

か」という質問が飛び、それに対して別の学僧から「他宗派にあるから特徴といえない、ということとはできない」との声が出る、というようにである。その他にも、グライ・ラマ13世による僧院改革やマチュ・ラブドン (Ma gcig lab sgron) の生没年に関する発表に対しては活発な議論がおこなわれた。

宗教部会でおこなわれた研究発表の中で、個人的に最も興味をいだいたのは、ツェリントル (Tshe ring thar, 中央民族大学) “Dus rabs brgyad pa'i ban bon 'brel ba'i nang gi dran pa nam mkha' (8世紀の仏教・ボン教関係の中でのテンパ・ナムカ)” および蘇得華 (sKal bzang don grub, 武威市文物考古研究室)「涼州藏朱砂版藏文大藏經初探」であった。ツェリントル氏の発表は、ディクムツェンボ王の時代からティソンデツェン王の時代まで、約800年生きたとされるテンパ・ナムカを、ボン教文献・仏教文献の比較検討を通じ、ティソンデツェン王時代の実在の人物として浮かび上がらせ、ボン教と仏教を混淆することによってチベットの文化を豊にした人物として位置づけたものである。蘇得華氏の発表は、武威市に保管されている1000葉の赤字版カンギル零本について、永楽版とは異なるもので、明の正統年間に涼州で開版されたものであるというものであった。

8月3日におこなわれた全体会では、中国蔵学研究中心副幹事ダムドゥル (dGra 'dul) 氏から、中国蔵学研究中心の研究成果の報告と2つの大きな研究計画が示された。研究計画の1つ目は、チベット語訳仏典の中国語訳であり、もう1つは、「中華大典」(蔵文巻) (Krunghwa'i bod yig rig mdzod chen mo) と称する、歴代祖師たちの全集や歴史、芸術、医学、占星術から仏教哲学にいたるまでのあらゆるチベット語文献をジャンルごとに分類し、出版していこうという壮大な企画である。

今回のセミナーで発表された研究成果のいくつかは、すでに『中国蔵学』等の雑誌に論文として掲載されている。目についたところでは、

- ・ Chab 'gag rTa mgrin, “mTsho sngon gter lam rdzong gi bod btsan po'i dus kyi bang so ang gsum pa'i rdo ring yi ge las 'phros pa'i gtam”, *Krung go'i bod rig pa* (中国蔵学), 2012-4, 2012, pp. 50-56.
- ・ sTong skor Tshe ring thar, “Dus rabs brgyad pa'i ban bon 'brel ba'i nang gi dran pa nam mkha'”, *Krung go'i bod rig pa* (中国蔵学), 2012-4, 2012, pp. 68-80.
- ・ 仁青卓瑪 (Rin chen sgrol ma) 「七世達賴喇嘛致三世察罕諾門汗文告考述」『中国蔵学』(漢文版) 2012年第4期, 2012年, pp. 33-38.

などがあげられる。

今回のセミナーについては、以下のような詳細な報告がすでに公表されている。

- ・ 中国蔵学編輯部「伝承文化・服務社会：第五届北京（国際）蔵学検討会綜述」『中国蔵学』(漢文版) 2012年第4期, 2012年, pp.7-25.
- ・ 護山真也「第5回北京国際チベット学セミナー会議報告：サンスクリット・パネルを中心として」『東方学』第126号, 2013年, pp.158-164.

The Influence of rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags on Early Tibetan Buddhism in the Period of the Second Diffusion

AKAHANE Ritsu

1 Introduction

Since the complete works of bKa' gdams pa, *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum* (KS), in which many valuable Tibetan Buddhist texts are included, were first published in 2006,⁽¹⁾ many scholars of Tibetan Buddhism have studied the rare texts included in this collection. Among them, the texts of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109; hereafter, rNgog) and Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–69; hereafter, Phya pa) have been chosen and studied by scholars, such as Kano (2007, 2009), Hugon (2009, 2009 (2010)), and Tauscher (2010).⁽²⁾ It is well known that both played a very important role in the evolution of Tibetan Buddhism, especially in the field of Tibetan logic, and thus their influence on later Buddhists in Tibet is immense. Akahane (2010) has also referred to one of Phya pa's texts, the *dBu ma bden gnyis kyi 'grel pa* (hereafter, Phya_BDG), which is a commentary on the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* (SDVV), written by Jñānagarbha (ca. early 700). Of course, rNgog and Phya pa are considered the most important Buddhists in Tibet, but there remain many other important Buddhists whose texts are yet to be examined.⁽³⁾ I think rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags (ca. 11c–12c; hereafter, rGya dmar ba) is especially important, because he is known in Tibet as Phya pa's teacher and as a specialist in logic and Madhyamaka thought.⁽⁴⁾ Moreover, like Phya pa, he wrote a commentary on the SDVV, the *bDen gnyis nam dbye bshad pa*⁽⁵⁾ (hereafter, rGya_DNS), which also can be found in the KS, though a portion is lost (Akahane 2010). In addition to these two commentaries, I will explore another commentary on the SDVV that is not included in the KS, namely, the *bDen gnyis nam 'byed kyi bshad pa* (hereafter, Dar_DNS), written by Dar ma bkra shis (ca. 1200), who came from the same lineage as Phya pa.⁽⁶⁾ We can use these three commentaries on the SDVV—which were written in Tibet over a course of approximately 100 years, during the early period of the Second Diffusion (*phyi dar*)—in the present paper to study rGya dmar ba's influence on the other two Tibetan Buddhists, especially Phya pa, by comparing these three commentaries.

2 The framework of the texts: The distinction between two truths

After the KS was published, Tauscher (2010) examined Phya_BDG, referring to some

characteristic features as Phya pa's "innovations." His suggestion seems to be reasonable to me, because Phya pa is very famous for "innovating" many original logical terms that influenced later Tibetan Buddhists (Kuijp 1978). However, there remains an important question to be examined regarding Tauscher's suggestions, namely, how or where did Phya pa get such "innovative" ideas? Could these ideas have come to him without any help from others? If we believe that Phya pa was a student (possibly, the most intelligent student) of rGya dmar ba on the basis of the Tibetan history (Blue Annals, 386), we can find the key to answering this question in rGya dmar ba's texts.

