacking the example; moreover, only one reason is provided.