In the present paper, from among the "innovations," I want to focus on the distinction between two truths, providing the basis for the following framework. According to Tauscher (2010), Phya pa's two texts, *dBu ma shar gyi stong thun* (hereafter, Phya_BST) and Phya_BDG, have the same framework: (1) the basis of distinction [between two truths] (*dbye gzhi*), (2) the meaning of [this] distinction (*dbye ba'i don*)⁽⁷⁾, (3) the ascertainment of the number [of truths] (*grangs nges pa*), and (4) the meanings of the terms [of the two truths] (*ming gi don*) (Phya_BDG, 5b5). This framework is also used in Phya_BST, and thus Tauscher suggests the possibility that this framework is one of Phya pa's innovations.⁽⁸⁾

When we examine rGya_DNS and the *dBu ma'i de kho na nyid rnam par dpyod pa* (hereafter, rGya_BDN) written by rGya dmar ba, we can find the same framework used in both. For example, in rGya_DNS, rGya dmar ba states:

de dag dbye ba ni / (1) dbye ba'i gzhi' dang / (2) don dang / (3) ming gi don dang / (4) grangs nges pa'o // (rGya_DNS, 7a3-4)

Although parts (3) and (4) of this framework are arranged in a different order from those of Phya_BDG, the contents are the same. rGya dmar ba uses a similar framework in another text, rGya_BDN, as follows:

bDen gnyis rnam dbye bshad pa 'dir //
(1) dbye gzhi (2) don dang (3) ming gi don //
(4) grangs nges (5) mtshan nyid (6) tshad mar babs //
rnam pa drug du shes par bya // (rGya_BDN, 2a8-b1)

This framework of rGya_BDN, shown as a verse, gives us important information. For example, the a-pāda of this verse says, "In this (*'dir*) commentary on the SDVV" (*bDen gnyis rnam dbye bshad pa*). What does "this" mean? We have no information about the Tibetan commentary on the SDVV, written by a Tibetan Buddhist before rGya dmar ba (Akahane 2005), and this framework is not used in the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* (hereafter, SDVP), which was written by Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–88) and is the only Indian commentary on the SDVV. Therefore, all we can infer at this stage is that "this" means his commentary on it, namely, rGya_DNS. This inference is probably reasonable, because we can find many similarities in common sentences and discussions in both texts. In particular, the discussions and sentences found in Part (2) of both texts are very similar (rGya_DNS, 7b6–8b3; rGya_BDN, 3a5–5a8).⁽⁹⁾ Even so, there remains a question regarding this verse. The framework in

rGya_DNS has only four elements, as I have already shown, whereas there are six elements in the framework of rGya_BDN, among which the former four elements are the same as those of rGya_DNS, while the remaining two, (namely, "definition" (*mtshan nyid*) and "valid cognition" (*tshad ma*)), cannot be found in rGya_DNS. However, the fifth element, "definition" (*mtshan nyid*), appears just after a reference to the fourth element, "ascertainment of the number of two truths" (rGya_DNS, 9b5). On the other hand, the sixth element, "valid cognition" (*mtshad ma*), cannot be found in rGya_DNS at all. However, this element has actually been discussed in rGya_DNS. Therefore, we cannot deny the possibility that it exists in the lost folios in rGya_DNS. At any rate, I think there is a high possibility that *bDen gnyis rnam dbye bshad pa* in this verse refers to rGya_DNS.⁽¹⁰⁾

As far as we can see, from the similarities in the frameworks of the texts by rGya dmar ba and Phya pa, it is obvious that rGya dmar ba influenced Phya pa at least on the innovation of this framework.

3 Relationship between the two truths (*Paramārthasatya* and *Samvṛtisatya*)

When Tibetan Buddhists discuss the Two Truths Theory, they often pick up the relationship between two truths as one of the main subjects: that is, they focus on whether the ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*), which is free from conception, and the conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*), which is expressed through words, are the same or not. If both truths were distinct, the question of why the truth is not one would arise. On the other hand, if both were the same, the question of why two truths must exist would arise. Indeed, this discussion can be found in many Tibetan Buddhist texts. For example, the most important and famous Buddhist in Tibet, Tsong kha pa (1357–1419), discusses this in his text *Lam rim chung ba* (hereafter, LRCung, 248). Although this subject is discussed in the second element of the framework, "the meaning of the distinction [of the two truths]," an interesting feature can be found in the rGya_DNS, rGya_BDN and Phya_BDG. This subject is discussed on the basis of the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (hereafter, SNS). The detailed analysis of this discussion in Phya pa has been established (Tauscher 2010), but in the present paper, I want to explore how rGya dmar ba influenced Phya pa on this subject, as well as how this discussion appeared and was formed during the early period of the Second Diffusion in Tibetan Buddhism.

Phya pa conjectures three possibilities regarding the relationship between two truths, and points out none of these three possibilities is correct. The three possibilities are as follows:

- (a1) Two truths are distinct with regard to entity (*dgnos po tha dad*)
- (a2) Two truths are distinct insofar as they are not one (*gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad*)
- (B) Two truths are not distinct with regard to concept (*ldog pa tha mi dad*)

However, the first two can be unified as "distinct with regard to entity." Therefore, he conjectures two possibilities regarding the relationship between two truths, namely, that (A) both truths are distinct with regard to entity,⁽¹¹⁾ and (B) that both truths are unique (not distinct) with regard to

concept.⁽¹²⁾ He insists that both should be denied on the basis of the SNS, as follows:

Phya_(A) [In case that both truths were distinct with regard to entity]⁽¹³⁾

[Phya_BDG] *dmyigs bcas kyi blos yul du bya ba'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa dang spros bral don dam pa'i bden pa dag dngos po tha dad pa'am gcig pa bkag pa'i tha dad ma yin te / yin na phan tshun spangs pas dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa nas gsungs pa'i tha dad pa'i phyogs kyi skyon bzhir 'gyur te / don dam rtogs pas snang pa la mtshan mar 'dzin pa'i gnyen po ma yin pa dang / snang pa'i chos nyid ma yin pa dang / kun rdzob la bdag dang / chos bkag pa tsam ma yin pa dang / kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam byang dus gcig par 'gyur ba'o //* (Phya_BDG, 5b7-6a1)

[Translation] The conventional truth, which is the object of the knowledge having the object to be recognized, and the ultimate truth, which is free from the manifestation, are neither (a1) distinct with regard to entity (like a pot and a pole) nor (a2) distinct insofar as they are not one (like an actual pot and the pot in the preceding moment).⁽¹⁴⁾ If [both were] distinct [with regard to entity (= in case of (A))], the following four faults, which are expounded in the SNS, would occur because [both truths] exclude each other.

(A1) [Even if one] recognizes the ultimate truth, it would not be the antagonist of acquiring the characteristics of the appearance [in the conventional truth].

(A2) [The ultimate truth] would not be the inherent property of the appearance [in the conventional truth].

(A3) Mere negation of essential nature and property in the conventional truth would not become [the ultimate truth].

(A4) [Two contrary things,] the affliction (**kleśa*) [of the conventional truth] and the pureness (**viśuddha*) [of the ultimate truth,] can exist at the same time.⁽¹⁵⁾

Phya_(B) [In case that both truths were non-distinct with regard to concept]

[Phya_BDG] *yang kun rdzob kyi bden par mtshon par bya ba'i gzhi ma yin dgag rnam dang don dam pa'i bden par mtshon par bya ba'i gzhi spros bral ldog pa tha dad du mtshan gzhi de gnyis nges pa'i tshad mas grub mod kyi / de gnyis ldog pa tha mi dad do zhes tha snyad la log par rtogs na yang dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa nas gsungs pa'i tha mi dad kyi skyon bzhi ste / don dam pa'i bden pa so so'i skye bo'i mngon sum gyi gzhal byar 'gyur ba dang / sgrib pa'i dmyigs par 'gyur ba dang / mthong pa dang thos pa las gzhan du btsal myi dgos par 'gyur ba dang / kun rdzob la rnam dbye myed par 'gyur ba'o //* (Phya_BDG, 6a6-8)

[Translation] Or, the relative negation, which is the basis of definiendum in the conventional truth, and the non-conceptual, which is the basis of definiendum in the ultimate truth, are distinctly established by the valid cognition, which makes these both definitional bases certain. But even if [one] would misunderstand with regard to transactional usage, that the two [truths] (the relative negation in the conventional truth and the non-conceptual in the ultimate truth) are not distinct with regard to concept, the following four faults, which are expounded in the SNS,

would occur.

(B1) The ultimate truth would become the object of direct perception of ordinary people.

(B2) [The ultimate truth] would become a support for the obstacle (**āvaraṇa*).

(B3) [The ultimate truth] would not need to be acquired by ways other than seeing and hearing [in the conventional truth].

(B4) The distinctness [of things]⁽¹⁶⁾ would not exist in the conventional [truth].

Although each of the four faults cannot be directly found in the SNS, similar discussions can certainly be found (SNS, 46-47), as Tauscher (2010) shows.⁽¹⁷⁾ What I should ask in the present paper is this: Why did Phya pa explain the relationship between two truths by using these two conditions, namely, (A) “distinct with regard to entity” and (B) “unique (non-distinct) with regard to concept”? The key to answering this question can be found in rGya dmar ba's texts. In my research, although I found similar discussions on the basis of the SNS in both rGya_DNS and rGya_BDN, rGya_BDN clearly shows the background of this topic. Therefore, I will pick up the discussion found in rGya_BDN.

When we carefully read rGya_BDN, we find that rGya dmar ba's explanation of the relationship between the two truths is connected to the division of the Madhyamaka school of thought in Tibet. The explanation on the division of the Madhyamaka school is found just before the section “The meaning of the distinction between the two truths.” It is summarized as follows:⁽¹⁸⁾

1. Mādhyamikas, who established a fundamental doctrine.

2. Mādhyamikas, who interpreted the fundamental doctrine.

In the sight of the ultimate [truth] (paramārtha*, *don dam pa*) P.**

[P-1] The Mādhyamikas, who explain it as magical illusions (*sGyu ma ltar smra ba*).

[P-2] The Mādhyamikas, who do not have any own assertion (*Rab tu mi gnas par 'dod pa*).

In the sight of the conventional [truth] (saṃvṛti*, *kun rdzob pa*) S.**

[S-1] The Mādhyamikas, who explain the conventional in the same way as Yogācārarin (that is, no external world exists).

[S-2] The Mādhyamikas, who think that an external world exists.

[S-2.1] The Mādhyamikas, who explain the external world in the same way as Sautrāntika does.

[S-2.2] The Mādhyamikas, who explain the external world in the same way as Sarvastivādin does.⁽¹⁹⁾

A similar, or the same divisions as this, can be found in other Tibetan Buddhist texts. Among them, it is well known that the division of [P-1] and [P-2] is criticized by rNgog as the wrong one (Kobayashi 1993; Kano 2009). Kobayashi (1991; 1993) in particular, minutely examines this type of division and discusses some other problems around it. Consequently, we know that such divisions amongst schools already existed. After he brings this division to light, rGya dmar ba starts the section

on “The meaning of the distinction [between the two truths]” (*ming gyi don*) as follows:

[rGya_BDN Introducing part] *don ni gcig pa bkag pa tsam gyis gnyis ste / de nyid dang gzhan du brjod du myed pas snang ba dang stong pa dbyer myed pa'i chos can dang chos nyid yin gyi / mtshan nyid shin tu gcig pa'am / ngo bo tha dad pa ni ma yin no // dir (1) dbye ba gtan myed pa'am / (2) yod na yang ngo bo tha dad pa'am / (3) ngo bo gcig la (i) chos kyi dbye ba'am / (4) gcig pa bkag pa tsam gyi dbye ba las / dang po (1) dang gnyis pa (2) ni dGongs 'grel nas gsungs pa'i skyon bzhi bzhis dgag par bya la / gsum pa (3) dang bzhi ba (4) ni sgyu ma dang rab tu mi gnas pa'i bye brag las dbyad par bya'o // des na ngo bo gcig la chos kyi dbye ba 'dod pa la ni mdo'i nyes pa bzhi mi gnas te / (rGya_BDN, 2b1–3).*

[Translation] About the meaning [of the distinction between the two truths], [the number] two is [said] in order (X) only to deny the identity [of the two truths]. (Y) [The two truths,] which can be seen in [two forms, namely] “itself” and “the different thing [from itself],” do not exist at all. Therefore, “the appearance” (*snang ba*) and “the emptiness” (*stong ba*) are related to “property” (**dharma*) and “property possessor” (**dharmin*), which cannot be separately divided: however, both are neither unique [with regard to] characteristics nor distinct [with regard to] natures. [There are four explanations] for this [relationship between the two truths]: (1) there exists no distinction in substance [between the two truths]; (2) even if there exists [the distinction between the two truths] [both] natures (*ngo bo*) are distinct; (3) there are (i) distinctions of [both] properties (*chos*), though [both are] same [with regard to] entity; or (4) the distinction is made in order only to deny the identity [of both truths]. Among them, (1) and (2) should be refuted on the basis of the respective four faults expounded in the SNS (like shown in Phya_(A) and Phya_(B)), and (3) and (4) should be examined on the basis of the distinction of “*sGyu ma ltar smra ba*” (P-1) and “*Rab tu mi gnas par 'dod pa*” (P-2). Thus, about [(3)], in which the distinction of property (*chos*) of what is same [with regard to] nature (*ngo bo*) is found, such faults expounded in the sūtra (= the SNS) do not exist.

In short, at least, rGya dmar ba thinks that the explanation of the relationship between the two truths should be connected to the division in the Madhyamaka school of thought. In the underlined passage (X), rGya dmar ba refers to why the two truths should be stated, and shows his opinion. His opinion is referred to again in the underlined passage (4), which is the view of Madhyamaka called as the *Rab tu mi gnas par 'dod pa*. Therefore, it seems that he has the same interpretation on this point as that of the “*Rab tu mi gnas par 'dod pa*.” Indeed, he criticizes the former two positions, namely (1) and (2), as what are denied respectively in the form of (B) and (A) on the basis of the SNS, as being denied by Phya pa. On the other hand, (3) and (4) cannot be found in Phya_BDG. Of course, as I have already mentioned, (4) is his opinion, and thus it must not be denied. What should we think about (3)? In last sentence of the above citation, rGya dmar ba refers to the possibility of (3) and it cannot be denied on the basis of the SNS unlike (1) and (2). In the following sentence, he mentions the reasons in four forms in correspond with the four kinds of faults expounded in the SNS like Phya_(B). Its

contents are summarized as follows:

[(3) cannot be denied in dependence on the SNS]

1. Even if one sees the conventional [truth], he does not see the enlightenment (= the ultimate truth). (= The fault of B1 would not occur)
2. Even if one depends on the ultimate [truth], the sorrow (= the obstacle against the enlightenment) does not increase. (= The fault of B2 would not occur)
3. Even if there is not any difference in the ultimate [truth], in the conventional there exists manifestation of things. (= The fault of B4 would not occur)
4. The ultimate can also be acquired by seeing and hearing.⁽²⁰⁾ (= The fault of B3 would not occur)

In this way, the four faults like Phya_(B) on the basis of the SNS do not occur in the case of (3), because both truths are distinct with regard to property. In other words, (1) and (3) should be thought of as a pair of conditions. Both (1) and (3) have the same condition that both truths are unique with regard to nature. That said, in (1) both truths are unique also with regard to property, whereas in (3) both truths are distinct with regard to property. Therefore, after this explanation, he says in conclusion:

[rGya_BDN conclusion of (3)] *de'i phyir (i) mtshan nyid kyi dbye ba tsam yang khas mi len na nyes pa de dag brjod par gdon mi za'o // (rGya_BDN, 2b5)*

[Translation] Therefore, if [one] does not accept even the distinction of [both] definitions (*mtshan nyid*) of two truths, [namely, if one does not accept (3) but (1)], then [four] such faults [as Phya_(B) expounded in SNS] can be undoubtedly pointed out.

Therefore, through this conclusion, rGya dmar ba insists that the possibility (1) that both truths are unique with regard to both nature and property/definition is rejected like Phya_(B) in dependence on SNS. That is, (1), which rGya dmar ba says, corresponds with Phya_(B) and is denied. In consequence, the four faults like Phya_(B) are not directly referred to in rGya_BDN because (B) may be indirectly mentioned in [(3) cannot be denied in dependence on the SNS].

I want here to make an observation about the terminology. At first, rGya dmar ba uses the term “distinction of [both] properties” (*chos kyi dbye ba*), in the underlined part (i) in [rGya_BDN Introducing part] and its translation. In the conclusion, however, which is to say, in [rGya_BDN conclusion of (3)], he uses the term, “distinction of [both] definitions” (*mtshan nyid kyi dbye ba*). Thus, the terms, “property” (*chos*) and “definition” (*mtshan nyid*) probably have the same meaning for him at least in this context.

Regarding the case (A) that both truths are distinct with regard to nature, rGya dmar ba says in rGya_BDN that

[rGya_BDN_(A)] *ngo bo tha dad na nyes pa bzhi ste / don dam mngon du mthong na yang kun nas nyon mongs pa'i dmigs pa kun rdzob logs su (2b6) dmigs pas mya ngan las 'das pa mi 'thob par*

'gyur ba dang / bum pa dang snam bu bzhin du don dam kun rdzob kyi chos nyid du mi rung ba dang / bum pa rab du ma grub pa tsam snam bu ma yin pa bzhin du kun rdzob bdag myed pa'am rab tu ma grub tsam don dam ma yin par 'gyur ba dang / bum pa dang snam bu'i blo bzhin du dmigs pa so sor grub pa'i phyir kun nas nyon mongs (2b7) pa dang rnam par byang ba rgyu cig la cig par 'gyur ba'o // (rGya_BDN: 2b5-7)

[Translation] If [two truths] were distinct [with regard to] nature (*ngo bo*), the following four faults would exist. (A1) Even if one can clearly recognize the ultimate, [at the same time] the knowledge with affliction (**kleśa*) would recognize only the conventional. Therefore, he would not attain enlightenment. (A2) The ultimate would not be suitable as the inherent nature (*chos nyid*) of the conventional, [because the ultimate is distinct with regard to nature] like “pot” and “cloth.” (A3) Non-existence of the intrinsic nature of the conventional or non-establishment of the conventional would not be always the ultimate. It is same that non-establishment of a pot does not always mean a cloth. (A4) Each cognition of the conventional and the ultimate is established like each cognition of a pot and a cloth. Therefore, affliction (**kleśa*) and pureness (**viśuddha*) would occur at the same time in dependence on respective causes.

These four faults, which rGya dmar ba shows in the case that both truths are distinct with regard to nature (A), are fundamentally same as those of Phya_(A). Therefore, the most important different interpretations of the relationship between two truths for both persons exists in the case of (B) but not (A).

How, then, does rGya dmar ba explain (B) in the other text, rGya_DNS? Although he shows the same discussion in rGya_DNS, in contrast with that of rGya_BDN, he shows that (B) is denied as four faults in dependence on the SNS and then (3) cannot be denied like it (= (B)) in rGya_DNS.

rGya_(B) [In case that both truths are same with regard to concept]

[rGya_DNS_(B)] *don ni byas pa dang mi rtag pa bzhin dngos po gcig la chos kyi dbye bas gnyis sam / bum pa dang snam bu bzhin du dngos po gnyis tha dad par gnas zhe na / gnyi' ga ltar yang ma yin te / de nyid dang gzhan du rjod (7a4) du med pa gcig bkag pa tsam la gnyis zhes bya'o // de la 1 yin na nyes pa bzhi ste / skye bo mtha' dag gis kun rdzob mthong pa na / don dam pa yang mthong zin pas mya ngan las 'das pa thob zin par 'gyur ro // gnyis pa kun rdzob rten nas zag pa 'phel ba ltar don dam dmigs pas kyang 'phel bar 'gyur bas / kun rdzob bzhin du don dam yang kun nas nyon mong pa'i dmigs par 'gyur ro // gsum pa ni don dam la phan tshun dbye ba med pa ltar bum pa la sogs pa kun rdzob thams cad tha mi dad par 'gyur ro // bzhi pa ni ci ltar mthong pa dang thos pa las kun rdzob logs su btsal du med pa ltar / mthong pa dang thos pa las don dam logs su thos bsam gis btsal du med par 'gyur ro // zhes dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo' nas gsungs pas 'gog pa ma legs te / byas pa dang mi rtag pa bzhin dngos po gcig pa la nyes pa de dag med pa'i phyir ro // (rGya_DNS 7a4-6)*

[Translation] If one insists that the meaning [of distinction between both truths] is either (3)

what is unique [with regard to] entity is divided into two in dependence on the distinction of [both] properties (*chos*) like “produced” (**kṛtaka*) and “impermanent” (**anitya*) or (2) what are distinct with regard to entity (*dngos po*) like “a pot” and “a cloth,” neither is correct. (4) (Y) [The two truths] do not exist as what is mentioned in two forms of “itself” and “the different thing [from itself],” do not exist at all, and (X) [The number of] two is [said] in order only to deny the identity [of the two truths].

[The SNS expounds as follows:] “If [both were] unique [with regard to entity], the [following] four faults would occur:

(B1) When all people see the conventional [truth], they see the ultimate [truth] as well. Therefore, all people would have already attained enlightenment (**nirvāṇa*) [without any effort]. (B2) The afflictions (**kleśa*) increase [when one] depends on the conventional [truth]. Similarly, [their] afflictions would increase even when [people] recognize the ultimate [truth]. Therefore, like the conventional [truth], the ultimate [truth] would also become the object of [the knowledge with] the affliction.

(B4) There would be no distinction [between all things] in the ultimate truth [as no intrinsic nature]. In the same way, any distinction would not exist between all the conventional things, like a pot and so on.

(B3) Not only the conventional truth [but also the ultimate truth] would be pursued through seeing and hearing. In the same way, [the practitioner, like] the Hearer (**Śrāvaka*) and Thinker (**Cintāmayī*), would pursue not only the ultimate things [but also conventional things] through seeing and hearing.”

It is not correct to deny (3) like this in dependence on what is expounded in the SNS, because such faults as the SNS expounds cannot exist in the case that [the two truths are] unique with regard to entity [but distinct with regard to property/definition] like “produced” (**kṛtaka*) and “impermanent” (**anitya*).

As we can understand from the above citation, the explanation in rGya_DNS fundamentally coincides with [rGya_BDN Introducing part]. After this citation, he picks up the example of (3) and shows that these four faults would not occur, like [(3) cannot be denied in dependence on the SNS].⁽²¹⁾ In the conclusion of a line of discussions, rGya dmar ba says as follows:

[rGya_DNS conclusion] *dGongs 'grel gyi dgongs pa ni kun rdzob dang don dam mtshan nyid ??? (7b1) pa shin tu gcig par 'dod na nyes pa bzhi po gdon mi za'o // (rGya_DNS, 7a7-b1)*

[Translation] The intention of SNS is that these four faults are necessary when the conventional and the ultimate are unique with regard to the definition (*mtshan nyid*).

This conclusion is the same as that of rGya_BDN, which I have already mentioned as [rGya_BDN conclusion of (3)].

In short, there are only two divisions of the relationship between the conventional truth and the

ultimate truth in SNS, namely, (A) both truths are distinct with regard to entity and (B) both truths are unique with regard to entity. The former possibility is not problematic for rGya dmar ba. In the latter possibility, however, two further divisions can be suggested, namely, both are also unique with regard to the property/definition like (1) and both are distinct with regard to the property/definition, like (3). This is because the SNS does not refer to whether both truths are unique or distinct with regard to property/definition by saying only the unique entity. Among both possibilities, the object of the negation expounded in the SNS is, according to rGya dmar ba, the former one, but not the latter, but such sub-divisions are not found in Phya pa's text. On the basis of such a discussion of rGya dmar ba, Phya pa shows two divisions as follows: (A) Both truths are distinct with regard to the entity and (B) both truths are not distinct with regard to the concept (*ldog pa*). In other words, he rejects, from the beginning of this discussion, the possibility that both truths are unique with regard to entity but distinct with regard to a concept like (3), because it has been already proved by rGya dmar ba that such possibility like (3) cannot be denied in dependence on the SNS.⁽²²⁾

4 After Phya pa

How did Dar ma bkra shis, who was active after Phya pa, handle this topic, especially (B)? He also refers to this topic, but his explanations are simpler than his predecessors. About (A), no important difference is discernible, so in the present paper I will look only at (B):

Dar_B. [Where both truths are the same concept] by Dar ma bkra shis

[Dar_DNS] *ldog pa 1 pa yin na yang dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa las gsungs pa 4 ste / don dam gyi bden pa de kun rdzob dang ldog pa. 1 yin pas byis pa rnams kyi mngon 3 du grub par 'gyur la de 'dod na 'phags par 'gyur ba dang / don dam gyi bden pa de thos bsam gyis btsal myi dgos par 'gyur ba dang / don dam gyi bden pa de kun nas nyon mongs pa'i dmyigs par 'gyur ba dang / kun rdzob kyi bden pa de don dam gyi bden pa dang ldog pa 1 pas rnam dbye' myed par 'gyur bas ldog pa 1 pa ma yin no //* (Dar_DNS, 5b6-7)

[Translation] Even if [the two truths are] unique with regard to concept [as well as entity], these four faults, as are expounded in the SNS, would occur:

(B1) The ultimate truth is the same as the conventional [truth with regard to] concept. Therefore, [the ultimate truth] would be established in the direct perception of the fool. And if [we] accepted it, even [the fool] would become the wise.

(B3) The ultimate truth would not need to be pursued by [practitioners like] the Hearer (*Śrāvaka) and the Thinker (*Cintāmayī).

(B2) The ultimate truth would become the object of [the knowledge with] the affliction.

(B4) The distinctions [among things] in the conventional truth would not exist, because the conventional truth is same as the ultimate truth [with regard to] concept.

Therefore, [both truths] are not unique [with regard to] concept.

As we can see at a glance, in Dar_DNS, Dar ma bkra shis does not examine the possibility that both truths are unique with regard to entity but distinct with regard to concept (*ldog pa*) like (3) of rGya dmar ba. He also uses the term “concept” (*ldog pa*). Such an explanation is similar as that of Phya pa, but much simpler.⁽²³⁾ Thus, we know that from rGya dmar ba to Dar ma bkra shis, this explanation of the relationship between the two truths on the basis of the SNS became more sophisticated in stages.

5 Property (*chos*), nature (*ngo bo*), definition (*mtshan nyid*), entity (*ngo bo*), and concept (*ldog pa*)

When I examine the usage of five terminologies—“property” (*chos*), “nature” (*ngo bo*), “definition” (*mtshan nyid*), “entity” (*ngo bo*), and “concept” (*ldog pa*) — in these four texts (rGya_BDN, rGya_DNS, Phya_BDG, and Dar_DNS), we can find small but important differences. I will show examples of these five terminologies as follows:

[rGya_BDN] unique nature (*ngo bo gcig*), distinct natures (*ngo bo tha dad*), distinction of [both] properties (*chos kyi dbye*), distinct definition (*mtshan nyid tha dad*)

[rGya_DNS] unique entity (*ngos po gcig*), distinct entities (*ngos po nyid tha dad*), distinction of [both] properties (*chos kyi dbye*), distinct definition (*mtshan nyid tha dad*)

[Phya_BDG] distinct entity (*ngos po tha dad*), non-distinct concept (*ldog tha mi dad*)

[Dar_DNS] distinct entity (*ngos po tha dad*), unique concept (*ldog gcig*)

When we compare the usage of these terms, we may be able to say as follows:

(I) The terms “distinction of [both] properties” (*chos kyi dbye ba*) and “distinction of [both] definitions” (*mtshan nyid kyi dbye ba*), which are used in both texts of rGya dmar ba, have the same meaning in substance, as I have already mentioned.

(II) The term, “nature” (*ngo bo*) is only used in rGya_BDN; in the other three texts, “entity” (*ngos po*) is used instead of “nature.” Therefore, we can infer that “nature” was changed into “entity.” Depending on the usage of this term, we may be able to say that rGya_BDN was written before rGya_DNS.

(III) Although we can often find the term, “concept” (*ldog pa*), in both the texts of rGya dmar ba, in the topic handled in the present paper, we may be able to say that Phya pa used this term first.

(IV) It is interesting that Phya pa uses the term “non-distinct concept” (*ldog tha mi dad*), rather than, “unique concept” (*ldog gcig*).

6 Conclusion

There is no doubt that Phya pa is one of the most innovative Buddhists of the Second Diffusion in Tibet. At the same time, however, it is true that some of his ideas were inspired by, or were transmitted from, his teacher rGya dmar ba. Phya pa developed and refined some of these inherited ideas into something innovative, as Tauscher points out. In the present paper, I could examine only a small part of the question on how the Two Truths Theory was formed and transmitted in the Second Diffusion in Tibet. Many more texts would have to be examined in order to make the point clear.

- (1) rGya dmar ba influenced Phya pa and Dar ma bkra shis while they found an explanation for the relationship between the two truths, which depends on the SNS.
- (2) The explanation for the relationship between the two truths as given by rGya dmar ba is connected to the division of the Madhyamaka school of thought.
- (3) The explanation for the relationship between the two truths became increasingly elaborated from rGya dmar ba to Dar ma bkra shis. In particular, changes in usage of the five terminologies *ngo bo*, *ngos po*, *chos*, *mtshan nyid*, and *ldog pa*, in the context of the explanation for the relationship between the two truths, give us interesting and important information on the development of thought in Tibet.

Abbreviations

D	sDe dge ed.
Dar_DNS	Dar ma bkra shis (ca.12c–13c). <i>bDen pa gnyis rnam par 'byed kyi bshad pa</i> . Mss., 26fols.
rGya_BDN	rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags (ca. 11c–12c). <i>dBu ma'i de kho na nyid rnam par dpyod pa</i> . In <i>bKa' gdams gsung 'bum 'phyogs sgrig thengs gnyis pa</i> Vol.31, 7–67, 31fols.
rGya_DNS	rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags (ca. 11c–12c). <i>bDen gnyis rnam bshad</i> . In <i>bKa' gdams gsung 'bum 'phyogs sgrig thengs dang po</i> Vol.19, 247–316, 35fols.
KS	<i>bKa' gdams gsung 'bum 'phyogs sgrig thengs dang po</i> . Ed. dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib 'jug khang. 90 Vols. Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang. 2006–09.
LRCung	Tsong kha pa Blo gzang grags pa (1357–1419). <i>Lam rim chung gu</i> . In Tshultrim (2012).
P	Peking ed.
Phya_BDG	Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–69). <i>dBu ma bden pa gnyis rnam par bshad pa yi ge rung dus gzhung gsal bar byed pa</i> . In <i>bKa' gdams gsung 'bum 'phyogs sgrig thengs dang po</i> Vol.6, 181–250, 33fols.
Phya_BST	Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–69). <i>dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun</i> . In Tauscher (1999).
SDVP	Śāntarakṣita (ca. 724–88). <i>Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā</i> . D(3883) sa15b2-52b7, P(5283) sa 1–48b7.
SDVV	Jñānagarbha (ca. 8c). <i>Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti</i> . In Eckel (1987, 155–90).
SNS	<i>Sandhinirmocanasūtra</i> . <i>L'Explication des Mystères</i> . Éd. et trad. par É. Lamotte, Louvain, Paris: Bureaux du Recueil 1935.
?	Unclear parts in texts

(+) A part which is written out of line.

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Notes

- (1) Detailed information can be found in Kano (2007; 2009).
- (2) Of course, we cannot forget the first study on Phya pa by Kuijp (1978).
- (3) For example, Yoshimizu (2006; 2008) examines a work by Zhang Thang sag pa (ca. 12c), a Tibetan commentary on the *Prasannapadā*.
- (4) For example, according to Tauscher (2010, 2), Padma kar po states that Phya pa was the best of rGya dmar ba’s students. Tauscher (1995, n.4) further states that rGya dmar ba was of the third generation in the second transmission (*phyi dar*) lineage of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109). The *Blue Annals* (386) says the followings: “Cog ro Cho kyi rgyal mtshan was born in the year Earth-Male-Mouse (1108) in Lower Khams. At the age of 19, he came to the school of rGya dmar. The Earth-Mouse year is the Mouse year that preceded the Iron-Tiger year (1110), in which dPal Phag mo gru pa was born. He studied the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the teachings of the school known as Madhyamaka-Svātantrika and became a learned man.” According to this, we can understand that rGya dmar ba was famous for logic and Madhyamaka (*rigs pa dang dbu ma pa*), and he had one school.
- (5) Some folios in this text are lost and thus we cannot know the original title and author. However, rGya dma ba was identified as the author in Akahane (2010) and the title of this text can be inferred from this.
- (6) For detailed information on this commentary and its author, see Akahane (2005). I am currently preparing to publish this text.
- (7) Tauscher (2010) translates the term as “mode of distinction.” In the present paper, however, as per the original meaning of the Tibetan word *don* I have translated it as meaning.
- (8) A similar framework can also be found in the text of Tsong kha pa–LRCung (284).
- (9) We cannot easily determine which texts were written first. At the present, I believe that rGya_DNS was written first, followed by rGya_BDN. I have two circumstantial pieces of evidence for this conclusion. The first is the existence of the following description, which can be found at the end of long discussions around (2) in rGya_DNS: “This [topic] should be minutely examined in another time” (*’di’ ni skabs gzhan du zhib mor rig par bya’o //*: rGya_DNS, 8b2). This “another time” probably refers to rGya_BDN, because the discussions in rGya_BDN are normally much more detailed than those in the rGya_DNS. We cannot ignore the contrary possibility, however. See, the fifth section of the present paper.
- (10) This fact gives us a clue to the correct name of rGya_DNS.
- (11) It is written as “two truths are distinct entities” in literal Tibetan. The expression that two truths are distinct entities is difficult to understand clearly. What does it mean that truth is entity? In LRCung p. 284, Tsong kha pa says that the objects of knowledge are the conventional truth and the ultimate truth (*shes par bya ba yang kun rdzob dang don dam pa’i bden pa ’dir zad do //* p. 284 ll.4–5). He then refers to the relationship between both truths: that is to say, he does not show the entity of truth but the entities of the objects of knowledge in two truths. Although it is not clear how we should think about the expression in the present context, it seems to be like that in Phya_BDG, specifically with regard

- to the expression of Phya_(A): “The conventional truth, which is the object of knowledge having the object to be recognized.” I am not sure, however, whether we can understand this term similarly in the texts of rGya dmar ba and Dar ma bkra shis, which are picked up in the present paper. Therefore, in the present paper, I translate it freely like this in order to make its meaning easily understood and common to all these texts.
- (12) Although I translate the term *ldog pa* as “concept” here, it means “the exclusion of all the others” in substance, in dependence on the *apoha* theory. Phya pa insists in conclusion at the end of the discussion that what is true as a collection of relative negations is the conventional truth, while the truth, which cannot be established at all as the object of the logic which examines the ultimate, is the ultimate truth. Therefore, [two truths] are distinct concepts for a unique [entity]. (ma yin dgag sna tshogs su bden pa ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin la / mthar thug spyod pa’i rigs pa’i yul du cir yang ma grub par bden pa don dam pa’i bden pa yin pas ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad yin no // (Phya_BDG, 6b5)). As we can understand at a glance, “distinct [with regard to] concept” means “distinct with regard to concept for a unique [entity],” which is explained by Hugon (2009 (2010) 326, n.17) as follows: “The classical example is that of ‘produced’ and ‘impermanent,’ two properties of the pot, which correspond to two ways of conceiving the pot, namely, as something that is excluded from what is non-produced, and as something that is excluded from what is permanent.” This is dependent on the *apoha* theory. She translates this passage (*ngo bo cig gi ldog pa tha dad*) as “x and y are distinct concepts for a unique, undifferentiated nature.” Therefore, I use “concept” as the translation of the term, *ldog pa*, in the present paper.
 - (13) Tauscher (2010, 8) provides the following translation: “the conditioned and the absolute are different (in nature).”
 - (14) Hugon (2009 (2010), 326, fn. 17) clearly explains what kinds of things both expressions mean. My translations about both terms follow the explanations of Hugon.
 - (15) See, Tauscher (2010, 8–12).
 - (16) See, Tauscher (2010, 12–3).
 - (17) Reportedly, some Tibetan Buddhists refer to the SNS when they discuss this topic. For example, according to Mochizuki (2011, 292 & n.381), Tāranātha and Dol po pa also refer to the SNS.
 - (18) de la gzhung dBu ma’i bka’i rtogs par bya ba’i don gtan la ’bebs pa ni gzhung phyi mo dang phyogs ’dzin pa’i dbu ma gnyis su sNga rabs ba dag tha snyad ’dogs so // (2a5) phyogs ’dzin pa yang don dam pa la sgyu ma ltar smra ba dang / rab tu mi gnas par ’dod pa dang / ’gal ’dus don dam par ’dod pa’o // kun rdzob la rNal ’byor dpyod pa dang / mDo sde spyod pa dang / gnyi ga’i lugs dang mi ’gal pa zhes sam / sphyi bzung zhal che ba zhes ’chad pa ni mi bzang ste / ’gal ’dus la sogs pa ni ngan pa’i rtog pa mtha thug pa myed pas de lta bu’i phyogs ’dzi(n) (2a6) pa bgrang pa las ’das pa’i phyir ro // mDo sde spyod pa dang rNal ’byor spyod pa bas ma bsdus pa’i Bye brag du smra ba ltar ’dod pa yod pa’i phyir dang / gnyi ga’i lugs dang mi ’gal ba ’dod pa mi srid dang / ’gal ba gnyis dang mi ’gal ba’i grub mtha ’dzin na rtog ldan mkhas par mi rung ba’i phyir ro // zhal che byas pa yang myed kyi / lugs gnyis rjes su brjod nas rang gis phyogs (2a7) gang yang ma bzung ba gzhung la ma snang ba’i phyir ro // des na don dam la sgyu ma dang rab tu myi gnas pa gnyis dang / kun rdzob la rNal ’byor spyod pa dang Phyi rol gyi don yod pa gnyis pos / don kyang mDo sde pa ltar ram Bye brag smra ba ltar ’dod pa’o // (rGya_BDN, 2a4–7).
 - (19) This division in the Madhyamaka school should be examined more closely, because it seems to contain further complicated problems. For example, the division he shows here has certain problems, whether rGya dmar ba aggressively insisted on this or not: This is because we found a slightly different idea in another part of the rGya_BDN (Prof. Kobayashi kindly gave me this information privately after the conference, and he also gave me further information about where the same discussions can be found

in Go rams pa's text.)

- (20) des na ngo bo gcig la chos kyi dbye ba 'dod pa la ni mdo'i nyes pa bzhi mi gnas te / (1) kun rdzob mthong pa na don dam pa mthong yang ma nges pas sgro 'dogs pa mi 'gal te / skad cig (2b3) ma bzhin no // des na mya ngan las 'das pa thob par 'gyur ba myed do // (2) de kun nas nyon mongs pa'i dmigs pa yin yang / de'i ngo bor gyur pa'i chos gzhan ma yin pa yang mi 'gal te / sngon po chags pa'i yul pa ni yang skad cig ma yid 'byung ba'i gnas yin pa bzhin no // des na don dam pa la brten na nas zag pa rgyas par 'gyur ba myed do // (3) chos can phan tshun (2b4) tha dad kyang chos nyid dbye ba myed pa yang mi 'gal te / de lta ma yin na chos can phan tshun rjes su 'gro ba mi srid pas chos kyang mi srid par 'gyur ro // des na kun rdzob rnam tha mi dad par 'gyur ba myed do // (4) dngos po gzhan du mi btsal{brtsal in Ms.} ba ni 'dod par 'gyur la / mtshan nyid kyi ldog pa ni sngon? po (2b5) rtogs kyang skad cig ma nyes par bya ba bzhin no // des na mthong ba dang thos pa las don dam logs su btsal bar bya ba ma yin par 'gyur ba myed do // (rGya_BDN: 2b2-5).
- (21) (The faults of B1 would not occur) de mthong pa'i blo la de snang yang phyin ci log mi spong pas mya ngan las 'das pa mi thob par 'gyur te / sngon po mthong yang rtag par phyin ci log mi spong pa bzhin no // (The faults of B2 would not occur) de kun nas nyon mongs pa'i dmigs ?? (7a7) yin yang de dang ngo bo 1 pa'i chos gzhan nyon mongs pa'i dmigs par mi 'gyur te / sngon po chags pa'i yul yin yang skad 1 ma skyo ba skye ba'i yul yin pa bzhin no // (The faults of B4 would not occur) chos nyid dbye ba med kyang de dang ngo bo gcig pa'i chos can tha dad par mi 'gal te / bsgrub par bya ba'i chos kyi spyi mi rtag pa la dbye ba med kyang dpe' dang rtsod gzhi' (+ kun rdzob) tha dad pa bzhin no // (The faults of B3 would not occur) [mthong pa dang? ??] (7a8) thos pa las rdzas kyi ngo bo logs su btsal du med par thal pa ni 'dod par 'gyur la / mtshan nyid kyi ldog pa ni sngon po mthong yang skad 1 ma rdzas dpag gis btsal bar bya ba bzhin du btsal bar mi 'gal lo // (rGya_DNS: 7a6-8).
- (22) This fact does not always mean that the possibility (3) cannot be denied at all, because his opinion is (4) but not (3). Indeed, he denies (3) later in both his texts on the basis of many other reasons besides the SNS.
- (23) It is obvious that Dar ma bkra shis's explanation is based on that of Phya pa.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Prof. Kobayashi and an anonymous referee for giving many valuable suggestions as well as the Mishima Kaiun Memorial Foundation for their financial support for this work.

○大会記事

第60回日本チベット学会大会は、2012年10月20日（土）、筑波大学（筑波キャンパス中地区）において開催され、午後12時30分から以下の研究発表が行われた。

- カルマパ転生者と本山ツルプ寺座主の関係について 高橋 誠（早稲田大学大学院文学研究科）
- カンカル家文書の成立と伝来について 手塚 利彰（佛教大学歴史学部）
- アムド東部の多民族社会におけるチベット仏教の役割に関する一考察
..... 上原 周子（北海道大学大学院文学研究科）
- 14世紀チベット語文献『王統明鏡』に見られる「切り札の提示」機能をもつpa節
..... 星 泉（東京外国語大学アジア・アフリカ言語文化研究所）
- Bu stonの示す茶毘儀礼——Mi 'khrugs pa'i cho ga la brten nas ro'i sbyin sreg gi cho gaを中心に——
..... 桜井 宗信（東北大学大学院文学研究科）
- ツォンカバの『中観莊嚴論覚書』における自立論証について 古角 武陸（佛教大学大学院）
- チャパ・チューキセンゲの教義書 西沢 史仁（東京大学大学院人文社会系研究科）
- チベット仏教後伝播期に於ける二諦説——rGya dmar ba Byang chub gragsが与えた影響——
..... 赤羽 律（オーストリア科学アカデミー アジア文化・思想史研究所）

大会当日の総会において、以下の事項が報告あるいは承認された。

- 会則の変更について：文言を精査し、改定した会則を学会報第59号に掲載する。
- 会長の交代について：会長を御牧克己氏より長野泰彦氏に交代する。
- 会報No. 59の編集について：査読委員の名前は公表しない。
- 第61回大会（2013年度）の開催校について：高野山大学で開催する。
- 2011年度学会会計報告：

収入	前年度よりの繰越金	2,876,685
	学会費	546,000
	学会報販売	3,000
	大会開催補助金返金	99,016
	利子	780
	合計	3,525,481
支出	会報58号印刷費	281,400
	会報58号発送費	24,180
	第59回大会ポスター印刷代	43,050
	第59回大会案内発送費	21,510
	第59回大会開催補助費	100,000
	アルバイト謝礼	55,000
	事務費	4,500
	郵送費	54,110
	合計	583,750

2012年度への繰越金 2,941,731

- * 総会の席で第3回若手チベット学研究者国際会議（The 3rd International Seminar of Young Tibetologists）の報告が、会議の組織委員の1人、岩尾一史氏（神戸市外国語大学）よりおこなわれた。

総会終了後、午後6 時より懇親会が行われた。

※ 大会開催について：大会参加費として参加者より1,000 円徴収する。開催校には学会より運営費として100,000 円を支給する。

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